Battle of Xuân Lộc
Battle of Xuân Lộc | |
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Part of the Đồng Nai Province, South Vietnam 10°55′24″N 107°14′21″E / 10.92333°N 107.23917°E | |
Result | North Vietnamese victory |
Lê Minh Đảo
At Xuân Lộc: at least 20,000
At Xuân Lộc: at least 12,000[3]: 229–30
5,000 dead and wounded[4]: 132
PAVN claim (only 4th Corps):
460 dead and 1,428 wounded[5]: 369
2,036 dead and wounded, 2,731 captured[5]: 392
The Battle of Xuân Lộc (
From the beginning of 1975, PAVN forces swept through the northern provinces of South Vietnam virtually unopposed. In the
The ARVN
Background
In the first half of 1975, the government of the Republic of Vietnam was in deep political turmoil, which reflected the military situation on the battlefield. At least two assassination attempts specifically targeting President Thiệu were foiled. On 23 January an ARVN officer tried to shoot Thiệu with his pistol but failed. The officer was subsequently tried by a military court.
On 2 April, the
During a meeting with the Chief of Staff of the United States Army, General Frederick C. Weyand on 3 April, Thiệu outlined his strategy to defend South Vietnam, vowing to hold what was left of his country. In his strategy, Thiệu decided that Xuân Lộc would be the center of his country's resistance, together with Tây Ninh and Phan Rang on either side.[7]: 59 Eventually, the meeting became more intense when Thiệu produced a letter written by former U.S. President Richard Nixon, which promised military retaliation against North Vietnam if they violated the terms of the Paris Peace Accords. The meeting then concluded with Thiệu accusing the United States Government of selling out his country the moment they signed the Paris Peace Accords.[3]: 208
In contrast to the situation faced by their opponents in Saigon, the North Vietnamese government were buoyed by the victories achieved by their armies since December 1974. By 8 April 1975, the PAVN had captured all of South Vietnam's I and II Corps, as well as
Order of battle
South Vietnam
On 8 April 1975, the ARVN 18th Division was the main unit defending Xuân Lộc, composed of three infantry regiments: the 43rd, 48th and 52nd. There were also five armored
North Vietnam
As the PAVN 4th Army Corps was the first PAVN formation to arrive at Xuân Lộc, the PAVN Central Military Committee decided that it would lead the assault. The 4th Army Corps fielded three divisions (6th, 7th and 341st Infantry Divisions). Those divisions had support from the 71st Anti-Aircraft Regiment, two combat engineering regiments (24th and 25th Engineering Regiments), the 26th Communications Regiment, two armored battalions, two artillery battalions, and two Long Khánh provincial infantry battalions.[2]: 112 On 3 April 1975, the 4th Army Corps Command came up with two options for attack; the first option would involve capturing all ARVN outposts in the surrounding areas and isolating the town center in the process; if the opportunity arose, the 4th Army Corps would launch a full frontal assault on the town center to capture all of Xuân Lộc. In the second option, if ARVN forces in Xuân Lộc did not have the strength to resist, the 4th Army Corps would strike directly at the town center using infantry units, with armored and artillery units in support.[5]: 381
Prelude
In March 1975, as the PAVN 3rd Army Corps attacked
The PAVN 4th Army Corps Command selected Dầu Tiếng–Chon Thanh as the first target for their operation, as it was the weakest point in the South Vietnamese defensive line in the north-west area. South Vietnam maintained four
On the afternoon of 11 March, ARVN General Lê Nguyên Khang ordered the 345th Armored Squadron to move out from Bau Don to relieve the military zone of Dầu Tiếng, but they were defeated by the PAVN 16th Infantry Regiment at Suoi Ong Hung, and forced to retreat to their base. At the same time, ARVN artillery units at Bau Don and Rung Nan were subdued by elements of the 9th Infantry Division, so they were unable to return fire.[2]: 102 By 13 March, the PAVN was in complete control of the Dầu Tiếng military zone. After three hours of fighting, the PAVN 9th Infantry Division also captured ARVN positions at Vuon Chuoi, Nga ba Sac, Cau Tau and Ben Cui. The ARVN 3rd Brigade had planned to retake Dầu Tiếng using elements of the 5th Division, but Thiệu ordered them to pull back and defend Truong Mit, Bau Don and Tây Ninh instead.[9]: 3–5
On 24 March, two regiments from the PAVN 9th Infantry Division, in coordination with two provincial infantry battalions from Bình Phước, attacked Chơn Thành with full force but were repeatedly driven back from the ARVN defensive lines. On 31 March, the PAVN 4th Army Corps sent the 273rd Regiment and one artillery battalion equipped with 15 artillery guns to bolster the 9th Infantry Division. Following the arrival of these reinforcements, the PAVN continued their assault on the military zone of Chơn Thành. South Vietnam responded by deploying the 3rd Armored Brigade to relieve Chơn Thành, but they were stopped by elements of the 9th Infantry Division along Route 13.[2]: 104–5 To avoid destruction, all surviving members from the ARVN 31st Ranger Battalion retreated to Bau Don in the east. On 2 April, the PAVN captured Chơn Thành; they claimed to have killed 2,134 ARVN soldiers, as well as capturing 472, and to have shot down 16 aircraft.[2]: 104–5 In addition, North Vietnam captured 30 military vehicles (including eight tanks) and about 1,000 guns (including five artillery pieces) of various kinds. With the province of Binh Long firmly in their hands, the PAVN then set their sights on Xuân Lộc.[2]: 104–5
Battle
The PAVN began their Long Khánh-Bình Tuy campaign with strong attacks against ARVN positions on the two principal lines of communication in the region, Highways 1 and 20, striking outposts, towns, bridges and culverts north and east of Xuân Lộc. On 17 March, the PAVN 209th Infantry Regiment and the 210th Artillery Regiment, 7th Division, opened what was to become the Battle of Xuân Lộc. The 209th struck first at Định Quán, north of Xuân Lộc, and at the La Nga bridge, west of Định Quán. Eight tanks supported the initial assault on Định Quán and PAVN artillery fire destroyed four 155 mm howitzers supporting the RF. Anticipating the attack, Đảo had reinforced the La Nga bridge the day before, but the intense fire forced a withdrawal from the bridge. After repeated assaults, the 209th Infantry penetrated Định Quán and the 2nd Battalion, 43rd Infantry, as well as the RF battalion were forced to withdraw with heavy losses on 18 March.[10]: 167
Also on 17 March, the 3rd Battalion, 43rd Regiment killed 10 PAVN in heavy fighting northwest of Hoai Duc. At the same time another outpost of Xuân Lộc District, Ong Don, defended by an RF company and an artillery platoon, came under artillery and infantry attack. The PAVN assault was repulsed with heavy losses on both sides, and another RF company, sent to reinforce, ran into strong resistance on Highway 1 west of Ong Don. North of Ong Don, Gia Ray on Route 333 was under attack by the PAVN 274th Infantry Regiment, 6th Division. The 18th Division headquarters therefore realized that two PAVN divisions, the 6th and the 7th, were committed in Long Khánh. While the battle raged at Gia Ray, another post on Highway 1 west of Ong Don came under attack. Meanwhile, a bridge and a culvert on Highway 1 on each side of the Route 332 junction were blown up by PAVN sappers. Thus, all ARVN forces east of Route 332 were isolated from Xuân Lộc by formidable obstacles and PAVN roadblocks. North from Xuân Lộc, on Route 20, hamlets along the road were occupied to varying degrees by PAVN soldiers, and the RF outpost far to the northeast near the Lam Dong boundary was overrun. Đảo decided to counterattack up Route 20 with his 52nd Regiment, minus one battalion but reinforced with the 5th Armored Cavalry Squadron from Tây Ninh Province. The regiment was ordered to clear the road as far as Định Quán, but the attack quickly stalled as it met heavy resistance well short of its objective.[10]: 167–9
Evidence of increasingly heavy PAVN commitments in Long Khánh flowed into III Corps headquarters in Bien Hoa. The PAVN 141st Regiment, 7th Infantry Division had apparently participated in the attack on Định Quán. Hoai Duc was overrun by the PAVN 812th Regiment, 6th Infantry Division, while that division's other two regiments, the 33rd and 274th, seized Gia Ray. The ARVN outpost on the conical peak of Chua Chan, standing 2,200 ft (670 m) above Xuân Lộc and providing excellent observation, also fell to PAVN 6th Infantry Division forces and Xuân Lộc itself began to receive artillery fire, including 105 mm fire. III Corps commander Lieutenant General Nguyễn Văn Toàn responded to the burgeoning threat on his eastern flank first by sending the 5th Armored Cavalry Squadron and then one battalion of the 48th Regiment from Tây Ninh to Long Khánh.[10]: 169 The rest of the 48th Regiment was still heavily engaged near Go Dau Ha. The 3rd Battalion made contact with a PAVN company west of the Vàm Cỏ Đông River on 17 March, killed 36, and captured a number of weapons.[10]: 169 On 26 March, Toàn sent the headquarters and two battalions of the 48th Regiment to reinforce Khiem Hanh.[10]: 169
After capturing all key objectives surrounding Xuân Lộc in Long Khánh Province, the PAVN 4th Army Corps spent four days preparing for the final push against the ARVN 18th Division. PAVN Major General Hoàng Cầm personally took control of the operation; he decided to launch a full-frontal assault on Xuân Lộc using his infantry, tank and artillery units from the north and northwest. Colonel Bui Cat Vu, deputy commander of the 4th Army Corps, would direct operations from the east.[11]: 168 While the PAVN were closing in on Xuân Lộc, Đảo and the chief of Long Khánh Province, Colonel Nguyen Van Phuc, were also busy lining up their units in anticipation of the PAVN onslaught. Prior to the battle, Đảo told foreign media that: "I am determined to hold Xuân Lộc. I don't care how many divisions the Communist will send against me, I will smash them all! The world shall see the strength and skill of the Army of the Republic of Vietnam".[3]: 228–9
On 1 April, Toàn returned the headquarters and two battalions of the 48th Regiment to the 18th Division. The regiment moved to the Xuân Lộc area but sent its 2nd Battalion to
After the first PAVN attempt to seize Xuân Lộc had been repulsed, the PAVN began a second assault on the town. At 05:40 on 9 April 1975, the PAVN 4th Army Corps began bombarding South Vietnamese positions around Xuân Lộc firing about 4,000 rounds, in one of the heaviest artillery bombardments of the war. North of the town, the PAVN 341st Infantry Division captured the ARVN communications center and the local police station after more than an hour of heavy fighting.[12] However, all PAVN units moving down from the north were forced to stop when elements of the ARVN 52nd Task Force counter-attacked from the south. From the east, the PAVN 7th Infantry Division advanced on ARVN positions without tank support, so they sustained heavy casualties in the initial stages of the fighting. At 08:00, the 4th Army Corps Command sent eight tanks to support the 7th Infantry Division, but three were destroyed by entrenched ARVN soldiers at Bao Chanh A.[12] By midday, the PAVN 209th and 270th Infantry Regiments captured the 18th Division headquarters and the Governor's Residence, which was defended by the ARVN 43rd and 48th Infantry Regiments, setting ablaze seven ARVN tanks in the process.[12] In the south, the PAVN 6th Infantry Division attacked ARVN positions on Highway 1 from Hung Nghia to Me Bong Con, where they destroyed 11 tanks from the ARVN 322nd Armored Brigade.[5]: 382 Throughout the day on 9 April, the 18th Division staged counter-attacks on the PAVN flanks to slow down their momentum, especially movements from the north and northwest.[11]: 172
The PAVN resumed the attack on 10 April, this time committing the 165th Regiment of the 7th Infantry Division along with regiments of the 6th and 341st Divisions; again the attack failed. West of Xuân Lộc, between
On 12 April, the battalions of the 52nd Regiment were still engaged in heavy fighting north of Xuân Lộc, but the town, although demolished, was still held by the 43rd Regiment.
On 13 April, Lieutenant General
On 15 April, the situation on the battlefield began to change as PAVN artillery stopped their shelling of Xuân Lộc, but started pounding Bien Hoa Air Base instead. In just one day, the RVNAF 3rd Air Force Division at Bien Hoa was forced to cease all operations due to continuous PAVN artillery bombardments. To continue their support of ground troops at Xuan Loc, the RVNAF mobilised the 4th Air Force Division based at
With Dau Giay and all the main roads under PAVN control, Xuân Lộc was completely isolated, the 18th Division was cut off from reinforcements and surrounded by the PAVN 4th Army Corps. On 19 April, the Joint General Staff ordered Đảo to evacuate the 18th Division and other support units from Xuân Lộc to a new defensive line formed east of Bien Hoa at the town of Trảng Bom which was defended by the remnants of the Division, the 468th Marine Brigade and the reconstituted 258th Marine Brigade.[8]: 465 [5]: 392–3 On 20 April, under the cover of heavy rain, South Vietnamese soldiers and civilians began pulling out from Xuân Lộc, in a convoy of about 200 military vehicles. On 21 April, Xuân Lộc was completely abandoned, with the ARVN 1st Airborne Brigade being the last unit to be evacuated from the area. At 04:00 on 21 April, the 3rd Battalion, 1st Airborne Brigade was completely destroyed by the PAVN at the hamlet of Suoi Ca. By the end of the day Xuân Lộc was under North Vietnamese control and the gateway to Saigon was open.[5]: 392 [13]: 181–2
Aftermath
Military outcome
Following their costly victory at Xuân Lộc, the PAVN effectively controlled two-thirds of South Vietnam's territory. The loss of Xuân Lộc dealt a severe blow to the military strength of South Vietnam, which had lost almost every unit from its general reserve. On 18 April 1975, III Corps commander Toàn, informed Thiệu that the South Vietnamese forces at Xuân Lộc had been beaten and South Vietnam's armed forces could only hold out for a few more days as a result of their losses on the battlefield.[6]: 99 According to North Vietnam's official account of the battle, about 2,036 South Vietnamese soldiers were either killed or wounded and another 2,731 were captured.[5]: 392 Total casualties on the North Vietnamese side are unknown, but the 4th Army Corps alone claimed to have suffered 460 killed in action, and another 1,428 wounded.[5]: 369 While Đảo claimed that the battle cost the PAVN over 50,000 killed and 370 tanks destroyed, American estimates only put PAVN casualties at around 10 percent of those figures with 5,000 troops killed or wounded and 37 tanks destroyed.[4]: 132
Political outcome
In the days following the loss of Xuân Lộc, there was still much debate in both houses of South Vietnam's National Assembly about the country's wartime policies. Pro-war elements in the National Assembly argued South Vietnam should fight until the very end, in the belief that the United States would eventually give the country the necessary aid to resist the North Vietnamese.[7]: 66 Anti-war elements, on the other hand, strongly opposed the idea. They believed the Government should negotiate with the North Vietnamese, in order to avoid a catastrophic defeat. Despite their differences of opinion, members in both houses of South Vietnam's National Assembly agreed that Thiệu should be held responsible for the country's dire military and political situation, because his policies had allowed the North Vietnamese to easily penetrate South Vietnam's military defences.[7]: 66
Finally at 20:00 on 21 April 1975, Thiệu officially resigned as the president of the Republic of Vietnam upon learning that Xuân Lộc had fallen that morning. In his final effort to save South Vietnam, Thiệu gambled his political career by sending the last units of the ARVN to Xuân Lộc in an attempt to hold off the PAVN.[7]: 66 Ultimately, however, Thiệu's effort came too late. Trần Văn Hương was appointed president, and he was ordered by the National Assembly to seek a negotiated peace with North Vietnam at any cost, to the disappointment of many in South Vietnam's political elite, who argued that the situation could have been different if Thiệu had gone earlier.[3]: 241–2
References
- ^ Halstead, Dick. "Welcome to the Paris of the Orient". White Christmas. Archived from the original on 20 February 2005. Retrieved 25 September 2010.
- ^ a b c d e f g h i j Ho, Son Dai (2004). History of the 4th Army Corp-Cuu Long Corps. People's Army Publishing House.
- ^ a b c d e f g h i j Duong, Hao (1980). A Tragic Chapter. People's Army Publishing House.
- ^ .
- ^ a b c d e f g h i j k Pham, Ngoc Thach; Ho, Khang (2008). History of the War of Resistance against America (8th edn). National Politics Publishing House.
- ^ a b Snepp, Frank (2001). A Disastrous Retreat. Ho Chi Minh City Publishing.
- ^ ISBN 9780133144765.
- ^ ISBN 9781594035722.
- ^ a b Dinh, Van Thien (2005). Battles on the Doorstep of Saigon. People's Army Publishing House.
- ^ .
- ^ a b Hoang, Cam (2001). The Journey of Ten Thousand Days. People's Army Publishing House.
- ^ a b c Tran, Xuan Ban (2006). History of the 7th Infantry Division. People's Army Publishing House. p. 146.
- ^ a b c Le, Dai Anh Kiet (2003). The Narratives of Saigon Generals. People's Police Publishing.
Further reading
- Nguyen Van Bieu. (2005). The Army at the Tây Nguyên Front- 3rd Army Corp. Hanoi: People's Army Publishing House
- Veith, George; Pribbenow, Merle (January 2004). ""Fighting Is an Art": The Army of the Republic of Vietnam's Defense of Xuan Loc, 9–21 April 1975". Journal of Military History. 68 (1): 163–213. S2CID 159658662.
- James H. Willbanks. (2004). Abandoning Vietnam: How America Left and South Vietnam Lost Its War. Lawrence KS: University of Kansas Press.