Battle of the Defile
Battle of the Defile | |||||||
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Part of the Muslim conquest of Transoxiana | |||||||
View of the Zarafshan Mountains from the Takhtakaracha Pass today | |||||||
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Belligerents | |||||||
Umayyad Caliphate |
Khaganate and Transoxianian allies | ||||||
Commanders and leaders | |||||||
| Suluk | ||||||
Strength | |||||||
over 40,000 | unknown | ||||||
Casualties and losses | |||||||
| 10,000 (Ibn A'tham) | ||||||
The Battle of the Defile or Battle of the Pass (
The battle, for which one of the most detailed accounts of the entire Umayyad era survives in the History of al-Tabari, halted or reversed Muslim expansion into Central Asia for a decade. The losses suffered by the Khurasani army also led to the transfer of reinforcements from the metropolitan regions of the Caliphate, which in the long term weakened the Umayyad regime and helped bring about its collapse twenty years later in the Abbasid Revolution that began in Khurasan.
Background
The region of
In the hope of reversing the situation, in early 730 Caliph
Battle
Junayd could not advance along the old
The two armies that met at the Takhtakaracha Pass represented two different military philosophies. The Umayyad armies fielded a sizeable cavalry contingent, both
Supported by troops from the rulers of Sogdia,
The next day, the Türgesh launched renewed attacks on the Arabs, but these were repelled. The Arabs engaged in vigorous
Junayd used the diversion to break through to Samarkand, but as his army exited the defile, his officers persuaded him to make camp and spend the night there instead of making for the city. The advice proved sound, as the Türgesh caught up with them and would likely have annihilated Junayd's army on open ground. As it was, the camp's fortifications could not be completed before the next day, when the Türgesh renewed their attack. At this point, the Arabs were so hard-pressed that Junayd promised the army's slaves their freedom if they would fight. Many did so, using saddle blankets as armour. The Türgesh attacks were repelled, and despite its heavy casualties the Umayyad army reached Samarkand after almost three days of battle.[33][34][35]
Aftermath
Junayd remained in Samarkand for about four months, until October 731, allowing his army to recover. The Türgesh meanwhile made for Bukhara, which they besieged. Junayd again resolved to meet them in battle and managed to inflict some defeats on the Türgesh in early November and raise the siege of Bukhara, which he entered on the day of
Although Samarkand was relieved and the Umayyad army escaped annihilation, the battle "was not wholly an Arab victory", according to the historian
To make up for the losses and shore up the depleted army of Khurasan, the Umayyads were forced to resort to mobilizing some 20,000
The events during and after the battle increased Khurasani disaffection with the Umayyad regime and its representatives, as exemplified by the words of the Azdi standard-bearer to Junayd. Al-Tabari also reports the words – albeit possibly a later addition – of another Khurasani to Junayd before the battle: "It used to be said that certain of the troops of Khurasan would perish at the hands of a luxury-loving man from the Qays. We now fear that you may be he". According to Blankinship, these passages, as well as poems disparaging Junayd's leadership, are an eloquent testimony to the Khurasanis' frustration at being "forced to fight continuous, unrewarding campaigns for the benefit of vainglorious generals on one of the caliphate's worst fronts, by a central government whose special Syrian army had not hitherto, in the Khurasanis' opinion, faced similar hardships".[33][47] Blankinship observes that:
[A]fter the Day of the Defile, many Khurasani tribal surnames never again appear as part of the army in Khurasan, leading one to suppose they had been annihilated or their men had given up fighting. Some Khurasani troops remain, of course, but their divisions are now paralleled by Syrian ones. Thus it appears, particularly from Tabari's emphasis, that the Day of the Defile was practically a turning point in the war with the Turks, at least as far as the Khurasanis were concerned.[39]
The subsequent period in Khurasan was turbulent, with revolts and anti-Umayyad agitation among the local Khurasani Arabs, necessitating the introduction of 20,000 Syrian troops into the province, in addition to the Iraqis sent in after the Battle of the Defile. Only in 739–741, after the Türgesh Khaganate collapsed following the murder of its leader Suluk, was the new governor of Khurasan, Nasr ibn Sayyar, able to largely restore the Caliphate's position in Transoxiana, and extend Muslim control again up to Samarkand.[48][49]
In the aftermath of the setbacks at the battles of the Defile, Marj Ardabil, and other similar disasters, the Umayyad government was forced to take urgent measures to reinforce the buckling frontiers of the empire. As the defeats also increased the bitterness and reluctance of the local frontier armies to campaign, the caliphs were left with little choice but send out detachments of the trusted Syrian army to the threatened fronts. This move proved doubly destabilizing for the Umayyad regime: the introduction of the Syrians in the frontier provinces further alienated the local troops, who saw their hitherto privileged position being threatened by the regime's favourites; while the parcelling out of the Syrian army to distant areas, and the losses it suffered, weakened the dynasty's main power base. This would be the major factor in the fall of the Umayyad Caliphate during the civil wars of the 740s and the subsequent Abbasid Revolution, which began in Khurasan.[50][51]
Notes
- Iraq in c. 665/6 and their descendants, who retained their tribal organization. As an exclusive warrior caste, they were jealous of their privileges, and for a long time limited the number of natives allowed to take up arms, apart from the forces provided by allied native rulers. In c. 715, according to al-Tabari, next to 47,000 Khurasani Arabs there were only about 7,000 native converts (mawali). Cases of the recruitment of 10,000–20,000 native levies are reported in the following decades, but it appears that these were not permanent additions to the army, but rather auxiliaries recruited for specific campaigns or emergencies.[15][16]
References
- ^ Blankinship 1994, pp. 19, 29–30.
- ^ Blankinship 1994, pp. 109–110.
- ^ Blankinship 1994, pp. 125–127.
- ^ Gibb 1923, pp. 61–67.
- ^ Blankinship 1994, pp. 127–128.
- ^ Gibb 1923, pp. 67–70.
- ^ Blankinship 1994, p. 155.
- ^ Gibb 1923, pp. 72–73.
- ^ Blankinship 1994, pp. 155–156.
- ^ Gibb 1923, p. 73.
- ^ Kennedy 2001, p. 43.
- ^ a b c d Kennedy 2001, p. 29.
- ^ Blankinship 1989, p. 72.
- ^ a b Kennedy 2007, p. 285.
- ^ Gibb 1923, pp. 40–41.
- ^ Kennedy 2001, pp. 43–46.
- ^ Blankinship 1994, pp. 156, 157.
- ^ Blankinship 1994, p. 156.
- ^ Blankinship 1994, p. 126.
- ^ Kennedy 2001, pp. 23–25.
- ^ Blankinship 1994, pp. 109, 126.
- ^ Kennedy 2007, pp. 234–235.
- ^ Kennedy 2007, p. 236.
- ^ Blankinship 1989, pp. 73–76.
- ^ Kennedy 2001, pp. 29–30.
- ^ Kennedy 2007, pp. 285–287.
- ^ a b Blankinship 1989, p. 76.
- ^ a b c Gibb 1923, p. 74.
- ^ Blankinship 1989, pp. 77–78.
- ^ a b Kennedy 2007, p. 287.
- ^ Kennedy 2001, pp. 25–26.
- ^ Blankinship 1989, pp. 78–79, 83.
- ^ a b c Kennedy 2001, p. 30.
- ^ Blankinship 1989, pp. 80–81.
- ^ Kennedy 2007, pp. 287–288.
- ^ Blankinship 1994, p. 160.
- ^ Gibb 1923, p. 75.
- ^ Shaban 1979, p. 113.
- ^ a b Blankinship 1989, p. xv.
- ^ a b Blankinship 1994, p. 157.
- ^ Blankinship 1994, pp. 157, 326 note 69.
- ^ Blankinship 1994, p. 327 note 86.
- ^ Blankinship 1994, pp. 161, 176.
- ^ Blankinship 1994, pp. 157, 161, 176, 326 note 69.
- ^ Blankinship 1994, pp. 58–59.
- ^ Kennedy 2001, p. 44.
- ^ Blankinship 1994, pp. 157–159.
- ^ Blankinship 1994, pp. 176–185.
- ^ Kennedy 2007, pp. 289–293.
- ^ Blankinship 1994, pp. 7–8, 157, 223ff., 230–236.
- ^ Kennedy 2001, pp. 47–51.
Sources
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- OCLC 499987512.
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- ISBN 978-0-306-81740-3.
- Shaban, M. A. (1979). The ʿAbbāsid Revolution. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. ISBN 0-521-29534-3.