Battle of the Great Plains
The Battle of the Great Plains | |||||||
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Part of the Second Punic War | |||||||
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Belligerents | |||||||
Rome | Carthage | ||||||
Commanders and leaders | |||||||
Strength | |||||||
c. 20,000 | c. 30,000 | ||||||
The battle of the Great Plains was fought in 203 BC in modern Tunisia between a Roman army commanded by Publius Cornelius Scipio, and allied Carthaginian and Numidian armies commanded by Hasdrubal Gisco and Syphax respectively. The battle was part of the Second Punic War and resulted in a heavy defeat for Carthage.
In the wake of its defeat in the
The Carthaginians reformed their army in an area known as the Great Plains, 120 kilometres (75 mi) from Utica. They were reinforced by 4,000 Iberian warriors to a total of about 30,000 men. Hearing of this, Scipio immediately marched most of his army to the scene. The size of his army is not known, but it was outnumbered by the Carthaginians. After several days of skirmishing, both armies committed to a pitched battle. Upon being charged by the Romans all of those Carthaginians who had been involved in the debacle at Utica turned and fled; morale had not recovered. Only the Iberians stood and fought. They were enveloped by the well-drilled Roman legions and wiped out.
Syphax and his Numidians were pursued, brought to battle at Cirta, and again defeated; Syphax was captured. The Roman ally Masinissa took over his kingdom. Scipio moved his main army to Tunis, within sight of the city of Carthage. Scipio and Carthage entered into peace negotiations, and Carthage recalled armies from Italy commanded by Hannibal and Mago Barca. The Roman Senate ratified a draft treaty, but because of mistrust and a surge in confidence when Hannibal arrived from Italy, Carthage repudiated it. The following year the Carthaginians raised another army, incorporating Hannibal and Mago's recalled veterans. This was also defeated by Scipio, at the battle of Zama. Carthage sued for peace and accepted a humiliating treaty, ending the war.
Background
First Punic War
The
From 236 BC
Second Punic War
In 218 BC Hannibal led a large Carthaginian army from Iberia through
There was also extensive fighting in
Opposing forces
Roman
Most male Roman citizens were liable for military service and would serve as
It was the long-standing Roman procedure to elect two men each year as senior magistrates, known as consuls, who in time of war would each lead an army. An army was usually formed by combining a Roman legion with a similarly sized and equipped legion provided by their Latin allies; allied legions usually had a larger attached complement of cavalry than Roman ones.[32][33] By this stage of the war, Roman armies were generally larger, typically consisting of four legions, two Roman and two provided by its allies, for a total of approximately 20,000 men. The Roman army which invaded Africa consisted of four legions, each of the Roman pair reinforced to an unprecedented 6,200 infantry and with a more usual 300 cavalry each. Modern historians estimate the army to have totalled 25,000–30,000 men, including perhaps 2,500 cavalry.[34][35][36]
Carthaginian
Carthaginian citizens only served in their army if there was a direct threat to the city of
Battles
Pitched battles were usually preceded by the two armies camping 2–12 kilometres (1–7 mi) apart for days or weeks; sometimes forming up in battle order each day. If either commander felt at a disadvantage, they might march off without engaging. In such circumstances it was difficult to force a battle if either of the commanders was unwilling to fight.[47][48] Forming up in battle order was a complicated and premeditated affair, which took several hours. Infantry were usually positioned in the centre of the battle line, with light infantry skirmishers to their front and cavalry on each flank.[49]
Prelude
In 206 BC Scipio left Iberia and returned to Italy.[50] He was denied the triumph he would normally have expected on the grounds that he had not occupied any of the magistracies of the cursus honorum, the sequential mixture of military and political administrative positions held by aspiring Roman politicians.[51] Aged 31 he was elected to the senior position of consul in early 205 BC, despite not meeting the minimum age for the position of 42.[52] Scipio was already anticipating an invasion of North Africa and while still in Spain had been negotiating with the Numidian leaders Masinissa and Syphax. He failed to win over the latter, but made an ally of the former.[53]
Opinion was divided in Roman political circles as to whether an invasion of North Africa was excessively risky. Hannibal was still on Italian soil; there was the possibility of further Carthaginian invasions,[54] shortly to be realised when Mago Barca landed in Liguria;[55] the practical difficulties of an amphibious invasion and its logistical follow up were considerable; and when the Romans had invaded North Africa in 256 BC during the First Punic War they had been driven out with heavy losses, which had re-energised the Carthaginians.[56] Eventually a compromise was agreed: Scipio was given Sicily as his consular province,[57] which was the best location for the Romans to launch an invasion of the Carthaginian homeland from and then logistically support it, and permission to cross to Africa on his own judgement.[54] But Roman commitment was less than wholehearted: Scipio was not allowed to conscript troops for his consular army, as was usual, but could only call for volunteers.[58][55]
In 216 BC the survivors of the Roman defeat at Cannae had been formed into two legions and sent to Sicily.[59] They still formed the main part of the garrison of Sicily and Scipio used the many men who volunteered to increase the strength of each of these to an unprecedented 6,500.[29] The total number of men available to Scipio and how many of them travelled to Africa is unclear; the Roman historian Livy, writing 200 years later, gives totals for the invasion force of either 12,200, 17,600 or 35,000. Modern historians estimate a combat strength of 25,000–30,000, of whom more than 90 per cent were infantry.[29][35] With up to half of the complement of his legions being fresh volunteers, and with no fighting having taken place on Sicily for the past five years, Scipio instigated a rigorous training regime. This extended from drill by individual centuries – the basic Roman army manoeuvre unit of 80 men – to exercises by the full army. This lasted for approximately a year. At the same time Scipio assembled a vast quantity of food and materiel, merchant ships to transport it and his troops, and warships to escort the transports.[60]
Also during 205 BC 30 Roman ships under Scipio's second-in-command, the legate Gaius Laelius, raided North Africa around Hippo Regius, gathering large quantities of loot and many captives.[61][35] The Carthaginians initially believed this was the anticipated invasion by Scipio and his full invasion force; they hastily strengthened fortifications and raised troops – including some units made up of Carthaginian citizens. Reinforcements were sent to Mago in an attempt to distract the Romans in Italy.[62] Meanwhile a succession war had broken out in Numidia between the Roman-supporting Masinissa and the Carthaginian-inclined Syphax. Laelius re-established contact with Masinissa during his raid. Masinissa expressed dismay regarding how long it was taking the Romans to complete their preparations and land in Africa.[63]
Invasion
In 204 BC, probably in June or July, the Roman army left Sicily in 400 transport ships, escorted by 40 galleys.[64] Three days later[65] they disembarked at Cape Farina 20 kilometres (12 mi) north of the large Carthaginian port of Utica.[64] The locals fled and Carthage's immediate response, a scouting party of 500 cavalry, was defeated with the loss of its commander and the general in overall charge of responding to the invasion. The area was pillaged and 8,000 captives were sent back to Sicily as slaves or hostages. Masinissa joined the Romans with either 200 or 2,000 men, the sources differ. A large fortified camp was established on a rocky peninsula near Ghar el-Melh[66][67] which was known as Castra Cornelia. Masinissa had been recently defeated by his Numidian rival Syphax, wounded and had his army scattered. Syphax had been persuaded to take firm action in support of Carthage by the Carthaginian general Hasdrubal Gisco and by his assertive new wife: Hasdrubal's daughter Sophonisba.[68]
Carthage sent a larger party to probe the Roman position, about 4,000 soldiers under a general called Hanno. His command of mixed Numidians and Carthaginian citizens based itself at Salaeca, 24 kilometres (15 mi) from the Romans, and did little scouting. Following a stratagem agreed with Scipio, Masinissa's cavalry raided Hanno's force who chased them off and then pursued them into a Roman ambush. Hanno died in a sharp conflict during which 1,000 of his men were killed or taken prisoner. The survivors were in turn pursued for 50 kilometres (30 mi), only 1,000 escaped. The Romans pillaged an ever-wider area, sending their loot and prisoners to Sicily in the ships bringing their supplies.[69]
Wanting a more permanent base and a port more resilient to the bad weather to be expected when winter came, Scipio
Scipio sent
Battle of Utica
As the weather improved Scipio made conspicuous preparations to assault Utica.[78] Instead, he marched his army out late one evening and divided it in two.[79][80] One part launched a night attack on the Numidian camp, setting fire to their reed barracks. In the ensuing panic and confusion the Numidians were dispersed with heavy casualties.[81] Not realising what was happening, many Carthaginians set off in the dark to help extinguish what they assumed was an accidental blaze in their allies' camp. Scipio attacked them with the remaining Romans, stormed their camp and set fire to many of the Carthaginians' wooden huts. Again the Romans inflicted heavy casualties in the dark.[82][81]
Hasdrubal fled 40 kilometres (25 mi) to Carthage with 2,500 survivors, pursued by Scipio. Syphax escaped with a few cavalry and regrouped 11 kilometres (7 mi) away.[80][83] With no Carthaginian field army to threaten them, the Romans pressed their siege of Utica and pillaged an extensive area of North Africa with strong and far-ranging raids. As well as gold and slaves the Romans accumulated large amounts of foodstuffs. This was added to the extensive stocks already built up by shipping grain from Sicily.[84]
Battle
When word of the defeat reached Carthage there was panic, and some senators wanted to renew the peace negotiations. The Carthaginian Senate also heard demands for Hannibal's army to be recalled. A decision was reached to fight on with locally available resources.
When he heard that the Carthaginians were reassembling their army, Scipio left a force to continue the siege of Utica and led the rest on a rapid march to the Great Plains. His army did not take a baggage train, which suggests that Scipio was intent on bringing the Carthaginians to battle as soon as possible. It is not known how large this army was, but it was smaller than the Carthaginian; the modern historian Brian Carey suggests that it was about 20,000 strong.[83] The Romans established a fortified camp approximately 6 kilometres (4 mi) from that of the Carthaginians. For three days there were skirmishes between the lighter troops of both sides, but their main forces stayed in camp. On the fourth day, nine days after Scipio had left Utica, both commanders formed up their full armies and they advanced towards each other.[84]
Both armies deployed in the usual formation. Hasdrubal placed his newly arrived Iberian infantry in the centre of his line, with the Carthaginian infantry who had survived the battle at Utica on their right, and to their right his Carthaginian cavalry. To the left of the Iberians were Syphax's Numidian infantry and to their left Numidian cavalry.[84] The two Roman legions took position in the centre of their line, deployed in their customary three lines. An allied legion deployed in similar fashion on each side of the Romans.[83] On the Roman right flank were the cavalry attached to the four legions with Laelius in command; the Numidian cavalry under Masinissa were on the left flank.[84][87]
The two armies approached each other and the battle opened when the cavalry on each flank charged. Then either both units of Carthaginian cavalry broke on contact and were routed, or possibly turned and fled without attempting to counter-charge their attackers. The two legions of Latin allies charged the opponents facing them and again the Carthaginian and Numidian infantry put up little or no resistance before turning and fleeing.[88][84] It is possible that these troops started to flee as soon as their flanking cavalry did, well before the Latin allies contacted them.[89] Many of the men of these units had been involved in the recent debacle of the burning camps at Utica and the memory of having been beaten by the same Roman army reduced their morale to the point that they had no stomach for the fight. The Roman cavalry and the two Latin legions pursued their opponents off the battlefield.[84]
The Iberians however charged home against the hastati in the front rank of the two Roman legions and fought fiercely. Once he saw that his hastati were holding their own Scipio did not follow normal practice, which would have been to feed in men from the second rank of principes to replace casualties and relieve tired fighters. Instead he had the principes and triari of each legion form a column, march parallel to the line of battle and then round to attack the Iberians in the flank and rear.[90] Thus enveloped, the Iberians fought to the death and were wiped out. A large proportion of the rest of the Carthaginian army succeeded in escaping.[46][90] Most of these deserted rather than rallying to either Hasdrubal or Syphax.[91]
The historian Nigel Bagnall considers it a "foolish decision" by Hasdrubal to fight a battle with an army consisting entirely of men who were either demoralised or new recruits and whose state of training was "deplorably low". He describes the Roman army as "battle-hardened" and as having high morale. He suggests that Scipio's rapid march from Utica forced the Carthaginians into a battle before they were ready.[92]
Aftermath
Hasdrubal fled to Carthage, where he was demoted and exiled.[93] Syphax and his Numidians were pursued, brought to battle outside his capital, Cirta, and again defeated, Syphax being captured.[93] Cirta surrendered to Masinissa, who took over Syphax's kingdom.[note 6][94] Scipio moved his main army to Tunis, within sight of the city of Carthage.[95] Scipio and Carthage entered into peace negotiations, while Carthage recalled both Hannibal and Mago from Italy.[96] The Roman Senate ratified a draft treaty, but because of mistrust and a surge in confidence when Hannibal arrived from Italy, Carthage repudiated it.[97]
Hannibal was placed in command of another army, formed of his and Mago's veterans from Italy and newly raised troops from Africa, with 80 war elephants but few cavalry.[98] The decisive battle of Zama followed in October 202 BC.[99] After a prolonged fight the Carthaginian army collapsed; Hannibal was one of the few to escape the field.[99][100]
The peace treaty the Romans subsequently imposed on the Carthaginians stripped them of all their overseas territories and some of their African ones. An indemnity of 10,000 silver talents[note 7] was to be paid over 50 years. Hostages were taken. Carthage was forbidden to possess war elephants and its fleet was restricted to 10 warships. It was prohibited from waging war outside Africa, and in Africa only with Rome's express permission. Many senior Carthaginians wanted to reject it, but Hannibal spoke strongly in its favour and it was accepted in spring 201 BC. Henceforth it was clear Carthage was politically subordinate to Rome.[101] Scipio was awarded a triumph and received the agnomen "Africanus".[102]
Notes, citations and sources
Notes
- ^ Several different "talents" are known from antiquity. The ones referred to in this article are all Euboic (or Euboeic) talents, of approximately 26 kilograms (57 lb).[6][7] 3,200 talents was approximately 82,000 kg (81 long tons).[6]
- ^ 1,200 talents was approximately 30,000 kg (30 long tons) of silver.[6]
- ^ Publius Scipio was the bereaved son of the previous Roman co-commander in Iberia, also named Publius Scipio, and the nephew of the other co-commander, Gnaeus Scipio.[24]
- ^ Roman and Greek sources refer to these foreign fighters derogatively as "mercenaries", but the modern historian Adrian Goldsworthy describes this as "a gross oversimplification". They served under several arrangements: some were the regular troops of allied cities or kingdoms seconded to Carthage as part of formal treaties; some were from allied states fighting under their own leaders; many were volunteers from areas under Carthaginian control who were not Carthaginian citizens. (Citizenship was largely reserved for inhabitants of the city of Carthage.)[39]
- ^ "Shock" troops are those trained and used to close rapidly with an opponent, with the intention of breaking them before, or immediately upon, contact.[40]
- ^ Masinissa also married Syphax's wife, Sophonisba, Hasdrubal's daughter.[94]
- ^ 10,000 talents was approximately 269,000 kilograms (265 long tons) of silver.[6]
Citations
- ^ Coarelli 2002, pp. 73–74.
- ^ Etcheto 2012, pp. 274–278.
- ^ a b Goldsworthy 2006, p. 82.
- ^ Lazenby 1996, p. 157.
- ^ Bagnall 1999, p. 97.
- ^ a b c d Lazenby 1996, p. 158.
- ^ Scullard 2006, p. 565.
- ^ Miles 2011, p. 196.
- ^ Scullard 2006, p. 569.
- ^ Miles 2011, pp. 209, 212–213.
- ^ Hoyos 2015, p. 211.
- ^ Miles 2011, p. 213.
- ^ Lazenby 1996, p. 175.
- ^ Miles 2011, p. 220.
- ^ Goldsworthy 2006, pp. 143–144.
- ^ Goldsworthy 2006, p. 144.
- ^ Collins 1998, p. 13.
- ^ Goldsworthy 2006, pp. 144–145.
- ^ Goldsworthy 2006, p. 145.
- ^ a b Ñaco del Hoyo 2015, p. 377.
- ^ Bagnall 1999, pp. 192–194.
- ^ Carey 2007, p. 2.
- ^ a b Edwell 2015, p. 322.
- ^ Miles 2011, pp. 268, 298–299.
- ^ a b Edwell 2015, p. 323.
- ^ Zimmermann 2015, p. 292.
- ^ Goldsworthy 2006, pp. 277–285.
- ^ Bagnall 1999, p. 23.
- ^ a b c Goldsworthy 2006, p. 287.
- ^ Goldsworthy 2006, p. 48.
- ^ Goldsworthy 2006, p. 53.
- ^ Bagnall 1999, pp. 22–25.
- ^ Goldsworthy 2006, p. 50.
- ^ Goldsworthy 2006, pp. 50, 227, 287.
- ^ a b c Carey 2007, p. 100.
- ^ Miles 2011, p. 309.
- ^ Lazenby 1998, p. 9.
- ^ Scullard 2006, p. 494.
- ^ Goldsworthy 2006, p. 33.
- ^ Jones 1987, p. 1.
- ^ a b Goldsworthy 2006, pp. 32–34.
- ^ Koon 2015, pp. 79–87.
- ^ Koon 2015, p. 93.
- ^ Rawlings 2015, p. 305.
- ^ Bagnall 1999, pp. 8–9.
- ^ a b Rawlings 1996, p. 90.
- ^ Goldsworthy 2006, p. 56.
- ^ Sabin 1996, p. 64.
- ^ Goldsworthy 2006, p. 57.
- ^ Goldsworthy 2006, p. 285.
- ^ Bagnall 1999, p. 268.
- ^ Carey 2007, p. 99.
- ^ Goldsworthy 2006, pp. 285–286.
- ^ a b Goldsworthy 2006, p. 286.
- ^ a b Miles 2011, p. 306.
- ^ Goldsworthy 2006, pp. 286–287.
- ^ Lazenby 1998, p. 194.
- ^ Lazenby 1998, p. 195.
- ^ Goldsworthy 2006, p. 218.
- ^ Goldsworthy 2006, pp. 287–288.
- ^ Goldsworthy 2006, p. 288.
- ^ Lazenby 1998, pp. 194–195.
- ^ Lazenby 1998, pp. 198–199.
- ^ a b Carey 2007, p. 103.
- ^ a b Goldsworthy 2006, p. 291.
- ^ Bagnall 1999, p. 275.
- ^ a b Briscoe 2006, p. 63.
- ^ Goldsworthy 2006, pp. 290–292.
- ^ Goldsworthy 2006, p. 292.
- ^ Lazenby 1998, p. 206.
- ^ a b c Goldsworthy 2006, pp. 292–293.
- ^ Lazenby 1996, p. 207.
- ^ Hoyos 2015b, p. 203.
- ^ a b Goldsworthy 2006, p. 294.
- ^ a b c Bagnall 1999, p. 277.
- ^ Hoyos 2015b, p. 204.
- ^ Bagnall 1999, p. 278.
- ^ Bagnall 1999, pp. 278–279.
- ^ Goldsworthy 2006, p. 293.
- ^ a b c Lazenby 1998, p. 208.
- ^ a b Carey 2007, pp. 105–106.
- ^ Goldsworthy 2006, pp. 293–294.
- ^ a b c Carey 2007, p. 106.
- ^ a b c d e f g Goldsworthy 2006, p. 295.
- ^ a b Hoyos 2003, p. 162.
- ^ Goldsworthy 2006, pp. 294–295.
- ^ Carey 2007, pp. 106–107.
- ^ Edwell 2015, p. 333.
- ^ Carey 2007, p. 108.
- ^ a b Goldsworthy 2006, pp. 295–296.
- ^ Bagnall 1999, p. 281.
- ^ Bagnall 1999, pp. 280–281.
- ^ a b Hoyos 2015b, p. 205.
- ^ a b Lazenby 1998, p. 212.
- ^ Bagnall 1999, pp. 282, 284.
- ^ Carey 2007, p. 111.
- ^ Bagnall 1999, pp. 287–291.
- ^ Goldsworthy 2006, p. 302.
- ^ a b Miles 2011, p. 315.
- ^ Carey 2007, p. 118.
- ^ Carey 2007, p. 132.
- ^ Miles 2011, p. 318.
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