Battle of the Kerch Peninsula
Battle of the Kerch Peninsula | |||||||
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Part of the Crimean campaign during the Eastern Front of World War II | |||||||
German bombs fall on the Kerch Peninsula, May 1942 45.260752231734244, 35.46772926230884 | |||||||
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Belligerents | |||||||
Germany Romania | Soviet Union | ||||||
Commanders and leaders | |||||||
W. F. von Richthofen | |||||||
Units involved | |||||||
11th Army 8th Air Corps |
Caucasus Front[a] Air Force of the Crimean Front Black Sea Fleet | ||||||
Strength | |||||||
8 May 1942: 232,549 men (2 May)[1] 200 tanks[2] 57 assault guns[3] 800+ aircraft[4] 95,000 men (2 May)[1] |
8 May 1942: 249,800 men[5] 238 tanks[6] 404 aircraft (Air Force of the Crimean Front)[4] | ||||||
Casualties and losses | |||||||
38,362 Breakdown
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570,601 Breakdown
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The Battle of the Kerch Peninsula, which commenced with the Soviet Kerch-Feodosia Landing Operation (
On 8 May 1942, the Axis struck with great force in a major
Manstein's outnumbered 11th Army suffered 7,588 casualties, while the Crimean Front lost 176,566 men, 258 tanks, 1,133 artillery pieces and 315 aircraft in three armies comprising twenty-one divisions.[16] Total Soviet casualties during the five-month-long battle amounted to 570,000 men, while Axis losses were 38,000. Trappenjagd was one of the battles immediately preceding the German summer offensive (Case Blue). Its successful conclusion allowed the Axis to concentrate their forces on Sevastopol, which was conquered within six weeks. The Kerch Peninsula was used as a launching pad by German forces to cross the Kerch Strait on 2 September 1942 during Operation Blücher II, a part of the German drive to capture the Caucasus oilfields.
Prelude
On 8 December 1941,
Tolbukhin's plan was too complicated for the
A German
On the evening of 25 December 1941, the Soviet 224th Rifle Division and 83rd Naval Infantry Brigade were packed into small craft on the Taman Peninsula and began to pass the Kerch Strait.[22]
Battle
Kerch landing, 26 December – 28 December
Group 2 disembarked at Cape Khroni to the northeast of Kerch.
At
The 302nd Mountain Rifle Division landed at
Lieutenant General Kurt Himer was aware of the Soviet landings by 0610 hours but was uncertain where the Soviet point of main effort was due to the disunited nature of the Soviet forces. He ordered Colonel Friedrich Schmidt's 72nd Infantry Regiment to wipe out the Soviet force at Cape Khroni but lacked the troops to deal with the Bulganak Bay and Cape Zyuk formations. Himer improvised by ordering a headquarters company, 3rd Battalion/97th Infantry Regiment and an artillery battery of 10.5 cm howitzers to tackle the Cape Zyuk landing. By midnight, infantry regiment (IR) 97 had its 1st and 3rd Battalions and two artillery batteries in position for a counterattack the next day.[25] At 1350 hours on 26 December, IR 72 reported that a captured Soviet officer from Cape Khroni had revealed the extent of the Soviet plan – to land 25,000 troops at Kerch. Himer acted decisively and decided to bring up 2nd Battalion/IR 97 from Feodosia as well to crush the Cape Zyuk force with IR 97's full strength. IR 42 would contain the Kamysh Burun landings until the northern Soviet forces were destroyed. A mixed alarm unit consisting of infantry, artillery and combat engineers would deal with the Bulganak Bay landing. Army Corps commander Lieutenant General Sponeck requested permission to use the Romanian 8th Cavalry Brigade to reinforce Himer.[26]
The counterattack against Zyuk was launched only at 1300 hours on 27 December due to the muddy roads. The beachhead was flat and devoid of flora, offering no cover for either side. The Soviet 2nd Battalion/83rd Naval Infantry Brigade spotted the German deployment and launched an immediate attack with three T-26 tanks and several infantry companies. A 3.7 cm Pak 36 anti-tank gun fired 42 rounds and knocked out all three Soviet tanks. Several German bombers showed up to support the German infantry and helped drive the Soviet naval infantry back to its beachhead but the Germans delayed their main attack until the next day.[27] At dawn, the two deployed infantry battalions of IR 97 attacked the Soviet position, supported by two 10.5 cm howitzers. A combat engineer company blocked the Soviet escape route to the east. The Soviet defensive position was hopelessly exposed. Six He 111 bombers and a few Stukas bombed the Soviet troops. The Soviet defenses were smashed and by 1200 hours the Germans reached the beach. A number of Soviet troops fought on while waist-deep in the water. Their resistance fell apart by evening; 458 were captured and approximately 300 were killed. Infantry Regiment 97 lost only 40 men killed or wounded in two days of destroying the Soviet beachhead at Cape Zyuk.[27] The Soviet beachhead at Cape Khroni was also wiped out by IR 72 on 28 December, with only 12 men swimming to safety. Himer's division took 1,700 prisoners and only the 1,000-strong Soviet force at Bulganak Bay remained, along with the Kamysh Burun beachhead as well as isolated pockets of Soviet resistance inland.[27]
Feodosia landing, 29 December – 2 January
The 44th Army began loading up men and equipment at 1300 hours on 28 December into an invasion fleet at
At 0500 hours, the cruiser Krasnyi Kavkaz began unloading 1,853 soldiers from the 633rd Rifle Regiment of the 157th Rifle Division at the mole. The Germans concentrated all of their fire on the cruiser, hitting it 17 times and setting its No. 2 gun turret on fire. Krasnyi Kavkaz responded with its 180 mm batteries, landed its troops in three hours and then departed the harbor. The Luftwaffe arrived above the battlefield and sank a minesweeper and a patrol boat in the morning, but missed its chance to stop the main force from landing. By 0730, the Soviets were in full control of the port and began landing artillery and vehicles. The Soviets fought their way through the town and by 1000 hours the Germans fled after a brief fight. In a quickly executed operation, the Soviets landed 4,500 troops in the morning and parts of three divisions were ashore by the end of the day.[30] Sponeck immediately ordered the Romanian 8th Cavalry Brigade and 4th Mountain Brigade to turn around and form defensive positions around the Soviet bridgehead at Feodosia. He requested permission from 11th Army commander General der Infanterie Erich von Manstein to withdraw the 46th Infantry Division from Kerch to avoid its encirclement but Manstein refused, ordering Sponeck to throw the enemy back into the sea with the help of reinforcements in the form of Gruppe Hitzfeld from the 73rd Infantry Division and the entire 170th Infantry Division, which would crush the Soviet landing force at Feodosia.[28][31] Sponeck then disobeyed orders, cut off contact with 11th Army headquarters and at 0830 hours on 29 December, ordered the 46th Infantry Division to retreat west from Kerch to avoid encirclement. Sponeck's order was highly controversial. There were insufficient German forces at Feodosia to stop further Soviet advances, but there were 20,000 Romanian troops in the vicinity and strong German reinforcements on the way. Two Romanian brigades launched a counterattack on 30 December, but were defeated in large part due to their insufficient air and artillery support.[31]
The 46th Infantry Division retreated 120 kilometers through a snowstorm in two days from 30–31 December. A number of vehicles were abandoned due to a lack of fuel. Moving from Feodosia, the Soviet 63rd Mountain Infantry Division established a
By 1 January XXXXII Army Corps had a defensive line 20 kilometers west of Feodosia. Gruppe Hitzfeld, led by
The Soviet landings prevented the fall of Sevastopol and seized the initiative.[35] They did not succeed in their main objective of relieving Sevastopol.[36] Casualties were high. The Soviet forces involved in the Kerch-Feodosia landing operation from 26 December 1941 through 2 January 1942 lost 41,935 men, including 32,453 killed or captured and 9,482 wounded or sick.[12]
During the offensive, Soviet photojournalist
German counterattack, 15 January – 20 January
The 51st Army moved with extreme slowness from Kerch, reaching the Parpach Narrows on 5 January but deploying only two rifle divisions in its forward elements on 12 January. It conducted no offensive action against the 46th Infantry Division aside from minor
On 16 January, Kozlov landed the 226th Rifle Regiment behind German lines at
The Soviet 236th Rifle Division's forward security zone was 20 kilometers west of Feodosia and the main line of resistance ran atop a major ridge 15 kilometers from the town. At daybreak on 15 January, He 111 medium bombers and Stuka dive bombers began attacking the Soviet positions on the ridge and were preceded by a quick artillery preparation. German bombers located the 44th Army headquarters, destroyed it and severely wounded its commander, throwing the Soviet leadership into chaos. Otto Hitzfeld's IR 213 attacked, supported by two battalions from the 46th Infantry Division (ID) and three StuG IIIs. The Germans achieved complete surprise and swiftly overran the Soviet positions. The StuGs knocked out two T-26 tanks but lost one of their own to a Soviet 76.2 mm anti-tank gun. The ridge-line west of Feodosia was in German hands by afternoon, along with a dominant position over the 44th Army. In the north, 46 ID and the Romanian 8th Cavalry Brigade launched distraction attacks against 51st Army and succeeded in drawing the majority of the Soviet reserves into an irrelevant sector. Fretter-Pico's XXX Corps lost 500 men killed, wounded and missing in its 15 January attack against the 236th Rifle Division. In exchange, five German infantry battalions backed up by powerful air support and several assault guns crushed a Soviet division and established an ascendancy over the 44th Army.[39]
The German counteroffensive continued on 16 January. Fretter-Pico reinforced Hitzfeld with more battalions as the Soviet 63rd Mountain and 236th Rifle Divisions lost ground and were pushed into narrow, isolated sectors close to the sea. In the afternoon, the 132nd Infantry Division began deploying for an attack into Feodosia. The Luftwaffe bombed the Red Army at Feodosia with impunity. The Soviets mistakenly located the German main point of effort at
XXX Corps' attack intensified on 19 January as the remaining two divisions of the 44th Army were pursued along the Black Sea coast, unraveling the Soviet forward positions to the north. On 20 January, the XXXXII and XXX Corps reached the Parpach Narrows, greatly shortening the front-line. Kozlov was thrown into a panic and predicted the Soviet landing force's complete destruction. The Soviets paid the price for their slow westward deployment from Kerch, as they lacked the reserves to throw back this new and potent German threat. Soviet generals complained about the impassable roads, although this did not stop the German 46th Infantry Division from executing a fast march over the same terrain in late December. Both sides began to construct defensive positions reinforced by
Battle of the Parpach Narrows, 27 February – 11 April
Stavka reinforced the Caucasus Front Front with nine rifle divisions. Soviet engineers built an ice road across the frozen Kerch Strait, enabling 96,618 men, 23,903 horses and 6,519 motor vehicles to reinforce the Kerch peninsula forces. The
First Offensive, 27 February – 3 March
The 51st Army planned to attack in the north on 27 February across a flat, 80-square kilometer plain dotted only by a handful of small villages. The Germans fortified the villages of
51st Army's offensive kicked off at 0630 hours on 27 February with a 230-gun artillery preparation of which most were light 76 mm guns and only 30 were heavy 122 mm guns.
The German strongpoint at Tulumchak was overrun by T-26 tanks and infantry, although seven tanks were lost to German
The German strongpoint at Koi-Asan, held by IR 42 and 72 in the junction between XXXXII and XXX Corps was the pivot of Manstein's defense and its control allowed the Germans to feed reserves into the north with little difficulty.[57] Kozlov directed two rifle divisions, three tank brigades and a tank battalion to take the village on 2 March.[57] German obstacles slowed down the Soviet tanks, turning them into easy targets for German anti-tank units and artillery.[57] The Luftwaffe made its presence felt with 40 Stuka sorties on the overcrowded Soviet tank masses.[57] The Soviets admitted to losing 93 tanks in one day.[57] Their gains were comparatively minor: four Czech-made German howitzers were destroyed and the Soviet Air Forces bombed and destroyed a 23-ton ammunition dump at Vladislavovka.[58] The Soviets called off their attack on 3 March.[58] Kozlov's big push failed and from 27 February he suffered extremely heavy losses of infantry and tanks, including 28 KV-1s.[58] He had gained an exposed salient, which he could hold only with light forces due to its lack of cover.[58]
Second Offensive, 13 March – 15 March
Kozlov blamed the weather for his failure, while Mekhlis decided the fault lay with Tolbukhin's inept planning and had him fired.[58][59] Stalin ordered the second offensive to proceed in ten days.[58] The Soviet planning staffs saw Koi-Asan as the priority target and decided to mass 51st Army's striking power against it.[58] The 44th Army would launch a significant feint attack on the 132nd Infantry Division along the coast.[58] Kozlov had 224 tanks, but on Mekhlis' recommendation he decided to share them between the rifle divisions instead of massing them in a strike force.[58] Stalin reinforced the Air Force of the Crimean Front to 581 aircraft by early March, though they were largely obsolete models.[58] The Germans laid down 2,000 Teller mines near the Koi-Asan position and Manstein concentrated assault guns for its defense.[58]
The Soviets attacked at 0900 hours on 13 March with three rifle divisions that were quickly cut to pieces in the boggy terrain. The supporting Red Army tanks were easily destroyed by StuG IIIs and anti-tank guns. Lieutenant Johann Spielmann's StuG III destroyed 14 T-34s in one day while Fritz Schrödel's StuG III destroyed eight Soviet tanks, of which two were KV-1s. Soviet tank losses were large, with 157 tanks destroyed in three days. The 56th Tank Brigade lost 88 tanks.[60] The Soviet attempt to capture Koi-Asan failed yet again but the fighting had been bitter.[61] The German 46th Infantry Division repulsed at least 10 Soviet attacks during the three-day offensive.[61] On 24 March, strongpoint Korpech’ fell to the 51st Army after the Soviet infantry suffered heavy losses. The Crimean Front had fired off most of its artillery ammunition and could not proceed further despite its limited success. II./JG 77, a German fighter wing, arrived in Crimea after refitting and began to weaken Soviet air superiority. The 60-ton ammunition dump at Vladislavovka was again blown up by Soviet bombers.[60]
German counterattack, 20 March
The
Third Offensive, 26 March
Kozlov's third drive on Koi-Asan began after a week of replacements, restocking and reinforcements; it was a smaller operation conducted by the 390th Rifle Division and 143rd Rifle Brigade of the 51st Army, supported by two T-26 companies, six KVs, and three T-34s from the 39th and 40th Tank Brigades and the 229th Separate Tank Battalion. It failed on the first day after immense losses and quickly died down.[62] As a result of these operations, the 51st Army suffered losses of 9,852 killed, 4,959 missing, and 23,799 wounded for a total of more than 39,000 casualties between 10 and 31 March.[64]
Fourth Offensive, 9 April – 11 April
Mounting Luftwaffe air superiority began to tell as Kerch port came under heavy and sustained German air attack, constraining the buildup of Soviet armor and artillery. Mekhlis demanded that massed tank attacks be made against the unbroken German lines.
Kozlov's four major offensives from 27 February through 11 April were all defeated by Manstein's 11th Army with heavy Soviet losses. From 1 January to 30 April, Kozlov's Crimean Front, including the forces at Sevastopol, lost 352,000 men of which 236,370 were lost from February through April in the Parpach Narrows fighting.[41][8] The Front's losses were the second-heaviest of any Soviet Front during the period.[41] The offensives cost the Crimean Front 40 percent of its manpower, 52 percent of its tanks, and 25 percent of its artillery.[14] Axis 11th Army casualties from January to April 1942 were far fewer at 24,120 men.[8] The result was an unbalanced loss ratio of 14–1. Insufficient artillery and air support and ignorance of the German defenses were singled out by Soviet critics as the causes of the failure.[14] The Crimean Front had been all but destroyed as a combat-effective formation and would be completely routed from the peninsula in May.[41] For four months, Manstein had conducted a successful defense on two fronts at once. The spring thaw arrived in early May, and both sides prepared for the battle that would decide the campaign.[66]
Luftwaffe anti-shipping operations
To slow the Soviet build-up,
Meanwhile, the Luftwaffe had flown in the specialist
Operation Bustard Hunt, 8 May – 19 May
The Germans launched Operation Trappenjagd on 8 May 1942. ("Trappenjagd" is a German compound noun meaning "bustard hunt".) Prior to the offensive, the Luftwaffe succeeded in applying severe pressure to the Soviet supply lines. By late April food and other resources were virtually exhausted. Everything, including firewood had to be brought in by sea. The Stavka asked Stalin to consider the evacuation of the Kerch region. Stalin refused, and on 21 April ordered preparations for an offensive to retake the Crimea. On 6 May, he changed his mind and issued Order No. 170357, which ordered all forces to assume a defensive posture. He also refused to send more reinforcements. Mixed in with this order, was a limited offensive operation against German lines to improve the defenders' tactical positions. Instead of preparing for a defense against the impending German offensive, the Soviets were preparing for an attack.[69]
For the defence of the peninsula, the Soviets had three armies; the 51st, protecting the north, had eight rifle divisions and three rifle and two tank brigades, while the 44th Army in the south had five rifle divisions and two tank brigades. The 47th Army, with four rifle and one cavalry division, was kept in reserve. The Air Force of the Crimean Front deployed 404 aircraft.[4] Kozlov did not expect a major attack as he outnumbered the Germans two to one. Moreover, on the southern front, he had swampy terrain, which made it an unfavorable place for offensive operations. Although the Soviets constructed an anti-tank ditch that ran the entire length of the Parpach Narrows and had three lines of defense, the infantry units were deployed in one line at the front, with the tanks and cavalry in reserve.[70] Kozlov failed to deploy his troops into a well-prepared defense-in-depth.[71]
The German offensive had no option but to
To maximize surprise, Manstein selected the swampy terrain held by the 44th Army as his main attack sector. Fretter-Pico's XXX Corps would breach the Soviet lines, allowing the 22nd Panzer Division to run riot through the gaps. Improved tactics for breaking through heavily defended enemy lines were utilised, built on the integration of infantry assault groups, assault guns, combat engineers, Panzerjäger and flak units. Fretter-Pico received 57 StuG IIIs, 12 of which had the new 7.5 cm KwK 40 gun, two batteries of 8.8 cm Flak and ample combat engineer support. Only one German infantry division and the Romanians were in the north, while the rest were under Fretter-Pico's command.[3]
Trappenjagd began at 04:15 on 8 May.[73] Fliegerkorps VIII operating under Luftflotte 4, began operations against lines of communication and against Soviet airfields. Within hours, Ju 87s of StG 77 had knocked out the Soviet 44th Army's critical communications and mortally wounded the 51st Army's commander. The airfields were destroyed and 57 of the 401 Soviet aircraft in the area were shot down in 2,100 German sorties. With the army's Headquarters knocked out, the Soviets could not organise a counter offensive and the 44th Army collapsed into a retreat when Manstein launched the ground attack.[69] Manstein had five infantry divisions, the 22nd Panzer Division, and two and a half Romanian divisions against 19 Soviet divisions and four armoured brigades at Kerch. The 902nd Assault Boat Command of the 436th Regiment, 132nd German Infantry Division, landed behind the Soviet lines and helped unbuckle the Soviet second lines.[74] The Soviet Black Sea Fleet failed to stop the German seaborne attack. The German artillery bombardment, which included four Nebelwerfer rocket batteries, lasted only 10 minutes, and within 210 minutes of the assault being launched, the second defensive line of the 44th Army was broken.[75]
Stukas, Henschel Hs 129s, Ju 88s and He 111s raked the Soviet positions, paving a smooth road for the German ground forces. Soviet field fortifications were neutralized by Fliegerkorps VIII's close air support and air interdiction capabilities. The 44th Army's 157th and 404th Rifle Divisions were mauled and paralyzed in their movements by the Stukas and Hs 129s.[74] In one incident, 24 counterattacking Soviet tanks were destroyed on sight by StuG IIIs for the loss of only one German assault gun.[74] The 56th Tank Brigade and 126th Separate Tank Battalion launched a counterattack with 98 tanks, including seven KV-1 against the 28th Light Infantry Division. Stukas and Hs 129 Bs showed up and destroyed the attacking Soviet tanks. An estimated 48 Soviet tanks were knocked out, including all seven KV-1.[74] On the first day, XXX Corps, attacking with the 28th, 50th and 132nd Divisions broke through in the south. At a cost of 104 killed and 284 wounded, they captured 4,514 Soviet soldiers.[74] The German engineers partially bridged the anti-tank obstacles on 8 May to prepare the way for the 22nd Panzer Division. Kozlov did not appreciate the significance of the German breakthrough and failed to release reserves for a counter-attack.[74]
On 9 May, the German engineers finished breaching the anti-tank ditch and Manstein committed the 22nd Panzer Division, which swung north and trapped the 51st Army against the Sea of Azov on mid-day 10 May.[2] Confused Soviet counterattacks near Arma-Eli were blasted apart by German close air support and infantry-armor teams. The remaining combat-capable Soviet armor was eliminated by German airpower on 9 May and 25 Soviet aircraft were shot down by German Bf 109 fighters.[74] Richthofen's air units flew 1,700 sorties on 9 May and claimed 52 Soviet aircraft shot down for the loss of 2 of their own. A rainstorm gave the Soviets a brief respite on the evening of 9 May, but when it cleared the next morning, Fliegerkorps VIII destroyed the remaining isolated Soviet tanks, including 11 KV-1.[76]
Soviet morale and organisation collapsed, and a stampede to the rear areas began. Once this happened, the eight divisions of the 51st Army surrendered on 11 May, releasing XXX Corps to pursue the fragments of retreating Soviet forces to Marfovka , barely 12 kilometers from Kerch.[10] The motorized ad-hoc Groddeck brigade , supported by the Schlachtgeschwader 1 wing, reached the Marfovka airfield in the afternoon and destroyed 35 fighters on the ground.[76] Fliegerkorps VIII's air supremacy peaked on 12 May, when it conducted 1,500 sorties without significant Soviet opposition and was free to bomb the fleeing Soviet columns, resistance nests and Kerch harbour.[77] Richthofen burned Kerch to the ground by dropping 1,780 bombs on it on 12 May.[2] That day, Richthofen was ordered to send the bulk of his combat units to support the German 6th Army at the Second Battle of Kharkov. The number of flown missions was reduced accordingly; from 1,500 to 2,000 sorties per day prior to the redeployment to between 300 and 800 to the end of the Kerch operation.[78] Richthofen described his bombing operations during Trappenjagd as 'concentrated air support, the likes of which has never existed'.[4]
The speed of the advance was rapid. The 132nd Infantry Division overran several airfields, capturing 30 Soviet aircraft on the ground. On 10 May, Fliegerkorps VIII launched KG 55's He 111s against the Soviet forces. The large and slow He 111s made easy targets for ground fire, and eight were lost, but the anti-personnel bombs (SD-2) were devastating to Soviet infantry. German bombers also attacked shipping evacuating personnel from Kerch. Three transports with 900 wounded aboard were sunk, along with a gunboat, six patrol boats and other small craft.[2] The 1,048-ton Chernomorets was sunk the same day.[79] By this time, the air battle was won by the Luftwaffe. Despite the withdrawal of a number of Geschwader to support the 6th Army at the Second Battle of Kharkov, the Luftwaffe had destroyed Soviet aerial opposition and enabled the German Army to make deep penetrations, capturing 29,000 Soviet men, 220 guns and around 170 tanks.[72] Kerch fell on 15 May.[80] The Luftwaffe assisted the final defeat of Soviet ground forces on 20 May, when the last pocket of Soviet resistance south of Kerch was destroyed.[81]
Aftermath
Manstein destroyed three Soviet armies, wiping out nine Soviet divisions and reduced nine more to ineffective remnants.[9] Although forced to return several Luftwaffe units and the 22nd Panzer Division for Case Blue, he could now concentrate his forces for an attack on Sevastopol.[10]
Analysis
Manstein executed a successful
Casualties
In the 11 days of Operation Bustard Hunt, Fliegerkorps VIII lost 37 aircraft.[11] At the same time, the Air Force of the Crimean Front lost 417 aircraft.[11] Between 37,000–116,045 Soviet soldiers were evacuated by sea, of which 20 percent were wounded. An estimated 162,282 were left behind, killed or captured. 28,000 Soviet troops were killed and 147,000–170,000 taken prisoner, but according to Swedish historian Christer Bergström the prisoners included a large number of civilians.[69][9] German casualties amounted to only 7,588 men in XXX and XLII Corps, including 1,703 killed or missing.[9] They expended 6230 tons of ammunition, losing nine artillery pieces, three assault guns and 8–12 tanks.[9]
Several groups of Soviet survivors refused to surrender and fought on for many months, hiding in the catacombs of the Adzhimushkay quarries . Many of these soldiers were occupying the caves along with many civilians, who had fled the city of Kerch.[9] The Germans also deployed poison gas against the survivors, thus furthering the casualties.[82]
Notes
- Transcaucasian Front, which became the Caucasus Front on 30 December 1941, and which the independent Crimean Frontsplit from on 28 January 1942
References
- ^ a b Isaev 2016, p. 626.
- ^ a b c d Forczyk 2014, p. 168.
- ^ a b Forczyk 2014, p. 163.
- ^ a b c d e f g Hooton 2016, p. 116.
- ^ a b Krivosheev 1997, p. 108.
- ^ Isaev 2016, p. 638.
- ^ "Heeresarzt 10-Day Casualty Reports per Army/Army Group, 1941". Archived from the original on 25 May 2013. Retrieved 19 March 2018.
- ^ a b c d e Forczyk 2014, p. 127.
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- ^ a b c d e Forczyk 2008, p. 36.
- ^ a b c d Hooton 2016, p. 117.
- ^ a b Krivosheev 1997, p. 122.
- ^ Glantz 2001, p. 165, 115,630 in January, 98,523 in February, 74,125 in March and 63,722 in April.
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- ^ a b c d e f g Forczyk 2014, p. 94.
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- ^ a b c Forczyk 2014, p. 97.
- ^ Forczyk 2014, p. 98.
- ^ a b c d Forczyk 2014, p. 99.
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- ^ a b Forczyk 2014, p. 102.
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- ^ a b Forczyk 2014, p. 125.
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- ^ a b Forczyk 2014, p. 167.
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Bibliography
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- Forczyk, Robert (2014). Where the Iron Crosses Grow: The Crimea 1941–44. Oxford: Osprey. ISBN 978-1-4728-1678-8.
- ISBN 978-0-7006-0717-4.
- Glantz, David M. (March 2001). "Forgotten Battles of the German-Soviet War (1941-45), Part 6: The Winter Campaign (5 December 1941 – April 1942): The Crimean Counteroffensive and Reflections". Journal of Slavic Military Studies. 14 (1): 121–170. S2CID 143776440.
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Further reading
- Hayward, Joel S. A. (Summer 1997). "The German Use of Air Power at Kharkov, May 1942" (PDF). Air Power History. 44 (2).
- Hayward, Joel S. A. (June 1997). "Von Richthofen's 'Giant fire-magic': The Luftwaffe's Contribution to the Battle of Kerch, 1942". The Journal of Slavic Military Studies. 10 (2): 97–124. .
- ISBN 1-86019-995-X