British logistics in the Falklands War
The 1982 British military campaign to recapture the Falkland Islands depended on complex
The
The
Background
Tensions between Britain and Argentina over the disputed
The
When intelligence was received in London on 31 March that the Falklands would be invaded on 2 April, the
Shipping
Amphibious
On 2 April, orders went out to make the Royal Navy's two aircraft carriers,
The rest of the Royal Navy's amphibious capability consisted of six
As vital as they were, these ships were insufficient for the logistics needs of a task force operating 8,000 miles (13,000 km) from home. Civilian ships could be obtained by charter or by requisition; but there was no time to allow ships to complete the deliveries of their cargo or meet their existing passenger booking obligations. The British government therefore resorted to requisitioning, a practice last exercised during the
Government policy was that only British-flagged vessels could be requisitioned, and only British nationals could serve as crewmen. British crewmen were retained, and a 150 per cent bonus was paid to those who entered the South Atlantic,[21] considerably more than the extra £1 per day paid to members of the armed services.[22] Among the RFA crews were some 400 Hong Kong Chinese, who were British Overseas Territories citizens. Some protested that their contracts said nothing about service in a war zone, but the Ministry of Defence refuted this.[23] A declaration of active service brought everyone under the Naval Discipline Act 1957.[24] A senior naval officer was assigned to each ship,[16] with authority to direct the ship's actions and movements, even if, in the opinion of the master, it might put the ship at risk.[24]
Many modern ships are designed for maximum economy in performing a specific task, which limits their flexibility. The ferries that plied the English Channel, for example, did not have the capacity to store enough fresh water for a voyage to the South Atlantic. STUFT had to have a combination of range, endurance and
On 3 April it was decided to add the 3rd Battalion, Parachute Regiment (3 Para) to Thompson's 3rd Commando Brigade. This ended plans for the amphibious force to carry the entire landing force. Even if troops were accommodated on the aircraft carriers, they could not carry what was now a 4,350-man force. Calculations indicated that capacity was short by 1,700 men, 150 long tons (150 t) of stores and 60 vehicles.[28] For a troop transport, an ocean liner was the best alternative, but there were few of these left. P&O's 44,807-gross-register-ton (126,880 m3) SS Canberra was chosen.[29] She was on a cruise in the Mediterranean with a full complement of passengers and crew, but due to return to Southampton on 6 April.[21] Some 400 of her crew were Asian nationals, and therefore had to be disembarked,[16] but her master, Captain D. J. Scott-Masson, was a Royal Naval Reserve officer.[30]
The
Soon after his appointment as land component commander on 9 April, Moore began to press for British Army's 5th Infantry Brigade to be sent to the South Atlantic as well. Fieldhouse formally requested this on 27 April. The brigade had a strength of 3,961 men, and for 35 days' operations it required 1,067 long tons (1,084 t) of ammunition, 1,129 long tons (1,147 t) of stores, 205 vehicles and 19 helicopters. If the ships carrying the 3rd Commando Brigade were to be reused, even if the troops were flown to Ascension Island and embarked from there, they could not reach the Falkland Islands before the middle of June. It was therefore decided that the brigade would have to be carried in other ships. The War Cabinet only approved the despatch of the 5th Infantry Brigade on 2 May.[36] The Cunard Line's 67,140-gross-register-ton (190,100 m3) SS Queen Elizabeth 2 was taken up just 19 hours before she was due to depart for the Mediterranean with cruise passengers.[34][37]
To carry the 5th Infantry Brigade's vehicles and stores, two more roll-on/roll-off vessels were requisitioned, the 6,455-gross-register-ton (18,280 m3) MS Baltic Ferry and Nordic Ferry.[33] Atlantic Conveyor's sister ship, SS Atlantic Causeway, was requisitioned for the same conversion to an aircraft transport on 4 May.[34][35] They were joined by the helicopter support ship RFA Engadine. Atlantic Causeway was loaded with vehicles and stores, requiring another vessel to carry the aircraft. It had also been decided to send another six RAF Harriers to augment the six already sent on Atlantic Conveyor.[38] MV Contender Bezant was requisitioned for conversion to an aircraft transport on 10 May, followed by Astronomer on 29 May.[34]
Logistical
Fuel was a critical requirement of the task force, and for political reasons could not be obtained from South America or South Africa. Countries in South America, even if sympathetic, felt unable to offer overt support in a conflict involving a neighbouring state, while South Africa was an international pariah at the time due to its system of apartheid, and collaboration with its regime risked alienating other countries at a time when Britain needed all the support it could muster for its international diplomatic efforts. The nearest source of supply was Freetown in Sierra Leone, 4,100 miles (6,600 km) from the Falkland Islands. To carry the diesel fuel required by the gas turbines of the warships and the fuel oil required by Hermes and some of the older RFA and STUFT, the fourteen RFA tankers were supplemented by fifteen requisitioned tankers.[39]
Although the Royal Navy ships in the task force were fitted with
The Royal Navy had no hospital ships. HMY Britannia had been built to allow its conversion into a hospital ship, but she required special fuel oil, and had only a 200-bed capacity. Instead, the 16,907-gross-register-ton (47,880 m3) P&O liner SS Uganda, which was in the Mediterranean on an educational cruise with a thousand schoolchildren on board, was requisitioned, and modified to become a hospital ship. A team of 135 medical personnel was assigned, which included members of Queen Alexandra's Royal Naval Nursing Service (QARNNS).[44] This was the first time that QARNNS personnel had been deployed afloat since the Korean War. They brought a packaged 250-bed portable hospital and 90 tons of medical supplies with them.[45] Beds were provided for 20 intensive-care patients and 94 medium-dependency patients. Up to 940 low-dependency patients could be accommodated in dormitories.[46] Three Hecla-class survey vessels, HMS Hecla, Herald and Hydra, became ambulance ships.[16]
Hospital ships were exempt from attack under the Geneva Conventions, but they also require that patients not be returned directly to the battlefield after treatment. Due to the distances involved, this meant that treatment on Uganda would involve a prolonged absence, even those with relatively minor injuries that were anticipated such as trench foot. Additional medical facilities were therefore established elsewhere in the task force.[47] Surgical teams were also embarked on Hermes, Fearless and Canberra.[48] In addition to the British Army medical staff embarked, there were 425 Royal Navy medical staff with the task force, including 103 doctors. Some 40 Royal Naval Reserve doctors were called up for service in the UK to replace those headed for the South Atlantic.[49] The departure of so many trained personnel led to the suspension of nursing training at the Royal Naval Hospital, Haslar, and Royal Naval Hospital, Stonehouse.[48] The Army Blood Supply Depot issued 800 units to the task force, and more units were obtained from a blood donation drive on Canberra.[50]
Dockyards
It was initially hoped that ships could be loaded and converted at commercial shipyards, but these were soon overwhelmed by the requirements for skilled labour and specialised facilities, and the burden fell on the
Other ships required major alterations. The conversion of Atlantic Conveyor at Devonport required the removal of 500 tie-down points for containers from her deck, adding a landing pad for helicopters and Hawker Siddeley Harriers, installing UHF radio equipment and satellite communications, providing accommodation for 122 men, installing a liquid oxygen tank, cutting additional hatches, and modifying the stern doors.[55] Similar conversions were undertaken on Atlantic Causeway, Contender Bezant and Astronomer.[34][35] The experience with Atlantic Conveyor allowed these to be converted far more quickly.[56] The conversion of Uganda to a hospital ship was carried out at Gibraltar in 65 hours. Minesweepers were converted at Rosyth.[57] Some 17 ships were fitted with helicopter landing pads; on Canberra and Queen Elizabeth 2, the area around the swimming pool was used, as it had been designed to hold the weight of 70 to 100 long tons (71 to 102 t) of water. On RMS St Helena and the cable ship Iris there was insufficient room for the flight deck and it had to be cantilevered over the stern. All ships fitted to operate helicopters also had to have communications, lighting and glide path indicators.[58]
The Royal Marines normally kept war reserves both afloat and ashore, but the floating reserve was on Sir Geraint, and had just been unloaded for a routine transfer to another LSL. These were soon reloaded. A request to the Army for assistance for the Commando Logistic Regiment in moving stores from the depots was met by 150 trucks on the first day; 1,500 trucks would ultimately be used. The depots despatched one million operational rations and twelve million ordinary meals. They also supplied 10,000 long tons (10,000 t) of ammunition, 1,260 long tons (1,280 t) of fuel, and 3,880 long tons (3,940 t) of stores. Eventually, 38,000 long tons (39,000 t) would be moved through to the ports.[59] Good weather at Devonport and Portsmouth permitted loading to be carried out in the open without the danger of perishable stores being damaged by rain.[51]
Ships were not combat loaded—loaded in such a way that the weapons, ammunition, equipment and stores that the embarked troops would require on landing were immediately accessible. Most units sent critical equipment to the ports first, and this then became the first equipment loaded, and the last that could be unloaded. Baltic Ferry had munitions stored deep in her holds that could only be retrieved by removing all the other cargo.[60] Most of the 3rd Commando Brigade's ammunition, about 2,000 long tons (2,000 t) of it, was loaded on Elk, making that vessel a particularly vulnerable target.[61]
Wheeled vehicles were not expected to be able to traverse the islands, so most were left behind. The 3rd Commando Brigade did take 54 of the Commando Logistic Regiment's 82 4-ton prime movers, ten of its fifteen fuel trucks, and nine of its forklifts.
Ascension
The task force headed for
A dozen RAF Lockheed C-130 Hercules transports flew to Ascension via Gibraltar and Dakar on 3 April, bringing stores and RAF and Royal Navy personnel to establish a base on Ascension.[75] Royal Navy Captain Robert McQueen was appointed to command the British Forces Support Unit (BFSU) on Ascension,[69] and arrived on 8 April.[6] The BFSU ballooned to over 800 personnel in the first three weeks. It began operating Westland Sea King and Wessex helicopters.[70] Aviation fuel storage facilities on Ascension were controlled by the United States. On 13 April, the US agreed that the British forces could use 950,000 US gallons (3,600,000 L) of the 12.5 million US gallons (47,000,000 L) stored on the island. Some 250,000 US gallons (950,000 L) of this allocation was consumed on 19 April, and just 12,000 US gallons (45,000 L) remained on 25 April when a supply tanker with 2.4 million US gallons (9,100,000 L) commenced replenishment. At this point, the US released its reserve stocks for British use.[70] Fuel was discharged from tankers through a floating pipeline to an American fuel farm. It then needed to be transported 3.5 miles (5.6 km) to Wideawake Airfield. Tanker trucks found the island's steep and rough road heavy going.[76] The compacted volcanic rock used to surface the roads was abrasive, and tyres soon wore out. New sets had to be flown in.[77] Sappers of 1 Troop, 51 Field Squadron, Royal Engineers, built a pipeline to connect the fuel farm with the storage tanks at the airfield. Meanwhile, 12 Petroleum Operations Section, Royal Army Ordnance Corps, had taken over management of the fuel farm. Fuel storage at Wideawake Airfield was increased by 180,000 US gallons (680,000 L) by the addition of 30,000-US-gallon (110,000 L) fuel bladders.[76]
The RAF presence sharply increased after it was decided to use Ascension as a base for operations. Two
The number of personnel on the island increased to about one thousand, of whom around 120 were Navy, 60 were British Army, and 800 were RAF.[81] This exceeded the capacity of the island's water supply, and McQueen instituted draconian measures to limit the number of personnel on Ascension Island, in some cases sending people back on the planes they arrived on.[82] In early May, the USAF flew in fourteen planeloads of portable accommodation in the form of 31 twelve-man living units. Each was self-contained, with its own air-conditioning, bunks, showers and toilets. They were erected in five days by British and American personnel. The Army's 30 Signal Regiment established direct telephone circuits to the UK, and its 2 Postal Regiment provided mail and courier services. By June, some 20,000 mailbags had passed through Ascension. A detachment of 9 Ordnance Battalion established laundry facilities in a disused laundry. Service cooks from all three services prepared a thousand meals per day through three field kitchens.[83] Intelligence sources warned of a possible Argentine attack on Ascension, perhaps using special forces and a long-range civilian airliner like a Boeing 707. Concerns about the vulnerability of the base led to three RAF Harriers being assigned for air defence on 10 May. These were replaced by McDonnell Douglas F-4 Phantom IIs on 24 May.[84]
Hermes reached Ascension on 16 April, and Fearless, Stromness and the five LSLs the following day. Canberra and Elk arrived on 20 April, having refuelled at Freetown.[81][85] By this time, cargo planes were arriving at Wideawake Airfield at a rate of eight per day, and 1,500 long tons (1,500 t) of supplies had arrived, a third of which were earmarked for the 3rd Commando Brigade. Stores were difficult to identify, as many were poorly labelled, making it difficult to distinguish real ammunition from training ammunition. When cargo was not properly logged on arrival, it became difficult to know whether or not an item had been delivered. There was no security at the airfield, so goods were subject to pilferage.[86] D Squadron, 22 Special Air Service Regiment, helped themselves to special ammunition and weapons belonging to the 3rd Commando Brigade, which they thought were just lying around.[87]
The amphibious force took the opportunity to re-stow its equipment. This took eleven days. Having not yet refuelled, Fearless rode too high in the water, and was unable to launch its LCUs, so the burden of the effort initially had to be carried by helicopters. Two Wessexes, three Sea Kings and a Boeing CH-47 Chinook supported the effort. Shortages of lifting gear and cargo nets hampered the effort, as did the haphazard original stowage of stores. In some cases, cargo had shifted during the voyage to Ascension. Some 138 Wessex, 40 Chinook and 40 Sea King sorties were flown on a single day. The LSLs Sir Galahad and Sir Percivale were stocked with two days' supply of ammunition, fuel and rations. Four more days' supply was stowed on Stromness, and sixteen on Elk. Units were issued with supplies and equipment they would require for an amphibious assault.[88] Meanwhile, Intrepid, Atlantic Conveyor, Norland and Europic Ferry departed the UK on 25 and 26 April, and Sir Bedivere, which reached Marchwood on 25 April, sailed for Ascension on 27 April.[89] The five LSLs, carrying most of the Commando Logistic Regiment, weighed anchor and set out for the Falkland Islands on 1 May, along with Pearleaf and escorted by the frigate HMS Antelope. Norland arrived at Ascension on the morning of 7 May, and departed for the Falklands that evening. Canberra, Tidepool and Elk had left the previous day, and the last ship, the LPD Intrepid, departed Ascension on 8 May.[90]
To allow ships to be resupplied by air when operating in the South Atlantic, modifications were made to the Hercules aircraft, which normally had a range of about 2,000 miles (3,200 km). At
Part of 47 Air Despatch Squadron, Royal Corps of Transport, went to Ascension on Fearless. They prepared their first packages for airdropping on 19 April, of high priority supplies for HMS Alacrity and Invincible. The first LR2 Hercules arrived at Wideawake Airfield on 12 May, and four days later a 24-hour, 6,300-nautical-mile (11,700 km) flight delivered 1,000 pounds (450 kg) of supplies to Antelope. A flight to the Falkland Islands would take 28 hours, so two crews were needed, and required five Victor tankers for aerial refuelling. McQueen tried to enforce a policy that airdrop loads be rigged in the UK to save space at Ascension, but was overruled by Fieldhouse. By 1 June, 47 Air Despatch Squadron had prepared 47 loads totalling 163 long tons (166 t), with high priority items delivered within 40 hours of the initial request.[91] Airdrop missions mounted from Ascension were given girls' names, in ascending alphabetical order. After "Zara" was flown on 9 June, the sequence started again with "Alison" the following day. While most airdrops were at sea, some were made to units in the Falkland Islands.[93] Those at sea were made with the stores in waterproof containers which were retrieved by the ships' boats.[94] Occasionally personnel were also dropped. In the "Ursula" mission on 1 June, Lieutenant Colonel David Chaundler, a replacement commander for 2 Para, parachuted into the sea and was plucked from the water by a boat from the frigate HMS Penelope.[95]
Over the beach
Landing
The plan for an amphibious landing in the Falkland Islands, codenamed Operation Sutton,[96] called for units to land from the ships in which they had sailed,[97] which meant that 40 Commando, 42 Commando and 3 Para would land from Canberra;[98] but Fieldhouse became concerned about risking 2,000 men on one ship.[99] On 18 May, Clapp received orders for different battalions to be carried on separate ships.[98] Unusually calm seas on 19 May allowed this cross-decking to be carried out by LCUs and LCVPs from Fearless and Intrepid, with 40 Commando transferred to the former, and 3 Para to the latter. Both LPDs were seriously overloaded, and, unlike Canberra, did not have enough life rafts for everyone. After sunset an 846 Naval Air Squadron Sea King from Hermes transferring troops of D Squadron, 22 Special Air Service Regiment, to Intrepid crashed into the ocean. Intrepid's LCVPs rescued eight men, but 22 others were lost.[100][101]
Another change was that the Commando Logistic Regiment wanted the LSLs beached so they could be quickly unloaded. Clapp demurred. If done improperly, this could damage the ship. For this reason, peacetime financial restraints had prevented the LSL captains from practising this manoeuvre. Clapp ruled that the LSLs would discharge onto mexeflotes and landing craft through the stern doors. The LSLs had been loaded with the most urgently required stores in the bow, where they could be accessed first, but now the order needed to be changed. The double-handling required meant that unloading would be slower than planned.[102]
The logistics plan called for the support elements of the combat units, known as the B Echelons, to remain afloat, along with the entire Commando Logistic Regiment. After the beachhead was secured, the B Echelons would join their units. Lieutenant Colonel Ivar Hellberg, the commander of the Commando Logistic Regiment, and Major Gerry Wells-Cole, the 3rd Commando Brigade's Deputy Assistant Adjutant and Quartermaster General (DAA & QMG), would select a Brigade Maintenance Area (BMA) site near Ajax Bay to be run by the Commando Logistic Regiment. Engineers would establish a refuelling point for Harriers and helicopters, and establish water points.[103]
Hellberg and Wells-Cole planned to use a "pull" system whereby unit quartermasters would request supplies that they needed. There would be no equipment repair facilities ashore; the Commando Logistic Regiment's Workshop Squadron would remain afloat, with detachments going ashore temporarily to retrieve or repair equipment as necessary.[103] Medical support was supplied by No. 1 Medical Troop on Sir Galahad, the Parachute Clearing Troop of the 16th (Parachute) Field Ambulance on Norland, and No. 3 Medical Troop, No. 2 Surgical Support Team and the Commando Logistic Regiment's Medical Squadron on Canberra. After the beachhead was secure, No. 1 Medical Troop and the Parachute Clearing Troop would establish a field dressing station in the BMA. Casualties could be flown to Uganda, and then taken to Montevideo by HMS Hecate, Hydra and Hecla, from whence they would be flown back to the UK via Ascension. The dead would be buried in the BMA or at sea.[103]
The amphibious force entered
Build-up
Daylight allowed helicopter operations to begin. On 21 May, helicopters carried 288 loads, moving 520 personnel and 220 long tons (220 t) of stores from 11 ships to 21 sites. STUFT were unloaded at a rate of 20 long tons (20 t) per hour, and the LSLs could be unloaded at 90 long tons (91 t) per hour, the lesson being that STUFT were a poor substitute for purpose-built amphibious vessels.
Of the seven escorts, five, HMS Antrim, Ardent, Argonaut, Brilliant and Broadsword, were hit; only HMS Plymouth and Yarmouth were unscathed. Of those hit, only Broadsword was fully capable of continuing the fight, while Ardent was ablaze and sinking.[109] Clapp decided that the sound was too dangerous for STUFT, and ordered that Canberra, Norland and Europic Ferry leave Falkland Sound by midnight.[110] The LSLs remained, but on 23 May Argentine bombs found Sir Bedivere, Sir Galahad and Sir Lancelot. None of those that struck the LSLs exploded. Damage to Sir Bedivere was minor, but Sir Galahad was set on fire and beached, and was put out of action for a week. Fires started on Sir Lancelot, which put it out of action until 7 June—although in the meantime she acted as an accommodation ship and helicopter refuelling station.[111][112] Clapp decided that the remaining stores had to be landed as quickly as possible. Inevitably, some stores that were neither requested nor required were landed.[113]
This disrupted the logistics plan. 42 Commando came ashore at Green Beach by LCU, but the B Echelons remained on Canberra, and the assault troops had left rucksacks, parkas, sleeping and cooking gear, and spare clothing behind. Canberra and Norland also took 90,000 rations with them.[114] The BMA was far from ideal. There was a landing ramp where forklifts could unload landing craft, but unusable rocky ground limited the area available to about a third of what was really required to properly disperse the stores, and the only cover was a disused refrigeration plant on the shore of Ajax Bay, which had been taken over by the hospital.[111]
Commander Rick Jolly brought No. 2 Surgical Support Team and the Headquarters of the Commando Logistic Regiment's Medical Squadron ashore from Canberra. No. 1 Medical Troop disembarked from Sir Galahad, and the Parachute Clearing Troop had already come ashore from Norland. With these units he set up a field hospital in the refrigeration plant. They decided not to paint a Red Cross on the building, as it was close to the ordnance stores.[115] A sign painted over the entrance proclaimed it to be "The Red and Green Life Machine", alluding to the colour of the paratroopers' and commandos' berets.[116] A "Water Heater, Field Kitchen, Portable" was the sole source of hot water for the surgical team at Ajax Bay. It was loaned from an American unit for a crate of beer; the British kit they were supposed to use never made it ashore.[117] Of 1,205 men treated, including 310 who required major surgery, 3 died.[118]
Atlantic Conveyor was struck by an Exocet anti-ship missile on the afternoon of 25 May and set ablaze. Although she remained afloat for several days, nothing could be salvaged. She was the most serious loss of the campaign. Twelve of those on board died, but 150 were rescued.[119] Of the aircraft she had brought to the South Atlantic, the Harriers of No. 1 Squadron RAF had already been transferred to Hermes,[120] a Wessex of 848 Naval Air Squadron had already flown ashore, and a Chinook of No. 18 Squadron RAF was in the air at the time. The rest, three Chinook and six Wessex helicopters, were lost.[119]
The
In addition to the helicopters, Atlantic Conveyor took with her four tent camps, complete with field kitchens and sanitary facilities, which would have accommodated 4,500 personnel. Another serious loss was a portable fuelling system and six 10-long-ton (10 t) fuel tanks. Material for building an airstrip at Port San Carlos also went down,
Over the mountains
3rd Commando Brigade
North east of the Total Exclusion Zone (TEZ) that the British government had declared around the Falkland Islands, the Royal Navy designated a Tug, Repair and Logistics Area (TRALA) where ships could receive and transfer supplies, and conduct repairs of battle damage under the protection of the carrier battle group. Hercules airdrops were made to ships there.[126][112] Ships were now held in the TRALA, from whence it took about 20 hours to reach San Carlos. Their captains preferred to navigate Falkland Sound by night, allowing them to be unloaded by day, which suited the Commando Logistic Regiment. Working around the clock was inadvisable, for there were no relief crews for the landing craft or helicopters.[113]
Only four Sea Kings had night vision equipment, allowing them to operate at night. These were reserved for night operations; to allow the crews to rest, and necessary aircraft maintenance to be performed, they were not employed during the day. One Sea King was permanently assigned to support of the Rapier battery. This left six Sea King, five Wessex and the Chinook helicopter available for logistical and tactical missions.[127]
Requested supplies took at least two days to fetch from the TRALA.[113] Hellberg visited Clapp on Fearless each night and presented a list of required ships. Clapp would then signal Woodward and ask for them; but for operational reasons a requested ship might not arrive, or a substitute might be sent containing none of the required stores.[128] The Ordnance Squadron of the Commando Logistic Regiment had compiled lists of what was on board each ship, but lacked the manpower to maintain teams on all the supply ships. Goods became damaged from improper storage or handling, or were pilfered, and the contents of the ships slowly became less certain. RFA Resource carried stores for both the Royal Navy and the 3rd Commando Brigade, and with no-one to assess conflicting priorities, she remained with the fleet.[113]
As a result, Sir Galahad and Sir Tristram were caught unloading in daylight on 8 June and
For the final battles around Port Stanley, the gun positions were stocked with 500 rounds per gun,[151] plus another 500 in reserve. Each combat unit would have two days' supply, plus two more days at the FBMAs at Fitzroy or Teal Inlet. The remaining LSLs made runs to Fitzroy and Teal Inlet on alternating days, moving over 1,000 long tons (1,000 t) to each. The arrival of four more Wessex helicopters on Engadine brought the number of helicopters available to forty; these were used to move ammunition to the gun positions. FARPs at each FBMA saved the helicopters from having to return to San Carlos.[155] The field hospital was broken up on 10 June, with teams deploying to Fitzroy and Teal Inlet.[156]
The final four-day battle around Port Stanley involved some of the hardest fighting of the campaign. One battery almost ran out of ammunition, requiring an emergency helicopter resupply mission in a snowstorm at night. The lone bridge over the Murrell River collapsed when an armoured recovery vehicle loaded with ammunition attempted to cross it, cutting the 3rd Commando Brigade's overland supply line for their Bv202s, but the engineers built an air-portable bridge at Fitzroy which the Chinook delivered.[157]
On 14 June, the Argentine commander, Brigadier General
Aftermath
Lieutenant Colonel Leslie Kennedy arrived at San Carlos soon after the Argentine surrender as Commander Royal Engineers (CRE) Works, Falkland Islands. His task was to rehabilitate Port Stanley. It took the sappers of 9 Parachute Squadron and 61 Field Squadron four days to restore the water supply to Port Stanley. By this time, the reservoirs were down to two days' supply. In the meantime it was supplied by Fort Toronto through a dracone moored offshore. A military water supply point at Moody Brook was constructed and operated by 3 Field Squadron. The town's consumption was about 12,000 imperial gallons (55,000 L) per day. The electric grid had also been damaged by shellfire, and took a week longer to repair. Its capacity was still limited, so it was supplemented by two 250 KW Army generators. A separate military power station was subsequently established. Fuel was supplied using a dracone.[159][160]
The major task was restoration of the port and airfield. In the interim, the Hercules transports continued to fly from Ascension, dropping high priority items.[161] The postal unit moved from Ajax Bay into the Post Office at Port Stanley. At first, mail bags were airdropped but some fell into Argentine minefields. A method was then devised to allow the Hercules to deliver bags without having to land by trailing a grappling hook attached to the bags which snagged a wire strung between two poles.[162]
Built in the 1970s, the airfield had a 4,100-by-150-foot (1,250 by 46 m) runway. It was unusable because it had been cratered by the RAF. Its rehabilitation was undertaken by 11 Field Squadron and 59 Independent Commando Squadron.[163] The Argentinians had already repaired three craters. The others were filled in and topped with Argentine aluminium matting. A huge crater caused by a 1,000-pound (450 kg) bomb required over 1,000 square metres (11,000 sq ft) of matting. "Scabs", or scrapes in the runway surface, of which there were several hundred, were repaired with Bostik 276, a magnesium phosphate cement and aggregate mixture. There were 47 Hercules and several hundred Harrier landings before the airfield was closed for repairs on 15 August.[164]
The runway was too short for use by the RAF's Phantoms, so 50 Field Squadron (which had been detailed for the task in May) began extending it to 6,100 feet (1,900 m). Some 9,000 long tons (9,100 t) of airfield construction stores, plant and equipment were landed for this purpose. 25,000 long tons (25,000 t) of quartz granite rock fill was used, which was obtained by 3 and 60 Field Squadrons from a local quarry. Aluminium matting was laid along the whole length of the runway. The first Hercules landed on the new runway on 28 August.
Sites for the breakdown and storage of bulk supplies were limited, and the warehouses were initially used for the Argentine prisoners.
With the end of hostilities in the Falklands (although
The Bakery Section of 91 Ordnance Company baked its first loaf in the Falkland Islands on 30 June. It baked up to 6,000 loaves per day before settling down to just 4,000 by August.[170] Although rations could soon be supplemented with fresh fruit and vegetables, it was not until August that the troops could be fed fresh rations.[159]
A wing of the small King Edward VII Memorial Hospital at Port Stanley was occupied by 16 Field Ambulance. Its first task was sorting through captured Argentine medical supplies. The military hospital wing opened on 29 June. Uganda dropped anchor at Port William to supply backup care, and donated fifty hospital beds and bedding to King Edward VII Memorial Hospital.[159] Having sailed from the UK on the TEV Rangatira on 19 June, 2 Field Hospital reached the Falkland Islands on 11 July. Its staff included fourteen officers and other ranks of Queen Alexandra's Royal Army Nursing Corps. Its tent accommodation had been lost on Atlantic Conveyor, so it moved into the King Edward VII Memorial Hospital.[171]
About 3,000 long tons (3,000 t) of British ammunition was recovered from 47 battlefield sites by 81 Ordnance Company, along with over 4.5 million rounds of Argentine ammunition. Some 1,000 long tons (1,000 t) was found to be serviceable, and was shipped to the UK.[172] Most Argentine equipment was dumped at sea, but some items, including Chinook and Agusta 109 helicopters, were taken back to the UK.[173][174]
The first units to return from the Falkland Islands were 2 and 3 Para, which left on Norland and Europic Ferry in June. The 3rd Commando Brigade followed, departing on Canberra on 26 June, with the Commando Logistic Regiment embarking on Sir Percivale two days later. This left the 5th Infantry Brigade, whose logistic support was consolidated into the Falkland Islands Logistic Battalion on 28 June. Major General
Thorne gave a high priority to providing proper accommodation for his men before the next winter.
A Grave Registration unit of the Royal Pioneer Corps arrived on the SS Strathewe, along with coffins and embalming materials. It had the task of disinterring the bodies of those killed. For the first time in British history, families were given the option of having their loved ones' remains returned to the UK, and 64 chose to exercise this option. The remaining 14 bodies (including that of Lieutenant Colonel H. Jones, who was posthumously awarded the Victoria Cross (VC) for his part in the Battle of Goose Green) were re-interred in the Blue Beach Military Cemetery at San Carlos.[177] An Argentine Military Cemetery was established near Goose Green in 1983,[178] which was rebuilt between 2002 and 2004. The Argentine government did not wish to "repatriate" its dead, as it considered that they were already in Argentina. Many were not identified, and were buried with the inscription "Argentine soldier known unto God."[179]
Lessons
In the logistics section of its report to Parliament on the lessons of the war, the Ministry of Defence highlighted the prodigious expenditure of ammunition and missiles; the high level of logistic support required for operations outside western Europe; the importance of civil resources in the defence effort; and the utility of aerial refuelling.[180][181] The value of the Royal Navy's amphibious forces was reassessed. A replacement for the lost Sir Galahad was ordered, and two roll-on roll-off ferries, RFA Sir Caradoc and Sir Lamorak, were chartered while the new RFA Sir Galahad was built and Sir Tristram was repaired. However, the government still dithered over the replacement of the Fearless-class LPDs;[182] and replacements, the Albion class, were not ordered until 1996.[183] The oil rig support ship MV Stena Inspector was purchased in 1983, and became RFA Diligence, while Astronomer and Contender Bezant were retained as RFA Reliant and Argus respectively. The value of STUFT was recognised, and over the next few years STUFT would see active service in the Mediterranean, the Red Sea and the Persian Gulf.[182]
The Falkland War was also studied in other countries, notably in China, where it was the subject of organised teaching and research at the PLA Naval Command College in Nanjing.[184] The Americans were impressed by the speed with which the British were able to mobilise their forces and get them moving to the theatre of operations in response to a crisis that had erupted with very little warning.[185] A programme was already under way to improve American sealift capability, and between 1982 and 1986, the United States Congress appropriated and spent US$7 billion on the purchase or lease of new logistics ships. They would be tested in the 1991 Gulf War.[186] Thompson felt that the overriding importance of logistics as the driving factor of operations was overlooked. He was particularly disappointed that the 5th Infantry Brigade had not used the time it had before embarkation to remedy more of its logistical shortcomings.[187]
Logistics lessons drawn from the conflict were not new, but had not been learned either. These included the failure to integrate operational and tactical planning; improper tactical loading of ships; outdated planning data for consumables, particularly fuel and ammunition; lack of heavy-lift helicopters and poor discipline in the employment of helicopters; shortages of land transport; the employment of new and highly complex equipment on the battlefield; faulty casualty evacuation plans; and the need for post-conflict planning.[185] British and American commentators observed that much of this could be traced to logistically unrealistic peacetime training and exercises, and called for more exercises where there were "no permanent quarters to house the troops, no Federal Express to deliver critical supply parts, no power production and no in-place hookups for communications or intelligence information."[188]
Notes
- ^ Brown 1987, pp. 50–52.
- ^ Freedman 2005, pp. 4–11.
- ^ a b c Brown 1987, p. 53.
- ^ Brown 1987, pp. 67–68.
- ^ a b Freedman 2005, pp. 29–30.
- ^ a b Freedman 2005, p. 64.
- ^ Freedman 2005, p. 207.
- ^ Privratsky 2014, pp. 32–35.
- ^ a b Hellberg 2005, p. 111.
- ^ Woodward 1992, p. 73.
- ^ "HMS "Fearless" and "Intrepid"". Parliamentary Debates (Hansard). Vol. 19. HC. 8 March 1982. col. 327. Retrieved 14 August 2022.
- ^ a b Brown 1987, pp. 65–68.
- ^ Clapp & Southby-Tailyour 1997, p. 21.
- ^ Brown 1987, p. 72.
- ^ Villar 1984, p. 9.
- ^ a b c d e Freedman 2005, p. 54.
- ^ Villar 1984, p. 8.
- ^ Messenger, Nick (January 1983). "Ships Taken Up From Trade – STUFT" (PDF). Ministry of Defence. Archived from the original (PDF) on 10 November 2016. Retrieved 19 November 2017.
- ^ a b Privratsky 2014, p. 29.
- ^ a b Freedman 2005, p. 53.
- ^ a b c Privratsky 2014, p. 28.
- ^ Clapp & Southby-Tailyour 1997, p. 60.
- ^ Simpson, Peter (10 June 2007). "The War Within". South China Morning Post. Archived from the original on 9 July 2018. Retrieved 9 June 2018.
- ^ a b Villar 1984, pp. 15–16.
- ^ Villar 1984, pp. 12–13.
- ^ Privratsky 2014, p. 26.
- ^ Webb 2007, p. 298.
- ^ Freedman 2005, pp. 51–53.
- ^ Villar 1984, pp. 12–15.
- ^ Villar 1984, p. 14.
- ^ Freedman 2005, p. 195.
- ^ Villar 1984, p. 171.
- ^ a b Villar 1984, pp. 15, 172–173.
- ^ a b c d e Privratsky 2014, p. 30.
- ^ a b c Villar 1984, pp. 15, 178–179.
- ^ Freedman 2005, pp. 207–211.
- ^ a b Villar 1984, p. 15.
- ^ Freedman 2005, pp. 211–212.
- ^ Villar 1984, p. 12.
- ^ Villar 1984, pp. 52, 174–176.
- ^ Villar 1984, p. 53.
- ^ Brown 1987, pp. 70–71.
- ^ Freedman 2005, p. 47.
- ^ Brown 1987, p. 75.
- ^ Villar 1984, p. 134.
- ^ Villar 1984, pp. 131–132.
- ^ Villar 1984, p. 128.
- ^ a b Brown 1987, p. 76.
- ^ Villar 1984, p. 127.
- ^ Tustin 1984b, p. 400.
- ^ a b Villar 1984, p. 29.
- ^ Brown 1987, pp. 67, 73.
- ^ Privratsky 2014, p. 31.
- ^ Villar 1984, pp. 31, 52–53.
- ^ Villar 1984, p. 31.
- ^ Bowie 1985, p. 11.
- ^ Villar 1984, p. 33.
- ^ Villar 1984, pp. 20–22.
- ^ Privratsky 2014, pp. 34–35.
- ^ Valovcin 1992, pp. 8–9.
- ^ Badsey 2014, p. 109.
- ^ Hellberg 2005, pp. 111–112.
- ^ a b Privratsky 2014, pp. 37–38.
- ^ Tustin 1984a, p. 296.
- ^ Privratsky 2014, p. 53.
- ^ a b Badsey 2014, pp. 111–112.
- ^ Thompson 1985, p. 12.
- ^ Privratsky 2014, p. 39.
- ^ a b c d e f Privratsky 2014, pp. 60–63.
- ^ a b c d e f g h Freedman 2005, pp. 62–63.
- ^ a b c McQueen 2008, pp. 6–7.
- ^ Hore 2005, p. 217.
- ^ a b McQueen 2008, pp. 73–74.
- ^ Hore 2005, p. 223.
- ^ Privratsky 2014, p. 21.
- ^ a b Privratsky 2014, p. 72.
- ^ White 2012, p. 166.
- ^ Brown 1987, p. 91.
- ^ Freedman 2005, pp. 277–283.
- ^ Burden et al. 1986, pp. 393–394.
- ^ a b Brown 1987, p. 89.
- ^ Privratsky 2014, p. 70.
- ^ Privratsky 2014, pp. 72–73.
- ^ Freedman 2005, pp. 65–67.
- ^ Privratsky 2014, p. 73.
- ^ Privratsky 2014, pp. 74–76.
- ^ Thompson 1991, p. 263.
- ^ Privratsky 2014, pp. 76–77.
- ^ Brown 1987, p. 92.
- ^ Clapp & Southby-Tailyour 1997, pp. 121–123.
- ^ a b c Privratsky 2014, pp. 66–69.
- ^ White 2012, pp. 136–137.
- ^ Burden et al. 1986, pp. 407–408.
- ^ Privratsky 2014, pp. 101–102, 236.
- ^ Privratsky 2014, pp. 172–173.
- ^ Freedman 2005, p. 194.
- ^ Clapp & Southby-Tailyour 1997, p. 151.
- ^ a b Freedman 2005, p. 461.
- ^ Freedman 2005, pp. 427–428.
- ^ Clapp & Southby-Tailyour 1997, pp. 152–154.
- ^ Brown 1987, pp. 171–172.
- ^ Privratsky 2014, pp. 97–98.
- ^ a b c Privratsky 2014, pp. 95–97.
- ^ Thompson 1985, pp. 55–60.
- ^ Gardiner 2012, p. 69.
- ^ Privratsky 2014, p. 120.
- ^ Thompson 1985, pp. 61–68.
- ^ Privratsky 2014, p. 108.
- ^ Brown 1987, pp. 196–198.
- ^ Clapp & Southby-Tailyour 1997, p. 185.
- ^ a b Privratsky 2014, pp. 111–114.
- ^ a b Brown 1987, p. 216.
- ^ a b c d Privratsky 2014, pp. 114–115.
- ^ Privratsky 2014, pp. 109–111.
- ^ Jolly 1983, pp. 48–53.
- ^ Jolly 1983, p. 97.
- ^ Jolly 1983, pp. 93–94.
- ^ Tustin 1984b, p. 409.
- ^ a b c Brown 1987, pp. 228–230.
- ^ Pook 2007, p. 35.
- ^ "Royal Air Force CH47 Chinook 'Bravo November'". Royal Air Force. Archived from the original on 21 March 2017. Retrieved 18 November 2017.
- ^ Thompson 1991, p. 278.
- ^ Privratsky 2014, p. 164.
- ^ a b Thompson 1991, p. 279.
- ^ Freedman 2005, p. 486.
- ^ Privratsky 1986, pp. 11–12.
- ^ Thompson 1991, p. 274.
- ^ Thompson 1991, pp. 272–273.
- ^ a b c Tustin 1984b, p. 401.
- ^ a b c Thompson 1991, pp. 274–275.
- ^ a b c Privratsky 2014, pp. 117–119.
- ^ a b Van der Bijl & Aldea 2003, pp. 86–87.
- ^ a b c d e Privratsky 2014, pp. 149–151, 161–164.
- ^ Privratsky 2014, p. 197.
- ^ Pook 2007, pp. 144–145.
- ^ Van der Bijl & Aldea 2003, pp. 129–130.
- ^ a b Privratsky 2014, pp. 133–135.
- ^ Freedman 2005, p. 557.
- ^ Jolly 1983, pp. 69–70.
- ^ Thompson 1991, pp. 280–281.
- ^ Privratsky 2014, pp. 143–144.
- ^ Thompson 1991, p. 287.
- ^ Thompson 1985, pp. 101–104.
- ^ Freedman 2005, pp. 586–587.
- ^ Freedman 2005, pp. 583–584.
- ^ Thompson 1991, p. 281.
- ^ Freedman 2005, p. 580.
- ^ Privratsky 2014, p. 172.
- ^ Thompson 1991, p. 284.
- ^ Van der Bijl & Aldea 2003, p. 124.
- ^ a b c Thompson 1991, pp. 284–285.
- ^ Privratsky 2014, pp. 176–179.
- ^ Freedman 2005, p. 607.
- ^ Privratsky 2014, pp. 185–187.
- ^ Privratsky 2014, pp. 196–198.
- ^ Jolly 1983, pp. 119–120.
- ^ Thompson 1991, pp. 285–286.
- ^ Freedman 2005, pp. 652–653.
- ^ a b c d Privratsky 2014, pp. 225–226.
- ^ Fursdon 1988, pp. 46–47.
- ^ a b Privratsky 2014, pp. 227–228.
- ^ Fursdon 1988, pp. 125–126.
- ^ Fursdon 1988, p. 48.
- ^ a b Fursdon 1988, pp. 53–56.
- ^ Fursdon 1988, p. 172.
- ^ Fursdon 1988, p. 155.
- ^ a b Fursdon 1988, pp. 155–156.
- ^ a b Freedman 2005, pp. 656–660.
- ^ Privratsky 2014, pp. 222–223.
- ^ Fursdon 1988, p. 44.
- ^ Fursdon 1988, pp. 156–157.
- ^ Fursdon 1988, p. 79.
- ^ Fursdon 1988, p. 81.
- ^ "RAF helicopter built using half of Chinook captured in Falklands". The Telegraph. 17 July 2009. Archived from the original on 3 December 2017. Retrieved 24 November 2017.
- ^ Privratsky 2014, p. 230.
- ^ Fursdon 1988, pp. 146–147.
- ^ Privratsky 2014, p. 229.
- ^ Freedman 2005, p. 660.
- ^ Rubenstein 2011, p. 153.
- ^ Thompson 1991, pp. 295–296.
- ^ Secretary of State for Defence 1982, pp. 25–27.
- ^ a b Grove 1987, pp. 383–387.
- ^ "LPD (R) Albion Class Landing Platform Dock, United Kingdom". Naval Technology. Archived from the original on 5 June 2011. Retrieved 10 December 2017.
- ^ Goldstein 2008, pp. 65–67.
- ^ a b Valovcin 1992, pp. 19–22.
- ^ Menarchik 1993, pp. 10–11.
- ^ Thompson 1991, pp. 297–298.
- ^ Valovcin 1992, p. 21.
References
- Badsey, Stephen (March 2014). "The Logistics of the British Recovery of the Falkland Islands, 1982". Defense of the Wider Realm: the Diplomacy and Strategy of the Protection of Islands in War (PDF). NIDS International Forum on War History. Tokyo: National Institute for Defense Studies. pp. 107–114. Archived (PDF) from the original on 3 October 2017. Retrieved 10 November 2017.
- Bowie, Christopher J. (April 1985). "Coping with the Unexpected: Great Britain and the War in the South Atlantic" (PDF). Rand Paper Series. Santa Monica, California: Rand Corporation. Archived (PDF) from the original on 12 August 2017. Retrieved 12 November 2017.
- Brown, David (1987). The Royal Navy and the Falklands War. London: Leo Cooper. OCLC 780526247.
- Burden, Rodney A.; Draper, Michael I.; Rough, Douglas A.; Smith, Colin R.; Wilton, David L. (1986). Falklands: The Air War. London: Arms and Armour Press. OCLC 159813718.
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- Fursdon, Edward (1988). Falklands Aftermath: Picking up the Pieces. London: Leo Cooper. OCLC 464011312.
- Gardiner, Ian (2012). The Yompers: With 45 Commando in the Falklands War. Barnsley, South Yorkshire: Pen and Sword. OCLC 757931967.
- Goldstein, Lyle (June–July 2008). "China's Falklands Lessons". Survival. 50 (3): 65–82. S2CID 153364825.
- OCLC 871764626.
- Hellberg, J. J. (2005). "An Experience with the Commando Logistic Regiment Royal Marines". In Badsey, Stephen; Havers, Rob; Grove, Mark (eds.). The Falklands Conflict: Twenty Years On. London; New York: Frank Cass. pp. 109–130. OCLC 55037580.
- Hore, Peter (2005). "The 'Logistics Miracle' of Ascension Island". In Badsey, Stephen; Havers, Rob; Grove, Mark (eds.). The Falklands Conflict: Twenty Years On. London ; New York: Frank Cass. pp. 213–225. OCLC 55037580.
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- McQueen, Robert (2008). Island Base: Ascension in the Falklands War. Caithness, Scotland: Whittles Publishing. OCLC 852122537.
- Menarchik, Douglas (1993). Powerlift – Getting to Desert Storm: Strategic Transportation and Strategy in the New World Order. Westport, Connecticut: Praeger. OCLC 27430669.
- Pook, Jerry (2007). RAF Harrier Ground Attack – Falklands. Barnsley, South Yorkshire: Pen and Sword. OCLC 81453470.
- Privratsky, Kenneth L. (1 April 1986). British Combat Service Support During the Falkland Islands War: Considerations for Providing Operational Sustainment to Remote Areas (PDF) (Report). Fort Leavenworth, Kansas: School of Advanced Military Studies, United States Army Command and General Staff College. Retrieved 21 April 2023.
- Privratsky, Kenneth L. (2014). Logistics in the Falklands War. Barnsley, South Yorkshire: Pen and Sword Books. OCLC 890938195.
- Rubenstein, Jérémy (2011). "'Argentine Soldier Known unto God:' The Darwin Cemetery and Conflicts in the Retelling of the Falklands/Malvinas War". Le Mouvement Social (237): 153–169. from the original on 9 December 2017. Retrieved 9 December 2017.
- OCLC 255102778.
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- Tustin, W. J. (July 1984). "The Logistics of the Falklands War – Part I". The Army Quarterly and Defence Journal. 114 (3): 295–301. ISSN 0004-2552.
- Tustin, W. J. (October 1984). "The Logistics of the Falklands War – Part II". The Army Quarterly and Defence Journal. 114 (4): 398–411. ISSN 0004-2552.
- Valovcin, Paul (February 1992). Logistics Lessons for the Operational Commander – The Falklands War (PDF) (Report). Newport, Rhode Island: Naval War College. Retrieved 21 April 2023.
- Van der Bijl, Nicholas; Aldea, David (2003). 5th Infantry Brigade in the Falklands. Barnsley, South Yorkshire: Leo Cooper. OCLC 911261490.
- Villar, Roger (1984). Merchant Ships at War: The Falklands Experience. London: Conway Maritime Press. OCLC 926867109.
- Webb, Kieran (2007). "The Continued Importance of Geographic Distance and Boulding's Loss of Strength Gradient". Comparative Strategy. 26 (4): 295–310. S2CID 153451707.
- OCLC 941503520.
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External links
- Privratsky, Kenneth (16 March 2016). Falklands 1982: Challenges in Expeditionary Warfare (Speech). United States Army Heritage and Education Center. Archived from the original on 14 November 2021.