Nuclear weapons of the United Kingdom
United Kingdom | ||
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NPT party Yes (1968, one of five recognised powers) | |
Nuclear weapons |
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Background |
Nuclear-armed states |
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In 1952, the United Kingdom became the third country (after the
The UK initiated a nuclear weapons programme, codenamed
The
In 1982, the Polaris Sales Agreement was amended to allow the UK to purchase
History
Tube Alloys
The
The discovery of fission raised the possibility that an extremely powerful
Oliphant took the resulting
Manhattan Project
In July 1940, Britain had offered to give the United States access to its scientific research,
The United Kingdom did not have the manpower or resources of the United States, and despite its early and promising start, Tube Alloys fell behind its American counterpart and was dwarfed by it.[24] On 30 July 1942, Anderson advised the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom, Winston Churchill, saying: "We must face the fact that ... [our] pioneering work ... is a dwindling asset and that, unless we capitalise it quickly, we shall be outstripped. We now have a real contribution to make to a 'merger.' Soon we shall have little or none."[25]
The British considered producing an atomic bomb without American help, but it would require overwhelming priority, would disrupt to other wartime projects, and was unlikely to be ready in time to affect the outcome of the
A British mission led by Akers assisted in the development of
Penney worked on means to assess the effects of a nuclear explosion, and wrote a paper on what height the bombs should be detonated at for maximum effect in attacks on Germany and Japan.
End of American cooperation
With the end of the war, the
On 9 November 1945, Attlee and the
The next meeting of the Combined Policy Committee on 15 April 1946 produced no accord on collaboration, and resulted in an exchange of cables between Truman and Attlee. Truman cabled on 20 April that he did not see the communiqué he had signed as obligating the United States to assist Britain in designing, constructing and operating an atomic energy plant.[53] The passing of the Atomic Energy Act of 1946 (McMahon Act) in August 1946, which was signed by Truman on 1 August 1946, and went into effect at midnight on 1 January 1947,[54] ended technical cooperation. Its control of "restricted data" prevented the United States' allies from receiving any information.[55] The remaining British scientists working in the United States were denied access to papers that they had written just days before.[56]
This partly resulted from the arrest for espionage of British physicist Alan Nunn May, who had worked in the Montreal Laboratory, in February 1946, while the legislation was being debated.[57] It was but the first of a series of spy scandals. The arrest of Klaus Fuchs in January 1950,[58] and the June 1951 defection of Donald Maclean, who had served as a British member of the Combined Policy Committee from January 1947 to August 1948, left Americans with a distrust of British security arrangements.[59]
Resumption of independent UK efforts
Most leading scientists and politicians of all parties were determined that Britain should have its own nuclear weapons. Their motives included national defence, a vision of a civil programme for nuclear power, and a desire that a British voice should be as powerful as any in international debate. Attlee set up a cabinet sub-committee, the Gen 75 Committee (known informally by Attlee as the "Atomic Bomb Committee"),[60] on 10 August 1945 to examine the feasibility of an independent British nuclear weapons programme.[61] A nuclear reactor and plutonium-processing facility was approved by the Gen 75 committee on 18 December 1945 "with the highest urgency and importance".[62] The Chiefs of Staff Committee considered the issue in July 1946, and recommended that Britain acquire nuclear weapons.[63] [64] They estimated that 200 bombs would be required by 1957.[65]
The Tube Alloys Directorate was transferred from the
The decision to proceed was formally made on 8 January 1947 at a meeting of Gen 163, a subcommittee of the Gen 75 Committee consisting of six
Production facilities were constructed under the direction of
Uranium ore was stockpiled at Springfields. As the American nuclear programme expanded, its requirements became greater than the production of the existing mines. To gain access to the stockpile, they reopened negotiations in 1947. This resulted in the 1948
Unsuccessful attempt to renew American partnership
The United States feared the USSR obtaining British atomic technology after conquering the United Kingdom in an invasion of western Europe. In February 1949 General
By that year, international control of atomic weapons seemed almost impossible to achieve, and Truman proposed to the
By agreeing to subsume its own weapons programme within the American one, the plan would have given Britain nuclear weapons much sooner than its own target date of late 1952. Although Truman supported the proposal, several key officials, including the United States Atomic Energy Commission's Lewis Strauss and Senator Arthur Vandenberg, did not. Their opposition, along with security concerns raised by the arrest of Fuchs, who was working at Harwell, ended the negotiations in January 1950.[88] After Britain developed nuclear weapons through its own efforts, the engineer Sir Leonard Owen stated that "the McMahon Act was probably one of the best things that happened ... as it made us work and think for ourselves along independent lines."[89]
First test and early systems
Churchill, now again prime minister, announced on 17 February 1952 that the first British weapon test would occur before the end of the year. During
This led to the development of the first deployed weapon, the
About fifty-eight Blue Danube bombs were produced.[98] The first bombs had plutonium cores, but all service models were modified to use a composite core which used both uranium-235 and plutonium. The bomb had a nominal yield of 15 kilotonnes of TNT (63 TJ).[99] The cores were stored separately from the high explosive components in concrete "igloos" at RAF Barnham in Suffolk and RAF Faldingworth in Lincolnshire. Some casings were stored elsewhere in the UK and in Cyprus for "second strike" use.[100] It remained in service until 1962, and was replaced by Red Beard, a smaller tactical nuclear weapon. The Blue Danube cores were recycled, and the plutonium used in other nuclear weapons.[98]
Being so big and heavy, Blue Danube could only be carried by the
Thermonuclear development
A month after Britain's first atomic weapons test,
The government decided on 27 July 1954 to begin development of a thermonuclear bomb, and announced its plans in February 1955.
The Green Granite prototype, known as Short Granite, was tested in the first of the
The next test was Grapple 2, of Orange Herald,
An
The scientists at Aldermaston had not yet mastered the design of thermonuclear weapons. They produced a new design, called Round A.[132][133] Another trial was scheduled, known as Grapple X.[132][134] Round A was dropped on 8 November 1957.[135][136] To save time and money,[132] the target was off the southern tip of Christmas Island rather than off Malden Island, just 20 nautical miles (37 km; 23 mi) from the airfield where 3,000 men were based.[134] This time the yield of 1.8 megatonnes of TNT (7.5 PJ) exceeded expectations. Round A was a true hydrogen bomb, but it used a relatively large quantity of expensive highly enriched uranium.[137]
Aldermaston had plenty of ideas about how to follow up Grapple X. A new design used
Eisenhower, now US president, on 22 August 1958 announced a moratorium on nuclear testing. This did not mean an immediate end to testing; on the contrary, the United States, the Soviet Union and the United Kingdom all rushed to perform as much testing as possible before the deadline.[142] A new British test series, known as Grapple Z, commenced on 22 August. It explored new technologies such as the use of external neutron initiators, which had first been tried out with Orange Herald. Core boosting using tritium and external boosting with layers of lithium deuteride were successfully tested, allowing a smaller, lighter two-stage devices.[143] The international moratorium commenced on 31 October 1958, and Britain ceased atmospheric testing for good.[144]
An independent deterrent
Believing that the United Kingdom was extremely vulnerable to a nuclear attack to which defence was impossible, the Chiefs of Staff and the RAF first advocated a British nuclear deterrence—not just nuclear weapons—in 1945: "It is our opinion that our only chance of securing a quick decision is by launching a devastating attack upon [enemy cities] with absolute weapons." In 1947, the Chiefs of Staff stated that even with American help the United Kingdom could not prevent the "vastly superior" Soviet forces from overrunning Western Europe, from which Russia could destroy Britain with missiles without using atomic weapons. Only "the threat of large-scale damage from similar weapons" could prevent the Soviet Union from using atomic weapons in a war.[145]
Churchill stated in a 1955 speech that deterrence would be "the parents of disarmament" and that, unless Britain contributed to Western deterrence with its own weapons, during a war the targets that threatened it the most might not be prioritised. The Prime Minister, Harold Macmillan, advanced the position that nuclear weapons would give Britain influence over targeting and American policy, and would affect strategy in the Middle East and Far East. His Minister of Defence, Duncan Sandys, considered that nuclear weapons reduced Britain's dependence on the United States.[148] The 1956 Suez Crisis demonstrated that Britain was no longer a great power,[149] but increased the value to Britain of an independent nuclear deterrent that would give it greater influence with the US and USSR.[150] While the military target of British nuclear weapons was the Soviet Union, the political target was the United States.[151]
Independent targeting was vital. The Chiefs of Staff believed that—contrary to Tizard's view—once the Soviet Union became able to attack the United States itself with nuclear weapons in the late 1950s, America might not risk its own cities to defend Europe, or not emphasise targets that endangered the United Kingdom more than the United States.
Renewed American partnership
The Soviet Union's launch of
British information security, or the lack thereof, no longer seemed so important now that the Soviet Union was apparently ahead, and British scientists had demonstrated that they understood how to build a hydrogen bomb with a different form of the
Under the MDA, 5.37 tonnes of UK-produced plutonium was sent to the US in exchange for 6.7 kg of tritium and 7.5 tonnes of HEU between 1960 and 1979.
The MDA has been renewed or amended many times. Most amendments merely extended the treaty for another five or ten years; others added definitions and made minor changes.[161][168][169] As of 2018[update], the most recent renewal was on 22 July 2014, extending the treaty to 31 December 2024.[170][171] A 1974 US proliferation report discussing British nuclear and missile development noted that "In many cases, it is based on technology received from the US and could not legitimately be passed on without US permission."[172]
Weapons systems
US nuclear weapons in British service
Production of British nuclear weapons was slow and Britain had only ten atomic bombs on hand in 1955 and just fourteen in 1956.
Four squadrons of
Under the Project E MOU, US personnel had custody of the weapons. This meant they performed all the tasks related to their storage, maintenance and readiness. The bombs were stored in Secure Storage Areas (SSAs) on the same bases as the bombers which British staff were not permitted to enter. It was therefore impossible to store British and American bombs together in the same SSA.[185] US custody also created operational problems. The procedure for handing over the bombs added an extra ten minutes to the bombers' reaction time,[186] and the requirement that US personnel had guardianship of the weapons at all times meant that neither they nor the bombers could be relocated to dispersal airfields as the RAF desired.[187] The operational restrictions imposed by Project E "effectively handed the US government a veto over the use of half of Britain's nuclear deterrent".[188]
The Air Council decided on 7 July 1960 that Project E weapons would be phased out by December 1962, by which time it was anticipated that there would be sufficient British megaton weapons to equip the entire strategic bomber force.[189] Project E weapons were replaced by British Yellow Sun bombs.[190] Problems encountered in the development of Red Beard meant that the replacement of kiloton weapons took longer than anticipated.[191] The Air Ministry decided to replace the Canberras with Valiants as the long-range Vulcan and Victor V bombers became available. A Valiant squadron at RAF Marham was assigned to SACEUR on 1 January 1961, followed by two more in July. The UK-based Canberra squadrons were then disbanded. Each of the 24 Valiants was equipped with two Project E Mark 28 nuclear bombs.[180] These were replaced by the newer Mark 43 nuclear bombs in early 1963.[180] The Valiants were withdrawn from service in 1965.[192]
Project E nuclear warheads were also used on the sixty
The British Army purchased 113
A maritime version of Project E, known as Project N supplied US Navy weapons. Providing American atomic bombs for Royal Navy ships would have involved similar dual key arrangements and detachments of
When the Cold War ended in 1991, the BAOR still had about 85 Lance missiles, and more than 70 W33 eight-inch and W48 155 mm nuclear artillery shells. The last Project E warheads, including the Mark 57 nuclear depth bombs and those used by the BAOR, were withdrawn in July 1992.[207]
US nuclear weapons in US service in the UK
In the early years of the Cold War, the majority of the bomber force of the US Strategic Air Command (SAC) was made up of World War II vintage Boeing B-29 Superfortress bombers, and their successors, the Boeing B-50 Superfortress and the Boeing B-47 Stratojet, all of which lacked the range to reach targets in the Soviet Union from bases in the continental United States. Only the small number of Convair B-36 Peacemaker bombers could do this. Overseas bases were therefore required, and the need for bases in the UK was a feature of American war planning for over a decade.[208]
Obtaining British permission was easy thanks to the wartime comradeship between the RAF and the United States Army Air Forces (USAAF). Bypassing the politicians,
The
In fulfilment of NATO's plans to halt a Soviet invasion of Western Europe using tactical nuclear weapons, the 3rd Air Force received its own nuclear weapons when the
Under the terms of the 1987
British nuclear weapons
The MDA made fully developed and tested American designs available quickly and cheaply. The first of these was the Mark 28, which was "Anglicised" and manufactured in the UK as Red Snow. Exact copies of American designs were not pursued; the high explosive used in American warheads were more sensitive than British high explosive, and had caused fatal accidents in the US. Its use was not contemplated in the UK after an accident at Aldermaston on 28 February 1959 when two men were killed after a piece of British high explosive fell from a lorry. British high explosive was also bulkier, so a redesign was required.[226]
Red Snow was far more economical in its use of fissile material than the Green Grass warhead in the Yellow Sun Mk.1 bomb, Britain's first production hydrogen bomb. A Yellow Sun Mk.2 with Red Snow, therefore, cost £500,000 compared to £1.2 million for the Mk.1. RAF Bomber Command wanted Violet Club replaced as soon as possible, so 37 Yellow Sun Mk.1s were delivered by the end of 1959. Deliveries of the Yellow Sun Mk.2 commenced in January 1961, and 43 were delivered by the end of the year. In November 1958. Red Snow also replaced Green Grass as the warhead in the
The kiloton Red Beard was developed for use by the Canberras and the Royal Navy's
The availability of US weapons and designs under the MDA led to the cancellation of several research projects.
In 1960, the government decided to cancel the
The Americans initially intended to pair Skybolt with the
At the same time, work was in progress on a Red Beard replacement for use with the RAF's BAC TSR-2 and the Royal Navy's Blackburn Buccaneer. Ultimately, a warhead was produced in two variants: the high-yield (300 to 450 kilotonnes of TNT (1,300 to 1,900 TJ)) WE.177B and the low-yield (0.5 or 10 kilotonnes of TNT (2.1 or 41.8 TJ)) WE.177A as a Red Beard replacement, and for use in depth charges and anti-submarine missiles. WE.177 was later adapted for use with Polaris, and would become the longest-serving British nuclear weapon.[238][237]
The deployment of ships carrying nuclear weapons caused complications during the Falklands War, and in the aftermath of that war it was decided to stockpile them ashore in peacetime.[239] When the US withdrew its theatre nuclear weapons from Europe, the British government followed suit. The nuclear depth bombs were withdrawn from service in 1992,[237][240] followed by the WE.177 free-fall bombs on 31 March 1998, and all were dismantled by the end of August.[241]
Research and production facilities
The Atomic Weapons Establishment (AWE), Aldermaston, formerly the Atomic Weapons Research Establishment (AWRE), is situated on a 750-acre (300 ha) site near
The Atomic Weapons Research Establishment became part of the United Kingdom Atomic Energy Authority on 1 January 1955.[244] The last trials at Orford Ness were conducted on 9 June 1971, and the site was closed on 1 October 1971.[245]
Cardiff closed in 1997,
Polaris
The
Macmillan met with President
The
Polaris had not been designed to penetrate
Trident
In 1982, the
Each submarine could carry up to 16 missiles, each of which can each carry up to 8 warheads. However, when the decision to purchase Trident II was announced, it was stressed that British Trident boats would carry no more than 128 warheads—the same number as Polaris. In November 1993, the Secretary of State for Defence, Malcolm Rifkind, announced that each boat would deploy no more than 96 warheads.[222] In 2010, this was reduced to a maximum of 40 warheads, split between eight missiles.[275][276] The missiles have a range of 12,000 kilometres (7,500 mi).[277]
The first Trident boat, HMS Vanguard, collected a full load of 16 missiles in 1994, but the second, HMS Victorious drew only 12 in 1995, and the third, HMS Vigilant, 14 in 1997, leaving the remaining missile tubes empty.[278] Although the UK designed, manufactured and owns the warheads, there is evidence that the warhead design is similar to, or even based on, the US W76 warhead fitted in some US Navy Trident missiles, with design data being supplied by the United States through the MDA.[279][280]
Since 1969, the United Kingdom has always had at least one ballistic-missile submarine on patrol, giving it a
The Trident system cost £12.6 billion to build (at 1996 prices) and £280m a year to maintain. Options for replacing Trident ranged from £5 billion for the missiles alone to £20 to £30 billion for missiles, submarines and research facilities. At a minimum, for the system to continue after around 2020, the missiles would need to be replaced.[286] By 2016, the price of replacement of submarine had risen to £31 billion and it was estimated by Ministry of Defence that the cost of Trident replacement programme for 30 years would be £167 billion.[287]
Trident renewal
With the tactical nuclear weapons having been withdrawn from service, Trident was the UK's only remaining nuclear weapons system.[288] By this time, possession of nuclear weapons had become an important part of Britain's national identity. Not renewing Trident meant that Britain would become a non-nuclear power and strike at Britain's status as a great power.[289] A decision on the renewal of Trident was made on 4 December 2006. Prime Minister Tony Blair told MPs it would be "unwise and dangerous" for the UK to give up its nuclear weapons. He outlined plans to spend up to £20bn on a new generation of ballistic missile submarines. The new boats would continue to carry the Trident II D-5 missiles, but submarine numbers might be cut from four to three, and the number of nuclear warheads would reduced by 20% to 160. He said although the Cold War had ended, the UK needed nuclear weapons, as no-one could be sure another nuclear threat would not emerge in the future.[290][291]
The 2010 coalition government agreed "that the renewal of Trident should be scrutinised to ensure value for money. Liberal Democrats will continue to make the case for alternatives." Research and development work continued, but the final decision to proceed with building a replacement was scheduled for 2016, after the next election.[292] There was already some urgency to move ahead because some experts predicted it could take 17 years to develop the replacement for the Vanguard-class submarines.[293][294] The vote in the House of Commons on whether to replace the existing four Vanguard-class submarines was held on 18 July 2016.[295] The Trident renewal programme motion passed with a significant majority with 472 MPs voting in favour and 117 against. The Leader of the Opposition, Jeremy Corbyn, and 47 other Labour MPs had voted against it; 41 did not vote but 140 Labour votes were cast in favour of the motion.[296][297] The Successor class was officially named the Dreadnought class on 21 October 2016.[298] The four new Dreadnought submarines were expected to come into operation in the early 2030s,[299][300] with the programme lasting until at least the 2060s.[301]
The government released a written statement on 25 February 2020, outlining that the UK nuclear warheads will be replaced and will match the US Trident II SLBM and related systems.
Nuclear tests
The UK's first nuclear test, Operation Hurricane, was in the Montebello Islands of Western Australia.
The British government formally requested a permanent test facility on 30 October 1953. Due to concerns about
In addition to the major tests involving explosions, many
The Australian government prohibited hydrogen bomb tests in Australia, so Britain had to look for another test site for its hydrogen bombs.[315][316] The first British hydrogen bombs were tested during Operation Grapple at Malden Island and Christmas Island in the Pacific Ocean.[317] Nine tests were conducted there in 1957, 1958 and 1959,[318] ultimately demonstrating that the UK had developed expertise in thermonuclear weapons.[319]
Beginning in December 1962, the UK conducted 24 tests at the
The United Kingdom, along with the United States and the Soviet Union, signed the
Altogether forty-five nuclear tests were carried out by the United Kingdom between 3 October 1952 to 26 November 1991 at the Montebello Islands, Emu Field and Maralinga in Australia, on Christmas and Malden Islands in Kiribati, and at the Nevada Test Site in the United States. The 45 tests included 21 tests carried out in the atmosphere.[329]
Series | Years | Location | Tests | kilotons )
|
Total yield (kilotons) | Notes | References |
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Hurricane | 1952 | Trimouille Island, Montebello Islands, Western Australia | 1 | 25 | 25 | First British nuclear test. | [329] |
Totem | 1953 | Emu Field, South Australia, Australia | 2 | 8 to 10 | 18 | [329] | |
Mosaic | 1956 | Montebello Islands, Western Australia | 2 | 15 to 60 | 75 | [329] | |
Buffalo | 1956 | Maralinga, South Australia | 4 | 2 to 15 | 30 | [329] | |
Antler | 1957 | Maralinga, South Australia | 3 | 1 to 27 | 34 | [329] | |
Grapple | 1957–1958 | Kiritimati and Malden Island, Kiribati | 9 | 24 to 3,000 | 7,869 | First scalable thermonuclear test. | [329] |
NTS series | 1961–1991 | Nevada Test Site, Nevada, United States | 24 | 0 to 140 | 1,232 | [329] | |
Totals | 1952–1991 | 45 | 0 to 3,000 | 9,282 | Total country yield is 1.7% of all nuclear testing. |
Nuclear defence
Britain was extremely vulnerable to nuclear weapons. The 1955 Strath Committee grimly estimated that an attack on the UK with just ten 10-megaton weapons would kill 12 million people and seriously injure another 4 million even before the country was blanketed with radioactive fallout.[330]
Warning systems
The UK has relied on the Ballistic Missile Early Warning System (BMEWS) and, in later years, Defense Support Program (DSP) satellites for warning of a nuclear attack. Both of these systems are owned and controlled by the United States, although the UK has joint control over UK-based systems. One of the four component radars for the BMEWS is based at RAF Fylingdales in North Yorkshire.[331][332]
In 2003, the UK government stated that it would consent to a request from the US to upgrade the radar at Fylingdales for use in the US
Attack scenarios
During the Cold War, a significant effort by government and academia was made to assess the effects of a nuclear attack on the UK. There were four major exercises:
- Exercise Inside Right took place in 1975.[336]
- Exercise Scrum Half was conducted in 1978.[336]
- Exercise megatons (69 ground burst, 62 air burst) with an average of 1.5 megatons per bomb. The exercise was criticised as unrealistic as an actual exchange may be much larger or smaller, and did not include targets in Inner London such as Whitehall.[337] Even so, the effect of the limited attack in Square Leg was estimated to be 29 million dead (53 per cent of the population) and 6.4 million seriously injured.[338]
- Exercise Hard Rock was a combined communications and civil defence exercise planned for September and October 1982. It assumed a conventional war in Europe lasting two to three days, during which the UK would be attacked with conventional weapons, then a limited nuclear exchange, with 54 nuclear warheads used against military targets in the UK. 250,000 people protested against the exercise and 24 councils refused to participate. The limited scenario still assumed casualties of 7.9 million dead and 5 million injured.[338] The scenario was ridiculed by the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament and the exercise was postponed indefinitely.[339] The New Statesman later claimed the Ministry of Defence insisted on having a veto over proposed targets in the exercise and several were removed to make them politically more acceptable; for example, the nuclear submarine base at Faslane was removed from the target list.[340]
Civil defence
Successive governments developed
Politics
Anti-nuclear movement
The anti-nuclear movement in the United Kingdom consists of groups who oppose nuclear technologies such as
The end of atmospheric nuclear testing, internal squabbles, and activists focusing their energies on other causes led to a rapid decline, but it revived in the early 1980s in the wake of the Thatcher government's December 1979 decision to deploy US GLCMs in the UK, and the announcement of its decision to purchase Trident in July 1980. Membership leapt from 3,000 in 1980 to 50,000 a year later, and rallies for unilateral nuclear disarmament in London in October 1981 and June 1982 attracted 250,000 marchers, the largest ever mass demonstrations in the UK up to that time.[345]
End of cross-party support
There was little dissent in the House of Commons from the government's nuclear weapons policy; it had almost
From 1955 the government chose to emphasise the nuclear deterrent and de-emphasise conventional forces. In 1962, it stated that the forthcoming
Gaitskell's Labour party ceased supporting an independent deterrent in 1960 via its new "Policy for Peace", after the cancellation of Blue Streak made nuclear independence less likely. Labour also adopted a resolution favouring unilateral disarmament. Although Gaitskell opposed the resolution and it was reversed in 1961 in favour of continuing support of a general Western nuclear deterrent, the party's opposition to a British deterrent remained and became more prominent.
The 1982 Labour Party Conference adopted a platform calling for the removal of the GLCMs, the scrapping of Polaris and the cancellation of Trident. This was reaffirmed by the 1986 conference. While the party was given little chance of winning the 1983 election in the aftermath of the Falklands War, polls had shown Labour ahead of the Conservatives in 1986 and 1987. In the wake of Labour's unsuccessful performance in the 1987 election, the Labour Party leader, Neil Kinnock, despite his own unilateralist convictions, moved to drop the party's disarmament policy, which he saw as a contributing factor in its defeat.[352][353] The party formally voted to do so in October 1989.[354]
The vote on whether to order the
Nuclear posture
The UK relaxed its nuclear posture after the
- The stockpile of "operationally available warheads" was reduced to 225
- The final batch of missile bodies would not be purchased, limiting the fleet to 58.
- A submarine's load of warheads was reduced from 96 to 48. This reduced the explosive power of the warheads on a Vanguard class Trident submarine to "one third less than a Polaris submarine armed with Chevaline". However, 48 warheads per Trident submarine represents a 50% increase on the 32 warheads per submarine of Chevaline. Total explosive power has been in decline for decades as the accuracy of missiles has improved, therefore requiring less power to destroy each target. Trident can destroy 48 targets per submarine, as opposed to 32 targets that could be destroyed by Chevaline.
- Submarines' missiles would not be targeted, but rather at several days "notice to fire".
- Although one submarine would always be on patrol it will operate on a "reduced day-to-day alert state". A major factor in maintaining a constant patrol is to avoid "misunderstanding or escalation if a Trident submarine were to sail during a period of crisis".[366]
In April 2017 Defence Secretary Michael Fallon confirmed that the UK would use nuclear weapons in a pre-emptive nuclear strike under "the most extreme circumstances".[367] Until 1998 the aircraft-delivered, free-fall WE.177 bombs provided a sub-strategic option in addition to their designed function as tactical battlefield weapons. With the retirement of WE.177, a sub-strategic warhead is used with some (but not all) deployed Trident missiles. The 2010 Strategic Defence and Security Review further pledged to reduce its requirement for operationally available warheads from fewer than 160 to no more than 120.[368] In a January 2015 written statement, Defence Secretary Michael Fallon reported that "all Vanguard Class SSBNs on continuous at-sea deterrent patrol now carry 40 nuclear warheads and no more than eight operational missiles".[369] However, on 17 March 2021, Prime Minister Boris Johnson announced that the number of nuclear warheads in the UK stockpile would be increased to 260. This reversed the long-term trend of steadily reducing the stockpile.[370][371]
Nuclear weapons control
Role of the Prime Minister
The Prime Minister authorises the use of nuclear weapons.[372] All former prime ministers have supported an "independent nuclear deterrent", including David Cameron.[373][374] Only one, James Callaghan, has given any insight on his orders; Callaghan stated that, although in a situation where nuclear weapon use was required – and thus the whole purpose and value of the weapon as a deterrent had failed – he would have ordered use of nuclear weapons, if needed: "if we had got to that point, where it was, I felt it was necessary to do it, then I would have done it (used the weapon) ... but if I had lived after pressing that button, I could have never forgiven myself."[375] Denis Healey, the Secretary of State for Defence and "alternate decision-taker" under Harold Wilson, said that in the event of Soviet nuclear weapons attacking the United Kingdom and the Prime Minister had been killed or incapacitated, he would not have ordered a retaliation.[375]
The precise details of how a British Prime Minister would authorise a nuclear strike remain secret, although the principles of the Trident missile control system are believed to be based on the plan set up for Polaris in 1968, which has now been declassified. A closed-circuit television system was set up between 10 Downing Street and the SSBN Control Officer at the
Until 1998, when it was withdrawn from service, the WE.177 bomb was armed with a standard
Role of the Chief of the Defence Staff
There appears to be a debate over whether concurrence of the
Following the death of Queen Elizabeth II, the role of Command-in-Chief succeeded to King Charles III[380]
The same interview pointed out that while the Prime Minister would have the constitutional authority to fire the Chief of the Defence Staff, he could not appoint a replacement as the position is appointed by the monarch.
Nuclear deputies
The Prime Minister appoints nuclear deputies in case they are out of reach or indisposed during an emergency. Such appointments are made on a personal basis rather than according to the ministerial ranking.[383] In 1961, the Prime Minister was advised for the first time to appoint a first deputy and second deputy to authorise nuclear retaliation if they were not immediately available.[384]
In 1961, Harold Macmillan chose
Letters of last resort
During the Cold War, if a nuclear attack had taken place and the Prime Minister and their deputies could not be obtained, then Royal Air Force Strike Command had standing delegated authority to retaliate.[372]
Since 1972, the Prime Minister has also written four letters of last resort, one for each SSBN commander.[372] The Prime Minister writes these letters when they take office and they set out what the commander should do in the event of a nuclear attack that kills the Prime Minister and their nuclear deputy/ies.[394] Past options proposed to the Prime Minister have included commit the forces, do not commit the forces, make the most reasonable choice or place yourself under Allied command.[372] This system of issuing notes containing orders in the event of the head of government's death is said to be unique to the United Kingdom (although the concept of written last orders, particularly of a ship's captain, is a naval tradition), with other nuclear powers using different procedures. The letters are destroyed unopened whenever a Prime Minister leaves office.[395]
Legality
The United Kingdom is one of the
Article VI of the NPT imposes an obligation on all states: "to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament, and on a Treaty on general and complete disarmament". The NPT Review Conference held in 2000 agreed, by consensus, 13 practical steps towards nuclear disarmament. The UK remains committed to these steps and is making progress on them. We have been disarming. Since the Cold War ended, we have withdrawn and dismantled our tactical maritime and airborne nuclear capabilities. We have terminated our nuclear capable Lance missiles and artillery. We have the smallest nuclear capability of any recognised nuclear weapon state accounting for less than one per cent of the global inventory. And we are the only nuclear weapon state that relies on a single nuclear system.[398]
The subsequent vote was won overwhelmingly, including unanimous support from the opposition Conservative Party.[290] The Government's position remained that it was abiding by the NPT in renewing Trident, and Britain has the right to possess nuclear weapons, a position reiterated by Tony Blair on 21 February 2007.[399] Only the United Kingdom has expressed its opposition to the establishment of a new legally binding treaty to prevent the threat or use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear states,[400] through its vote in the United Nations General Assembly in 1998.[401]
The United Kingdom decided not to sign the UN treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons, a binding agreement for negotiations for the total elimination of nuclear weapons, supported by more than 120 nations.[402] None of the nine countries known or believed at the time to possess nuclear weapons supported the treaty, nor did any of the 30 countries of the NATO alliance.[403]
See also
Notes
- ^ "Status of World Nuclear Forces – Federation Of American Scientists". Fas.org.
- ^ Clark 1961, p. 9.
- ^ Gowing 1964, pp. 17–18.
- ^ Clark 1961, p. 5.
- ^ Clark 1961, p. 11.
- ^ Bernstein 2011, p. 240.
- ^ Zimmerman 1995, p. 262.
- ^ Gowing 1964, pp. 23–29.
- ^ Farmelo 2013, pp. 15–24.
- ^ Gowing 1964, pp. 37–39.
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Further reading
- Hill, Christopher Robert (2019). "Britain, West Africa and 'The new nuclear imperialism': decolonisation and development during French tests". S2CID 149516886.
- Hogg, Jonathan; Brown, Kate (2019). "Social and cultural histories of British nuclear mobilisation since 1945". .
- Salisbury, Daniel (2020). Secrecy, Public Relations and the British Nuclear Debate: How the UK Government Learned to Talk about the Bomb, 1970–83. Abingdon, Oxfordshire: Routledge. OCLC 1124777618.
External links
- British Nuclear Weapons Stockpile, 1953–2013 at History in Pieces
- Video archive of the UK's Nuclear Testing[permanent dead link] at sonicbomb.com
- British Nuclear Policy, BASIC
- Table of UK Nuclear Weapons models
- The Real Meaning of the Words: a Pedantic Glossary of British Nuclear Weapons Archived 25 March 2009 at the Wayback Machine (PDF)