Buddhist crisis
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Date | 8 May – 2 November 1963 (5 months, 3 weeks and 4 days) | ||
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The Buddhist crisis (Vietnamese: Biến cố Phật giáo) was a period of political and religious tension in South Vietnam between May and November 1963, characterized by a series of repressive acts by the South Vietnamese government and a campaign of civil resistance, led mainly by Buddhist monks.[1]
The crisis was precipitated by the
Background
Part of a series on |
Violence against Buddhists |
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In
The
Events
May 1963
A rarely enforced 1958 law—known as Decree Number 10—was invoked in May 1963 to prohibit the display of religious flags. This disallowed the flying of the
In response to the shootings in Huế, Buddhist leader Thích Trí Quang proclaimed a five-point "manifesto of the monks" that demanded freedom to fly the Buddhist flag, religious equality between Buddhists and Catholics, compensation for the victims' families, an end to arbitrary arrests, and punishment of the officials responsible.[20] The request was formalized on 13 May, and talks began on 15 May.[22]
Diệm denied governmental responsibility for the incident. Instead, he blamed the VC for the event. Diệm's Secretary of State
On May 30, more than 500 monks demonstrated in front of the National Assembly in Saigon. The Buddhists had evaded a ban on public assembly by hiring four buses, packing them with monks, and closing the blinds. They drove around the city until the convoy stopped at the designated time and the monks disembarked. This was the first time an open protest had been held in Saigon against Diệm in his eight years of rule.
June 1963
On June 1, Diệm's authorities announced the dismissal of the three major officials involved in the Huế incident: the provincial chief and his deputy, and the government delegate for the Central Region of Vietnam. The stated reason was that they had failed to maintain order. By this time, the situation appeared to be beyond reconciliation.[29]
On June 3, amid nationwide protests in Saigon and other cities,
Diệm responded to the controversy of the chemical attacks by agreeing to formal talks with the Buddhist leaders. He appointed a three-member Interministerial Committee, which included Vice President
On June 11, Buddhist monk Thích Quảng Đức burned himself to death at a busy Saigon road intersection in protest against Diệm's policies.
In response to Buddhist self-immolation as a form of protest,
Acting US Ambassador
On June 16, an agreement between the committee and the Buddhists was reached. An agreement had been reached pertaining to all five demands, although the terms were vague. Diệm claimed it contained nothing that he had not already accepted. The "Joint Communiqué" asserted that the national flag "should always be respected and be put at its appropriate place".[38] The National Assembly would consult with religious groups in an effort to remove them "from the regulations of Ordinance No. 10" and to establish new guidelines appropriate to their religious activities.[38] In the meantime the government committee promised a loose application of the regulation. It also promised leniency in the censorship of Buddhist literature and prayer books and the granting of permits to construct Buddhist pagodas, schools and charitable institutions.[38]
Both sides agreed to form an investigative committee to "re-examine" the Buddhist grievances and Diệm agreed to grant a full amnesty to all Buddhists who had protested against the government. The agreement stated the "normal and purely religious activity" could go unhindered without the need for government permission in pagodas or the headquarters of the General Association of Buddhists. Diệm promised an inquiry into the Huế shootings and punishment for any found guilty,[39][40] although it denied government involvement. In an attempt to save face, Diệm signed the agreement directly under a paragraph declaring that "the articles written in this joint communiqué have been approved in principle by me from the beginning", which he added with his own handwriting,[40] thereby implying that he had nothing to concede.[39]
The Joint Communiqué was presented to the press on June 16 and Thích Tịnh Khiết thanked Diệm and exhorted the Buddhist community to work with the government. He expressed his "conviction that the joint communiqué will inaugurate a new era and that ... no erroneous action from whatever quarter will occur again." He declared that the protest movement was over, and called on Buddhists to return to their normal lives and pray for the success of the agreement.[41] However, some younger monks were disappointed with the result of the negotiations feeling that Diem's regime had not been made accountable.[42]
Trueheart was skeptical about its implementation, privately reporting that if Diệm did not follow through, the US should look for alternative leadership options. The troubles had become a public relations issue for Diem beyond his country, with speculation about a US-Diệm rift being discussed in American newspapers following the self-immolation.
The agreement was put in doubt by an incident outside Xá Lợi Pagoda the following day. A crowd of around 2,000 people were confronted by police who persisted in ringing the pagoda despite the agreement. A riot eventually broke out and police attacked the crowd with tear gas, fire hoses, clubs, and gunfire. One protester was killed and scores more injured. Moderates from both sides urged calm while some government officials blamed "extremist elements". An Associated Press story described the riot as "the most violent anti-Government outburst in South Vietnam in years".[41][44] Furthermore, many protesters remained in jail contrary to the terms of the Joint Communique. The crisis deepened as more Buddhists began calling for a change of government and younger monks such as Thích Trí Quang came to the forefront, blaming Diệm for the ongoing impasse.[41] Due to the failure of the agreement to produce the desired results, older and more senior monks, who were more moderate, saw their prestige diminished, and the younger, more assertive monks began to take on a more prominent role in Buddhist politics.[45]
Thich Tinh Khiet sent Diệm a letter after the funeral of Thích Quảng Đức, noting the government was not observing the agreement and that the condition of Buddhists in South Vietnam had deteriorated. Tho denied the allegation, and Ngô Đình Nhu told a reporter: "If anyone is oppressed in this affair, it is the government which has been constantly attacked and whose mouth has been shut with Scotch tape."
A US State Department report concluded that the religious disquiet was not fomented by communist elements.[47] In the meantime the government had quietly informed local officials that the agreements were a "tactical retreat" to buy time before decisively putting down the Buddhist movement. Diệm's regime stalled on implementing the release of Buddhists who had been imprisoned for protesting against it. This led to a discussion within the US government to push for the removal of the Nhus, who were regarded as the extremist influence over Diệm, from power.[47]
The Buddhists were becoming increasingly skeptical of government intentions. They had received information that suggested that the agreement was just a governmental tactic to buy time and wait for the popular anger to die down, before Diệm would arrest the leading Buddhist monks.[42] They began to step up the production of critical pamphlets and began translating articles critical of Diệm in the Western media to distribute to the public. As promises continued to fail to materialise, the demonstrations at Xá Lợi and elsewhere continued to grow.[48]
July 1963
In July, Diệm's government continued to attack the Buddhists. It accused Thích Quảng Đức of having been drugged before being set alight. Tho speculated that the VC had infiltrated the Buddhists and converted them into a political organization. Interior Minister Luong alleged that cabinet ministers had received death threats.[49] Henry Cabot Lodge Jr. was announced as the new US ambassador effective in late August, replacing Frederick Nolting, who was considered too close to Diệm.[47]
On July 7, 1963, the secret police of Ngô Đình Nhu attacked a group of journalists from the United States who were covering Buddhist protests on the ninth anniversary of Diem's rise to power. Peter Arnett of the Associated Press (AP) was punched in the nose, but the quarrel quickly ended after David Halberstam of The New York Times, being much taller than Nhu's men, counterattacked and caused the secret police to retreat. Arnett and his colleague, the Pulitzer Prize-winning journalist and photographer Malcolm Browne, were later accosted by police at their office and taken away for questioning on suspicion of attacking police officers.[50][51][52] In the end, Diem agreed to have the charges against Browne and Arnett dropped after intervention from the US Embassy.[51]
On the same day, Diem publicly claimed that the "problems raised by the
August 1963
On Sunday, August 18, the Buddhists staged a mass protest at Xá Lợi Pagoda, Saigon's largest, attracting around 15,000 people, undeterred by rain.
On the evening of August 18, ten senior ARVN generals met to discuss the situation and decided that martial law needed to be imposed. On August 20, Nhu summoned seven of the generals to Gia Long Palace for consultation. They presented their request to impose martial law and discussed dispersion of the monks. Nhu sent the generals to see Diệm. The president listened to the group of seven, led by General Trần Văn Đôn. Đôn claimed that communists had infiltrated the monks at Xá Lợi Pagoda and warned that ARVN morale was deteriorating because of the civil unrest. He claimed that it was possible that the Buddhists could assemble a crowd to march on Gia Long Palace. Hearing this, Diệm agreed to declare martial law effective the next day, without consulting his cabinet. Troops were ordered into Saigon to occupy strategic points. Đôn was appointed as the acting Chief of the Armed Forces in the place of General Lê Văn Tỵ, who was abroad having medical treatment. Đôn noted that Diệm was apparently concerned with the welfare of the monks, telling the generals that he did not want any of them hurt. The martial law orders were authorized with the signature of Đôn, who had no idea that military action was to occur in the early hours of August 21 without his knowledge.[59][60]
Shortly after midnight on August 21, on the instructions of Nhu, ARVN Special Forces troops under Colonel
Once the US government realized the truth about who was behind the raids, they reacted with disapproval towards the Diệm regime. The US had pursued a policy of quietly and privately advising the Ngos to reconcile with the Buddhists while publicly supporting the alliance, but following the attacks, this route was regarded as untenable. Furthermore, the attacks were carried out by US-trained Special Forces personnel funded by the CIA, and presented incoming Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge Jr., with a fait accompli.[63][64] The state department issued a statement declaring that the raids were a "direct violation" of the promise to pursue "a policy of reconciliation".[61][65]
On August 24, the Kennedy administration sent Cable 243 to Lodge at the embassy in Saigon, marking a change in US policy. The message advised Lodge to seek the removal of Nhu from power, and to look for alternative leadership options if Diem refused to heed American pressure for reform. As the probability of Diệm's sidelining Nhu and his wife was seen as virtually nil, the message effectively meant the fomenting of a coup.[66][67][68] The Voice of America also broadcast a statement blaming Nhu for the raids and absolving the army of responsibility.[69]
September 1963
After the events of August, Diệm's regime became a major preoccupation of the
In their submissions to the United States National Security Council (NSC), Krulak presented an extremely optimistic report on the progress of the war, while Mendenhall presented a very bleak picture of military failure and public discontent. Krulak disregarded the effects of popular discontent in combating the Viet Cong. The general felt that the Vietnamese soldiers' efforts in the field would not be affected by the public's unease with Diệm's policies. Mendenhall focused on gauging the sentiment of urban-based Vietnamese and concluded that Diệm's policies increased the possibility of religious civil war. Mendenhall said that Diệm's policies were causing the South Vietnamese to believe that life under the VC would improve the quality of their lives.[70]
The divergent reports led US President John F. Kennedy to famously ask his two advisers, "The two of you did visit the same country, didn't you?"[71][72]
The inconclusive report was the subject of bitter and personal debate among Kennedy's senior advisers. Various courses of action towards Vietnam were discussed, such as fostering a regime change or taking a series of selective measures designed to cripple the influence of the Nhus, who were seen as the major causes of the political problems in South Vietnam.[70]
The disparate reports of Krulak and Mendenhall resulted in a follow-up mission, the McNamara–Taylor mission.
November 1963
On November 1, 1963, after six months of tension and growing opposition to the regime, ARVN generals executed the
See also
- 1963 South Vietnamese coup, the coup that resulted from the crisis
- Vietnam War
- Thich Quang Duc
- Xa Loi Pagoda raids
- Vietnam portal
- Politics portal
- Religion portal
- 1960s portal
Notes
- ^ Adam Roberts, 'Buddhism and Politics in South Vietnam', The World Today, Royal Institute of International Affairs, London, vol. 21, no. 6, June 1965, pp. 240–50 analyses the causes of the Buddhist crisis and its significance as a case of non-violent struggle.
- ^ Moyar, pp. 215–216.
- ^ "The Religious Crisis". Time. June 20, 1963. Archived from the original on December 4, 2012. Retrieved August 21, 2007.
- ^ Tucker, pp. 49, 291, 293.
- ^ Maclear, p. 63.
- ^ "The Situation in South Vietnam – SNIE 53-2-63". The Pentagon Papers (Gravel ed.). July 10, 1963. pp. 729–733. Archived from the original on November 9, 2017. Retrieved August 21, 2007.
- ^ Tucker, p. 291.
- ^ a b Gettleman, pp. 280–282.
- ^ "South Vietnam: Whose funeral pyre?". The New Republic. June 29, 1963. p. 9.
- ^ Warner, p. 210.
- ^ Fall, p. 199.
- ^ Buttinger, p. 993.
- ^ Karnow, p. 294.
- ^ Buttinger, p. 933.
- ^ Jacobs p. 91.
- ^ "Diệm's other crusade". The New Republic. June 22, 1963. pp. 5–6.
- ^ a b Manhattan, Avro (1987). Vietnam: Why Did We Go?. Chick Publications. pp. 78–79.
- ^ Hammer, pp. 103–105.
- ^ Jacobs, p. 142.
- ^ a b c Jacobs, p. 143.
- ^ Hammer, pp. 113–114.
- ^ Hammer, p. 117.
- ^ Hammer, pp. 113–117.
- ^ Jones, pp. 250–260.
- ^ Jones, pp. 252–253.
- ^ Jacobs, pp. 144–145.
- ^ Gettleman, p. 279.
- ^ Hammer, pp. 118, 259.
- ^ Jones, pp. 259–260.
- ^ Jones, pp. 261–262.
- ^ Jones, pp. 261–265.
- ^ Jones, pp. 263–264.
- ^ Hammer, p. 136.
- ^ Halberstam, David (June 7, 1963). "Buddhist Accord Sought in Saigon". The New York Times. p. 6.
- ^ Halberstam, David (June 8, 1963). "Diem Concession Won by Buddhists". The New York Times. p. 8.
- ^ Sorkin, Amy Davidson (April 26, 2011). "Madame Nhu's Match". The New Yorker. Archived from the original on February 25, 2021. Retrieved April 23, 2021.
- ^ a b Jones, pp. 273–275.
- ^ a b c Hammer, p. 148.
- ^ a b Halberstam, p. 129.
- ^ a b Jones, p. 276.
- ^ a b c Jacobs, p. 150.
- ^ a b c d Halberstam, p. 130.
- ^ Jones, pp. 275–276.
- ^ Jones, p. 277.
- ^ Halberstam, pp. 130–131.
- ^ a b Hammer, pp. 152–153.
- ^ a b c Jones, p. 278.
- ^ Hammer, pp. 149–150.
- ^ Jones, p. 284.
- ^ Prochnau, pp. 328–330.
- ^ a b Langguth, p. 219.
- ^ Hammer, p. 157.
- ^ a b Hammer, pp. 157–158.
- ^ a b c Halberstam, p. 140.
- ^ a b Sheehan, p. 354.
- ^ Hammer, p. 164.
- ^ Dommen, p. 524.
- ^ Halberstam, p. 141.
- ^ Hammer, p. 166.
- ^ Jones, p. 300.
- ^ a b Hammer, p. 168.
- ^ Jones, p. 298.
- ^ Halberstam, p. 147.
- ^ Halberstam, p. 151.
- ^ Jacobs, p. 153.
- ^ Jacobs, pp. 162–163.
- ^ Karnow, pp. 303–304.
- ^ Halberstam, pp. 157–158.
- ^ Halberstam, p. 152.
- ^ a b c Jones, pp. 356–360.
- ^ Jones, p. 357.
- ^ "Historian Says Viet Nam was JFK's Greatest Failure". Spartanburg Herald. Spartanburg, SC. November 26, 1965. p. 3. Archived from the original on November 1, 2023. Retrieved January 2, 2023 – via news.google.com.
The president listened politely and finally said, 'Were you two gentlemen in the same country?'
References
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- Dommen, Arthur J. (2001). The Indochinese Experience of the French and the Americans: Nationalism and Communism in Cambodia, Laos, and Vietnam. Bloomington: Indiana University Press. ISBN 0-253-33854-9.
- Fall, Bernard B. (1963). The Two Viet-Nams. London: Praeger.
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- ISBN 978-0-7425-6007-9.
- ISBN 0-525-24210-4.
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- ISBN 0-423-00580-4.
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- Warner, Denis (1963). The Last Confucian. New York: Macmillan.
- Miller, Edward (2014). "Religious Revival and the Politics of Nation Building: Reinterpreting the 1963 'Buddhist crisis' in South Vietnam". Modern Asian Studies. 49 (6): 1903–1962. S2CID 145166982.
- Nguyen, Phi-Vân (2018). "A Secular State for a Religious Nation: The Republic of Vietnam and Religious Nationalism, 1946–1963". The Journal of Asian Studies. 77 (3): 741–771. S2CID 165729774.
- Ngo, Hoang (2023). "From Death to Birth: Biography, Religious Context, and Remembering of Thích Quảng Đức and his Self-Immolation". Kyoto Review of Southeast Asia (35).