Byzantine navy
Byzantine navy | |
---|---|
Dates of operation | 330–1453 |
Headquarters | Constantinople |
Active regions | Mediterranean Sea, Danube, Black Sea |
Size | c. 42,000 men in 899.[3] c. 300 warships in 9th–10th centuries.[4] c. 150 warships under Seljuks, Anatolian beyliks, Ottomans |
Battles and wars | the Justinianic Wars, the Arab–Byzantine wars, the Byzantine–Bulgarian wars, the Rus'–Byzantine wars, the Byzantine–Norman wars, the Crusades and the Byzantine–Ottoman wars |
The Byzantine navy was the naval force of the Byzantine Empire. Like the state it served, it was a direct continuation from its Roman predecessor, but played a far greater role in the defence and survival of the state than its earlier iteration. While the fleets of the Roman Empire faced few great naval threats, operating as a policing force vastly inferior in power and prestige to the army, command of the sea became vital to the very existence of the Byzantine state, which several historians have called a "maritime empire".[5][6]
The first threat to Roman hegemony in the Mediterranean Sea was posed by the Vandals in the 5th century, but their threat was ended by the wars of Justinian I in the 6th century. The re-establishment of a permanently maintained fleet and the introduction of the dromon galley in the same period also marks the point when the Byzantine navy began departing from its late Roman roots and developing its own characteristic identity. This process would be furthered with the onset of the early Muslim conquests in the 7th century. Following the loss of the Levant and later Africa, the Mediterranean was transformed from a "Roman lake" into a battleground between the Byzantines and a series of Muslim states. In this struggle, the Byzantine fleets were critical, not only for the defence of the Empire's far-flung possessions around the Mediterranean basin, but also for repelling seaborne attacks against the imperial capital of Constantinople itself. Through the use of the newly invented "Greek fire", the Byzantine navy's best-known and feared secret weapon, Constantinople was saved from several sieges and numerous naval engagements resulted in Byzantine victories.
Initially, the defence of the Byzantine coasts and the approaches to Constantinople was borne by the great fleet of the Karabisianoi. Progressively however it was split up into several regional fleets, while a central Imperial Fleet was maintained at Constantinople, guarding the city and forming the core of naval expeditions. By the late 8th century, the Byzantine navy, a well-organized and maintained force, was again the dominant maritime power in the Mediterranean. Conflicts with navies of the Muslim world continued with alternating success, but in the 10th century, the Byzantines were able to gain supremacy in the Eastern Mediterranean.
During the 11th century, the navy, like the Empire itself, began to decline. Faced with new naval challenges from the West, the Byzantines were increasingly forced to rely on the navies of Italian city-states such as Venice and Genoa, with disastrous effects on the Empire's economy and sovereignty. A period of recovery under the Komnenos dynasty was followed by another period of decline, which culminated in the disastrous dissolution of the Empire by the Fourth Crusade in 1204. After the Empire was restored in 1261, several emperors of the Palaiologan dynasty attempted to revive the navy, but their efforts only had a temporary effect. Emperor Andronikos II Palaiologos even dissolved the navy completely, allowing Venice to defeat the Byzantines in two wars, the first of which resulted in a humiliating treaty that saw the Venetians keep multiple islands captured from Byzantine forces during the war and forced the latter to repay Venice for the destruction of Constantinople's Venetian quarter at the hands of the city's Genoese residents. By the mid-14th century, the Byzantine fleet, which once could put hundreds of warships to sea, was limited to a few dozen at best, and control of the Aegean Sea definitively passed to Italian navies and, in the 15th century, the nascent Ottoman Navy. The diminished Byzantine navy continued to be active until the fall of Constantinople to the Ottoman Empire in 1453.
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Operational history
Early period
Civil wars and barbarian invasions: the 4th and 5th centuries
The Byzantine navy, like the Eastern Roman or Byzantine Empire itself, continued the systems of the Roman Empire. After the Battle of Actium in 31 BC, in the absence of any external threat in the Mediterranean, the Roman navy performed mostly policing and escort duties. Massive sea battles, like those fought centuries before in the Punic Wars (264 to 146 BC), no longer occurred, and the Roman fleets comprised relatively small vessels, best suited to their new tasks. By the early 4th century AD, the permanent Roman fleets had dwindled, so that when the fleets of the rival emperors Constantine the Great and Licinius clashed in 324 AD,[7] they were composed to a great extent of newly built or -commandeered ships from the port cities of the Eastern Mediterranean.[8] The civil wars of the 4th and early 5th centuries, however, did spur a revival of naval activity, with fleets mostly employed to transport armies.[9] Considerable naval forces continued to be employed in the Western Mediterranean throughout the first quarter of the fifth century, especially from North Africa, but Rome's mastery of the Mediterranean was challenged when Africa was overrun by the Vandals[10] (429 to 442).
The new
Sixth century – Justinian restores Roman control over the Mediterranean
The 6th century marked the rebirth of Roman naval power. In 508, as antagonism with the
In 533, taking advantage of the absence of the Vandal fleet, sent to suppress a revolt in Sardinia, an army of 15,000 under Belisarius was transported to Africa by an invasion fleet of 92 dromons and 500 transports,[17] beginning the Vandalic War, the first of the wars of the reconquest of Emperor Justinian I (r. 527–565). These were largely amphibious operations, made possible by the control of the Mediterranean waterways, and the fleet played a vital role in carrying supplies and reinforcements to the widely dispersed Byzantine expeditionary forces and garrisons.[16] This fact was not lost on the Byzantines' enemies. Already in the 520s, Theodoric had planned to build a massive fleet directed against the Byzantines and the Vandals, but his death in 526 limited the extent to which these plans were realized.[18] In 535, the Gothic War began with a double-pronged Byzantine offensive, with a fleet again carrying Belisarius' army to Sicily and then Italy, and another army invading Dalmatia. Byzantine control of the sea was of great strategic importance, allowing the smaller Byzantine army to successfully occupy the peninsula by 540.[19]
In 541 however, the new Ostrogoth king, Totila, created a fleet of 400 warships with which to deny the seas around Italy to the Empire. Two Byzantine fleets were destroyed near Naples in 542,[20] and in 546, Belisarius personally commanded 200 ships against the Gothic fleet that blockaded the mouths of the Tiber, in an unsuccessful effort to relieve Rome.[21] In 550, Totila invaded Sicily, and over the next year, his 300-ship fleet captured Sardinia and Corsica, and raided Corfu and the coast of Epirus.[22] However, a defeat in a sea battle off Sena Gallica marked the beginning of the final Imperial ascendancy.[16] With the final conquest of Italy and southern Spain under Justinian, the Mediterranean once again became a "Roman lake".[16]
Despite the subsequent loss of much of Italy to the
Struggle against the Arabs
During the 640s, the
"At that time Kallinikos, an artificer from Heliopolis, fled to the Romans. He had devised a sea fire which ignited the Arab ships and burned them with all hands. Thus it was that the Romans returned with victory and discovered the sea fire."
Chronicle of
After seizing
In the 680s,
Byzantine counter-offensive
The Byzantines were unable to respond effectively to the Muslim advance in Africa because the two decades between 695 and 715 were a
In the aftermath of the siege, the retreating remains of the Arab fleet were decimated in a storm, and Byzantine forces launched a counter-offensive, with a fleet sacking Laodicea and an army driving the Arabs from Asia Minor.[44][45] For the next three decades, naval warfare featured constant raids from both sides, with the Byzantines launching repeated attacks against the Muslim naval bases in Syria (Laodicea), and Egypt (Damietta and Tinnis).[40] In 727, a revolt of the provincial thematic fleets, largely motivated by resentment against the Emperor's iconoclasm, was put down by the imperial fleet through the use of Greek fire.[46] Despite the losses this entailed, some 390 warships were reportedly sent to attack Damietta in 739, and in 746 the Byzantines decisively defeated the Alexandrian fleet at Keramaia in Cyprus, breaking the naval power of the Umayyad Caliphate.[40]
The Byzantines followed this up with the destruction of the North African flotillas and coupled their successes at sea with severe trading limitations imposed on Muslim traders. Given the Empire's new ability to control the waterways, this strangled Muslim maritime trade.
These successes enabled Emperor
Renewed Muslim ascendancy
The Byzantine naval predominance lasted until the early 9th century when a succession of disasters at the hands of the resurgent Muslim fleets spelled its end and inaugurated an era that would represent the zenith of Muslim ascendancy.
The Byzantines, on the other hand, were weakened by a series of catastrophic defeats against the Bulgars, followed in 820 by the
"During that time [...] the Muslims gained control over the whole Mediterranean. Their power and domination over it was vast. The Christian nations could do nothing against the Muslim fleets, anywhere in the Mediterranean. All the time, the Muslims rode its wave for conquest."
Ibn Khaldun, Muqaddimah, III.32[61]
The situation was even worse in the West. A critical blow was inflicted on the Empire in 827, as the Aghlabids began the slow
The same period, when a battered Byzantium defended itself against enemies on all fronts, also saw the emergence of a new, unexpected threat: the
Byzantine Reconquest: the era of the Macedonian dynasty
During the course of the later 9th and the 10th century, as the Caliphate fractured into smaller states and Arab power became weakened, the Byzantines launched a series of successful campaigns against them.[67] This "Byzantine Reconquest" was overseen by the able sovereigns of the Macedonian dynasty (867–1056), and marked the noontide of the Byzantine state.[68][69]
Reign of Basil I
The ascension of Emperor
In the West, the Muslims continued to make steady advances, as the local Byzantine forces proved inadequate: the Empire was forced to rely on the aid of their nominal Italian subjects, and had to resort to the transfer of the eastern fleets to Italy to achieve any progress.[77] Following the fall of Enna in 855, the Byzantines were confined to the eastern shore of Sicily, and under increasing pressure. A relief expedition in 868 achieved little. Syracuse was attacked again in 869, and in 870, Malta fell to the Aghlabids.[78] Muslim corsairs raided the Adriatic, and although they were driven out of Apulia, in the early 880s they established bases along the western Italian coast, from where they would not be completely dislodged until 915.[79] In 878, Syracuse, the main Byzantine stronghold in Sicily, was attacked again and fell, largely because the Imperial Fleet was occupied with transporting marble for the construction of the Nea Ekklesia, Basil's new church.[80] In 880, Ooryphas' successor, the droungarios Nasar, scored a significant victory in a night battle over the Aghlabids who were raiding the Ionian Islands. He then proceeded to raid Sicily, carrying off much booty, before defeating another Muslim fleet off Punta Stilo. At the same time, another Byzantine squadron scored a significant victory at Naples.[81][82] These successes allowed a short-lived Byzantine counter-offensive to develop in the West in the 870s and 880s under Nikephoros Phokas the Elder, expanding the Byzantine foothold in Apulia and Calabria and forming the theme of Longobardia, which would later evolve into the Catepanate of Italy. A heavy defeat off Milazzo in 888, however, signalled the virtual disappearance of major Byzantine naval activity in the seas around Italy for the next century.[59][83]
Arab raids during the reign of Leo VI
Despite the successes under Basil, during the reign of his successor
The most distinguished Byzantine admiral of the period was Himerios, the logothetes tou dromou. Appointed admiral in 904, he was unable to prevent the sack of Thessalonica, but he scored the first victory in 905 or 906, and in 910, he led a successful attack on Laodicea.[89][90] The city was sacked and its hinterland plundered and ravaged without the loss of any ships.[91] A year later, however, a huge expedition of 112 dromons and 75 pamphyloi with 43,000 men, that had sailed under Himerios against the Emirate of Crete, not only failed to recover the island,[92] but on its return voyage, it was ambushed and comprehensively defeated by Leo of Tripoli off Chios (October 912).[93][94]
The tide began to turn again after 920. Coincidentally, the same year witnessed the ascension of an admiral,
Recovery of Crete and the northern Levant
The Empire's growing might be displayed in 942, when Emperor Romanos I dispatched a squadron to the
In the East, in 956 the strategos
During the same period, the Byzantine fleet was active in the Black Sea as well: a Rus' fleet that was
Komnenian period
Decline during the 11th century
"Strive at all time to have the fleet in top condition and to have it not want for anything. For the fleet is the glory of
protonotariosof the fleet should [...] investigate with rigor the slightest thing which is done to the fleet. For when the fleet is reduced to nothingness, you shall be overthrown and fall."
Admonitions to the Emperor, from the Strategikon of Kekaumenos, Ch. 87[108]
Throughout most of the 11th century, the Byzantine navy faced few challenges. The Muslim threat had receded, as their navies declined and relations between the Fatimids, especially, and the Empire were largely peaceful. The last Arab raid against imperial territory was recorded in 1035 in the
By the last quarter of the 11th century, the Byzantine navy was a shadow of its former self, having declined through neglect, the incompetence of its officers, and lack of funds.
Attempts at recovery under Alexios I and John II
At this point, the sorry state of the Byzantine fleet had dire consequences. The Norman invasion could not be forestalled, and their army seized Corfu, landed unopposed in Epirus and
Byzantium's lack of a navy [...] meant that Venice could regularly extort economic privileges, determine whether invaders, such as the Normans or Crusaders entered the Empire, and parry any Byzantine attempts to restrict Venetian commercial or naval activity.[118]
In the clashes with the Normans through the 1080s, the only effective Byzantine naval force was a squadron commanded, and possibly maintained, by Michael Maurex, a veteran naval commander of previous decades. Together with the Venetians, he initially prevailed over the Norman fleet, but the joint fleet was caught off guard and defeated by the Normans off Corfu in 1084.[121][122]
Alexios inevitably realized the importance of having his own fleet, and despite his preoccupation with land operations, he took steps to re-establish the navy's strength. His efforts bore some success, especially in countering the attempts by Turkish emirs like
The navy enjoyed a major comeback under the ambitious emperor
In 1155, a Byzantine squadron of 10 ships in support of Norman rebel
Following the Empire-wide seizure and imprisonment of all Venetians in March 1171, the Byzantine fleet was strong enough to
Decline
Angelos dynasty and the Fourth Crusade
After the death of Manuel I and the subsequent demise of the Komnenian dynasty in 1185, the navy declined swiftly. The maintenance of galleys and the upkeep of proficient crews were very expensive, and neglect led to a rapid deterioration of the fleet. Already by 1182 the Byzantines had to pay Venetian mercenaries to crew some of their galleys,[141] but in the 1180s, as the bulk of the Komnenian naval establishment persisted, expeditions of 70–100 ships are still recorded in contemporary sources.[142] Thus Emperor Andronikos I Komnenos (1183–1185) could still gather 100 warships in 1185 to resist and later defeat a Norman fleet in the Sea of Marmara.[143] However, the subsequent peace treaty included a clause that required the Normans to furnish a fleet for the Empire. This, together with a similar agreement made by Isaac II Angelos (1185–1195 and 1203–1204) with Venice the next year, in which the Republic would provide 40–100 galleys at six months' notice in exchange for favourable trading concessions, is a telling indication that the Byzantine government was aware of the inadequacy of its own naval establishment.[141]
The period also saw the rise of piracy across the Eastern Mediterranean. The pirate activity was high in the Aegean, while pirate captains frequently offering themselves as mercenaries to one or the other of the region's powers, providing for the latter a quick and cheap way of raising a fleet for particular expeditions, without the costs of a standing navy. Thus a Byzantine fleet of 66 vessels sent by Isaac II to recapture Cyprus from
At the same time, however, the then megas doux, Michael Stryphnos, was accused by Niketas Choniates of enriching himself by selling off the equipment of the imperial fleet,[141][146] while by the early 13th century the authority of the central government had weakened to such an extent that various local potentates began seizing power in the provinces.[147] The general atmosphere was one of lawlessness, which enabled men like Leo Sgouros in southern Greece and the imperial governor of Samos, Pegonites, to use their ships for their own purposes, launching raids of their own. Even Emperor Alexios III Angelos (1195–1203) is said to have licensed one of his commanders, Constantine Phrangopoulos, to launch pirate raids against commerce in the Black Sea.[148]
The Byzantine state and its fleet were thus in no state to resist the naval might of Venice, which supported the
Nicaea and the Palaiologan period
Following the recapture of Constantinople a few months later however, Michael VIII was able to focus his attention on building up his own fleet. In the early 1260s, the Byzantine navy was still weak and depended still greatly on Genoese aid. Even so, the allies were not able to stand up to Venice in a direct confrontation, as evidenced by the defeat of a combined Byzantine–Genoese fleet of 48 ships by a much smaller Venetian fleet in 1263.[157] Taking advantage of the Italians' preoccupation with the ongoing Venetian–Genoese war,[156] by 1270 Michael's efforts had produced a strong navy of 80 ships, with several Latin privateers sailing under imperial colours. In the same year, a fleet of 24 galleys besieged the town of Oreos in Negroponte (Euboea), and defeated a Latin fleet of 20 galleys.[158] This marked the first successful independent Byzantine naval operation and the beginning of an organized naval campaign in the Aegean that would continue throughout the 1270s and would result in the recapture, albeit briefly, of many islands from the Latins.[159]
This revival did not last long. Following the death of
Andronikos' decision aroused considerable opposition and criticism from contemporary scholars and officials almost from the outset, and historians like
In the 14th century, recurrent civil wars, attacks from Bulgaria and Serbia in the Balkans and the devastation caused by ever-increasing Turkish raids hastened the collapse of the Byzantine state, which would culminate in its final fall to the Ottoman Turks in 1453.[171] Several emperors after Andronikos II also tried to re-build a fleet, especially in order to secure the security and hence the independence of Constantinople itself from the interference of the Italian maritime powers, but their efforts produced only short-term results.[172]
Thus Andronikos II's successor
Henceforth, the impoverished Byzantine state became a pawn of the great powers of the day, trying to survive by exploiting their rivalries.
The last recorded Byzantine naval victory occurred in 1427 in a
Organization
Early period (4th – mid-7th centuries)
Very little is known about the organization of the Roman fleets of late Antiquity, from the gradual break-up of the large provincial fleets into smaller squadrons in the 3rd century to the formation of a new navy at the onset of the Muslim conquests. Despite the evidence of considerable naval activity in this period, earlier scholars believed that the Roman navy had all but vanished by the 4th century, but more recent work has altered this picture towards a transformation into a mainly fluvial and coastal force, designed for close co-operation with the army.[196]
Under Emperor
For operations in the Mediterranean during the 5th century, fleets appear to have been assembled on an ad hoc basis and then disbanded.
Middle period (late 7th century – 1070s)
Fleet organization
In response to the Arab conquests during the 7th century, the whole administrative and military system of the Empire was reformed, and the
Rise and fall of the Karabisianoi
A similar process was followed in the fleet, which was organized along similar lines. In the second half of the 7th century, the fleet of the
The Karabisianoi however proved inadequate and were replaced in the early 8th century by a more complex system composed of three elements, which with minor alterations survived until the 11th century: a central imperial fleet based at Constantinople, a small number of large regional naval commands, either naval themes or independent commands termed "droungariates", and a greater number of local squadrons charged with purely defensive and police tasks and subordinate to the local provincial governors.[215] Unlike the earlier Roman navy, where the provincial fleets were decidedly inferior in numbers and included only lighter vessels than the central fleets, the Byzantine regional fleets were probably formidable formations in their own right.[216]
The Imperial Fleet
The capital's navy had played a central role in the repulsion of the Arab sieges of Constantinople,
Maritime themes
The first and for a long time only maritime theme (θέμα ναυτικόν, thema nautikon) was the
The Cibyrrhaeots were complemented by two independent naval commands in the Aegean, each headed by a droungarios: the Aigaion Pelagos ('Aegean Sea'), covering the northern half of the Aegean and the Dardanelles and
Local squadrons
Some of the other, 'land' themes also maintained sizeable squadrons, usually placed under a
- The Theme of the Peloponnese and the new Theme of Hellas, covering Central Greece and Thessaly, which also retained smaller fleets.[222][235]
- The Theme of Sicily (θέμα Σικελίας, thema Sikelias) was responsible for Sicily and the imperial possessions in south-western Italy (Calabria). Once the bastion of Byzantine naval strength in the West, by the late 9th century it had greatly diminished in strength and disappeared after the final loss of Taormina in 902.[105] Distinct tourmarchai are attested for Sicily proper and Calabria.[236]
- The Theme of Cephallenia (θέμα Κεφαλληνίας, thema Kephallenias), controlling the Ionian Islands, was established in the mid- to late 8th century, to protect imperial communications with Italy and defend the Ionian Sea from Arab raids. The new imperial possessions in Apulia were added to it in the 870s, before they were made into a separate theme (that of Longobardia) in about 910.[237]
- The Theme of Paphlagonia (θέμα Παφλαγονίας, thema Paphlagonias) and the Theme of Chaldia (θέμα Χαλδίας, thema Chaldias) were split off from the Armeniac Theme in c. 819 by Emperor Leo V and provided with their own naval squadrons, possibly as a defence against Rus' raids.[238]
Isolated regions of particular importance for the control of the major sea-lanes were covered by separate officials with the title of
Manpower and size
Just as with its land counterpart, the exact size of the Byzantine navy and its units is a matter of considerable debate, owing to the scantness and ambiguous nature of the primary sources. One exceptions are the numbers for the late 9th and early 10th century, for which we possess a more detailed breakdown, dated to the Cretan expedition of 911. These lists reveal that during the reign of Leo VI the Wise, the navy reached 34,200 oarsmen and perhaps as many as 8,000 marines.[3] The central Imperial Fleet totalled some 19,600 oarsmen and 4,000 marines under the command of the droungarios of the Imperial Fleet. These four thousand marines were professional soldiers, first recruited as a corps by Basil I in the 870s. They were a great asset to the Imperial Fleet, for whereas previously it had depended on thematic and tagmatic soldiers for its marines, the new force provided a more reliable, better trained and immediately available force at the Emperor's disposal.[73] The high status of these marines is illustrated by the fact that they were considered to belong to the imperial tagmata, and were organized along similar lines.[241] The Aegean thematic fleet numbered 2,610 oarsmen and 400 marines, the Cibyrrhaeot fleet stood at 5,710 oarsmen and 1,000 marines, the Samian fleet at 3,980 oarsmen and 600 marines, and finally, the Theme of Hellas furnished 2,300 oarsmen with a portion of its 2,000 thematic soldiers doubling as marines.[3]
The following table contains estimates, by Warren T. Treadgold, of the number of oarsmen over the entire history of the Byzantine navy:
Year | 300 | 457 | 518 | 540 | 775 | 842 | 959 | 1025 | 1321 |
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Rowers | 32,000[242] | 32,000[242] | 30,000[243] | 30,000[243] | 18,500[244] | 14,600[245] | 34,200[245] | 34,200[245] | 3,080[246] |
Contrary to popular perception, galley slaves were not used as oarsmen, either by the Byzantines or the Arabs, or by their Roman and Greek predecessors.[247] Throughout the existence of the Empire, Byzantine crews consisted of mostly lower-class freeborn men, who were professional soldiers, legally obliged to perform military service (strateia) in return for pay or land estates. In the first half of the 10th century, the latter were calculated to be of the value of 2–3 pounds (0.91–1.36 kg) of gold for sailors and marines.[248][249] Use was however made of prisoners of war and foreigners as well. Alongside the Mardaites, who formed a significant part of the fleet's crews, an enigmatic group known as the Toulmatzoi (possibly Dalmatians) appears in the Cretan expeditions, as well as many Rus', who were given the right to serve in the Byzantine armed forces in a series of 10th-century treaties.[250][251]
In his
Rank structure
Although naval themes were organized much the same way as their land counterparts, there is some confusion in the Byzantine sources as to the exact rank structure.
The Imperial Fleet was a different case, as it was not tied to the thematic administration, but was considered as one of the tagmata, the professional central reserve forces.
In the lower levels of organization, there was more uniformity: squadrons of three or five ships were commanded by a komes or droungarokomes, and each ship's captain was called
Late period (1080s–1453)
Reforms of the Komnenoi
After the decline of the navy in the 11th century, Alexios I rebuilt it on different lines. Since the thematic fleets had all but vanished, their remnants were amalgamated into a unified imperial fleet, under the new office of the megas doux. The first known occupant of the office was Alexios' brother-in-law John Doukas, in c. 1092. The megas droungarios tou ploïmou, once the overall naval commander, was subordinated to him, acting now as his principal aide.[124][273] The megas doux was also appointed as overall governor of southern Greece, the old themes of Hellas and the Peloponnese, which were divided into districts (oria) that supplied the fleet.[274][275] Under John II, the Aegean islands also became responsible for the maintenance, crewing and provision of warships, and contemporary sources took pride in the fact that the great fleets of Manuel's reign were crewed by "native Romans", although use continued to be made of mercenaries and allied squadrons.[124][276] However, the fact that the fleet was now exclusively built and based around Constantinople, and that provincial fleets were not reconstituted, did have its drawbacks, as outlying areas, in particular Greece, were left vulnerable to attack.[277]
With the decline of the Byzantine fleet in the latter 12th century, the Empire increasingly relied on the fleets of Venice and Genoa. Following the sack of 1204 however, sources suggest the presence of a relatively strong fleet already under the first Nicaean emperor,
Despite their efforts, the Nicaean emperors failed to successfully challenge the Venetian domination of the seas, and were forced to turn to the Genoese for aid.
At the same time, Michael and his successors continued the well-established practice of using foreigners in the fleet. Alongside the mistrusted Italian city-states, with whom alliances shifted regularly, mercenaries were increasingly employed in the last centuries of the Empire, often rewarded for their services with
Ships
Dromons and their derivatives
The primary warship of the Byzantine navy until the 12th century was the
Evolution and features
The appearance and evolution of medieval warships is a matter of debate and conjecture: until recently, no remains of an oared warship from either ancient or early medieval times had been found, and information had to be gathered by analyzing literary evidence, crude artistic depictions and the remains of a few merchant vessels. Only in 2005–2006 did archaeological digs for the Marmaray project in the location of the Harbour of Theodosius (modern Yenikapi) uncover the remains of over 36 Byzantine ships from the 6th to 10th centuries, including four light galleys of the galea type.[295]
The accepted view is that the main developments which differentiated the early dromons from the liburnians, and that henceforth characterized Mediterranean galleys, were the adoption of a full
The dromons that Procopius describes were single-banked ships of probably 50 oars, arranged with 25 oars on each side.[306] Again unlike Hellenistic vessels, which used an outrigger (parexeiresia), these extended directly from the hull.[307] In the later bireme dromons of the 9th and 10th centuries, the two oar banks (elasiai) were divided by the deck, with the first oar bank was situated below, whilst the second oar bank was situated above deck; these rowers were expected to fight alongside the marines in boarding operations.[308] Makrypoulias suggests 25 oarsmen beneath and 35 on the deck on either side for a dromon of 120 rowers.[309] The overall length of these ships was probably about 32 meters.[310] Although most contemporary vessels had a single mast (histos or katartion), the larger bireme dromons probably needed at least two masts in order to manoeuvre effectively,[311] assuming that a single lateen sail for a ship this size would have reached unmanageable dimensions.[312] The ship was steered by means of two quarter rudders at the stern (prymne), which also housed a tent (skene) that covered the captain's berth (krab[b]at[t]os).[313] The prow (prora) featured an elevated forecastle (pseudopation), below which the siphon for the discharge of Greek fire projected,[314] although secondary siphons could also be carried amidships on either side.[315] A pavesade (kastelloma), on which marines could hang their shields, ran around the sides of the ship, providing protection to the deck crew.[316] Larger ships also had wooden castles (xylokastra) on either side between the masts, similar to those attested for the Roman liburnians, providing archers with elevated firing platforms.[317] The bow spur (peronion) was intended to ride over an enemy ship's oars, breaking them and rendering it helpless against missile fire and boarding actions.[318]
The four galeai ships uncovered in the Yenikapi excavations, dating to the 10th–11th centuries, are of uniform design and construction, suggesting a centralized manufacturing process. They have a length of c. 30 m, and are built of
Ship types
By the 10th century, there were three main classes of bireme (two oar-banks) warships of the general dromon type, as detailed in the inventories for the Cretan expeditions of 911 and 949: the [chelandion] ousiakon ([χελάνδιον] οὑσιακόν), so named because it was manned by an ousia of 108; the [chelandion] pamphylon ([χελάνδιον] πάμφυλον), crewed with up to 120–160 men, its name either implying an origin in the region of Pamphylia as a transport ship or its crewing with "picked crews" (from πᾶν+φῦλον, 'all tribes'); and the dromon proper, crewed by two ousiai.[320][321] In the De Ceremoniis, the heavy dromon is said to have an even larger crew of 230 rowers and 70 marines; naval historian John H. Pryor considers them as supernumerary crews being carried aboard, while the Greek scholar Christos Makrypoulias suggests that the extra men correspond to a second rower on each of the upper-bank oars.[322][323] A smaller, single-bank ship, the moneres (μονήρης, 'single-banked') or galea (γαλέα, from which the term 'galley' derives), with c. 60 men as crew, was used for scouting missions but also in the wings of the battle line.[324] The galea in particular seems to have been strongly associated with the Mardaites, and Christos Makrypoulias even suggests that the ship was exclusively used by them.[325] Three-banked ('trireme') dromons are described in a 9th-century work dedicated to the parakoimomenos Basil Lekapenos. However, this treatise, which survives only in fragments, draws heavily upon references on the appearance and construction of a Classical trireme, and must therefore be used with care when trying to apply it to the warships of the middle Byzantine period.[326][327] The existence of trireme vessels is, however, attested in the Fatimid navy in the 11th and 12th centuries, and references made by Leo VI to large Arab ships in the 10th century may also indicate trireme galleys.[328]
For cargo transport, the Byzantines usually commandeered ordinary merchantmen as transport ships (phortegoi) or supply ships (skeuophora). These appear to have been mostly sailing vessels, rather than oared.
Western designs of the last centuries
The exact period when the dromon was superseded by galea-derived ships of Italian origin is uncertain. The term dromon continued in use until the late 12th century, although Byzantine writers were indiscriminate in their use of it.[334] Contemporary Western writers used the term to denote large ships, usually transports, and there is evidence to support the idea that this usage had also spread to the Byzantines.[335] William of Tyre's description of the Byzantine fleet in 1169, where "dromons" are classed as very large transports, and the warships with two oar banks are set apart from them, may thus indeed indicate the adoption of the new bireme galley types by the Byzantines.[336] From the 13th century on, the term dromon fell into gradual disuse and was replaced by katergon (κάτεργον, meaning 'detailed to/owing a service'), a late-11th century term which originally applied to the crews, who were drawn from populations detailed to military service.[337] During the latter period of the Byzantine Empire, Byzantine ships were based on Western models: the term katergon is used indiscriminately for both Byzantine and Latin ships, and the horse-carrying chelandion was replaced by the Western taride (itself deriving from Arabic tarrida, adopted as tareta, ταρέτα, in Greek).[338] A similar process is seen in surviving sources from Angevin Sicily, where the term lang was replaced by the taride, although for a time both continued to be used. No construction differences are mentioned between the two, with both terms referring to horse-carrying vessels (usserii) capable of carrying from 20 to 40 horses.[339]
The bireme Italian-style galleys remained the mainstay of Mediterranean fleets until the late 13th century, although again, contemporary descriptions provide little detail on their construction.[340] From that point on, the galleys universally became trireme ships, i.e. with three men on a single bank located above deck, each rowing a different oar; the so-called alla sensile system.[341][342] The Venetians also developed the so-called "great galley ", which was an enlarged galley capable of carrying more cargo for trade.[343]
Little is known on particular Byzantine ships during the period. The accounts of the 1437 journey by sea of the Byzantine delegation to the Council of Florence, by the Byzantine cleric Sylvester Syropoulos and the Greek-Venetian captain Michael of Rhodes, mention that most of the ships were Venetian or Papal, but also record that Emperor John VIII travelled on an "imperial ship". It is unclear whether that ship was Byzantine or had been hired, and its type is not mentioned. It is, however, recorded as having been faster than the Venetian great merchant galleys accompanying it, possibly indicating that it was a light war galley.[344] Michael of Rhodes also wrote a treatise on shipbuilding, which provided construction instructions and illustrations of the main vessels, both galleys and sailing ships, used by Venice and the other maritime states of the region in the first half of the 15th century.
Tactics and weapons
The Byzantines took care to codify, preserve and pass on the lessons of warfare at land and sea from past experience, through the use of
When examining ancient and medieval naval operations, it is necessary to first understand the technological limitations of galley fleets. Galleys did not handle well in rough waters and could be swamped by waves, which would be catastrophic in the open sea; history is replete with instances where galley fleets were sunk by bad weather (e.g. the Roman losses during the First Punic War).[345] The sailing season was therefore usually restricted from mid-spring to September.[346] The maintainable cruising speed of a galley, even when using sails, was limited, as were the amount of supplies it could carry.[347] Water in particular, being essentially a galley's "fuel" supply, was of critical importance. There is no evidence that the navy operated dedicated supply ships to support the warships.[348] With consumption levels estimated at 8 litres a day for every oarsman, its availability was a decisive operational factor in the often water-scarce and sun-baked coasts of the Eastern Mediterranean.[349] Smaller dromons are estimated to have been able to carry about four days' worth of water.[350] Effectively, this meant that fleets composed of galleys were confined to coastal routes,[345] and had to make frequent landfall to replenish their supplies and rest their crews.[351] This is well attested in Byzantine overseas endeavours, from Belisarius' campaign against the Vandals to the Cretan expeditions of the 9th and 10th centuries. It is for these reasons that Nikephoros Ouranos emphasizes the need to have available "men with accurate knowledge and experience of the sea [...], which winds cause it to swell and which blow from the land. They should know both the hidden rocks in the sea, and the places which have no depth, and the land along which one sails and the islands adjacent to it, the harbours and the distance such harbours are the one from the other. They should know both the countries and the water supplies."[350]
Medieval Mediterranean naval warfare was therefore essentially coastal and amphibious in nature, carried out to seize coastal territory or islands, and not to exercise "
On campaign, following the assembly of the various squadrons at fortified bases (aplekta) along the coast, the fleet consisted of the main body, composed of the oared warships, and the baggage train (touldon) of sailing vessels and oared transports, which would be sent away in the event of battle.[358] The battle fleet was divided into squadrons, and orders were transmitted from ship to ship through signal flags (kamelaukia) and lanterns.[359] The navy played key role in supplying land-based forces.[102]
On the approach to and during an actual battle, a well-ordered formation was critical: if a fleet fell into disorder, its ships would be unable to lend support to each other and probably would be defeated.[361] Fleets that failed to keep an ordered formation or that could not order themselves into an appropriate counter-formation (antiparataxis) to match that of the enemy, often avoided, or broke off from battle.[362][363] Tactical manoeuvres were therefore intended to disrupt the enemy formation,[362] including the use of various stratagems, such as dividing one's force and carrying out flanking manoeuvres, feigning retreat or hiding a reserve in ambush (Tactica, XIX.52–56).[364] Indeed, Leo VI openly advised (Tactica, XIX.36) against direct confrontation and advocates the use of stratagems instead.[365] According to Leo VI (Tactica, XIX.52), a crescent formation seems to have been the norm, with the flagship in the centre and the heavier ships at the horns of the formation, in order to turn the enemy's flanks.[366] A range of variants and other tactics and counter-tactics was available, depending on the circumstances.[29]
Once the fleets were close enough, exchanges of missiles began, ranging from combustible projectiles to arrows and javelins. The aim was not to sink ships, but to deplete the ranks of the enemy crews before the
Armament
Unlike the warships of Antiquity, Byzantine and Arab ships did not feature rams, and the primary means of ship-to-ship combat were boarding actions and missile fire, as well as the use of inflammable materials such as Greek fire.[216] Despite the fearsome reputation of the latter, it was only effective under certain circumstances, and not the decisive anti-ship weapon that the ram had been in the hands of experienced crews.[369]
Like their Roman predecessors, Byzantine and Muslim ships were equipped with small catapults (mangana) and ballistae (toxoballistrai) that launched stones, arrows, javelins, pots of Greek fire or other incendiary liquids, caltrops (triboloi) and even containers full of lime to choke the enemy or, as Emperor Leo VI suggests, scorpions and snakes (Tactica, XIX.61–65).[370] Marines and the upper-bank oarsmen were heavily armoured in preparation for battle (Leo referred to them as "cataphracts") and armed with close-combat arms such as lances and swords, while the other sailors wore padded felt jackets (neurika) for protection and fought with bows and crossbows.[371] The importance and volume of missile fire during sea combat can be gauged from the fleet manifests for the Cretan expeditions of the 10th century, which mention 10,000 caltrops, 50 bows and 10,000 arrows, 20 hand-carried ballistrai with 200 bolts myai, 'flies') and 100 javelins per dromon.[372]
From the 12th century on, the
Greek fire
"Greek fire" was the name given by Western Europeans to the flammable concoction used by the Byzantines, so called because the Europeans viewed the Byzantines as
"As he [the Emperor] knew that the Pisans were skilled in sea warfare and dreaded a battle with them, on the prow of each ship he had a head fixed of a lion or other land-animal, made in brass or iron with the mouth open and then gilded over, so that their mere aspect was terrifying. And the fire which was to be directed against the enemy through tubes he made to pass through the mouths of the beasts, so that it seemed as if the lions and the other similar monsters were vomiting the fire."
From the Alexiad of Anna Komnene, XI.10[380]
Despite the somewhat exaggerated accounts of Byzantine writers, it was by no means a "wonder weapon", and did not avert some serious defeats.
It is not easy to assess the importance of the Byzantine navy to the Empire's history. On one hand, the Empire, throughout its life, had to defend a long coastline, often with little hinterland. In addition, shipping was always the quickest and cheapest way of transport, and the Empire's major urban and commercial centres, as well as most of its fertile areas, lay close to the sea.[386] Coupled with the threat posed by the Arabs in the 7th to 10th centuries, this necessitated the maintenance of a strong fleet. The navy was perhaps at its most significant in the successful defence of Constantinople from the two Arab sieges, which ultimately saved the Empire. Throughout the period however, naval operations were an essential part of the Byzantine effort against the Arabs in a game of raids and counter-raids that continued up to the late 10th century.[387]
On the other hand, the nature and limitations of the maritime technology of the age meant that the neither the Byzantines nor any of their opponents could develop a true
It is clear nevertheless that the gradual decline of the indigenous Byzantine naval power in the 10th and 11th centuries, when it was eclipsed by the Italian city-states, chiefly Venice and later Genoa, was of great long-term significance for the fate of the Empire. The sack of the Fourth Crusade, which shattered the foundations of the Byzantine state, was due in large part to the absolute defencelessness of the Empire at sea.[393] This process was initiated by Byzantium itself in the 9th century, when the Italians were increasingly employed by the Empire to compensate for its own naval weakness in the West. The Italian republics also profited from their role as intermediaries in the trade between the Empire and Western Europe, marginalizing the Byzantine merchant marine, which in turn had adverse effects on the availability of Byzantine naval forces.[394] Inevitably however, as the Italian republics slowly moved away from the Byzantine orbit, they began pursuing their own policies, and from the late 11th century on, they turned from protection of the Empire to exploitation and sometimes outright plunder, heralding the eventual financial and political subjugation of Byzantium to their interests.[395] The absence of a strong navy was certainly keenly felt by the Byzantines at the time, as the comments of Kekaumenos illustrate. Strong and energetic emperors like Manuel Komnenos, and later Michael VIII Palaiologos, could revive Byzantine naval power, but even after landing heavy strokes against the Venetians, they merely replaced them with the Genoese and the Pisans. Trade thus remained in Latin hands, its profits continued to be siphoned off from the Empire, and after their deaths, their achievements quickly evaporated.[277] After 1204, and with the brief exception of Michael VIII's reign, the fortunes of the now small Byzantine navy were more or less tied to the shifting alliances with the Italian maritime republics.[396]
When viewing the entire course of Byzantine history, the waxing and waning of the navy's strength closely mirrors the fluctuation of the Empire's fortunes. It is this apparent interrelation that led the French Byzantinist Louis Bréhier to remark: "The epochs of [Byzantium's] dominion are those in which it held control of the sea, and it was when it lost it, that its reverses began."[397]
See also
Notes
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- ^ Campbell 1995, pp. 8–11.
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- ^ a b Pryor & Jeffreys 2006, pp. 153–159.
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- ^ Pryor & Jeffreys 2006, pp. 130–135.
- ^ Pryor 1995a, pp. 103–104.
- ^ Pryor & Jeffreys 2006, pp. 232, 255, 276.
- ^ Makrypoulias 1995, pp. 164–165.
- ^ Pryor & Jeffreys 2006, pp. 205, 291.
- ^ Pryor & Jeffreys 2006, p. 238.
- ^ Dolley 1948, p. 52.
- ^ Pryor & Jeffreys 2006, p. 215.
- ^ Pryor & Jeffreys 2006, p. 203.
- ^ Haldon 1999, p. 189.
- ^ Pryor & Jeffreys 2006, p. 282.
- ^ Pryor 1995a, p. 104.
- ^ Pryor & Jeffreys 2006, pp. 143–144.
- ^ Delgado 2011, pp. 190–191.
- ^ Pryor & Jeffreys 2006, pp. 189–192, 372.
- ^ Casson 1995, pp. 149–150.
- ^ Pryor & Jeffreys 2006, pp. 261–262.
- ^ Makrypoulias 1995, p. 165.
- ^ Pryor & Jeffreys 2006, p. 190.
- ^ Makrypoulias 1995, pp. 159–161.
- ^ a b Pryor 2003, p. 84.
- ^ Pryor & Jeffreys 2006, pp. 284–286.
- ^ Pryor 1995a, p. 108.
- ^ Pryor & Jeffreys 2006, p. 305.
- ^ Pryor & Jeffreys 2006, pp. 307–308, 322–324.
- ^ Pryor & Jeffreys 2006, pp. 166–169, 322–325, 449.
- ^ Makrypoulias 1995, p. 168.
- ^ Akkemik & Kocabas 2014.
- ^ Pryor & Jeffreys 2006, pp. 407–411.
- ^ Pryor & Jeffreys 2006, pp. 413–415.
- ^ Pryor & Jeffreys 2006, pp. 415–416.
- ^ Pryor & Jeffreys 2006, pp. 418–419.
- ^ Pryor & Jeffreys 2006, p. 420.
- ^ Pryor 1995a, p. 115.
- ^ Pryor 1995a, pp. 110–111.
- ^ Pryor 1995a, p. 116.
- ^ Casson 1995, p. 123.
- ^ Casson 1995, pp. 123–124.
- ^ Andriopoulou & Kondyli 2008.
- ^ a b Pryor 1988, p. 70.
- ^ Pryor 1995b, p. 209.
- ^ Pryor 1988, pp. 71–77.
- ^ McMahon 2021, p. 69.
- ^ Pryor & Jeffreys 2006, pp. 354, 356–357.
- ^ a b Pryor & Jeffreys 2006, p. 360.
- ^ Dotson 1995, pp. 219–220.
- ^ Pryor & Jeffreys 2006, pp. 388–389.
- ^ Pryor & Jeffreys 2006, p. 383.
- ^ Pryor & Jeffreys 2006, p. 387.
- ^ Christides 1981, pp. 79–80.
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- ^ Pryor & Jeffreys 2006, pp. 513–515.
- ^ Pryor & Jeffreys 2006, pp. 394–395.
- ^ Pryor & Jeffreys 2006, pp. 396–399.
- ^ Pryor & Jeffreys 2006, p. 144.
- ^ Pryor & Jeffreys 2006, p. 399.
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- ^ Pryor & Jeffreys 2006, pp. 399–400.
- ^ Pryor & Jeffreys 2006, pp. 505–507.
- ^ Pryor & Jeffreys 2006, p. 499.
- ^ Pryor & Jeffreys 2006, p. 505.
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- ^ Pryor 2003, pp. 102–104.
- ^ Pryor 2003, p. 96.
- ^ Pryor & Jeffreys 2006, p. 509.
- ^ Pryor & Jeffreys 2006, p. 381.
- ^ Pryor 2003, p. 102.
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- ^ Bartusis 1997, pp. 298–299, 331.
- ^ Heath & McBride 1995, pp. 19–21.
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- ^ Pryor 2003, p. 97.
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- ^ Mango 2002, p. 197.
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Further reading
- Bibicou, Helène (1958), "Problèmes de la marine byzantine", Annales. Économies, Sociétés, Civilisations (in French), 13 (2): 327–338, S2CID 245989631
- Christides, Vassilios (1995), "Byzantine Dromon and Arab Shini: The Development of the Average Byzantine and Arab Warships and the Problem of the Number and Function of the Oarsmen", Tropis III, 3rd International Symposium on Ship Construction in Antiquity, Athens 1989 proceedings (PDF), Hellenic Institute for the Preservation of Nautical Tradition, pp. 111–122, archived from the original (PDF) on 2012-03-06
- Christides, Vassilios (1997), "Military Intelligence in Arabo-Byzantine Naval Warfare", in Tsiknakis, K. (ed.), Byzantium at War (9th–12th c.) (PDF), National Hellenic Research Foundation – Centre for Byzantine Research, pp. 269–281, ISBN 960-371-001-6, archived from the original(PDF) on 2011-07-25
- D’Amato, Raffaele (2010). "The Last Marines of Byzantium: Gasmouloi, Tzakones and Prosalentai. A Short History and a Proposed Reconstruction of their Uniforms and Equipment". Journal of Mediterranean Studies. 19 (2): 219–248. ISSN 2523-9465.
- Dolley, R. H. (1953), "Naval tactics in the heyday of Byzantine thalassocracy", Atti dell' VIII Congresso internazionale di Studi bizantini, I, Rome: 324–339
- Eickhoff, Ekkehard (1966). Seekrieg und Seepolitik zwischen Islam und Abendland: das Mittelmeer unter byzantinischer und arabischer Hegemonie (650-1040) (in German). De Gruyter.
- Friedman, Zaraza; Zoroglu, Levent (2006), "Kelenderis Ship – Square or Lateen Sail?", The International Journal of Nautical Archaeology, 35 (1): 108–116, S2CID 108961383
- Kollias, Taxiarchis G. (1999), "Die byzantinische Kriegsmarine. Ihre Bedeutung im Verteidigungssystem von Byzanz", in Chrysos, Evangelos K. (ed.), Griechenland und das Meer. Beiträge eines Symposions in Frankfurt im Dezember 1996 (in German), Mannheim, pp. 133–140
{{citation}}
: CS1 maint: location missing publisher (link) - Makris, George (2002), "Ships", in Laiou, Angeliki E. (ed.), The Economic History of Byzantium from the Seventh through the Fifteenth Century, Dumbarton Oaks, pp. 91–100, ISBN 0-88402-288-9
- Michalopoulos, Dimitris; Milanos, Antonis (1994), Ελληνικά Πλοία του Μεσαίωνα [Greek Vessels of the Middle Ages] (in Greek), Evropi, ISBN 960-253-028-6
- Morgan, Gareth (1976). "The Venetian Claims Commission of 1278". S2CID 159571822.