Canada and the Iraq War
The
While Canada had previously participated in military action against
Canada's relation to the Iraq War that began in 2003 was unlike
Decision not to participate
In September 2002, the
During the lead-up to the conflict, Chrétien maintained contact with Ricardo Lagos, the president of Chile, and Vicente Fox, the president of Mexico.[7] Lagos and Fox had noted they were under pressure from the United States to join the coalition, although both told Chrétien that they would refuse to participate if Canada does so as well.[7]
The decision by the UN on whether or not to sanction the invasion rested on two elements, a discussion of
Domestic opinion
By August 2002, Canadian officials held no doubts that the United States was planning on targeting Iraq.
However, during the lead-up to the war, Chrétien did not take a count of opinions with the entire Cabinet over joining the coalition, instead having only really consulted key members within the cabinet, including
Chrétien also regularly updated himself with his parliamentary caucus, whose near-unanimous opposition to the war without support from the UN helped Chrétien make his final decision.
Protests
Protests against the Iraq War and counter-protests supporting the conflict took place in Canada both before and after the invasion of Iraq. One of the first large-scale demonstrations in opposition to the war took place at Queen's Park, Toronto, where approximately 2,000 people gathered on 16 November 2002.[15][16] The following day, as part of a cross-country day of action, a 3,000-strong anti-war coalition held a peace march from Peace Flame Park in Vancouver, approximately 1,000 people marched in Montreal, and about 500 individuals gathered in a snowstorm on Parliament Hill in Ottawa, while other rallies took place in Edmonton, Winnipeg, and Halifax.[15][16]
Canadians also took part in a set of protests that took place in towns and cities around the world in February 2003,[17] the biggest in Canada being the gathering of more than 100,000 people in Montreal, despite wind-chill temperatures of −30 °C (−22 °F). A further 10,000 people joined a demonstration in Toronto, 20,000 in Vancouver, 18,000 in Edmonton, 8,000 in Victoria, 4,000 in Halifax, and 2,000 in Ottawa; altogether, protests were held in close to 60 communities across the country.[18]
Assessments from Canadian diplomats and intelligence
Assessments from Canadian diplomats, as well as the Canadian intelligence community, played a constructive role in shaping Chrétien's view on US policy towards Iraq, as well as claims that Iraq possessed WMDs.
In the autumn of 2002, Bush had offered to send intelligence experts to brief the prime minister, and later offered to come personally to brief him; although Chrétien instead choose to have said information pass through regular intelligence-sharing channels where Canadian analysts analyzed the information and passed it on to him.[21][19] Reliance on Canadian analysis may have helped Chrétien reach a different conclusion from his American and British counterparts; with Blair at one point expressing frustration on how the Canadian prime minister failed to "see the evidence," despite the fact they largely shared the same intelligence sources.[20] The Canadian intelligence assessment of Iraq in 2002 and 2003 was notable in that it deviated from the assessments provided by its Five Eyes partners, even though they all had access to the same information.[21][22] This has largely been attributed to the fact that the Canadian intelligence community saw no external political pressures placed on it.[23] Subsequent inquiries after the 2003 invasion into American intelligence on Iraq also found that American analysts had assumed Iraq was determined to restart its WMD program as soon as possible.[22] This contrasted the assumptions held by Canadian analysts, who believed Iraq would temporarily suspend its WMD program for immediate economic relief; providing Canadian analysts the possibility to entertain the idea that Iraq may not have WMDs to begin with.[22]
On Iraq
In the decade following the Gulf War, Iraq had been a high priority within the Canadian intelligence community. During the mid-1990s, Canadian intelligence analysts compiled several reports on UN inspections in Iraq, Iraqi internal developments, as well as deception efforts by the Iraqi government.[24] However, the frequency of intelligence reports on Iraq dropped after the 1998 bombing of Iraq.[24]
In early 2002, the International Assessments Staff (IAS), the intelligence assessment branch for the Canadian Privy Council Office and the foreign affairs department, held oral briefings with Canadian officials where they stressed that there was no credible evidence linking Iraq to the September 11th attacks; in response to claims made by the Bush administration. IAS analysts worked closely with members of the Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS) who also shared the same view.[25] In June 2002, the Intelligence Assessment Committee (IAC), a committee that coordinated the analytical units of CSIS, IAS, and the Department of National Defence's (DND) Director General Intelligence, had also concluded that there was little evidence that regimes like Iraq were providing chemical weapons to terrorist organizations.[26]
On 30 August 2002, the IAC published another assessment to determine whether or not Iraq had any WMD stockpiles, and whether or not the country was attempting to reconstitute its WMD program after the 1998 bombings.[21][26] In its assessment, it could not conclude with certainty that Iraq had destroyed its WMDs, although it did note that any chemical agents or ballistic missiles that Iraq may possess would be in very small quantities, and would most likely be out of service due to poor storage of the materials.[26] The assessment also could find no real indications that Iraq was reconstituting a nuclear program.[21][27] The IAC assessment was also sceptical of the evidence presented by the Americans and was specifically critical of how there was little evidence of the wide range of equipment and resources needed to start such a program; even when accounting for potential deception efforts by the Iraqis.[27] The Interdepartmental Experts Groups, a group that supported the work of the IAC, also found no evidence of that the Iraqi chemical weapons program was reconstituted; although did make note that Iraqi ballistic missiles may have exceeded the 150-kilometre-range (93 mi), although only by a limited amount.[27] The IAS also assessed that Iraq did not appear to have taken the technical steps required to weaponize a biological agent like smallpox, although DND analysts have also highlighted that Iraq may have the virus itself.[27] However, scientific analysis from the DND largely corroborated with the IAC's assessment. The DND reported with high confidence, although not with absolute certainty, that Iraq no longer possessed chemical agents or munitions dating to the Gulf War.[28] The DND also could not find credible evidence that the Iraqi nuclear program had been restarted.[28] In March 2003, in the weeks before the invasion of Iraq, the DND published a report called Iraq: No Smoke, No Gun, where it assessed the coalition forces would fail to find WMDs in Iraq. Given that it contradicted the intelligence assessment from the UK and US, as well as the claims made by the coalition, the report was not shared with Canada's allies to not endanger the country's relationship with its Five Eyes partners.[29] IAS reports that also disagreed with the intelligence assessments of its Five Eyes partners were also marked as "Canadian-Eyes Only".[29]
From late August 2002, the IAC focused its efforts on reviewing incoming intelligence reports that would alter its assessment.[30] However, the conclusion reached by the IAC was reinforced by Canadian defence intelligence analysts who maintained regular contact with their counterparts in the UK, and to a lesser extent, in the US; where on a one-on-one basis, allied analyst seemingly expressed reservations about the evidence being shared through the Five Eyes intelligence-sharing arrangement.[30]
The IAS had also received intelligence passed along from the informant referred to as Curveball; concluding that the information provided by the informant was only circumstantial, and provided no direct evidence that Iraq had an active WMD program, or that they had the necessary delivery capabilities.[21] In early 2003, the US provided Canada with the classified version of a National Intelligence Estimate for Iraqi WMDs. Issues within the National Intelligence Estimate, including dissenting views taken from various US departments within the classified version of the document further reinforced IAS's assessment that Iraq didn't have WMDs.[31]
However, CSIS may have provided the impression to the Americans that the Canadian intelligence community had suspicions that Iraq possessed WMDs in early 2002, owing to a report from the organization which raised such concerns in February 2002.[28] Although that report was later withdrawn after the IAS raised several concerns about it, it had already been forwarded to the US.[28]
On the United States
The Canadian intelligence community's assessment of the situation was also influenced by their intelligence of the United States. Shortly after the
Shortly after the
In the months before the war, Canadian intelligence liaisons in Washington had noted that the Central Intelligence Agency was under political pressure to find evidence that confirmed the existence of a WMD program in Iraq.[7] Canadian analysts were also critical of how the US intelligence community were dismissive of the information being collected by UN inspector in Iraq, with the Americans viewing the UN inspectors as disorganized and ineffective.[31]
Military constraints
It was also noted that the Prime Minister's advice to the viceroy was also based on feasibility problems for Canada, with Maclean's magazine reporting that "Canada has committed about 2,000 troops to Afghanistan this summer, a significant contribution given the stretched state of the Canadian military."[6]
Neither the Pentagon nor the office of the US secretary of defence had pressured Canada for military support;[33] with US defence secretary Donald Rumsfeld making it clear to McCallum that the Americans were not seeking military support from Canada, and preferred if the Canadian Armed Forces focused on their deployment in Afghanistan.[33] Pressure for Canada to participate in the coalition primarily originated from the White House, which "sought the Canadian flag and the political cover it granted an invasion."[10]
Canadian involvement
Canada, despite not joining the invading coalition, still participated in the conflict in Iraq, joining a number of non-belligerent nations in helping to rebuild the country post-invasion, including the training of Iraqi police and army officers, and contributing approximately $300 million towards this effort. Also, a group of Canadians, including former
Military participation
Though no
Because of this Canadian involvement in Iraq, the
Amongst the Canadian officers who were sent to Iraq were: Brigadier-General Walter Natynczyk, who was later appointed Chief of the Defence Staff; Major-General Peter Devlin, who served since 14 December 2006 as Multi-National Corps-Iraq Deputy Command General as part of his role as Deputy Commander of the US III Corps through an officer exchange program;[36] and General Nicolas Matern, a special forces officer and former commander of Canada's elite counter-terrorism unit, who in mid February 2008 began service as deputy to Lieutenant-General Lloyd Austin.
Canadians taken hostage
Eight Canadians were taken hostage in Iraq over the course of the conflict there; one, Zaid Meerwali, an Iraqi-Canadian truck driver, was killed in 2005, and another Iraqi-Canadian, Rifat Mohammed Rifat, has been missing since 2004 and is presumed dead. The
American war resisters
During the
The choice of these United States
See also
References
- ^ Barnes 2020.
- ^ a b c d e f Gollom, Mark (9 October 2008). "Our own voice on Iraq?". Canadian Broadcasting Corporation. Archived from the original on 12 January 2016. Retrieved 12 January 2009.
- ^ Sanders, Richard. "Canada's secret war in Iraq". Common Ground. Archived from the original on 3 September 2012. Retrieved 2 March 2012.
- ^ a b Sayle 2015, p. 6.
- ^ Sayle 2015, p. 9.
- ^ ISSN 0024-9262. Archived from the originalon 18 May 2008. Retrieved 19 January 2009.
- ^ a b c Sayle 2015, p. 12.
- ^ a b Sayle 2015, p. 18.
- ^ Sayle 2015, p. 2.
- ^ a b c d e f g Sayle 2015, p. 8.
- ^ Sayle 2015, p. 13.
- ^ "Editorial | Toronto Star endorses the NDP". Toronto Star. 30 April 2011.
- ^ a b Harper, Tim (22 March 2003). "Canadians back Chrétien on war, poll finds". Toronto Star. Archived from the original on 6 July 2011. Retrieved 12 January 2009.
- ^ Sayle 2015, p. 14.
- ^ a b "Canadian activists stage anti-war rallies". CBC. 17 November 2002. Retrieved 22 September 2009.
- ^ a b "Protesters brave cold to condemn war against Iraq". CBC. 18 November 2002. Retrieved 22 September 2009.
- ^ "Millions say 'no' to war in Iraq". CBC. 16 February 2003. Retrieved 22 September 2009.
- ^ "Canadians join global peace rally | CBC News". CBC. Retrieved 31 October 2020.
- ^ a b c Barnes 2020, p. 940.
- ^ a b c Barnes 2020, p. 941.
- ^ a b c d e Sayle 2015, p. 11.
- ^ a b c Barnes 2020, p. 945.
- ^ Barnes 2020, p. 944.
- ^ a b c d e Barnes 2020, p. 928.
- ^ a b c Barnes 2020, p. 929.
- ^ a b c Barnes 2020, p. 930.
- ^ a b c d Barnes 2020, p. 931.
- ^ a b c d Barnes 2020, p. 934.
- ^ a b Barnes 2020, p. 937.
- ^ a b Barnes 2020, p. 932.
- ^ a b Barnes 2020, p. 933.
- ^ a b Sayle 2015, p. 5.
- ^ a b c Sayle 2015, p. 7.
- ^ "Canadian pilots flew missions in Iraq". Canada.com/The Ottawa Citizen. 22 April 2008. Archived from the original on 30 August 2013.
- ISBN 978-0-670-06722-0.
- ^ "Biography of Major-General Peter Delvin" (PDF). United States Central Command. Archived from the original (PDF) on 25 September 2007.
- ^ Meo, Nick; Evans, Michael; McGorey, Daniel (25 March 2006). "Army's top general attacks Kember for failing to thank SAS rescue team". The Times. Retrieved 22 September 2009.
- ^ "Elite Canadian soldiers helped free hostages". CTV. 24 March 2006. Archived from the original on 13 June 2008. Retrieved 22 September 2009.
- Angus Reid. Archived from the originalon 29 April 2009. Retrieved 12 July 2009.
- ^ Bailey, Sue (5 July 2009). "Federal website changes undermine Iraq resisters: critics". The Canadian Press. Retrieved 17 July 2009.
- ^ Cooper, Alex (21 April 2009). "Federal court to hear American war resister's appeal". Toronto Star. Retrieved 23 April 2009.
- ^ "BILL C-440". House of Commons of Canada. 17 September 2009. Retrieved 19 September 2009.
- ^ "40th PARLIAMENT, 2nd SESSION, EDITED HANSARD • NUMBER 083, Thursday, September 17, 2009". Hansard: House Publications. 17 September 2009. Retrieved 19 September 2009.
- ^ "Liberal MP introduces war resisters bill". The Toronto Star. 17 September 2009. Retrieved 19 September 2009.
Sources
- Barnes, Alan (28 May 2020). "Getting it right: Canadian intelligence assessments on Iraq, 2002-2003". Intelligence and National Security. 35 (7): 925–953. ISSN 0268-4527.
- Sayle, Timothy A. (2015). ""But he has nothing on at all!" Canada and the Iraq War, 2003". Canadian Military History. 19 (4): 5–19.