Case Blue
Case Blue | |
---|---|
Part of the | |
Result | Axis operational failure |
Fedor von Bock
Maximilian von Weichs
Hermann Hoth
Hans von Salmuth
Friedrich Paulus
C. Constantinescu-Claps
Gusztáv Jány
Italo Gariboldi
Wolfram von Richthofen
Wilhelm List
Ewald von Kleist
Richard Ruoff
Erich von Manstein
Petre Dumitrescu
Initially: 1,570,287-1.805.000 (incl. Italian Eighth Army from early August)
- : 1,210,861[2]
- : 235.000 Italian Eighth Army
- : 159,426[2]
1,000,000 (in reserve)
2,959–3,720 tanks[4][3]
1,671 aircraft[5]
16,500 artillery pieces[3]
Total:
2,715,000
200,000[6]
700 tanks destroyed[6]
Hungary Italy Slovakia:
~150,000
Total: 350,000 (excluding 150,000 casualties in the first phase of the Battle of the Caucasus)
4,862 tanks and SPG destroyed or damaged[6]
(including casualties in the first phase of the Battle of the Caucasus)
Case Blue (German: Fall Blau) was the Wehrmacht's plan for the 1942 strategic summer offensive in southern Russia between 28 June and 24 November 1942, during World War II. The objective was to capture the oil fields of Baku (Azerbaijan SSR), Grozny and Maikop for two purposes: to enable the Germans to re-supply their low fuel stock and also to deny their use to the Soviet Union, thereby bringing about the complete collapse of the Soviet war effort.
After
In the south, Army Group A captured
The Allies were concerned about the possibility of German forces continuing to the south and east and linking up with Japanese forces (then advancing in
Axis strategy
Background
On 22 June 1941, Germany launched
The oilfields
The Caucasus, a large, culturally diverse region traversed by its eponymous mountains, is bounded by the
The Caucasus also possessed plentiful coal and peat, as well as nonferrous and rare metals. Manganese deposits at Chiatura, in Transcaucasia, formed the richest single source in the world, yielding 1.5 million tons of manganese ore annually, half of the Soviet Union's total production. The Kuban region of the Caucasus also produced large amounts of wheat, corn, sunflower seeds, and sugar beets, all essential in the production of food.[13]
These resources were of immense importance to the German war effort. Of the three million tons of oil Germany consumed per year, 85 percent was imported, mainly from the
Planning
Axis forces
The German plan involved a three-staged attack:[17][18][19]
- Blau I: Fourth Panzer Army, commanded by Hermann Hoth (transferred from Army Group Centre) and the Second Army, supported by the Second Hungarian Army, would attack from Kursk to Voronezh and continue the advance, anchoring the northern flank of the offensive towards the Volga.
- Blau II: Sixth Army, commanded by Kharkovand move in parallel with Fourth Panzer Army, to reach the Volga at Stalingrad (whose capture was not deemed necessary).
- Blau III: First Panzer Army would then strike south towards the lower Don River, with Seventeenth Army on the western flank and Fourth Romanian Army on the eastern flank.
The strategic objectives of the operation were the oilfields at Maykop, Grozny and Baku. As in Barbarossa, these movements were expected to result in a series of grand encirclements of Soviet troops.[17]
The offensive was to be conducted across the southern Russian (Kuban) steppe utilizing the following Army Group units:[20]
Northern Sector (Volga campaign)[21]
- Army Group B
- Generalfeldmarschall Maximilian von Weichs[c]
- Second Army (General Hans von Salmuth)[d]
- Fourth Panzer Army (Generaloberst Hermann Hoth)
- XXIV Panzer Corps (W. Langermann und Erlenkamp)[e]
- XXXXVIII Panzer Corps (W. Kempf)
- XIII Army Corps (E. Straube)
- Sixth Army (General der Panzertruppe Friedrich Paulus)[f]
- Hungarian Second Army (Colonel-General Vitéz Gusztáv Jány)[i]
- III Corps (G. Rakovsky)
- VII Army Corps (Wehrmacht) (E.-E. Hell)
- Arrived 21–25 July:
- Romanian Fourth Army
- Italian Eighth Army (Arrived 11–15 August) (General Italo Gariboldi)
- Luftflotte 4
- Generaloberst Alexander Löhr[k] (thru 20 July)
- Generalfeldmarschall Wolfram Freiherr von Richthofen[l](from 20 July)
- German air strength in the east numbered 2,644 aircraft on 20 June 1942, over 20% more than a month earlier. Whereas in 1941 most units fought on the central front supporting Army Group Centre, 1,610 aircraft (61%), supported Army Group South.[22]
Southern Sector (Caucasus campaign)
- Army Group A
- Generalfeldmarschall Wilhelm List
Soviet forces
The Soviet army command (Stavka) failed to discern the direction of the main German strategic offensive anticipated in 1942, even though they were in possession of the German plans. On 19 June, the chief of operations of the 23rd Panzer Division, Major Joachim Reichel, was shot down over Soviet-held territory while flying an observation aircraft over the front near Kharkov. The Soviets recovered maps from his aircraft detailing the exact German plans for Case Blue. The plans were handed over to Stavka, in Moscow.[23]
With the German thrust expected in the north, Stavka planned several local offensives in the south to weaken the Germans. The most important of these was aimed at the city of Kharkov and would be conducted mainly by the Southwestern Front under
The Red Army order of battle at the start of the campaign was as follows:
Northern Sector (Volga campaign)[29]
Armies deployed north to south:
- Bryansk Front
- Generalleutnant Filipp I. Golikov[o]
- 48th Army (G.A. Khaliuzin)
- 4 rifle divisions (1 Guards), 2 rifle brigades, 2 tank brigades, 1 cavalry division
- 13th Army (N.P. Pukhov)
- 5 rifle divisions, 1 rifle brigade, 1 tank brigade
- 5th Tank Army (A.I. Liziukov) (KIA 23 July)
- 7 tank brigades
- 3rd Army (P.P. Korzun)
- 6 rifle divisions, 2 rifle brigades, 2 tank brigades
- 40th Army (M.A. Parsegov)
- 6 rifle divisions, 3 rifle brigades, 2 tank brigades
- Front forces
- 2 rifle divisions (1 Guards), 1 rifle brigade, 20 tank brigades (2 Guards), 6 cavalry divisions
- 48th Army (G.A. Khaliuzin)
- Second Air Army
- Generalmajor Stepan Y. Krasovsky
- Aviation divisions: 3 fighter, 4 ground attack, 2 bomber, 1 night bomber
- Southwestern Front
- Marshal Semyon K. Timoshenko[p]
- 28th Army (D.I. Riabyshev)
- 7 rifle divisions (1 Guards), 5 tank brigades (1 Guards)
- 38th Army (K.S. Moskalenko)
- 8 rifle divisions, 7 tank brigades, 1 independent tank battalion
- 9th Army (F.A. Parkhomenko)
- 8 rifle divisions, 1 tank brigade, 3 cavalry divisions
- 21st Army (A.I. Danilov)
- 5 rifle divisions, 1 NKVD motorized rifle division, 3 tank brigades
- Front forces
- 8 tank brigades, 2 independent tank battalions, 3 cavalry divisions
- 28th Army (D.I. Riabyshev)
- Eighth Air Army
- Generalmajor Timofei T. Khriukin
- Aviation divisions: 5 fighter, 2 ground attack, 2 bomber, 2 night bomber
The offensive
Opening phase
The German offensive commenced on 28 June 1942, with Fourth Panzer Army starting its drive towards Voronezh. Due to a chaotic Soviet retreat, the Germans were able to advance rapidly, restoring Wehrmacht confidence for the upcoming major offensive.[30]
By 5 July, forward elements of Fourth Panzer Army had reached the
Only two weeks into the operation, on 11 July, the Germans began to suffer logistical difficulties, which slowed the advance. The German Sixth Army was continually delayed by fuel shortages. Eight days later, on 20 July, shortages of fuel were still undermining operations, leaving many units unable to execute their orders. The
Splitting of Army Group South
Believing that the main Soviet threat had been eliminated, desperately short of oil and needing to meet all the ambitious objectives of Case Blue, Hitler made a series of changes to the plan in Führer Directive No. 45 on July 23, 1942:
- reorganized Army Group South into two smaller Army Groups, A and B;
- directed Operation Edelweiß);
- directed Army Group B to attack towards the Volga and Stalingrad (Operation Fischreiher).[7]
There is no evidence Hitler was opposed by, or received complaints from
The splitting of Army Group South enabled the launching of Operation Edelweiss and Operation Fischreiher, the two main thrusts of the Army Groups. Both groups had to achieve their objectives simultaneously, instead of consecutively.[7] The success of the initial advance was such that Hitler ordered the Fourth Panzer Army south to assist the First Panzer Army to cross the lower Don river.[37] This assistance was not needed and Kleist later complained that Fourth Panzer Army clogged the roads and that if they had carried on toward Stalingrad, they could have taken it in July. When it turned north again two weeks later, the Soviets had gathered enough forces together at Stalingrad to check its advance.[38]
Army Group A: Caucasus
Breaking into the Caucasus
With air support from the Ju 87s of Sturzkampfgeschwader 77, List's Army Group A recaptured Rostov, the "gate to the Caucasus", on 23 July 1942 relatively easily.[39] The Luftwaffe had air superiority in the early phase of the operation, which was of great help to the ground forces.[40] With the Don crossing secured and Sixth Army's advance flagging on the Volga front, Hitler transferred the Fourth Panzer Army to Army Group B and sent it back to the Volga.[41] The redeployment used enormous amounts of fuel to transfer the army by air and road.[42]
After crossing the Don on 25 July, Army Group A fanned out on a 200 km (120 mi) front from the Sea of Azov to Zymlianskaya (today Zymlyansk).[43] The German Seventeenth Army, along with elements of the Eleventh Army and the Romanian Third Army, manoeuvred west towards the east coast of the Black Sea, while the First Panzer Army attacked to the south-east. The Seventeenth Army made a slow advance but the First Panzer Army had freedom of action. On 29 July the Germans cut the last direct railway between central Russia and the Caucasus, causing considerable panic to Stalin and Stavka, which led to the passing of Order No. 227 "Not a step back!".[44] Salsk was captured on 31 July and Stavropol on 5 August.[28] Although the army group made a quick advance, by 3 August the vanguard comprised only light mobile forces and most of the tanks lagged behind, due to lack of fuel and supply breakdowns, despite the efforts of 4th Air Corps, which flew in supplies around the clock.[42]
On 9 August, the First Panzer Army reached Maikop in the foothills of the Caucasus mountains, having advanced more than 480 kilometers (300 mi) in fewer than two weeks. The western oil fields near Maikop were seized in a commando operation from 8–9 August, but the oil fields had been sufficiently destroyed by the Red Army to take about a year to be repaired. Shortly afterwards Pyatigorsk was taken.[28] On 12 August, Krasnodar was captured and German mountain troops hoisted the Nazi flag on the highest mountain of the Caucasus, Mount Elbrus.[45]
The length of the German advance created chronic supply difficulties, particularly of petrol; the Black Sea was judged too dangerous and fuel was brought by rail through Rostov or delivered by air, but panzer divisions were sometimes at a standstill for weeks. Even petrol trucks ran out of fuel and oil had to be brought up on camels.[46] With the Soviets often retreating instead of fighting, the number of prisoners fell short of expectations and only 83,000 were taken.[47] As Hitler and OKH began to concentrate on Stalingrad, some of Kleist's mobile forces were diverted. Kleist lost his flak corps and most of the Luftwaffe supporting the southern front, only reconnaissance aircraft being left behind. The Voyenno-Vozdushnye Sily (VVS) brought in about 800 bombers, a third of which were operational. With the transfer of air cover and flak units, Soviet bombers were free to harass the German advance.[48] The quality of the Soviet resistance increased, with many of the forces used coming from local levies, who Kleist thought were willing to fight harder for their homeland.[48] German units were especially bogged down by fighting Georgian alpine and mountain troops, who greatly contributed to stalling their advance.[49] The quantity of replacements and supplies the Soviets committed increased, and faced with these difficulties, the Axis advance slowed after 28 August.[28][50][51]
Battle for the oilfields
In the south-east, the Wehrmacht headed in the direction of Grozny and
Axis ships transported 30,605 men, 13,254 horses and 6,265 motor vehicles across the Black Sea from Romania, from 1–2 September. With the reinforcements, the Germans captured most of the Black Sea naval bases but were held up at Novorossiysk, where the Soviet 47th Army had prepared for a long siege.[58] The port fell on 10 September, after a four-day battle, the final German victory in the Caucasus. It left the heights south of the port and several coast roads in the hands of 47th Soviet Army. Attempts to push out of Novorossiysk were costly failures and the Axis also failed to break the defences on the coastal plain from Novorossiysk to Tuapse, having only the strength to stabilize the line. Romanian Army losses were particularly high and the Romanian 3rd Mountain Division was nearly wiped out by a Soviet counter-attack from 25–26 September.[59]
Further east, the Axis enjoyed greater success and on 1 September, the Germans took Khulkhuta (Хулхута́), halfway between Elista and Astrakhan.[60] During August and September, German patrols raided the railway around Kizlyar, north-east of Grozny, marking the farthest advance of the German forces towards the Caspian Sea.[61] In the south, the First Panzer Army advance on Grozny was stopped by the Red Army and the 14th Air Army. By late September, supply failures and the resistance of the Red Army slowed the Axis advance.[62] The Germans took Nakchik on 26 October.[citation needed]
On 2 November 1942, Romanian mountain troops (
Luftwaffe oil offensive
In the first week of October 1942, Hitler came to recognize that the capture of the Caucasus oil fields was unlikely before winter, which forced the Germans to take up defensive positions. Unable to capture them, he was determined to deny them to the enemy and ordered the Oberkommando der Luftwaffe (OKL) to inflict as much damage as possible.[68]
On 8 October, Hitler called for the air offensive to be carried out no later than 14 October, as he required air assets for a major effort at Stalingrad.[69] As a result, on 10 October 1942, Fliegerkorps 4 of Luftflotte 4 (4th Air Corps of Fourth Air Fleet) was ordered to send every available bomber against the oilfields at Grozny. Fourth Air Fleet was in poor shape by this time – Richthofen had begun Case Blue with 323 serviceable bombers out of a total of 480. He was now down to 232, of which only 129 were combat ready. Nevertheless, the force could still deliver damaging blows. Attacks on the refineries reminded Richthofen of the attacks on Sevastopol several months earlier. Thick black smoke rose from the refineries to a height of 5,500 m (18,000 ft). On 12 October, further raids caused even more destruction. It had been a strategic mistake not to have made greater efforts to hit the oil refineries at Grozny and Baku sooner, as their destruction would have been a greater blow to the Soviets than the loss of Stalingrad, where most of the air fleet was deployed. On 19 November, the Soviet counter-offensive at Stalingrad compelled Richthofen to once more withdraw his units north to the Volga and bring an end to the aerial offensive.[70]
Much damage was done at Grozny, but the remaining oilfields were beyond the logistical reach of the German Army as well as of the fighter aircraft of the Luftwaffe. Grozny was within range of German bombers from 4th Air Corps, based near the Terek River. But Grozny and the captured oilfields at Maykop produced only ten per cent of Soviet oil. The main fields at Baku were out of German fighter range. German bombers could have reached them, but it meant flying the most direct, thus most predictable route without protection. In August it may have been possible to carry out these operations owing to the weakness of Soviet air power in the region, but by October it had been considerably strengthened.[71]
Army Group B: Volga
Don bend
On 23 July, the main body of Army Group B started its advance toward the Don. The Germans met with increasing Soviet resistance from the new Stalingrad Front, with the
By 10 August, the Red Army had been cleared from most of the west bank of the Don, but Soviet resistance continued in some areas, further delaying Army Group B. The Wehrmacht advance on Stalingrad was also impeded by supply shortages caused by the poor state of Soviet roads. The Luftwaffe sent an ad-hoc force of 300 Ju 52 transport aircraft, enabling the Germans to advance; some bombers were diverted from operations to supply flights under the Stalingrad Transport Region force.[73] The Soviet defence at the Don forced the Germans to commit more and more troops to an increasingly vulnerable front, leaving few reserves to back up the Axis divisions on either flank.[74] The Soviets made several counter-attacks on the northern flank of Army Group B, between Stalingrad and Voronezh. From 20–28 August, the 63rd Army and the 21st Army counter-attacked near Serafimovich, forcing the Italian Eighth Army to fall back. The 1st Guards Army attacked near Novo-Grigoryevskaja, extending its bridgehead. These and several other bridgeheads across the Don, opposed by the Eighth Italian and Second Hungarian armies, were a constant danger.[51]
On 23 August, Sixth Army crossed the Don and Army Group B established a defensive line on one of its bends.[51] Sixth Army reached the northern suburbs of Stalingrad later that day, beginning the Battle of Stalingrad. The Hungarian, Italian and Romanian armies were 60 km (37 mi) from Stalingrad, which was in range of forward air bases. Luftflotte 4 attacked the city, turning much of it to rubble.[75] The Soviets reported that civilian casualties from 23–26 August were 955 dead and 1,181 wounded (a preliminary total; later reports of casualties in the tens of thousands were probably exaggerations).[76]
Sixth Army advanced from the north via Kalach and Fourth Panzer Army came up from the south through Kotelnikovo. In the first few days, the XIV Panzer Corps opened a corridor between the main body of Sixth Army and the northern Stalingrad suburbs at the Volga. In the south, Soviet resistance repulsed the Fourth Panzer Army. On 29 August another attempt was made with Hoth turning his forces west directly through the center of 64th Army. The attack was unexpectedly successful and Fourth Panzer Army got behind 62nd and 64th Armies with the chance to encircle and cut off 62nd Army. Weichs ordered Sixth Army to complete the encirclement; a Soviet counter-attack held up the advance for three days and the Soviets escaped and retreated towards Stalingrad.[77] The rapid German advance caused a slump in morale among the Soviet troops, who retreated in chaos, abandoning the outer defences of the city.[78] After defeating the last Soviet counter-attacks, Sixth Army resumed its offensive on 2 September, linking up with Fourth Panzer Army the following day. On 12 September, the Germans entered Stalingrad.[79]
Battle of Stalingrad
The advance into Stalingrad against the 62nd Army was carried out by Sixth Army, while Fourth Panzer Army secured the southern flank. The city was a 24 km (15 mi) ribbon along the west bank of the Volga, which forced the Germans to conduct a frontal assault, and the ruins of the city gave the defenders an advantage. To counter Luftwaffe air superiority, the commander of the 62nd Army, General
On 19 November, the Soviets launched
Hitler ordered Sixth Army to remain on the defensive, rather than try to break out. It was intended the army would be supplied by air, but the quantity of supplies necessary was far beyond the ability of the Luftwaffe to carry. Sixth Army's strength diminished and the Soviets gained the upper hand inside the city.[84] To stabilize the situation on the Eastern Front, Army Group Don (Heeresgruppe Don) under Field Marshal Erich von Manstein was created to fill the gap between Army Groups A and B.[85] On 12 December, a relief operation called Operation Winter Storm was launched from the South by fresh reinforcements of the 4th Panzer Army. The offensive surprised the Soviets and the Germans were able to penetrate the Soviet line for 50 km (31 mi) towards Stalingrad. Despite these gains, the Sixth Army was not allowed to attempt to break out and link up, so this led to nothing.[86] The failure was followed by a siege that lasted for almost two months, during which the Sixth Army was destroyed.[87]
Aftermath
Operation Saturn
Following the success of Operation Uranus, the Red Army began
The Soviets launched several follow-up offensives, later called the
The Kharkov and Donbas operations were started on 25 February by the new
Effect on the war
The failure of the operation, mainly due to the disastrous defeat at Stalingrad, marked the turning point in the war on the Eastern Front. Germany was forced to withdraw some 800 kilometers back to a new battle about 100 kilometers west of the city of Kursk. This withdrawal set the pace for Operation Citadel in the summer of 1943, which was unsuccessful, and resulted in a permanent swing of fortunes in the Soviets' favor for the remainder of the war.
The Soviets permanently secured the initiative with regard to offensives, while Germany was forced to switch to a defensive posture that persisted until its eventual defeat less than 2 years later.[citation needed]
Analysis
Due to the initial success of the German summer offensive in 1942, Hitler became more ambitious, putting great strain on the German army.[45] Hitler did not expect the Soviets to be able to launch a counter-offensive as big as Operation Uranus and sent troops elsewhere, ordering the Wehrmacht to simultaneously achieve several goals. Opposition and minor setbacks led to Hitler sacking dissenters and interfering more in command, constantly changing plans and orders, which led to confusion, delays and wastage of precious resources like fuel as the German army struggled to keep up with Hitler's indecisiveness.[94][95]
Overextension reduced the capabilities of the German Army and its allies to defend this territory and the Soviets mounted a decisive offensive at Stalingrad, encircling a German army. Soon both sides concentrated on the battle for the city, making the Caucasus a secondary theatre.[28] With Army Group B unable to hold the Volga line, Soviet offensives almost cut off Army Group A in the Caucasus and it was forced to withdraw. The surrender of Sixth Army was a huge blow to German morale and it came as a great shock to Hitler. Despite the destruction of Sixth Army, the Soviets were able to only force the German Army back from the Caucasus, delaying the final decision on the Eastern Front. The Soviet command overestimated its capabilities and pushed its forces forward to the limit of its supply lines, which led to defeat at the Third Battle of Kharkov and left the Germans able to fight the Battle of Kursk.[8][9]
See also
Notes
- ^ Around 6,000 men of the Croatian Home Guard served in the German 6th Army as the 369th Infantry Regiment and in the Italian 8th Army as the Light Transport Brigade
a Army Group A was under direct command of the OKH from 10 September 1942 until 22 November 1942, when Kleist took over.
b Not all of those tanks were serviceable at the beginning of the offensive, as tanks were in repair, already engaged in combat, refitting, or not present at the frontline.[96]
c Took command upon Bock being relieved by Hitler 17 July.
d Took command upon Weichs being raised to army group command 17 July.
e KIA 3 October at Storoshewoje on the Middle Don.
f Surrendered remains of Sixth Army at Stalingrad 31 January 1943.
g A set of plans for Fall Blau held by an officer of one of Stumme's panzer divisions fell into Soviet hands on 19 June. Furious at this breach, Hitler relieved Stumme 21 July and had him court-martialed. Stumme was reassigned to the Afrika Korps and was killed in action 12 October at El Alamein.
h Captured at Stalingrad 31 January 1943, died in captivity 9 February 1944.
i Executed by firing squad for war crimes November 1947.
j Committed suicide October 1944 following arrest by the Gestapo.
k Executed by firing squad in Yugoslavia for war crimes February 1947.
l Died of a brain tumor in American captivity 12 July 1945.
m The Third Romanian Army was later assigned to Army Group B and was one of the two Romanian armies heavily engaged in Operation Uranus.
n After the successful completion of the battle for the Kerch Peninsula, 11th Army was split and only parts of it were assigned to Army Group A.
o Relieved for military incompetence and reassigned March 1943.
p Relieved for military incompetence and reassigned 22 July.
q The Seventeenth Army of Army Group A stayed in the Kuban bridgehead.
References
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- ^ a b c d Mercatante 2012, p. 151.
- ^ a b c d e Antill (2007), p. 40.
- ^ a b c Nipe (2000), p. 33.
- ^ a b Antill (2007), pp. 87–88.
- ^ Antill (2007), pp. 7–12.
- ^ Glantz (1995), pp. 108–110.
- ^ Wegner (1990), p. 761.
- ^ a b Hayward (2001), p. 2.
- ^ Axworthy (1995), p. 19.
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