Central Powers intervention in the Russian Civil War
| Central Powers intervention in the Russian Civil War | ||||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Part of the Russian Civil War | ||||||||
| ||||||||
| Belligerents | ||||||||
Central Powers:
 Landeswehr[d] Freikorps[e] Bermontians[f] |
Lithuanian SSR  Latvian SSR |
Baltic States:
| ||||||
| Commanders and leaders | ||||||||
 H. von Eichhorn Max Hoffmann |
 Vladimir Lenin Jukums Vācietis |
 Ernst Põdder Jānis Balodis Silvestras Žukauskas | ||||||
Russian White Guard eradicate communists in the Baltics until their eventual withdrawal and defeat. In addition, pro-German factions fought against the newly independent Baltic states until their defeat by the Baltic States, backed by the victorious Allies.
Prologue to the Central intervention
The
Red Russia
a vacuum on the eastern border was created. Several states broke free in the chaos which Germany decided to take advantage of.
Peace with the Central Powers
The Bolsheviks decided to immediately make peace with the
Wilhelm II, German Emperor, offered to Lenin in hope that, with a revolution, Russia would withdraw from World War I. That suspicion was bolstered by the German Foreign Ministry's sponsorship of Lenin's return to Petrograd.[2] However, after the military fiasco of the summer offensive (June 1917) by the Russian Provisional Government, and in particular after the failed summer offensive of the Provisional Government had devastated the structure of the Russian Army, it became crucial that Lenin realize the promised peace.[3][4] Even before the failed summer offensive the Russian population was very skeptical about the continuation of the war. Western socialists had promptly arrived from France and from the UK to convince the Russians to continue the fight, but could not change the new pacifist mood of Russia.[5]
On 16 December 1917 an armistice was signed between Russia and the Central Powers in
nationalists and conservatives. Leon Trotsky, representing the Bolsheviks, refused at first to sign the treaty while continuing to observe a unilateral cease-fire, following the policy of "No war, no peace".[7]
In view of this, on 18 February 1918 the Germans began
Belarusian People's Republic, and the Ukrainian State. Following the defeat of Germany in World War I in November 1918, these states were abolished.[9][10]
independence from Russia in December 1917 and established itself in the ensuing Finnish Civil War from January–May 1918.[11] The Second Polish Republic, Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia formed their own armies immediately after the abolition of the Brest-Litovsk Treaty and the start of the Soviet westward offensive in November 1918.[12]
After the Armistice
After the eventual downfall of the Central Powers, the armies occupying the eastern territories could not be resupplied with the new
with the goal of maintaining German supremacy in the region.Aftermath
End of the intervention
In late 1919 it became clear that the
Baltic States were going to be independent and the Western Front was coming to a close. With the Baltic wars of Independence wrapping up the West Russian Volunteer Army was becoming obsolete. In mid-December 1919 a withdrawal was organized by Walter von Eberhardt from Lithuania to East Prussia
, finally back on German soil.
See also
Notes
References
- ^ Figes 1997, p. 258:quotes such comments from the peasant soldiers during the first weeks of the war: We have talked it over among ourselves; if the Germans want payment, it would be better to pay ten rubles a head than to kill people. Or: Is it not all the same what Tsar we live under? It cannot be worse under the German one. Or: Let them go and fight themselves. Wait a while, we will settle accounts with you. Or: 'What devil has brought this war on us? We are butting into other people's business.'
- ^ Lenin
- ^ Figes 1997, p. 416"As Brusilov saw it, the soldiers were so obsessed with the idea of peace that they would have been prepared to support the Tsar himself, so long as he promised to bring the war to an end."
- ^ Figes 1997, p. 419:"It was partly a case of the usual military failings: units had been sent into battle without machine-guns; untrained soldiers had been ordered to engage in complex maneuvers using hand grenades and ended up throwing them without first pulling the pins."
- ^ Figes 1997, p. 412:"This new civic patriotism did not extend beyond the urban middle classes, although the leaders of the Provisional Government deluded themselves that it did."
- ^ Mawdsley 2007, p. 42.
- ^ a b Smith & Tucker 2014, pp. 554–555.
- ISBN 90-420-0678-1.
- ^ Mieczysław B. Biskupski, "War and the Diplomacy of Polish Independence, 1914–18." Polish Review (1990): 5-17. online
- ^ Timothy Snyder, The Reconstruction of Nations: Poland, Ukraine, Lithuania, Belarus, 1569–1999 (Yale UP, 2004)
- .
- ^ Anatol Lieven, The Baltic revolution: Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and the path to independence (Yale UP, 1993) pp 54-61. excerpt
Bibliography
- Figes, Orlando (1997). A People's Tragedy: A History of the Russian Revolution. New York: Viking. ISBN 978-0670859160.
- Mawdsley, Evan (2007). The Russian Civil War. New York: Pegasus Books. ISBN 978-1681770093.
- Smith, David A.; Tucker, Spencer C. (2014). "Faustschlag, Operation". World War I: The Definitive Encyclopedia and Document Collection. Santa Barbara, CA: ABC-CLIO. pp. 554–555. ISBN 978-1851099658. Archivedfrom the original on 15 February 2017. Retrieved 27 December 2017.