Cohen v. Cowles Media Co.

Cohen v. Cowles Media Co.
Cohen v. Cowles Media Co.
	Minn. 1990); cert. granted, 498 U.S. 1011 (1990).
Subsequent	Affirmed on remand, 479 N.W.2d 387 (Minn. 1992); on rehearing, 481 N.W.2d 840 (Minn. 1992).
Court membership
	Chief Justice William Rehnquist Associate Justices Byron White · Thurgood Marshall; Harry Blackmun · John P. Stevens; Sandra Day O'Connor · Antonin Scalia; Anthony Kennedy · David Souter
Case opinions
Majority	White, joined by Rehnquist, Stevens, Scalia, Kennedy
Dissent	Blackmun, joined by Marshall, Souter
Dissent	Souter, joined by Marshall, Blackmun, O'Connor
Laws applied
	U.S. Const. amend. I

Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 501 U.S. 663 (1991), was a U.S. Supreme Court case holding that the First Amendment freedom of the press does not exempt journalists from generally applicable laws.^[1]

source would not be published. Over the reporters' objections, editors of both newspapers independently decided to publish his name. Cohen consequently lost his job at an advertising agency. He sued Cowles Media Company

, who owned the Minneapolis Star Tribune.

In 1988, a jury of six found in Cohen's favor. The Minnesota Supreme Court reversed. The United States Supreme Court, while refusing to reinstate the damages, remanded the case to the Minnesota Supreme Court, which reinstated the jury's original verdict of $200,000.

The Cowles Media Company was found liable based on a theory of promissory estoppel.

Opinion of the Court

The Supreme Court found, in a majority decision, that:

Against respondent's claims that it had no jurisdiction: citing Orr v. Orr (1979), whether the arguments in inferior courts were federal law arguments was irrelevant, and moreover the Minnesota Supreme Court had used federal law and respondent had relied on First Amendment protection.
Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell
(1988). Consequently, any restriction on reporting was "incidental, and constitutionally insignificant" result of applying a generally applicable law.
Deciding whether the claim under promissory estoppel was valid, and whether the state constitution shielded the press, was a matter for the Minnesota Supreme Court, and on that basis the request for reinstatement of damages was denied, and the case remanded to the inferior court.

Dissents

Justice Blackmun's dissent focussed on the proposition that applying promissory estoppel punished the publication of truth.

Justice Souter's dissent was based on the balance of "the importance of the information to public discourse" to the other interests involved. In this case the potential effect of the publication of Cohen's identity on an election for public office was thought to be compelling.