Communist insurgency in Malaysia (1968–1989)
Communist insurgency in Malaysia | |||||||
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Part of the Cold War and continuation of the Malayan Emergency | |||||||
Sarawak Rangers (present-day part of the Malaysian Rangers) consisting of Ibans leap from a Royal Australian Air Force Bell UH-1 Iroquois helicopter to guard the Malay–Thai border from potential Communist attacks in 1965, three years before the war starting in 1968. | |||||||
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Belligerents | |||||||
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Communist forces:
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Commanders and leaders | |||||||
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Strength | |||||||
8,000[22][23][24][25] 1,000[26][27] | |||||||
Casualties and losses | |||||||
155 killed 854 wounded[28] |
212 killed 150 captured 117 surrendered[28] |
History of Malaysia |
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Malaysia portal |
The Communist insurgency in Malaysia, also known as the Second Malayan Emergency (Malay: Perang insurgensi melawan pengganas komunis or Darurat Kedua), was an armed conflict which occurred in Malaysia from 1968 to 1989, between the Malayan Communist Party (MCP) and Malaysian federal security forces.
Following the end of the
The Malayan Communist Party received some support from the
The insurgency ended on 2 December 1989 when the MCP signed a
Background
During the first
The MCP also made efforts to recruit more Malays into their organisation. Despite a small number of Malay personnel, including Abdullah CD and Rashid Maidin, it remained dominated by the Chinese. A special Malay unit, known as the 10th Regiment was established under the leadership of a Central Committee member, Abdullah C.D. Abdullah also established several "Masses Revolutionary School" (Sekolah Revolusi Rakyat) to disseminate Maoist ideas among Thai Malays. Since the MCP was based in southern Thailand, most of its recruits were Thai Malays and people from Kelantan, a northeastern Malaysian state.[18][36]
To enhance the appeal of the MCP among the Malays, the Islamic Brotherhood Party (Malay: Parti Persaudaraan Islam, PAPERI) was set up as the front organisation of the MCP. PAPERI was responsible for distributing leaflets claiming that there was no incompatibility between Islam and Communism.[18] In July 1961, Chin Peng met Deng Xiaoping in China. Deng had proposed to the MCP that it conduct a second armed struggle. Deng insisted that Malaya was ripe for a revolution. The success of Vietnam War bolstered the MCP to launch another revolt in Malaya. Deng later promised Chin Peng that China would assist the MCP and contribute US$100,000 for the second insurgency in Malaya.[37][38]
Early offensive
On 1 June 1968, the Central Command of the MCP issued a directive entitled "Hold High the Great Red Banner of Armed Struggle and Valiantly March Forward."
According to Chin Peng, the MCP's ranks had grown to around 1,000 by the period between 1967 and 1968. Following the
To support the MCP's renewed insurgency, a clandestine radio station known as
Suara's programmes were beamed across the region by a powerful 20-kilowatt transmitter and it was broadcast in three languages:
In 1969, the Malaysian government responded to the Communist resurgence by establishing its own
MCP internal conflicts
In early 1970, the MCP experienced a major crisis within the party. Internal disputes due to the counterintelligence problems posed by the
Members in the militant wing started to accuse each other as government spies. Betrayal in guerrilla ranks was regarded as the most serious crime against the party and the punishment was normally death by execution. During the jungle trial held by the MCP leadership, a large number of guerrillas from Headquarters and Betong East Camp were found guilty of being enemy agents. However, the Sadao and the West Betong Group refused to conduct such trials. Instead, they refused to adhere to the MCP Central Committee orders. They in fact made an accusation that the MCP Central Committee was under the control of government agents.[44]
In 1970, a leadership struggle within the MCP led to the emergence of two break–away factions: the Communist Party of Malaya–
When the crisis was getting worse, the Sadao groups broke away from the main MCP groups and proclaimed themselves as the MCP Revolutionary Faction (RF). Subsequently, the Betong West group, who also broke from the main MCP groups, identified their party as the MCP “Marxist–Leninist” (M-L) and later renamed their guerrilla arm as the Malayan People's Liberation Army (MPLA) instead of the Malayan National Liberation Army.[45]
In 1973, the CPM implemented a new strategy calling for their military activities to be coordinated with those of front organisations. Later in January 1975, the CPM also issued a second directive calling for 1975 to be "a new year combat." These directives led to increased CPM operations in Malaysia between 1974 and 1975, though it did not reach Emergency-era levels. According to a
Some observers believed that this new revolutionary struggle was initiated with the influence of the
By April 1976, Malaysian government sources and the CIA estimated that there were at least 2,400 Communist insurgents in Peninsular Malaysia: 1,700 members in the original MCP, 300 in the CPM-RF, and 400 in the CPM-ML. Despite efforts by the MCP to recruit more Malay members, it was estimated in 1976 that less than 5 percent of the organisation's members were ethnic Malays originating in Malaysia. Meanwhile, it was estimated that 69 percent of the MCP's members were ethnic Chinese and that 57 percent of the organisation's members were Thai nationals, which also included both ethnic Chinese and Malays.[13]
The Security and Development Programme (KESBAN)
Learning from the Briggs Plan, the Malaysian Government understood the importance of security and development and how it could be used against the MCP insurgency. The Malaysian Government, then, introduced a new strategy of fighting the MCP. It was known as Security and Development Programme, or KESBAN, the local acronym (Program Keselamatan dan Pembangunan), and focused on civil military affairs. KESBAN constituted the sum total of all measures undertaken by the Malaysian Armed Forces and other (government) agencies to strengthen and protect society from subversion, lawlessness, and insurgency which effectively broke the resistance. Undoubtedly the Malaysian authorities found that security and development were the most prudent approaches to combating the Communist insurgency.[32]
The KESBAN programs succeeded in developing Malaysia into a more stable and secure society. Malaysia basically had institutionalised the concept of KESBAN, with the establishment of coordinated bodies from the village, district, and state to the federal levels. All the relevant agencies were represented and this enabled problems to be discussed and resolved through joint consultation. The government made large efforts to develop rural areas with the implementation of massive development programs such as building roads, schools, hospitals, medical clinics, and public utilities like electricity and water supply.[48] Major projects under the KESBAN programme were the East-West Highway and the Temenggor, Pedu and Muda dams.
The government also instituted other security measures to meet the MCP menace, including strict press censorship, increasing the size of the police force, resettling squatters, and relocating villages in "insecure" rural areas. By mid-1975, when the MCP militant activities were at a peak, the government promulgated a set of Essential Regulations, without declaring a state of emergency. The Essential Regulations provided for the establishment of a scheme called a "
The Malaysian Government made the decision not to declare a state of emergency during the second insurgency. The reason was a desire to avoid aggravating the fears of the populace (leading to increase in ethnic antipathy) and to avoid scaring away needed foreign investment. The economic prosperity achieved in the 1970s enabled the administration of
The MNLA also tried to win the support of the
Road to peace accord
Since 1974, Malaysia had established a bilateral relationship with
In 1988, the MCP leadership in the northern part of Malaysia agreed with the Malaysian government offer to attend a negotiation to a peace initiative. The MCP, which by that time was in a desperate situation to continue their armed struggle agreed with the proposal. Furthermore, since early 1981, Deng Xiaoping had encouraged them to seek a peace accord with the Malaysian government.[52]
When the
The peace accord did not require the MCP to surrender; it only required that the MCP cease their militant activities. With the signing of the Haadyai Peace Accord, the MCP agreed to disband their armed units and destroy all of their weapons. They also ‘pledged their loyalty’ to
At the end of the peace accord, it was estimated that there were about 1,188 MCP members still on the active list.[55] Some of them chose to return to their states in Malaysia and the rest selected to stay in a "Peace Village" at the Thai border. The Malaysian Government had paid them all some compensation money. First RM 3,000 was paid on their immediate return, and another RM 5,000 was paid three years after their return.[28]
Under the terms of the agreement, Chin Peng was one of the MCP officials who would be allowed to return home. However, successive Malaysian administrations have blocked his return on a number of justifications.[56] In 2005, his petition to enter Malaysia was formally rejected by the High Court. In June 2008, a Court of Appeal also rejected his petition, upholding an earlier ruling compelling him to show identification papers to prove citizenship; Chin claimed he could not because they were seized in a 1948 police raid.
Chin died in Bangkok, Thailand on 16 September 2013, and was cremated according to Buddhist rites. While he has previously voiced wishes to be buried in Sitiawan, Perak, his remains continued to be denied entry to Malaysia, as its government claimed that the one-year window after the agreement to reapply for citizenship had long lapsed and he had relinquished his rights to return.[57] His ashes would eventually be returned to Malaysia in November 2019. [58]
The Sarawak Insurgency
Besides the main Communist insurgency in Peninsular Malaysia, another one occurred in Sarawak, one of Malaysia's Borneo states.[13] Between 1962 and 1990, the North Kalimantan Communist Party (SCO) or the Communist Clandestine Organisation (CCO) fought a guerilla war against the Malaysian government. The SCO entered into peace negotiations with the Malaysian government in 1990, which led to a peace agreement on 17 October 1990 which finally ended all hostilities.[16][6]
See also
- Australian Rifle Company Butterworth
- Communist insurgency in Thailand
- East-West Highway
- Kanang anak Langkau
- Mahmud Sulaiman
- Malayan Communist Party
- Malayan Emergency (1948–60)
- Malaysian Army
- Malaysian Special Branch
- Sarawak Communist Insurgency
References
- ^ Talib 2005, pp. 16–22.
- ^ Yusof Ishak, pp.7–23
- ^ Peng 2003, pp. 479–480.
- ^ NIE report
- ^ a b c d Chan, Francis; Wong, Phyllis (16 September 2011). "Saga of communist insurgency in Sarawak". The Borneo Post. Archived from the original on 24 December 2013. Retrieved 10 January 2013.
- ^ a b Navaratnam 2001, pp. 3–5
- ^ Sison, Jose Maria. "Notes on People's War in Southeast Asia" Archived 18 October 2007 at the Wayback Machine
- ^ ISBN 978-1-134-48085-2.
- ISBN 978-0-19-026106-1. (until 1976)
- ^ Peng 2003, p. 465.
- ^ a b c d e f g h i j National Intelligence Estimate 54–1–76: The Outlook for Malaysia (Report). Central Intelligence Agency. 1 April 1976. Archived from the original on 17 February 2023.
- ^ Peng 2003, pp. 189–199.
- ^ a b c d e Cheah Boon Kheng (2009). "The Communist Insurgency in Malaysia, 1948–90: Contesting the Nation-State and Social Change" (PDF). New Zealand Journal of Asian Studies. 11 (1). University of Auckland: 132–52. Archived from the original (PDF) on 20 December 2019. Retrieved 5 January 2013.
- ^ a b c d Navaratnam 2001, p. 4
- ^ "Mǎ lái yǎ gòngchǎndǎng zhōngyāng wěiyuánhuì fù zǒng shūjì lǐ'āndōng (lǎo xiè) tóngzhì" 马来亚共产党中央委员会副总书记李安东(老谢)同志 [Comrade Li Andong (Lao Xie), Deputy General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Malaya] (in Chinese).
- ^ "Wǒ dǎng wǒ jūn jiéchū de lǐngdǎo rén zhānglíngyún tóngzhì" 我党我军杰出的领导人张凌云同志 [Comrade Zhang Lingyun, the outstanding leader of our party and our army] (in Chinese).
- ^ "Mǎ lái yǎ gòngchǎndǎng zhōngyāng wěiyuánhuì wěiyuán, zhōngyāng zhèngzhì jú wěiyuán wú yīshí tóngzhì" 马来亚共产党中央委员会委员、中央政治局委员吴一石同志 [Comrade Goh Yat Sek, member of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Malaya and member of the Political Bureau of the CPC Central Committee] (in Chinese).
- ^ Malayan Emergency
- ^ Tourism Malaysia http://www.spiritofmalaysia.co.uk/page/malaya-emergency Archived 8 January 2015 at the Wayback Machine
- ISBN 8129709988Page203
- ISBN 978-0877251989.
- ^ "Communist Guerrillas Push Government Into Campaign in Borneo's Town, Jungles". Spartanburg Herald-Journal. Herald-Journal. 2 September 1971. Retrieved 3 September 2015.
- ^ Michael Richardson (28 March 1972). "Sarawak Reds kill 13 soldiers". The Sydney Morning Herald. Retrieved 3 September 2015.
- ^ a b c d Talib 2005, p. 22
- ^ a b Talib 2005, pp. 16–17.
- ^ a b c Peng 2003, p. 450.
- ^ Peng 2003, pp. 467–468.
- ^ a b Talib 2005, pp. 19–20.
- ^ Talib 2005, pp. 21–22.
- ^ Peng 2003, pp. 434–35.
- ^ Rashid Maidin, pp.77–78
- ^ Peng 2003, pp. 428–430.
- ^ a b c Talib 2005, p. 17
- ^ Peng 2003, p. 463.
- ^ Peng 2003, pp. 465–466.
- ^ Peng 2003, p. 466–467.
- ^ a b Peng 2003, p. 467―468.
- ^ Peng 2003, p. 468–478.
- ^ Talib 2005, p. 10.
- ^ a b Talib 2005, p. 20
- ^ Talib 2005, pp. 20–21.
- ^ Peng 2003, p. 483.
- ^ a b c Talib 2005, p. 21
- ^ Peng 2003, pp. 489–499<.
- ^ Peng 2003, p. 491.
- ^ Ignatius, Dennis (27 October 2011). "Chin Peng: A dying banished man wanting to come home". The Star. Archived from the original on 21 February 2013. Retrieved 5 January 2013.
- ^ Lim, Ida (20 September 2013). "Open door to Chin Peng's ashes since Malay terrorists also buried here, says MCA". Malay Mail. Archived from the original on 25 February 2021. Retrieved 20 March 2015.
- ^ "Chin Peng's ashes brought back to Malaysia in September". The Star. Archived from the original on 8 August 2022.
Bibliography
- Talib, Nazar Bin (2005). Malaysia's Experience In War Against Communist Insurgency And Its Relevance To The Present Situation In Iraq (PDF) (Working Paper thesis). Marine Corps University. Archived from the original on 4 June 2011. Retrieved 6 January 2013.
- Peng, Chin (2003). My Side of History. Singapore: Media Masters. ISBN 981-04-8693-6.
- Navaratnam, A. (2001). The Spear and the Kerambit: The Exploits of VAT 69, Malaysia's Elite Fighting Force, 1968–1989. ISBN 967-61-1196-1.
Further reading
- Central Intelligence Agency, OPI 122 (National Intelligence Council), Job 91R00884R, Box 5, NIE 54–1–76, Folder 17. Secret. Reproduced at "Doc. 302: National Intelligence Estimate 54–1–76: The Outlook for Malaysia". US Department of State: Office of the Historian. Retrieved 8 January 2013.
- Maidin, Rashid (2009). The Memoirs of Rashid Maidin: From Armed Struggle to Peace. ISBN 978-983-3782-72-7.
- Chan, Francis; Wong, Phyllis (16 September 2011). "Saga of communist insurgency in Sarawak". The Borneo Post. Retrieved 10 January 2013.
- Corbett, Robin (1986). Guerilla Warfare: from 1939 to the present day. London: Orbis Book Publishing Corporation. ISBN 0-85613-469-4.
- Cheah Boon Kheng (2009). "The Communist Insurgency in Malaysia, 1948–90: Contesting the Nation-State and Social Change" (PDF). New Zealand Journal of Asian Studies. 11 (1). University of Auckland: 132–52. Archived from the original (PDF) on 20 December 2019. Retrieved 5 January 2013.
- Sia, Andrew (29 November 2009). "Rise and Fall of Communism in Malaysia". The Star. Archived from the original on 4 June 2011. Retrieved 6 January 2013.