Congo Crisis
Congo Crisis | |||||||
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Part of the Decolonisation of Africa and the Cold War | |||||||
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1960–63:
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1960–63:
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1963–65:
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Casualties and losses | |||||||
Total killed: c. 100,000[5] |
The Congo Crisis (French: Crise congolaise) was a period of political upheaval and conflict between 1960 and 1965 in the Republic of the Congo (today the Democratic Republic of the Congo).[c] The crisis began almost immediately after the Congo became independent from Belgium and ended, unofficially, with the entire country under the rule of Joseph-Désiré Mobutu. Constituting a series of civil wars, the Congo Crisis was also a proxy conflict in the Cold War, in which the Soviet Union and the United States supported opposing factions. Around 100,000 people are believed to have been killed during the crisis.
A nationalist movement in the
The involvement of the Soviets split the Congolese government and led to an impasse between Lumumba and President
With Katanga and South Kasai back under the government's control, a reconciliatory compromise constitution was adopted and the exiled Katangese leader, Moïse Tshombe, was recalled to head an interim administration while fresh elections were organised. Before these could be held, however, Maoist-inspired militants calling themselves the "Simbas" rose up in the east of the country. The Simbas took control of a significant amount of territory and proclaimed a communist "People's Republic of the Congo" in Stanleyville. Government forces gradually retook territory and, in November 1964, Belgium and the United States intervened militarily in Stanleyville to recover hostages from Simba captivity. The Simbas were defeated and collapsed soon after. Following the elections in March 1965, a new political stalemate developed between Tshombe and Kasa-Vubu, forcing the government into near-paralysis. Mobutu mounted a second coup d'état in November 1965, taking personal control of the country. Under Mobutu's rule, the Congo (renamed Zaire in 1971) was transformed into a dictatorship which would endure until his deposition in 1997.
Background
Belgian rule
Belgian rule in the Congo was based around the "colonial trinity" (trinité coloniale) of
During the 1940s and 1950s, the Congo experienced an unprecedented level of
Politics and radicalisation
An
The MNC's main rival was the
Although it was the largest of the African nationalist parties, the MNC had many different factions within it that took differing stances on a number of issues. It was increasingly polarised between moderate évolués and the more radical mass membership.[21] A radical faction headed by Iléo and Albert Kalonji split away in July 1959, but failed to induce mass defections by other MNC members. The dissident faction became known as the MNC-Kalonji (MNC-K), while the majority group became the MNC-Lumumba (MNC-L). The split divided the party's support base into those who remained with Lumumba, chiefly in the Stanleyville region in the north-east, and those who backed the MNC-K, which became most popular around the southern city of Élisabethville and among the Luba ethnic group.[22]
These developments led to the white community also becoming increasingly alarmed. Some whites looked to a possible military government to restore order while others petitioned the colonial government for crackdowns.[23] As law and order began to break down, white civilians formed militia groups known as Corps de Voluntaires Européens ("European Volunteer Corps") to police their neighborhoods, but these militias were outlawed on March 25.[25]
Independence
In the fallout from the Léopoldville riots, the report of a Belgian parliamentary
Belgians began campaigning against Lumumba, whom they wanted to marginalise; they accused him of being a
The proclamation of the independent
Politically, the new state had a
Beginning of the crisis
Force Publique mutiny, racial violence and Belgian intervention
Despite the proclamation of independence, neither the Belgian nor the Congolese government intended the colonial social order to end immediately. The Belgian government hoped that whites might keep their position indefinitely.[36] The Republic of the Congo was still reliant on colonial institutions like the Force Publique to function from day to day, and white technical experts, installed by the Belgians, were retained in the broad absence of suitably qualified black Congolese replacements (partly the result of colonial restrictions regarding higher education).[36] Many Congolese people had assumed that independence would produce tangible and immediate social change, so the retention of whites in positions of importance was widely resented.[37]
"Independence brings changes to politicians and to civilians. But for you, nothing will be changed ... none of your new masters can change the structure of an army which, throughout its history, has been the most organized, the most victorious in Africa. The politicians have lied to you."
Extract from Émile Janssens' speech to the Force Publique on 5 July 1960[37]
Lieutenant-General
Rather than deploying Belgian troops against the mutineers as Janssens had wished, Lumumba dismissed him and renamed the Force Publique the
Lumumba's stance appeared to many Belgians to justify their prior concerns about his radicalism.[39] On 9 July, Belgium deployed paratroopers, without the Congolese state's permission, in Kabalo and elsewhere to protect fleeing white civilians.[43] The Belgian intervention divided Lumumba and Kasa-Vubu; while Kasa-Vubu accepted the Belgian operation,[41] Lumumba denounced it and called for "all Congolese to defend our republic against those who menace it."[43] At Lumumba's request, white civilians from the port city of Matadi were evacuated by the Belgian Navy on 11 July. Belgian ships then bombarded the city; at least 19 civilians were killed. This action prompted renewed attacks on whites across the country, while Belgian forces entered other towns and cities, including Léopoldville, and clashed with Congolese troops.[41] The Belgian government subsequently announced that it would provide for Belgian bureaucrats back in the metropole, triggering an exodus of most of the Congo's 10,000 European civil servants and leaving the administration in disarray.[44] Engulfed by the disorder spreading throughout the country, most of the government ministries were unable to function.[45]
Katanga and South Kasai secessions
On 11 July 1960, Moïse Tshombe, the leader of CONAKAT, declared the Congo's southern province of Katanga independent as the State of Katanga, with Élisabethville as its capital and himself as president.[46] The mineral-rich Katanga region had traditionally shared closer economic ties with the Copperbelt of neighbouring Northern Rhodesia (then part of the Central African Federation) than with the rest of the Congo,[46] and because of its economic importance it had been administered separately from the rest of the country under the Belgians.[9] CONAKAT furthermore contended that Katangese people were ethnically distinct from other Congolese. The secession was partly motivated by the Katangese separatists' desire to keep more of the wealth generated by the province's mining operations and to avoid sharing it with the rest of the Congo.[47] Another major factor was what CONAKAT held to be the disintegration of law and order in the central and north-eastern Congo. Announcing Katanga's breakaway, Tshombe said "We are seceding from chaos."[48]
The major mining company in Katanga, the
Less than a month after the Katangese secession, on 8 August, a section of Kasai Province situated slightly to the north of Katanga also declared its autonomy from the central government as the Mining State of South Kasai (Sud-Kasaï) based around the city of Bakwanga.[49] South Kasai was much smaller than Katanga, but was also a mining region. It was largely populated by the Luba ethnic group, and its president, Albert Kalonji, claimed that the secession was largely sparked by persecution of the Baluba in the rest of the Congo.[49] The South Kasai government was supported by Forminière, another Belgian mining company, which received concessions from the new state in return for financial support.[49] Without control over Katanga and South Kasai, the central government was deprived of approximately 40 percent of its revenues.[44]
Foreign reaction and UN intervention
Disquiet about Belgium's support for the secessionist states led to calls within the United Nations (UN) to remove all Belgian troops from the country. The Secretary General of the UN, Dag Hammarskjöld, believed that the crisis would provide the organisation with a chance to demonstrate its potential as a major peacekeeping force and encouraged the sending of a multinational contingent of peacekeepers to the Congo under UN command.[51] On 14 July, the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 143, calling for total Belgian withdrawal from the Congo and their replacement with a UN-commanded force.[52]
The arrival of the United Nations Operation in the Congo (ONUC) was initially welcomed by Lumumba and the central government who believed the UN would help suppress the secessionist states.[53] ONUC's initial mandate, however, only covered the maintenance of law and order. Viewing the secessions as an internal political matter, Hammarskjöld refused to use UN troops to assist the central Congolese government against them; he argued that doing so would represent a loss of impartiality and breach Congolese sovereignty.[54] Lumumba also sought the assistance of the United States government of Dwight D. Eisenhower, which refused to provide unilateral military support.[55] Frustrated, he turned to the Soviet Union, which agreed to provide weapons, logistical and material support. Around 1,000 Soviet military advisors soon landed in the Congo.[54] Lumumba's actions distanced him from the rest of the government, especially Kasa-Vubu, who feared the implications of Soviet intervention. The Americans also feared that a Soviet-aligned Congo could form the basis of a major expansion of communism into central Africa.[54]
With Soviet support, 2,000 ANC troops launched a major offensive against South Kasai.[56] The attack was extremely successful, but during the course of the offensive, the ANC became involved in infighting between the Baluba and Bena Lulua ethnic groups.[56] and perpetrated a number of large massacres of Luba civilians.[56] Around 3,000 were killed.[57] The violence of the advance caused an exodus of thousands of Baluba civilians who fled their homes to escape the fighting.[58]
The involvement of the Soviet Union alarmed the United States. The American government under Eisenhower, in line with Belgian criticism, had long believed that Lumumba was a communist and that the Congo could be on track to become a strategically placed Soviet client state. In August 1960, Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) agents in the region reported to their agency that "Congo [is] experiencing [a] classic communist ... takeover" and warned that the Congo might follow the same path as Cuba.[59]
Political disintegration
Central government split and first Mobutu coup
Lumumba's appeal for Soviet support split the government and led to mounting pressure from Western countries to remove him from power. In addition, both Tshombe and Kalonji appealed to Kasa-Vubu, whom they believed to be both a moderate and federalist, to move against Lumumba's centralism and resolve the secession issue.[60] Meanwhile, Mobutu took effective control of the army, routing foreign aid and promotions to specific units and officers to secure their allegiance.[40]
On 5 September 1960, Kasa-Vubu announced on national radio that he had unilaterally
Following Kasa-Vubu's reinstatement, there was an attempted rapprochement between the Congolese factions. Tshombe began negotiations for the end of the secession and the formation of a
Members of the MNC-L fled to Stanleyville where, led by Antoine Gizenga, they formed a rebel government in November 1960 in opposition to the central government in Léopoldville.[66][67] The Gizenga government was recognised by some states, including the Soviet Union and China, as the official government of the Congo and could call on an approximate 5,500 troops compared to the central government's 7,000.[68] Faced with UN pressure, the Gizenga government however collapsed in January 1962 after Gizenga was arrested.[69]
Killing of Lumumba
Lumumba escaped house arrest and fled eastwards towards Stanleyville where he believed he could rally support. Pursued by troops loyal to Mobutu, he was captured at Lodi on 1 December 1960 and flown back to Léopoldville with his hands bound.[70][71] Despite UN appeals to Kasa-Vubu for due legal process, the Soviet Union denounced the UN as responsible for the arrest and demanded his release. A meeting of the UN Security Council was called on 7 December 1960 to consider Soviet demands that the UN seek Lumumba's immediate release, his restoration to the head of the Congolese government and the disarming of Mobutu's forces. The pro-Lumumba resolution was defeated on 14 December 1960 by a vote of 8–2. Still in captivity, Lumumba was tortured and transported to Thysville and later to Katanga, where he was handed over to forces loyal to Tshombe.[72] On 17 January 1961, Lumumba was executed by Katangese troops near Élisabethville.[73]
News of the execution, released on 13 February, provoked international outrage.[74] The Belgian Embassy in Yugoslavia was attacked by protesters in Belgrade, and violent demonstrations occurred in London and New York.[75] Shortly thereafter seven Lumumbists, including the first President of Orientale Province, Jean-Pierre Finant, were executed in South Kasai for "crimes against the Baluba nation". Gizenga's soldiers then shot 15 political prisoners in retaliation, including Lumumba's dissident Minister of Communications, Alphonse Songolo.[76]
United Nations escalation and the end of the Katangese secession
Since its initial resolution of July 1960, the UN had issued further resolutions calling for the total withdrawal of Belgian and mercenary forces from Katanga in progressively stronger terms. By 1961, ONUC comprised nearly 20,000 men.
On 18 September 1961, Hammarskjöld flew to
Resolution 169, issued in November 1961, called for ONUC to respond to the deteriorating human rights situation and prevent the outbreak of full-scale civil war. The resolution "completely rejected" Katanga's claim to statehood and authorised ONUC troops to use all necessary force to "assist the Central Government of the Congo in the restoration and maintenance of law and order".[85] The Katangese made further provocations and, in response, ONUC launched Operation Unokat to dismantle Katangese roadblocks and seize strategic positions around Élisabethville. Faced with international pressure, Tshombe signed the Kitona Declaration in December 1961 in which he agreed in principle to accept the authority of the central government and state constitution and to abandon any claim to Katangese independence.[86] Following the declaration, however, talks between Tshombe and Adoula reached a deadlock, while Katangese forces continued to harass UN troops. Diminishing support and Belgium's increasing reluctance to support Katanga demonstrated that the state could not survive indefinitely.[81] On 11 December 1962, Belgian Foreign Minister Paul-Henri Spaak declared that the Belgian government would support the UN or the central Congolese government should they attempt to end the Katangese secession through force.[87]
On 24 December 1962, UN troops and the Katangese Gendarmerie clashed near Élisabethville and fighting broke out. After attempts to reach a ceasefire failed, UN troops launched Operation Grandslam and occupied Élisabethville, prompting Tshombe to leave the country. A ceasefire was agreed upon soon thereafter. Indian UN troops, exceeding their orders, then occupied Jadotville, preventing Katangese loyalists from regrouping.[88] Gradually, the UN overran the rest of the Katanga and, on 17 January 1963, Tshombe surrendered his final stronghold of Kolwezi, effectively ending the Katangese secession.[88]
Attempted political reconciliation
Following the end of the Katanga secession, political negotiations began to reconcile the disparate political factions.[6] The negotiations coincided with the formation of an émigré political group, the Conseil National de Libération (CNL), by dissident Lumumbists and others in neighbouring Congo-Brazzaville.[89] The negotiations culminated in the creation of a new, revised constitution, known as the Luluabourg Constitution, after the city in which it was written, to create a compromise balance of power.[6] The new constitution increased the power of the presidency, ending the system of joint consultation between President and Prime Minister, and appeased federalists by increasing the number of provinces from six to 21 while increasing their autonomy.[90][6] The constitution also changed the name of the state from the Republic of the Congo to Democratic Republic of the Congo.[6] It was ratified in a constitutional referendum in June 1964 and Parliament was dissolved to await new elections.[6] Kasa-Vubu appointed Tshombe, the exiled Katangese leader, as interim Prime Minister.[91] Although personally capable, and supported as an anti-communist by Western powers, Tshombe was denounced by other African leaders such as King Hassan II of Morocco as an imperialist puppet for his role in the Katangese secession.[92]
Under Tshombe's interim government, fresh elections were scheduled for 30 March and the rebellion broke out in the central and eastern parts of the Congo.[6]
Kwilu and Simba rebellions
The period of political crisis had led to widespread disenchantment with the central government brought in by independence. Demands for a "second independence" from kleptocracy and political infighting in the capital grew.[93] The "second independence" slogan was taken up by Maoist-inspired Congolese revolutionaries, including Pierre Mulele who had served in the Lumumba government. The political instability of the Congo helped to channel wider discontentment into outright revolt.[94]
Disruption in the rural Congo begun with agitation by Lumumbists, led by Mulele, among the
The rebels, who called themselves "Simbas" (from the
The rebels founded a state, the People's Republic of the Congo (République populaire du Congo), with its capital at Stanleyville and Christophe Gbenye as president. The new state was supported by the Soviet Union and China, which supplied it with arms, as did various African states, notably Tanzania.[107] It was also supported by Cuba, which sent a team of over 100 advisors led by Che Guevara to advise the Simbas on tactics and doctrine.[107] The Simba rebellion coincided with a wide escalation of the Cold War amid the Gulf of Tonkin incident and it has been speculated that, had the rebellion not been rapidly defeated, a full-scale American military intervention could have occurred as in Vietnam.[108]
Suppression and Belgian and American intervention
After its early string of successes, the Simba rebellion began to encounter local resistance as it encroached on areas outside of the MNC-L's old domain. The People's Republic also suffered from a lack of coherent social and economic policy, contributing to an inability to administer its own territory.
In November 1964, the Simbas rounded up the remaining white population of Stanleyville and its environs. The whites were held hostage in the Victoria Hotel in the city to use as bargaining tools with the ANC. In order to recover the hostages, Belgian
As a result of the intervention, Tshombe lost the support of Kasa-Vubu and Mobutu and was dismissed from his post as prime minister in October 1965. Soon after Dragon Rouge, ANC and mercenary troops captured Stanleyville, putting an end to the Simba rebellion. The Simba rebels executed 20,000 Congolese and 392 Western hostages, including 268 Belgians, during the rebellion. Tens of thousands of people were killed in total during the suppression of the Simbas.[117] Pockets of Simba resistance continued to hold out in the eastern Congo, most notably in South Kivu, where Laurent-Désiré Kabila led a Maoist cross-border insurgency which lasted until the 1980s.[118]
Second Mobutu coup d'état
In the scheduled
Under the auspices of a régime d'exception (the equivalent of a state of emergency), Mobutu assumed sweeping, almost absolute, power for five years, after which, he claimed, democracy would be restored.[120] Mobutu's coup, which promised both economic and political stability, was supported by the United States and other Western governments, and his rule initially met widespread popularity.[120] He increasingly took other powers, abolishing the post of Prime Minister in 1966 and dissolving Parliament in 1967.[120]
Aftermath and legacy
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Once established as the sole source of political power, Mobutu gradually consolidated his control in the Congo. The number of provinces was reduced, and their autonomy curtailed, resulting in a highly centralised state. Mobutu increasingly placed his supporters in the remaining positions of importance.[120] In 1967, to demonstrate his legitimacy, he created a party, the Mouvement Populaire de la Révolution (MPR), which until 1990, was the nation's only legal political party under Mobutu's new constitution.[120] In 1971, the state was renamed Zaire and efforts were made to remove all colonial influences. He also nationalised the remaining foreign-owned economic assets in the country, including the UMHK which became Gécamines.[121] Despite initial successes, by the time of its disestablishment Mobutu's rule was characterised by widespread cronyism, corruption and economic mismanagement.[122]
In the years after the Congo Crisis, Mobutu was able to remove many opposition figures from the crisis who might threaten his control. Tshombe was sent into a second exile in 1965 after being accused of treason.
Political legacy
The issues of federalism, ethnicity in politics and state centralisation were not resolved by the crisis and partly contributed to a decline in support for the concept of the state among Congolese people.
The Congo Crisis holds great significance in the collective memory of the Congolese people.[133] In particular, Lumumba's murder is viewed in the context of the memory as a symbolic moment in which the Congo lost its dignity in the international realm and the ability to determine its future, which has since been controlled by the West.[134] Many Congolese view the problems of the crisis as unresolved, and believe that the Congo's self-determination has yet to be secured from Western machinations. The latter notion has largely shaped the political aspirations of a substantial number of Congolese.[135]
Historiography and historical controversy
The Congo Crisis is usually portrayed in historiography as a time of intense disorder and disarray; there is wide consensus that the processes around Congolese independence were a calamity. This interpretation often juxtaposes the crisis with the supposed stability of the Congo under Belgian rule before 1960 and under Mobutu's regime after 1965.
International importance
The turmoil of the Congo Crisis destabilised Central Africa and helped to ignite the
The Congo crisis revealed in one fell swoop the true nature of the powers which shaped large parts of the post-war world. The crisis showed in actual practice the true nature, not only of the former colonial powers, but also of the United Nations, of the recently independent countries united in what was called the Afro-Asian bloc, as well as of Moscow
Sociologist Ludo De Witte[144]
The crisis caused the newly independent African states to reconsider their allegiances and internal ties. In particular, it led to the division of African states into factions. Moderate-leaning states joined the
The Katangese secession would prove to be politically influential in Africa. During the
See also
- First Congo War (1996–1997)
- History of the Democratic Republic of the Congo
- "Indépendance Cha Cha" – a 1960 song by Le Grand Kallé commemorating Congolese independence
- The Poisonwood Bible (1998) – a novel by Barbara Kingsolver set during the crisis
- Second Congo War (1998–2003)
- Wind of Change (speech) by Harold Macmillan, 1960
- Year of Africa (1960)
- List of Swedish peacekeeping missions
Notes and references
Explanatory footnotes
- ^ The secession of Katanga and South Kasai was also supported by South Africa, France, Portuguese Angola and the neighbouring Central African Federation.[2][3] However, neither was ever officially recognised by any state.[4]
- ^ Not to be confused with the neighbouring state known as the Republic of the Congo, formerly the French Congo, with its capital at Brazzaville. The state's name changed to the Democratic Republic of the Congo in August 1964.[6]
- ^ In most Bantu languages, the prefix ba- (or wa-) is added to a human noun to form a plural. As such, Bakongo refers collectively to members of the Kongo ethnic group.
- ^ A similar mission, Operation Rum Punch, had taken place a few weeks earlier and had resulted in the successful arrest of around 40 mercenaries without violence.[78]
- ^ The Irish were compelled to surrender when their ammunition and supplies ran out. None were killed. The Katangese, though victorious, suffered hundreds of casualties.[79]
- Kata Katanga ("Secede Katanga"), have attempted to defeat government forces and proclaim regional independence.[129]
- ^ The UPA was renamed the Frente Nacional de Libertação de Angola, or FNLA, in 1962.[140]
Citations
- ^ Haskin 2005, pp. 24–25.
- ^ Nzongola-Ntalaja 2007, p. 101.
- ^ Dorn 2016, p. 32.
- ^ a b Nugent 2004, p. 97.
- ^ Mwakikagile 2014, p. 72.
- ^ a b c d e f g h EISA 2002a.
- ^ Pakenham 1992, pp. 253–55.
- ^ Pakenham 1992, pp. 588–89.
- ^ a b c Turner 2007, p. 28.
- ^ Turner 2007, p. 29.
- ^ a b Freund 1998, pp. 198–99.
- ^ Freund 1998, p. 198.
- ^ Borstelmann 1993, pp. 92–93.
- ^ Freund 1998, p. 199.
- ^ Zeilig 2008, p. 64.
- ^ Zeilig 2008, pp. 64–65.
- ^ a b Zeilig 2008, p. 76.
- ^ Zeilig 2008, pp. 65–66.
- ^ Zeilig 2008, p. 66.
- ^ Zeilig 2008, p. 74.
- ^ Zeilig 2008, pp. 82–83.
- ^ Zeilig 2008, pp. 83–85.
- ^ a b Zeilig 2008, p. 70.
- ^ Zeilig 2008, pp. 70–73.
- ^ Zeilig 2008, p. 79.
- ^ a b Zeilig 2008, p. 88.
- ^ a b Zeilig 2008, p. 87.
- ^ Zeilig 2008, pp. 89–91.
- ^ Zeilig 2008, pp. 90–91.
- ^ Zeilig 2008, pp. 93–94.
- ^ Zeilig 2008, p. 96.
- ^ Zeilig 2008, pp. 96–100.
- ^ Zeilig 2008, p. 100.
- ^ Zeilig 2008, pp. 100–01.
- ^ Zeilig 2008, p. 91.
- ^ a b c Zeilig 2008, p. 102.
- ^ a b c d Zeilig 2008, p. 103.
- ^ a b c Gondola 2002, p. 118.
- ^ a b Zeilig 2008, p. 104.
- ^ a b Renton, Seddon & Zeilig 2007, p. 113.
- ^ a b c Gondola 2002, p. 119.
- ^ Stanard 2018, pp. 145–146.
- ^ a b Zeilig 2008, p. 105.
- ^ a b Young 1966, p. 35.
- ^ Young 2015, p. 334.
- ^ a b Nugent 2004, p. 85.
- ^ Nugent 2004, pp. 85–86.
- ^ Struelens 1978, p. 48.
- ^ a b c d e Nugent 2004, p. 86.
- ^ Mockler 1986, p. 117.
- ^ Freund 1998, p. 201.
- ^ Gendebien 1967, p. 159.
- ^ Zeilig 2008, pp. 110–11.
- ^ a b c Zeilig 2008, p. 116.
- ^ Gibbs 1991, pp. 92–93.
- ^ a b c Zeilig 2008, p. 114.
- ^ Haskin 2005, p. 26.
- ^ Haskin 2005, p. 33.
- ^ Turner 2007, p. 32.
- ^ a b c d Nzongola-Ntalaja 2007, p. 108.
- ^ Zeilig 2008, p. 119.
- ^ Nzongola-Ntalaja 2007, p. 109.
- ^ a b Zeilig 2008, p. 117.
- ^ Nzongola-Ntalaja 2007, pp. 109–10.
- ^ Gendebien 1967, p. 78.
- ^ a b c Nugent 2004, p. 87.
- ^ Gendebien 1967, p. 87.
- ^ Haskin 2005, p. 30.
- ^ Gendebien 1967, p. 205.
- ^ Zeilig 2008, pp. 120–22.
- ^ Nzongola-Ntalaja 2007, p. 110.
- ^ Zeilig 2008, p. 122.
- ^ Nzongola-Ntalaja 2007, p. 111.
- ^ Haskin 2005, p. 29.
- ^ BBC 2005.
- ^ Young 2015, p. 331.
- ^ Nzongola-Ntalaja 2007, p. 94.
- ^ a b Boulden 2001, p. 35.
- ^ Whelan 2006, pp. 8, 12.
- ^ a b Whelan 2006, pp. 8, 60–62.
- ^ a b c d Boulden 2001, p. 36.
- ^ Packham 1996, p. 40.
- ^ Nzongola-Ntalaja 2007, p. 106.
- ^ Willame 1972, p. 68.
- ^ UN Resolution 169.
- ^ Boulden 2001, p. 38.
- ^ Packham 1996, p. 194.
- ^ a b Boulden 2001, p. 40.
- ^ Haskin 2005, p. 36.
- ^ Nzongola-Ntalaja 2007, p. 36.
- ^ Gleijeses 1994, p. 74.
- ^ Gleijeses 1994, pp. 73–74.
- ^ a b Freund 1998, p. 202.
- ^ Verhaegen 1967, p. 348.
- ^ Nugent 2004, p. 88.
- ^ a b c Verhaegen 1967, p. 346.
- ^ Fox, De Craemer & Ribeaucourt 1965, p. 78.
- ^ Verhaegen 1967, p. 349.
- ^ Verhaegen 1967, p. 350.
- ^ Verhaegen 1967, p. 352.
- ^ Verhaegen 1967, pp. 352–54.
- ^ Verhaegen 1967, p. 355.
- ^ Stapleton 2017, p. 244.
- ^ Horn & Harris 2001, p. 310.
- ^ Horn & Harris 2001, p. 312.
- ^ Horn & Harris 2001, p. 316.
- ^ a b Gleijeses 1994, p. 81.
- ^ Gleijeses 1994, p. 85.
- ^ a b Young 1966, p. 40.
- ^ Verhaegen 1967, p. 347.
- ^ Mockler 1986, pp. 116–17.
- ^ Mockler 1986, pp. 118–19.
- ^ Gleijeses 1994, pp. 79–80.
- ^ a b Nzongola-Ntalaja 2007, p. 136.
- ^ Nzongola-Ntalaja 2007, p. 138.
- ^ Nzongola-Ntalaja 2007, pp. 138–39.
- ^ Olivier 2010, section 2.
- ^ Gleijeses 1994, pp. 84–85.
- ^ EISA 2002b.
- ^ a b c d e Nugent 2004, p. 233.
- ^ Nugent 2004, pp. 234–35.
- ^ Nugent 2004, pp. 236–39.
- ^ a b Zeilig 2008, p. 140.
- ^ Haskin 2005, pp. 39–40.
- ^ Haskin 2005, p. 40.
- ^ a b Turner 2007, p. 185.
- ^ Turner 2007, p. 117.
- ^ Haskin 2005, pp. 40–41.
- ^ Jullien 2013.
- ^ Nugent 2004, pp. 88–89.
- ^ Nugent 2004, p. 393.
- ^ Braeckman 2007.
- ^ De Goede 2015, p. 587.
- ^ De Goede 2015, pp. 587–588.
- ^ De Goede 2015, p. 589.
- ^ Stanard 2018, pp. 144, 146.
- ^ BBC 2001.
- ^ Gibbs 1996, pp. 453, 458.
- ^ Meredith 1984, pp. 281–82.
- ^ Meredith 1984, p. 283.
- ^ Meredith 1984, pp. 282–83.
- ^ Meredith 1984, pp. 281.
- ^ Meredith 1984, p. 297.
- ^ De Witte 2002, p. 181.
- ^ a b Turner 2007, p. 149.
- ^ Marmon 2021, p. 24.
- ^ Marmon 2021, pp. 3–4.
- ^ Wood 2005, pp. 101, 471.
- ^ Kalck 1971, p. 124.
- ^ Dietrich 2013, pp. 242–243.
- ^ Nugent 2004, p. 98.
- ^ Nugent 2004, p. 82.
- ^ Nugent 2004, pp. 89, 96–97.
General and cited references
- "1961: Lumumba Rally Clashes with UK Police". On This Day. BBC News. 19 February 2008. Retrieved 8 July 2014.
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Further reading
- OCLC 477435.
- Hughes, Matthew (September 2003). "Fighting for White Rule in Africa: The Central African Federation, Katanga, and the Congo Crisis, 1958–1965" (PDF). The International History Review. 25 (3): 592–615. S2CID 154862276.
- Kaplan, Lawrence S. (April 1967). "The United States, Belgium, and the Congo Crisis of 1960". The Review of Politics. 29 (2): 239–256. S2CID 146425671.
- Loffman, R. A. "Religion, Class and the Katangese Secession, 1957–1962". In Church, State and Colonialism in Southeastern Congo, 1890–1962 (Palgrave Macmillan, 2019).
- Namikas, Lise (2013). Battleground Africa: Cold War in the Congo, 1960–1965. Washington, D.C.: Woodrow Wilson Center Press. ISBN 978-0-8047-8486-3.
- O’Malley, Alanna. The diplomacy of decolonisation: America, Britain and the United Nations during the Congo crisis 1960–1964 (2018).
- Passemiers, Lazlo. Decolonisation and Regional Geopolitics: South Africa and the ‘Congo Crisis’, 1960–1965 (Routledge, 2019).
- Weiss, Herbert (April 2012). "The Congo's Independence Struggle Viewed Fifty Years Later". African Studies Review. 55 (1): 109–115. S2CID 146425671.