Consociationalism

Consociationalism (

The goals of consociationalism are governmental stability, the survival of the power-sharing arrangements, the survival of democracy, and the avoidance of violence. When consociationalism is organised along religious confessional lines, as in Lebanon, it is known as confessionalism.

Consociationalism is sometimes seen as analogous to corporatism.^[2][3] Some scholars consider consociationalism a form of corporatism. Others claim that economic corporatism was designed to regulate class conflict, while consociationalism developed on the basis of reconciling societal fragmentation along ethnic and religious lines.^[4]

Concurrent majority can be a precursor to consociationalism. A consociational democracy differs from consensus democracy (e.g. in Switzerland), in that consociational democracy represents a consensus of representatives with minority veto, while consensus democracy requires consensus across the electorate.^[5]

The idea has received significant criticism in its applicability to democratic political systems, especially with regard to power-sharing.

Origins

Consociation was first discussed in the 17th century

While Lijphart's initial theory drew primarily from Western European democracies in its formulation of consociationalism, it has gained immense traction in post-conflict state-building contexts in the past decades.^[12][13] This development has been reflected in the expansion of the favourable conditions to external factors in the literature as well.^[14][12][15] Rather than internally constructed by state elites, these recent examples have been characterised by external facilitation, and at times imposition, through international actors.^[16][17][12] In the process, consociational arrangements have frequently been used to transform immediate violent conflict and solidify peace settlements in extremely fragile contexts of deeply divided societies.^[18] The volatile environments in which these recent examples have been implemented have exhibited the need for external interference not only for their initial implementation but also for their continued existence.^[19][12] As such, a range of international actors have assumed mediating and supporting roles to preserve power-sharing agreements in targeted states. Most prominently in Bosnia-Herzegovina, this has involved an "international regulating body" in the form of a High Representative who in one period frequently intervened in the domestic political affairs of the state to implement legislation on which domestic elites were reluctant to come to an agreement on.^[20]

While the current results of consociational arrangements implemented in post-conflict state-building endeavours have been mixed, scholars such as O'Leary and McGarry maintain that they have often proven to be the most practical approach to ending immediate conflict and creating the necessary stability for peace-building to take place.^[18] Its utility has been seen in its transformative aspect, flexibility, and "realist" approach to existing identity formations that are difficult to incorporate in a majoritarian system.^[21]

Characteristics

Lijphart identifies four key characteristics of consociational democracies:^[22]

Consociational policies often have these characteristics:^[23]

• Coalition cabinets, where executive power is shared between parties, not concentrated in one. Many of these cabinets are oversized, meaning they include parties not necessary for a parliamentary majority;
• Balance of power between
  legislative
  ;
• Decentralized and federal government, where (regional)
  minorities
  have considerable independence;
• Incongruent bicameralism, where it is very difficult for one party to gain a majority in both houses. Normally one chamber represents regional interests and the other national interests;
• minorities
  to gain representation too;
• Organized and
  minorities
  ;
• A
  rigid constitution, which prevents government from changing the constitution
  without consent of minorities;
• minorities
  to go to the courts to seek redress against laws that they see as unjust;
• Elements of
  minorities
  to enact or prevent legislation;
• Proportional employment in the public sector;
• A neutral head of state, either a monarch with only ceremonial duties, or an indirectly elected president, who gives up his or her party affiliation after being elected;
• minorities to block legislation: this means that they must be a citizen's initiative
  and that there is no compulsory voting.
• Equality between ministers in cabinet, the prime minister is only primus inter pares;
• An independent central bank, where experts and not politicians set out monetary policies.

Favourable conditions

Lijphart also identified a number of "favourable conditions" under which consociationalism is likely to be successful. He has changed the specification of these conditions somewhat over time.^[24] Michael Kerr summarised Lijphart's most prominent favourable factors as:^[25]

• Segmental isolation of ethnic communities
• A multiple balance of power
• The presence of external threats common to all communities
• Overarching loyalties to the state
• A tradition of elite accommodation
• Socioeconomic equality
• A small population size, reducing the policy load
• A moderate multi-party system with segmental parties

Lijphart stresses that these conditions are neither indispensable nor sufficient to account for the success of consociationalism.^[22] This has led Rinus van Schendelen to conclude that "the conditions may be present and absent, necessary and unnecessary, in short conditions or no conditions at all".^[26]

John McGarry and Brendan O'Leary argue that three conditions are key to the establishment of democratic consociational power-sharing: elites have to be motivated to engage in conflict regulation; elites must lead deferential segments; and there must be a multiple balance of power, but more importantly the subcultures must be stable.^[27] Michael Kerr, in his study of the role of external actors in power-sharing arrangements in Northern Ireland and Lebanon, adds to McGarry and O'Leary's list the condition that "the existence of positive external regulating pressures, from state to non-state actors, which provide the internal elites with sufficient incentives and motives for their acceptance of, and support for, consociation".^[25]

Arguments in favor

In a consociational state, all groups, including minorities, are represented on the political and economic stages. Supporters of the consociationalism argue that it is a more realistic option in deeply divided societies than integrationist approaches to conflict management.^[28]

Criticisms

Many criticisms have been levelled against the deployment of consociationalism in state-building. It has been criticised as institutionalising and deepening existing divisions,^[29] being severely dependent on external support for survival,^[18][12] and temporarily freezing conflicts but not resolving them.^[21] Given the apparent necessity for external regulation of these agreements, many scholars have characterised these state-building projects as deeply invasive.^[20][30] A recurring concern therein is the erosion of the governing elite's accountability towards its population and the fostering of clientele politics.^[20][31][30] These dynamics have been pointed to as obstacles to the resolution of the deep divisions consociations are meant to alleviate.^[21][32] Further critiques have pointed out that consociations have at times encouraged conditions of "fragile states", which state-building is meant to prevent.^[30]

Brian Barry

Rinus van Schendelen has argued that Lijphart uses evidence selectively. Pillarisation was "seriously weakening", even in the 1950s, cross-denominational co-operation was increasing, and formerly coherent political sub-cultures were dissolving. He argued that elites in the Netherlands were not motivated by preferences derived from the general interest, but rather by self-interest. They formed coalitions not to forge consociational negotiation between segments but to improve their parties' respective power. He argued that the Netherlands was "stable" in that it had few protests or riots, but that it was so before consociationalism, and that it was not stable from the standpoint of government turnover. He questioned the extent to which the Netherlands, or indeed any country labelled a consociational system, could be called a democracy, and whether calling a consociational country a democracy isn't somehow ruled out by definition. He believed that Lijphart suffered severe problems of rigor when identifying whether particular divisions were cleavages, whether particular cleavages were segmental, and whether particular cleavages were cross-cutting.^[26]

Lustick on hegemonic control

Ian Lustick has argued that academics lack an alternative "control" approach for explaining stability in deeply divided societies and that this has resulted in the empirical overextension of consociational models.^[35] Lustick argues that Lijphart has "an impressionistic methodological posture, flexible rules for coding data, and an indefatigable, rhetorically seductive commitment to promoting consociationalism as a widely applicable principle of political engineering",^[36] that results in him applying consociational theory to case studies that it does not fit. Furthermore, Lustick states that "Lijphart's definition of 'accommodation' ... includes the elaborately specified claim that issues dividing polarized blocs are settled by leaders convinced of the need for settlement".^[36]

Horowitz and centripetal criticism of consociationalism

Consociationalism focuses on diverging identities such as ethnicity instead of integrating identities such as class, institutionalizing and entrenching the former. Furthermore, it relies on rival co-operation, which is inherently unstable. It focuses on intrastate relations and neglects relations with other states. Donald L. Horowitz argues that consociationalism can lead to the reification of ethnic divisions, since "grand coalitions are unlikely, because of the dynamics of intraethnic competition. The very act of forming a multiethnic coalition generates intraethnic competition – flanking – if it does not already exist".^[37]

Consistent with Horowitz's claims, Dawn Brancati finds that federalism/territorial autonomy, an element of consociationalism, strengthens ethnic divisions if it is designed in a way that strengthens regional parties, which in turn encourage ethnic conflict.^[38]

James Anderson also supports Horowitz's contention that consociational powersharing built around diverging identities can entrench and sharpen these divisions. Citing the example of Northern Ireland, Anderson argues such approaches tend to "prioritise the same general type of territorial identity as the ethno-nationalists". Nonetheless, Anderson concedes difficulty lies in the fact such identities cannot simply be wished away, as he argues is attempted when focusing only on individual rights at the expense of group rights.^[39]

As an alternative of consociationalism Horowitz suggested an alternative model –

In 2022, Yascha Mounk argued that the case for consociationalism and power-sharing had weakened significantly since first proposed based on experiments and real-life observations. He argues that in some cases it can bring short-term peace, but that it is always temporary and is likely to worsen tensions in the long-run.[41]

Critics point out that consociationalism is dangerous in a system of differing

Consociationalism assumes that each group is cohesive and has strong leadership. Although the minority can block decisions, this requires 100 per cent agreement. Rights are given to communities rather than individuals, leading to over-representation of some individuals in society and under-representation of others. Grand coalitions are unlikely to happen due to the dynamics of ethnic competition. Each group seeks more power for itself. Consociationalists are criticized for focusing too much on the set up of institutions and not enough on transitional issues which go beyond such institutions. Finally, it is claimed that consociational institutions promote sectarianism and entrench existing identities.

Examples

The political systems of a number of countries operate or used to operate on a consociational basis, including Belgium, Italy, Cyprus (effective 1960–1963),^[42][43][44] the First Czechoslovak Republic,^[45] Israel, Lebanon, the Netherlands (1917–1967), Northern Ireland, Switzerland (consultation mostly across ideological lines), Ethiopia, Zimbabwe-Rhodesia, and South Africa. Some academics have also argued that the European Union resembles a consociational democracy, with consultation across ideological lines.^[46][47]

Additionally, a number of peace agreements are consociational, including:

• The
  war in Bosnia and Herzegovina, which is described as a "classic example of consociational settlement" by Sumantra Bose^[48] and "an ideal-typical consociational democracy" by Roberto Belloni.^[49]
• The Good Friday Agreement of 1998 in Northern Ireland^[50] (and its subsequent reinforcement with 2006's St Andrews Agreement), which Brendan O'Leary describes as "power-sharing plus".^[51]
• The
  Ohrid Agreement of 2001 setting the constitutional framework for power-sharing in North Macedonia.^[52]

The Islamic Republic of Afghanistan's political system was also described as consociational,^[53] although it lacked ethnic quotas.^[54]

In addition to the two-state solution to solve the Arab–Israeli conflict, some have argued for a one-state solution under a consociational democracy in the state of Israel, but this solution is not very popular, nor has it been discussed seriously at peace negotiations.^[55]

During the 1980s the South African government attempted to reform apartheid into a consociational democracy. The South African Constitution of 1983 applied Lijphart's powersharing ideas by establishing a Tricameral Parliament. During the 1990s negotiations to end apartheid the National Party (NP) and Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP) proposed a settlement based upon consociationalism. The African National Congress (ANC) opposed consociationalism and proposed instead a settlement based upon majoritarian democracy. The NP abandoned consociationalism when the U.S. Department of State came out in favor of the majoritarian democracy model in 1992.^[56]

See also

• Conflict management
• Consensus democracy
• Corporative federalism
• Directorial system
• Horizontalidad
• Minority groups
• Minority rights
• Negarchy
• Pillarisation
• Plural society
• Polycentric law
• Sui iuris

References

Further reading

• O'Leary, Brendan. 2020. "Consociation in the Present." Swiss Political Science Review.
• Bogaards, Matthijs; Helms, Ludger; Lijphart, Arend. 2020. "The Importance of Consociationalism for Twenty‐First Century Politics and Political Science." Swiss Political Science Review.
• Selway, Joel and K. Templeman. 2012. "The Myth of Consociationalism." Comparative Political Studies 45: 1542–1571.
• Issacharoff, S. "Constitutionalizing Democracy in Fractured Societies". Texas Law Review. 82: 2004.

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