Construct (philosophy)
In
Overview
As mind-dependent objects, concepts that are typically viewed as constructs include the
How much of what the observer perceives is objective is controversial, so the exact definition of constructs varies greatly across different views and philosophies. The view that the senses capture most or all of the
The creation of constructs is a part of operationalization, especially the creation of theoretical definitions. The usefulness of one conceptualization over another depends largely on construct validity. To address the non-observability of constructs, U.S. federal agencies such as the National Institutes of Health and the National Cancer Institute have created a construct database termed Grid-Enabled Measures (GEM) to improve construct use and reuse.
In the
History
Cronbach and Meehl (1955) define a hypothetical construct as a concept for which there is not a single observable referent, which cannot be directly observed, and for which there exist multiple referents, but none all-inclusive.[2] For example, according to Cronbach and Meehl a fish is not a hypothetical construct because, despite variation in species and varieties of fish, there is an agreed upon definition for a fish with specific characteristics that distinguish a fish from a bird. Furthermore, a fish can be directly observed. On the other hand, a hypothetical construct has no single referent; rather, hypothetical constructs consist of groups of functionally related behaviors, attitudes, processes, and experiences. Instead of seeing intelligence, love, or fear we see indicators or manifestations of what we have agreed to call intelligence, love, or fear.
McCorquodale and Meehl (1948) discussed the distinction between what they called intervening variables and these hypothetical constructs.[3] They describe hypothetical constructs as containing surplus meaning, as they imply more than just the operations by which they are measured.
In the positivist tradition, Boring (1923) described intelligence as whatever the intelligence test measures.[4] As a reaction to such operational definitions, Cronbach and Meehl (1955) emphasized the necessity of viewing constructs like intelligence as hypothetical constructs. They asserted that there is no adequate criterion for the operational definition of constructs like abilities and personality. Thus, according to Cronbach and Meehl (1955), a useful construct of intelligence or personality should imply more than simply test scores. Instead, these constructs should predict a wide range of behaviors.
References
- ^ Bunge, M. 1974. Treatise on Basic Philosophy, Vol. I Semantics I: Sense and Reference. Dordrecth-Boston: Reidel Publishing Co.
- ^ Cronbach, L.J., and Meehl, P.E. (1955) "Construct validity in psychological tests", Psychological Bulletin 52:281-302.
- ^ MacCorquodale, K.,& Meehl, P.E. (1948). "On a distinction between hypothetical constructs and intervening variables", Psychological Review 55:95-107.
- ^ Boring, E.G. (1923) "Intelligence as the tests test it", New Republic 36:35-37.