Continuation War
Continuation War | |||||||||
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Part of the Eastern Front of World War II | |||||||||
A Finnish soldier in Vyborg Bay during the Continuation War, 1944 | |||||||||
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Belligerents | |||||||||
Finland Germany Naval support: Italy[a] |
Soviet Union Air support: United Kingdom[b] | ||||||||
Commanders and leaders | |||||||||
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Strength | |||||||||
Average: 450,000 Finns[6] Peak: 700,000 Finns[6] 1941: 67,000 Germans[7] 1944: 214,000 Germans[7] 2,000 Estonian volunteers 1,000 Swedish volunteers 99 Italian navy personnel 550 aircraft[8] |
Total: 900,000–1,500,000[9] June 1941: 450,000[10] June 1944: 650,000[11] 1,506 tanks[d] 1,382 aircraft[e] | ||||||||
Casualties and losses | |||||||||
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The Continuation War,[f] also known as the Second Soviet-Finnish War, was a conflict fought by Finland and Nazi Germany against the Soviet Union during World War II. It began with a Finnish declaration of war and invasion on 25 June 1941 and ended on 19 September 1944 with the Moscow Armistice. The Soviet Union and Finland had previously fought the Winter War from 1939 to 1940, which ended with the Soviet failure to conquer Finland and the Moscow Peace Treaty. Numerous reasons have been proposed for the Finnish decision to invade, with regaining territory lost during the Winter War regarded as the most common. Other justifications for the conflict include Finnish President Risto Ryti's vision of a Greater Finland and Commander-in-Chief Carl Gustaf Emil Mannerheim's desire to annex East Karelia.
On 22 June 1941, the
Hostilities between Finland and the USSR ceased in September 1944 with the signing of the Moscow Armistice in which Finland restored its borders per the 1940 Moscow Peace Treaty and additionally ceded Petsamo and leased the Porkkala Peninsula to the Soviets. Furthermore, Finland was required to pay war reparations to the Soviet Union, accept partial responsibility for the war, and acknowledge that it had been a German ally. Finland was also required by the agreement to expel German troops from Finnish territory, which led to the Lapland War between Finland and Germany.
Background
Winter War
On 23 August 1939, the Soviet Union and Germany signed the
In October 1939, the Soviet Union attempted to negotiate with Finland to cede Finnish territory on the
Prior to the war, Finnish foreign policy had been based on
The Soviet Union had received the
German and Soviet expansion in Europe
After the Winter War, Germany was viewed with distrust by the Finnish, as it was considered an ally of the Soviet Union. Nonetheless, the Finnish government sought to restore diplomatic relations with Germany, but also continued its Western-orientated policy and negotiated a war trade agreement with the United Kingdom.[38] The agreement was renounced after the German invasion of Denmark and Norway on 9 April 1940 resulted in the UK cutting all trade and traffic communications with the Nordic countries. With the fall of France, a Western orientation was no longer considered a viable option in Finnish foreign policy.[40] On 15 and 16 June, the Soviet Union occupied the Baltic states almost without any resistance and Soviet puppet regimes were installed. Within two months Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania were incorporated into the USSR and by mid–1940, the two remaining northern democracies, Finland and Sweden, were encircled by the hostile states of Germany and the Soviet Union.[41]
On 23 June, shortly after the Soviet occupation of the Baltic states began, Soviet Foreign Minister Vyacheslav Molotov contacted the Finnish government to demand that a mining licence be issued to the Soviet Union for the nickel mines in Petsamo or, alternatively, permission for the establishment of a joint Soviet-Finnish company to operate there. A licence to mine the deposit had already been granted to a British-Canadian company and so the demand was rejected by Finland. The following month, the Soviets demanded that Finland destroy the fortifications on the Åland Islands and to grant the Soviets the right to use Finnish railways to transport Soviet troops to the newly acquired Soviet base at Hanko. The Finns very reluctantly agreed to those demands.[42] On 24 July, Molotov accused the Finnish government of persecuting the communist Finland–Soviet Union Peace and Friendship Society and soon afterward publicly declared support for the group. The society organised demonstrations in Finland, some of which turned into riots.[43][44]
Russian-language sources from the post-Soviet era, such as the study
Relations between Finland, Germany and Soviet Union
On 31 July 1940,
In response to that new situation, Molotov visited Berlin on 12–13 November 1940.
On 18 December 1940, Hitler officially approved Operation Barbarossa, paving the way for the German invasion of the Soviet Union,[57] in which he expected both Finland and Romania to participate.[58] Meanwhile, Finnish Major General Paavo Talvela met with German Colonel General Franz Halder and Reich Marshal Hermann Göring in Berlin, the first time that the Germans had advised the Finnish government, in carefully-couched diplomatic terms, that they were preparing for war with the Soviet Union. Outlines of the actual plan were revealed in January 1941 and regular contact between Finnish and German military leaders began in February.[58] Additionally in January 1941, Moscow again demanded Finland relinquish control of the Petsamo mining area to the Soviets, but Finland, emboldened by a rebuilt defence force and German support, rejected the proposition.[59]
In the late spring of 1941, the USSR made a number of goodwill gestures to prevent Finland from completely falling under German influence. Ambassador Ivan Stepanovich Zotov was replaced with the more conciliatory and passive Pavel Dmitrievich Orlov . Furthermore, the Soviet government announced that it no longer opposed a rapprochement between Finland and Sweden. Those conciliatory measures, however, did not have any effect on Finnish policy.[60] Finland wished to re-enter the war mainly because of the Soviet invasion of Finland during the Winter War, which the League of Nations and Nordic neutrality had failed to prevent due to lack of outside support.[61] Finland primarily aimed to reverse its territorial losses from the 1940 Moscow Peace Treaty and, depending on the success of the German invasion of the Soviet Union, to possibly expand its borders, especially into East Karelia. Some right-wing groups, such as the Academic Karelia Society, supported a Greater Finland ideology.[62] This ideology of a Greater Finland mostly composed of Soviet territories was augmented by anti-Russian sentiments.[63]
German and Finnish war plans
The details of the Finnish preparations for war are still somewhat opaque. Historian William R. Trotter stated that "it has so far proven impossible to pinpoint the exact date on which Finland was taken into confidence about Operation Barbarossa" and that "neither the Finns nor the Germans were entirely candid with one another as to their national aims and methods. In any case, the step from contingency planning to actual operations, when it came, was little more than a formality".[64]
The inner circle of Finnish leadership, led by Ryti and Mannerheim, actively planned joint operations with Germany under a veil of ambiguous neutrality and without formal agreements after an alliance with Sweden had proved fruitless, according to a meta-analysis by Finnish historian
Finland's relationship with Germany
Finland never signed the Tripartite Pact. The Finnish leadership stated they would fight against the Soviets only to the extent needed to redress the balance of the 1940 treaty, though some historians consider that it had wider territorial goals under the slogan "shorter borders, longer peace" (Finnish: ”lyhyet rajat, pitkä rauha”). During the war, the Finnish leadership generally referred to the Germans as "brothers-in-arms" but also denied that they were allies of Germany – instead claiming to be "co-belligerents".[67] For Hitler, the distinction was irrelevant since he saw Finland as an ally.[68] The 1947 Paris Peace Treaty signed by Finland described Finland as having been "an ally of Hitlerite Germany" during the Continuation War.[69][70] In a 2008 poll of 28 Finnish historians carried out by Helsingin Sanomat, 16 said that Finland had been an ally of Nazi Germany, six said it had not been and six did not take a position.[71]
Order of battle and operational planning
Soviet
The Northern Front (Russian: Северный фронт) of the Leningrad Military District was commanded by Lieutenant General Markian Popov and numbered around 450,000 soldiers in 18 divisions and 40 independent battalions in the Finnish region.[10] During the Interim Peace, the Soviet Military had relaid operational plans to conquer Finland,[72] but with the German attack, Operation Barbarossa, begun on 22 June 1941, the Soviets required its best units and latest materiel to be deployed against the Germans and so abandoned plans for a renewed offensive against Finland.[73][74] The 23rd Army was deployed in the Karelian Isthmus, the 7th Army to Ladoga Karelia and the 14th Army to the Murmansk–Salla area of Lapland. The Northern Front also commanded eight aviation divisions.[75] As the initial German strike against the Soviet Air Forces had not affected air units located near Finland, the Soviets could deploy around 700 aircraft supported by a number of Soviet Navy wings.[13] The Red Banner Baltic Fleet, which outnumbered the navy of Germany (Kriegsmarine), comprised 2 battleships, 2 light cruisers, 47 destroyers or large torpedo boats, 75 submarines, over 200 smaller crafts, and 682 aircraft (of which 595 were operational).[14][15]
Finnish and German
The Finnish Army (Maavoimat) mobilised between 475,000 and 500,000 soldiers in 14 divisions and 3 brigades for the invasion, commanded by Field Marshal (sotamarsalkka) Mannerheim. The army was organised as follows:[74][76][77]
- II Corps and IV Corps: deployed to the Karelian Isthmus and comprised seven infantry divisions and one brigade.
- Army of Karelia: deployed north of Lake Ladoga and commanded by General Erik Heinrichs. It comprised the VI Corps, VII Corps, and Group Oinonen; a total of seven divisions, including the German 163rd Infantry Division, and three brigades.
- 14th Division: deployed in the Kainuu region, commanded directly by Finnish Headquarters (Päämaja).
Although initially deployed for a static defence, the Finnish Army was to later launch an attack to the south, on both sides of Lake Ladoga, putting pressure on Leningrad and thus supporting the advance of the German
The
Finnish offensive phase in 1941
Initial operations
In the evening of 21 June 1941, German mine-layers hiding in the Archipelago Sea deployed two large minefields across the Gulf of Finland. Later that night, German bombers flew along the gulf to Leningrad, mining the harbour and the river Neva, making a refueling stop at Utti, Finland, on the return leg. In the early hours of 22 June, Finnish forces launched Operation Kilpapurjehdus ("Regatta"), deploying troops in the demilitarised Åland Islands. Although the 1921 Åland convention had clauses allowing Finland to defend the islands in the event of an attack, the coordination of this operation with the German invasion and the arrest of the Soviet consulate staff stationed on the islands meant that the deployment was a deliberate violation of the treaty, according to Finnish historian Mauno Jokipii.[88]
On the morning of 22 June, Hitler's proclamation read: "Together with their Finnish comrades in arms the heroes from Narvik stand at the edge of the Arctic Ocean. German troops under command of the conqueror of Norway, and the Finnish freedom fighters under their Marshal's command, are protecting Finnish territory."[89]
Following the launch of Operation Barbarossa at around 3:15 a.m. on 22 June 1941, the Soviet Union sent seven bombers on a retaliatory airstrike into Finland, hitting targets at 6:06 a.m. Helsinki time as reported by the Finnish coastal defence ship Väinämöinen.[90] On the morning of 25 June, the Soviet Union launched another air offensive, with 460 fighters and bombers targeting 19 airfields in Finland, however inaccurate intelligence and poor bombing accuracy resulted in several raids hitting Finnish cities, or municipalities, causing considerable damage. 23 Soviet bombers were lost in this strike while the Finnish forces lost no aircraft.[91][92][66] Although the USSR claimed that the airstrikes were directed against German targets, particularly airfields in Finland,[93] the Finnish Parliament used the attacks as justification for the approval of a "defensive war".[94] According to historian David Kirby, the message was intended more for public opinion in Finland than abroad, where the country was viewed as an ally of the Axis powers.[95][65]
Finnish advance in Karelia
The Finnish plans for the offensive in Ladoga Karelia were finalised on 28 June 1941,[96] and the first stages of the operation began on 10 July.[96][97][66] By 16 July, the VI Corps had reached the northern shore of Lake Ladoga, dividing the Soviet 7th Army, which had been tasked with defending the area.[96] The USSR struggled to contain the German assault, and soon the Soviet high command, Stavka (Russian: Ставка), pulled all available units stationed along the Finnish border into the beleaguered front line.[96] Additional reinforcements were drawn from the 237th Rifle Division and the Soviet 10th Mechanised Corps, excluding the 198th Motorised Division , both of which were stationed in Ladoga Karelia, but this stripped much of the reserve strength of the Soviet units defending that area.[98]
The Finnish
The Soviet order to withdraw from Vyborg came too late, resulting in significant losses in materiel, although most of the troops were later evacuated via the
The Finnish Army of Karelia started its attack in East Karelia towards
Operation Silver Fox in Lapland and Lend-Lease to Murmansk
The German objective in Finnish Lapland was to take Murmansk and cut the Kirov (Murmansk) Railway running from Murmansk to Leningrad by capturing Salla and
The crucial arctic lend-lease convoys from the US and the UK via Murmansk and Kirov Railway to the bulk of the Soviet forces continued throughout World War II. The US supplied almost $11 billion in materials: 400,000 jeeps and trucks; 12,000 armored vehicles (including 7,000 tanks, which could equip some 20 US armoured divisions); 11,400 aircraft; and 1.59 million t (1.75 million short tons) of food.[118][119] As a similar example, British shipments of Matilda, Valentine and Tetrarch tanks accounted for only 6 per cent of total Soviet tank production, but over 25 per cent of medium and heavy tanks produced for the Red Army.[120]
Aspirations, war effort and international relations
The Wehrmacht rapidly advanced deep into Soviet territory early in the Operation Barbarossa campaign, leading the Finnish government to believe that Germany would defeat the Soviet Union quickly.[66] President Ryti envisioned a Greater Finland, where Finns and other Finnic peoples would live inside a "natural defence borderline" by incorporating the Kola Peninsula, East Karelia and perhaps even northern Ingria. In public, the proposed frontier was introduced with the slogan "short border, long peace".[121][66][65] Some members of the Finnish Parliament, such as members of the Social Democratic Party and the Swedish People's Party, opposed the idea, arguing that maintaining the 1939 frontier would be enough.[121] Mannerheim often called the war an anti-Communist crusade, hoping to defeat "Bolshevism once and for all".[66] On 10 July, Mannerheim drafted his order of the day, the Sword Scabbard Declaration, in which he pledged to liberate Karelia; in December 1941 in private letters, he made known his doubts of the need to push beyond the previous borders.[2] The Finnish government assured the United States that it was unaware of the order.[122]
According to Vehviläinen, most Finns thought that the scope of the new offensive was only to regain what had been taken in the Winter War. He further stated that the term 'Continuation War' was created at the start of the conflict by the Finnish government to justify the invasion to the population as a continuation of the defensive Winter War. The government also wished to emphasise that it was not an official ally of Germany, but a 'co-belligerent' fighting against a common enemy and with purely Finnish aims. Vehviläinen wrote that the authenticity of the government's claim changed when the Finnish Army crossed the old frontier of 1939 and began to annex Soviet territory.[123] British author Jonathan Clements asserted that by December 1941, Finnish soldiers had started questioning whether they were fighting a war of national defence or foreign conquest.[124]
By the autumn of 1941, the Finnish military leadership started to doubt Germany's capability to finish the war quickly. The Finnish Defence Forces suffered relatively severe losses during their advance and, overall, German victory became uncertain as German troops were halted near Moscow. German troops in northern Finland faced circumstances they were unprepared for and failed to reach their targets. As the front lines stabilised, Finland attempted to start peace negotiations with the USSR.[125] Mannerheim refused to assault Leningrad, which would inextricably tie Finland to Germany; he regarded his objectives for the war to be achieved, a decision that angered the Germans.[2]
Due to the war effort, the Finnish economy suffered from a lack of labour, as well as food shortages and increased prices. To combat this, the Finnish government demobilised part of the army to prevent industrial and agricultural production from collapsing.[114] In October, Finland informed Germany that it would need 159,000 t (175,000 short tons) of grain to manage until next year's harvest. The German authorities would have rejected the request, but Hitler himself agreed. Annual grain deliveries of 180,000 t (200,000 short tons) equaled almost half of the Finnish domestic crop. On 25 November 1941, Finland signed the Anti-Comintern Pact, a less formal alliance, which the German leadership saw as a "litmus test of loyalty".[126][127]
Finland maintained good relations with a number of other Western powers. Foreign volunteers from Sweden and Estonia were among the foreigners who joined Finnish ranks.
British declaration of war and action in the Arctic Ocean
On 12 July 1941, the United Kingdom signed an agreement of joint action with the Soviet Union. Under German pressure, Finland closed the British
Trench warfare from 1942 to 1944
Unconventional warfare and military operations
Unconventional warfare was fought in both the Finnish and Soviet wildernesses. Finnish
Between 1942 and 1943, military operations were limited, although the front did see some action. In January 1942, the Soviet Karelian Front attempted to retake Medvezhyegorsk (Finnish: Karhumäki), which had been lost to the Finns in late 1941. With the arrival of spring in April, Soviet forces went on the offensive on the Svir River front, in the Kestenga (Finnish: Kiestinki) region further north in Lapland as well as in the far north at Petsamo with the 14th Rifle Division's amphibious landings supported by the Northern Fleet. All Soviet offensives started promisingly, but due either to the Soviets overextending their lines or stubborn defensive resistance, the offensives were repulsed. After Finnish and German counterattacks in Kestenga, the front lines were generally stalemated. In September 1942, the USSR attacked again at Medvezhyegorsk, but despite five days of fighting, the Soviets only managed to push the Finnish lines back 500 m (550 yd) on a roughly 1 km (0.62 mi) long stretch of the front. Later that month, a Soviet landing with two battalions in Petsamo was defeated by a German counterattack.[144][145] In November 1941, Hitler decided to separate the German forces fighting in Lapland from the Army of Norway and create the Army of Lapland, commanded by Colonel General Eduard Dietl. In June 1942, the Army of Lapland was redesignated the 20th Mountain Army.[146]
In the early stages of the war, the Finnish Army overran the former 1939 border, but ceased their advance 30–32 km (19–20 mi) from the center of Leningrad.
According to Clements, Mannerheim personally refused Hitler's request of assaulting Leningrad during their meeting on 4 June 1942. Mannerheim explained to Hitler that "Finland had every reason to wish to stay out of any further provocation of the Soviet Union."[152] In 2014, author Jeff Rutherford described the city as being "ensnared" between the German and Finnish armies.[153] British historian John Barber described it as a "siege by the German and Finnish armies from 8 September 1941 to 27 January 1944 [...]" in his foreword in 2017.[154] Likewise, in 2017, Alexis Peri wrote that the city was "completely cut off, save a heavily patrolled water passage over Lake Ladoga" by "Hitler's Army Group North and his Finnish allies."[155]
The 150 speedboats, two minelayers and four steamships of the Finnish Ladoga Naval Detachment, as well as numerous shore batteries, had been stationed on Lake Ladoga since August 1941. Finnish Lieutenant General Paavo Talvela proposed on 17 May 1942 to create a joint Finnish–German–Italian unit on the lake to disrupt Soviet supply convoys to Leningrad. The unit was named Naval Detachment K and comprised four Italian MAS torpedo motorboats of the XII Squadriglia MAS, four German KM-type minelayers and the Finnish torpedo-motorboat Sisu. The detachment began operations in August 1942 and sank numerous smaller Soviet watercraft and flatboats and assaulted enemy bases and beach fronts until it was dissolved in the winter of 1942–43.[1] Twenty-three Siebel ferries and nine infantry transports of the German Einsatzstab Fähre Ost were also deployed to Lake Ladoga and unsuccessfully assaulted the island of Sukho, which protected the main supply route to Leningrad, in October 1942.[156]
Despite the siege of the city, the Soviet Baltic Fleet was still able to operate from Leningrad. The Finnish Navy's flagship Ilmarinen had been sunk in September 1941 in the gulf by mines during the failed diversionary Operation North Wind in 1941.[157] In early 1942, Soviet forces recaptured the island of Gogland, but lost it and the Bolshoy Tyuters islands to Finnish forces later in spring 1942. During the winter between 1941 and 1942, the Soviet Baltic Fleet decided to use their large submarine fleet in offensive operations. Though initial submarine operations in the summer of 1942 were successful, the Kriegsmarine and Finnish Navy soon intensified their anti-submarine efforts, making Soviet submarine operations later in 1942 costly. The underwater offensive carried out by the Soviets convinced the Germans to lay anti-submarine nets as well as supporting minefields between Porkkala Peninsula and Naissaar, which proved to be an insurmountable obstacle for Soviet submarines.[158] On the Arctic Ocean, Finnish radio intelligence intercepted Allied messages on supply convoys to Murmansk, such as PQ 17 and PQ 18, and relayed the information to the Abwehr, German intelligence.[159]
Finnish military administration and concentration camps
On 19 July 1941, the Finns created a military administration in occupied East Karelia with the goal of preparing the region for eventual incorporation into Finland. The Finns aimed to expel the Russian portion of the local population (constituting to about a half), who were deemed "non-national",[160] from the area once the war was over,[161] and replace them with the local Finnic peoples, such as Karelians, Finns, Ingrians and Vepsians. Most of the East Karelian population had already been evacuated before the Finnish forces arrived, but about 85,000 people — mostly elderly, women and children — were left behind, less than half of whom were Karelians. A significant number of civilians, almost 30 per cent of the remaining Russians, were interned in concentration camps.[160]
The winter between 1941 and 1942 was particularly harsh for the Finnish urban population due to poor harvests and a shortage of agricultural labourers.[160] However, conditions were much worse for Russians in Finnish concentration camps. More than 3,500 people died, mostly from starvation, amounting to 13.8 per cent of those detained, while the corresponding figure for the free population of the occupied territories was 2.6 per cent, and 1.4 per cent for Finland.[162] Conditions gradually improved, ethnic discrimination in wage levels and food rations was terminated, and new schools were established for the Russian-speaking population the following year, after Commander-in-Chief Mannerheim called for the International Committee of the Red Cross from Geneva to inspect the camps.[163][164] By the end of the occupation, mortality rates had dropped to the same levels as in Finland.[162]
Jews in Finland
In 1939, Finland had a small
Soviet offensive in 1944
Air raids and the Leningrad–Novgorod Offensive
Finland began to seek an exit from the war after the German defeat at the
The Soviet
Vyborg–Petrozavodsk Offensive and breakthrough
On 9 June 1944, the Soviet Leningrad Front launched an offensive against Finnish positions on the Karelian Isthmus and in the area of Lake Ladoga, timed to coincide with
On 25 June, the Red Army reached the third line of defence, the
More battles were fought toward the end of the war, the last of which was the Battle of Ilomantsi, fought between 26 July and 13 August 1944 and resulting in a Finnish victory with the destruction of two Soviet divisions.[177][185][186] Resisting the Soviet offensive had exhausted Finnish resources. Despite German support under the Ryti-Ribbentrop Agreement, Finland asserted that it was unable to blunt another major offensive.[187] Soviet victories against German Army Groups Center and North during Operation Bagration made the situation even more dire for Finland.[187] With no imminent further Soviet offensives, Finland sought to leave the war.[187][188][189] On 1 August, Ryti resigned, and on 4 August, Field Marshal Mannerheim was sworn in as the new president. He annulled the agreement between Ryti and Ribbentrop on 17 August to allow Finland to sue for peace with the Soviets again, and peace terms from Moscow arrived on 29 August.[179][188][190][191]
Ceasefire and peace
Finland was required to return to the borders agreed to in the 1940 Moscow Peace Treaty, demobilise its armed forces, fulfill war reparations and cede the municipality of Petsamo. The Finns were also required to end any diplomatic relations with Germany immediately and to expel the Wehrmacht from Finnish territory by 15 September 1944; any troops remaining were to be disarmed, arrested and turned over to the Allies. The Finnish Parliament accepted those terms in a secret meeting on 2 September and requested for official negotiations for an armistice to begin. The Finnish Army implemented a ceasefire at 8:00 a.m. Helsinki time on 4 September. The Red Army followed suit a day later. On 14 September, a delegation led by Finnish Prime Minister Antti Hackzell and Foreign Minister Carl Enckell began negotiating, with the Soviet Union and the United Kingdom, the final terms of the Moscow Armistice, which eventually included additional stipulations from the Soviets. They were presented by Molotov on 18 September and accepted by the Finnish Parliament a day later.[192][191]
The motivations for the Soviet peace agreement with Finland are debated. Several Western historians stated that the original Soviet designs for Finland were no different from those for the Baltic countries. American political scientist Dan Reiter asserted that for Moscow, the control of Finland was necessary. Reiter and the British historian Victor Rothwell quoted Molotov as telling his Lithuanian counterpart in 1940, when the Soviets effectively annexed Lithuania, that minor states such as Finland, "will be included within the honourable family of Soviet peoples".[193][194] Reiter stated that concern over severe losses pushed Stalin into accepting a limited outcome in the war rather than pursuing annexation, although some Soviet documents called for military occupation of Finland. He also wrote that Stalin had described territorial concessions, reparations and military bases as his objective with Finland to representatives from the UK, in December 1941, and the US, in March 1943, as well as the Tehran Conference. He believed that in the end, "Stalin's desire to crush Hitler quickly and decisively without distraction from the Finnish sideshow" concluded the war.[195] Red Army officers captured as prisoners of war during the Battle of Tali-Ihantala revealed that their intention was to reach Helsinki, and that they were to be strengthened with reinforcements for this task.[196] This was confirmed by intercepted Soviet radio messages.[196]
Russian historian Nikolai Baryshnikov disputed the view that the Soviet Union sought to deprive Finland of its independence. He argued that there was no documentary evidence for such claims and that the Soviet government was always open for negotiations. Baryshnikov cited sources like the public information chief of Finnish Headquarters, Major Kalle Lehmus , to show that Finnish leadership had learned of the limited Soviet plans for Finland by at least July 1944 after intelligence revealed that some Soviet divisions were to be transferred to reserve in Leningrad.[197] Finnish historian Heikki Ylikangas stated similar findings in 2009. According to him, the Soviets refocused their efforts in the summer of 1944 from the Finnish Front to defeating Germany, and Mannerheim received intelligence from Colonel Aladár Paasonen in June 1944 that the Soviet Union was aiming for peace, not occupation.[198] Evidence of the Soviet leadership's intentions for the occupation of Finland has later been uncovered. In 2018, it was revealed that the Soviets' designed and printed (in Goznak) new banknotes for Finland during the closing phases of the war, which were to be put into use after the planned occupation of the country.[199]
Aftermath and casualties
Finland and Germany
According to Finnish historians, the casualties of the Finnish Defence Forces amounted to 63,204 dead or missing and around 158,000 wounded.
The Soviet demand for $600 million in war indemnities was reduced to $300 million (equivalent to $6.2 billion in 2022), most likely because of pressure from the US and the UK. After the ceasefire, the Soviets insisted for the payments to be based on 1938 prices, which doubled the de facto amount.
Many civilians who had been displaced after the Winter War had moved back into Karelia during the Continuation War and so had to be evacuated from Karelia again. Of the 260,000 civilians who had returned Karelia, only 19 chose to remain and become Soviet citizens.[209] Most of the Ingrian Finns, together with Votes and Izhorians living in German-occupied Ingria, had been evacuated to Finland in 1943–1944. After the armistice, Finland was forced to return the evacuees.[210] Soviet authorities did not allow the 55,733 returnees to resettle in Ingria and deported the Ingrian Finns to central regions of the Soviet Union.[210][211]
Soviet Union
The war is considered a Soviet victory.[201][212][213] According to Finnish historians, Soviet casualties in the Continuation War were not accurately recorded and various approximations have arisen.[16][17] Russian historian Grigori Krivosheev estimated in 1997 that around 250,000 were killed or missing in action while 575,000 were medical casualties (385,000 wounded and 190,000 sick).[10][16] Finnish author Nenye and others stated in 2016 that at least 305,000 were confirmed dead, or missing, according to the latest research and the number of wounded certainly exceeded 500,000.[17] Of material losses, authors Jowett and Snodgrass state that 697 Soviet tanks were destroyed,[21] 842 field artillery pieces captured,[214][i] and 1,600 airplanes destroyed by Finnish fighter planes (1,030 by anti-aircraft fire and 75 by the Navy).[22]
The number of
The extent of Finland's participation in the siege of Leningrad, and whether Soviet civilian casualties during the siege should be attributed to the Continuation War, is debated and lacks a consensus (estimates of civilian deaths during the siege range from 632,253[221] to 1,042,000).[148][154]
In film and literature
Several literary and cinematic arrangements have been made on the basis of the Continuation War. The best-known story about the Continuation War is
See also
Notes
- ^ Italian participation was limited to the four motor torpedo boats of the XII Squadriglia MAS serving in the international Naval Detachment K on Lake Ladoga during the summer and autumn of 1942.[1]
- carrier raid at Petsamo on 31 July 1941,[3] and commenced Operation Benedict to support air raids in the Murmansk area and train Soviet crews for roughly a month from September to October in 1941.[4]
- ^ On 19 September 1955, Finland and the Soviet Union signed an agreement to return the Porkkala Peninsula to Finland. In January 1956, 12 years after its lease to the USSR, the Soviets withdrew from their naval base on Porkkala and the peninsula was returned to Finnish sovereignty.[5]
- Mechanised Corps present in the Northern Front at the time of the invasion. The 1st Mechanised Corps and the 10th Mechanised Corps had 1,037 and 469 tanks respectively.[12]
- ^ This number was found by adding number of 700 aircraft present in the eight aviation divisions in the Soviet Air Forces in the Northern Front[13] and the 682 aircraft in the Red Banner Baltic Fleet.[14][15]
- ^ This name is translated as follows: Finnish: jatkosota, Swedish: fortsättningskriget, German: Fortsetzungskrieg. The names Finnish Front of the Great Patriotic War. (Russian: Советско-финский фронт Великой Отечественной войны) and the Soviet–Finnish War 1941–1944 (Russian: Советско–финская война 1941–1944) are often used in Russian historiography.[23] The U.S. Library of Congress' catalogue also lists the variants War of Retribution and War of Continuation (see authority control).
- ^ Secondary sources contradict each other and state either 5 or 6 December as the day war was declared. According to a news piece on 8 December 1941 by The Examiner, an Australian newspaper, Britain notified the Finnish Government on 6 December "that she considered herself at war with [Finland] as from 1 a.m. (G.M.T.) to-morrow."[135]
- ^ A detailed list of Finnish dead is as follows:[200]
- Dead, buried: 33,565;
- Wounded, died of wounds: 12,820;
- Dead, not buried, declared as dead: 4,251;
- Missing, declared as dead: 3,552;
- Died as prisoners-of-war: 473;
- Other reasons (diseases, accidents, suicides): 7,932;
- Unknown: 611.
- ^ This number includes only those field artillery pieces which were captured in full condition or were later repaired to full condition and used by Finnish artillery. It does not include anti tank guns, anti aircraft guns or coastal guns captured. Armies do not usually leave undestroyed guns behind and we can assume that Soviet army was no exception. So the number of guns left behind and lost by Soviet army is likely much higher.
References
Citations
- ^ a b Zapotoczny 2017, p. 123.
- ^ a b c Clements 2012, p. 210.
- ^ a b Sturtivant 1990, p. 86.
- ^ ISBN 9781444785135. Archivedfrom the original on 21 February 2018.
- ^ a b Jakobson 1969, pp. 45–47.
- ^ a b Kinnunen & Kivimäki 2011, p. 173.
- ^ a b Ziemke 2002, pp. 9, 391–393.
- ^ "History of the Finnish Air Force". Ilmavoimat. Retrieved 23 July 2023.
The Air Force had a total strength of 550 aircraft.
- ISBN 951-37-1495-0
- ^ a b c d e Krivosheev 1997, pp. 79, 269–271.
- ^ Manninen 1994, pp. 277–282.
- ^ Glantz 1998, p. 127.
- ^ a b Jokipii 1999, p. 301.
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The Air Force lost 182 aircraft destroyed in action or otherwise damaged beyond repair
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After the rise of National Socialism to power in Germany, the geopolitical importance of the former 'buffer states' had drastically changed. Both the Soviet Union and Germany vied for the inclusion of these states into their spheres of influence. Soviet politicians and military considered it likely, that in case of an aggression against the USSR, German Armed Forces will use the territory of the Baltic states and Finland as staging areas for invasion—by either conquering or coercing these countries. None of the states of the Baltic region, excluding Poland, had sufficient military power to resist a German invasion.
- ^ Meltyukhov 2000: "The English–French influence in the Baltics, characteristic for the '20s and early '30s, was increasingly limited by the growth of German influence. Due to the strategic importance of the region, the Soviet leadership also aimed to increase its influence there, using both diplomatic means as well as active social propaganda. By the end of the '30s, the main contenders for influence in the Baltics were Germany and the Soviet Union. Being a buffer zone between Germany and the Soviet Union, the Baltic states were bound to them by a system of economic and non-aggression treaties of 1926, 1932 and 1939."
- ^ Davies 2006, pp. 137, 147.
- ^ Lukacs 2006, p. 57.
- ^ Reiter 2009, p. 132.
- ^ Kirby 2006, p. 220.
- ^ Vehviläinen 2002, p. 83.
- ^ Kirby 2006, p. 219.
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- ^ Turtola 2000, p. 409.
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- ^ a b c Ziemke 2002, p. 9.
- ^ a b Vehviläinen 2002, p. 90.
- ^ Baryshnikov 2002: "A special role was assigned by the Finnish command to artillery, which consisted of 1,829 guns."
- ^ Corum 2004, p. 14.
- ^ "History of the Finnish Air Force". Ilmavoimat. Retrieved 23 July 2023.
The Air Force had a total strength of 550 aircraft.
- ^ Kinnunen & Kivimäki 2011, p. 168.
- ^ Nenye et al. 2016, p. 339.
- ^ Kirchubel 2013, p. 120-121.
- ^ Ziemke 2002, p. 10.
- ^ Ziemke 2015, pp. 149–151.
- ^ Ziemke 2002, pp. 7, 9.
- ^ Jokipii 1999, p. 282.
- ^ Mann & Jörgensen 2016, p. 74.
- ^ "Scan from the coastal defence ship Väinämöinen's log book". Digital Archive of the National Archives of Finland. 22 June 1941. Archived from the original on 6 November 2018. Retrieved 21 February 2018.
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- ^ Platonov, Semen P., ed. (1964). Битва за Ленинград [The Battle for Leningrad]. Moscow: Voenizdat Ministerstva oborony SSSR.
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- ^ Glantz 2002, p. 68-69.
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- ^ Glantz 2005, p. 50.
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- ^ Jones 2009, p. 142: "Finland advanced to within twenty miles of Leningrad's outskirts, cutting the city's northern supply routes, but its troops then halted at its 1939 border, and did not undertake further action."
- ^ a b Glantz 2002, p. 416.
- ^ Nenye et al. 2016, pp. 101–104.
- ^ Brinkley 2004, p. 210.
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- ^ a b Vehviläinen 2002, p. 92.
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- ^ Clements 2012, pp. 208–210.
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- ^ Clements 2012, pp. 211–213.
- ^ a b Glantz 2001, p. 179.
- ^ Baryshnikov 2002: "An explanation followed to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Finland about the position of the military leadership: 'Is it not better to take it from the south or in general, or force the inhabitants of the city to capitulate with the help of hunger?'. . .When assessing the personality of Marshal Mannerheim . . . one should pay attention to his actions not only in the first period of the battle for Leningrad, but also in the subsequent period, characterized by the participation of Finnish troops in the 900-day blockade of the city."
- ^ Jones 2009, p. 142: "Nikolai Baryshnikov, in [Finland and the Siege of Leningrad 1941–1944], has suggested that the country tacitly supported Hitler's starvation policy. Finland advanced to within twenty miles of Leningrad's outskirts, cutting the city's northern supply routes, but its troops then halted at its 1939 border, and did not undertake further action."
- ^ Kirschenbaum 2006, p. 44: "The blockade began two days later when German and Finnish troops severed all land routes in and out of Leningrad."
- ^ Clements 2012, p. 213.
- ^ Rutherford 2014, p. 190: "The ensnaring of Leningrad between the German and Finnish armies did not end the combat in the region as the Soviets launched repeated and desperate attempts to regain contact with the city."
- ^ a b c Barber 2017, p. 7: "While the exact number who died during the siege by the German and Finnish armies from 8 September 1941 to 27 January 1944 will never be known, available data point to 900,000 civilian deaths, over half a million of whom died in the winter of 1941–2 alone."
- ^ Peri 2017, p. 4: "In August 1941, Hitler's Army Group North and his Finnish allies began to encircle Leningrad. They rapidly extended their territorial holdings first in the west and south and eventually in the north. By 29 August 1941, they had severed the last railway line that connected Leningrad to the rest of the USSR. By early September, Leningrad was surrounded, save a heavily patrolled water passage over Lake Ladoga."
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- Baryshnikov, Nikolai I. (2006). Феномен фальши: 'Победа в противостоянии' [The Phenomenon of Lies: 'The Victory in the Confrontation']. St. Petersburg and the Countries of Northern Europe (in Russian). St. Petersburg: Russian Christian Humanitarian Academy. Archived from the original on 2 November 2013. Retrieved 1 November 2013.
- Baryshnikov, Vladimir N. (2002v). "Проблема обеспечения безопасности Ленинграда с севера в свете осуществления советского военного планирования 1932–1941 гг" [The problem of ensuring the security of Leningrad from the north in the light of the implementation of the Soviet military planning of 1932–1941]. St. Petersburg and the Countries of Northern Europe (in Russian). St. Petersburg: Russian Christian Humanitarian Academy. Archived from the original on 9 December 2007.
- Dzeniskevich, A.R.; et al. (1970). Непокоренный Ленинград. раткий очерк истории города в период Великой Отечественной войны [Unconquered Leningrad. A short outline of the history of the city during the Great Patriotic War] (in Russian). The Academy of Sciences of the USSR. Archived from the original on 7 November 2011.
- Enkenberg, Ilkka (2021). Jatkosota Päivä Päivältä (in Finnish). Readme.fi. ISBN 978-952-373-249-0.
- Haavikko, Paavo (1999). Päämaja – Suomen hovi (in Finnish). Art House. ISBN 951-884-265-5.
- Hietanen, Silvo (1992). "Evakkovuosi 1944 – jälleen matkassa" [Evacuation 1944 – On the Road Again]. Kansakunta sodassa [A nation at war] (in Finnish). Vol. 3. Helsinki: Valtion Painatuskeskus. ISBN 978-9518613858.
- Jokipii, Mauno (1999). Финляндия на пути к войне: Исследование о военном сотрудничестве Германии и Финляндии в 1940–1941 гг [Birth of the Continuation War: Research of German–Finnish Military Collaboration 1940–1941] (in Russian). Petrozavodsk: Karelia. ISBN 5754507356.
- Juutilainen, Antti (1994). Ilomantsi – lopultakin voitto (in Finnish). Rauma: Kirjapaino Oy West Point. ISBN 9519521852.
- Kiljanen, Kalervo (1968). Suomen Laivasto 1918–1968, II [Finnish Navy 1918–1968, II] (in Finnish). Helsinki: Meriupseeriyhdistys/Otava.
- Koskimaa, Matti (1993). Veitsen terällä : vetäytyminen Länsi-Kannakselta ja Talin-Ihantalan suurtaistelu kesällä 1944 (in Finnish). Porvoo: WSOY. ISBN 9510188115.
- Kovalevsky, N. F. (2009). "Боевой состав Красной Армии и Военно-морского флота СССР на 22 июня 1941 года" [The combat composition of the Red Army and the Navy of the USSR on June 22, 1941]. Военно-исторический журнал (ВИЖ) [Military Historical Journal (VIZH)] (in Russian). No. 6.
- Kujala, Antti (2009). "Illegal Killing of Soviet Prisoners of War by Finns during the Finno-Soviet Continuation War of 1941-44". Slavonic and East European Review. 87 (3): 429–451. ISSN 2222-4327.
- Leskinen, Jari; Juutilainen, Antti, eds. (2005). Jatkosodan pikkujättiläinen [The Little Giant of the Continuation War] (in Finnish) (1st ed.). WSOY. ISBN 9789510286906.
- Manninen, Ohto (1994). Molotovin cocktail – Hitlerin sateenvarjo [Molotov's cocktail – Hitler's umbrella] (in Finnish). Helsinki: Painatuskeskus. ISBN 9513714950.
- Mäkelä, Jukka (1967). Helsinki liekeissä: suurpommitukset helmikuussa 1944 [Helsinki Burning: Great Raids in February 1944] (in Finnish). Helsinki: W. Söderström Oy. Archived from the original on 25 April 2023.
- ISBN 5-7838-0590-4. Archivedfrom the original on 28 July 2009.
- Moisala, U. E.; Alanen, Pertti (1988). Kun hyökkääjän tie pysäytettiin (in Finnish). Keuruu: Otava. ISBN 9511103865.
- Nikunen, Heikki; Talvitie, Jyrki K.; Keskinen, Kalevi (2011). Suomen ilmasodan pikkujättiläinen (in Finnish). Helsinki: WSOY. ISBN 978-9510368718.
- Paulaharju, Jyri; Sinerma, Matti; Koskimaa, Matti (1994). Suomen kenttätykistön historia II Osa (in Finnish). Helsinki: Suomen Kenttätykistön säätiö. ISBN 952-9055110.
- Paulman, F. I. (1980). "Начало освобождения Советской Эстонии". От Нарвы до Сырве [From Narva to Sõrve] (in Russian). Tallinn: Eesti Raamat.
- Raunio, Ari; Kilin, Juri (2007). Jatkosodan hyökkäystaisteluja 1941 [Offensive Battles of the Continuation War 1941] (in Finnish). Keuruu: Otavan Kirjapaino Oy. ISBN 978-9515930699.
- Raunio, Ari; Kilin, Juri (2008). Jatkosodan torjuntataisteluja 1942–44 [Defensive Battles of the Continuation War 1942–44] (in Finnish). Keuruu: Otavan Kirjapaino Oy. ISBN 978-9515930705.
- Suprun, Mikhail (1997). Ленд-лиз и северные конвои: 1941–1945 гг [Lend-Lease and Northern Convoys: 1941–1945]. Андреевский флаг. ISBN 5-85608-081-5.
- Valtanen, Jaakko (1958). "Jäämeren rannikon sotatoimet toisen maailmansodan aikana". Tiede Ja Ase (in Finnish). from the original on 2 March 2018.
- Virkkunen, Sakari (1985). Myrskyajan presidentti Ryti (in Finnish). Otava. ISBN 951-1-08557-3.
- Virrankoski, Pentti (2009). Suomen historia [A History of Finland] (in Finnish). Vol. 1, 2. Finnish Literature Society. ISBN 978-9522221605.
- Ylikangas, Heikki (2009). Yhden miehen jatkosota [One Man's Continuation War] (in Finnish). Otava. ISBN 978-951-1-24054-9.
Further reading
- Jokipii, Mauno (1987). Jatkosodan synty: tutkimuksia Saksan ja Suomen sotilaallisesta yhteistyöstä 1940–1941 [Birth of the Continuation War: Research of German–Finnish Military Collaboration 1940–1941] (in Finnish). Helsinki: Otava. ISBN 951-1087991.
- Krosby, Hans Peter (1966). Nikkelidiplomatiaa Petsamossa 1940–1941 [Nickel diplomacy in Petsamo, 1940-1941] (in Finnish). Helsinki: Kirjayhtymä. OCLC 2801914.
- Krosby, Hans Peter (1967). Suomen valinta, 1941 [Finland's Choice, 1941] (in Finnish). Helsinki: Kirjayhtymä. OCLC 2801869.
- Krosby, Hans Peter (1968). Finland, Germany, and the Soviet Union, 1940–1941: The Petsamo Dispute. University of Wisconsin Press. ISBN 9780299051402.
- Institute of Military Science (Finland) (1994). Raunio, Ari (ed.). Jatkosodan historia [History of the Continuation War] (in Finnish). Vol. 1–6. WSOY. ISSN 0355-8002.
- Polvinen, Tuomo I. (1979). Suomi kansainvälisessä politiikassa 1941–1947 [Finland in International Politics 1941-1947] (in Finnish). Vol. 1–3. WSOY. ISBN 978-9510094754.
- Sana, Elina (1994). Luovutetut: Suomen ihmisluovutukset Gestapolle [The Extradited: Finland's Extraditions to Gestapo] (in Finnish). WSOY. ISBN 9510279757.
- Schwartz, Andrew J. (1960). America and the Russo–Finnish War. Public Affairs Press. ISBN 0837179645.
- Seppinen, Ilkka (1983). Suomen ulkomaankaupan ehdot 1939–1944 [Finnish Foreign Trade Conditions, 1939–44] (in Finnish). Suomen Historiallinen Seura. ISBN 9789519254494.
- Taylor, Alan (23 May 2013). "Finland in World War II". The Atlantic.
- Wuorinen, John H., ed. (1948). Finland and World War II 1939–1944. The Ronald Press Company. ISBN 0313241333.
External links
- Finna (search service for information from Finnish archives, libraries and museums)
- Finnish Wartime Photograph Archive (under CC BY 4.0)