Cretan War (1645–1669)
Cretan War (Fifth Ottoman–Venetian War) | |||||||||
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Part of the Ottoman–Venetian Wars | |||||||||
A Venetian map of Candia | |||||||||
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Belligerents | |||||||||
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Commanders and leaders | |||||||||
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Casualties and losses | |||||||||
30,985 Venetian dead[2] | 118,754 Ottoman dead[3] | ||||||||
^ Losses in Candia only, according to Venetian reports, excluding those on the Dalmatian front, at sea, and the initial operations in Crete. If included, the total number of casualties would possibly be twice as high.[4] |
The Cretan War (
Although most of Crete was conquered by the Ottomans in the first few years of the war, the fortress of Candia (modern Heraklion), the capital of Crete, resisted successfully. Its prolonged siege, "Troy's rival" as Lord Byron called it,[5] forced both sides to focus their attention on the supply of their respective forces on the island. For the Venetians in particular, their only hope for victory over the larger Ottoman army in Crete lay in successfully starving it of supplies and reinforcements. Hence the war turned into a series of naval encounters between the two navies and their allies. Venice was aided by various Western European nations, who, exhorted by the Pope and in a revival of crusading spirit, sent men, ships and supplies "to defend Christendom". Throughout the war, Venice maintained overall naval superiority, winning most naval engagements, but the efforts to blockade the Dardanelles were only partially successful, and the Republic never had enough ships to fully cut off the flow of supplies and reinforcements to Crete. The Ottomans were hampered in their efforts by domestic turmoil, as well as by the diversion of their forces north towards Transylvania and the Habsburg monarchy.
The prolonged conflict exhausted the economy of the Republic, which relied on the lucrative trade with the Ottoman Empire. By the 1660s, despite increased aid from other Christian nations,
Background
After the loss of
The potential for conflict between the Ottomans and Venice was still present, as evidenced in 1638, when a Venetian fleet attacked and destroyed a fleet of Barbary pirates that had sought protection in the Ottoman port of Valona, bombarding the city in the process.[11] Sultan Murad IV was enraged: he threatened to execute all Venetians in the Empire, and put an embargo on Venetian trade.[12] Eventually, and given that the Ottomans were still engaged in a war with the Persians, the situation was defused with the Republic paying the Ottomans an indemnity of 250,000 sequins.[9][13]
A similar episode however in 1644 had an entirely different outcome: on 28 September, the Knights of Malta
War
Early operations
The Venetians were indeed fooled by the Ottoman subterfuge and were taken by surprise at the arrival of the Ottoman fleet at Crete on 23 June 1645.
The Ottomans first landed 15 miles west of Canea (Chania), where the local militia fled before them.[19] They then attacked the small island fortress of St. Todero, the commander of which, the Istrian Blasio Zulian, blew himself, the fortress and its garrison up rather than let it fall to the Ottomans. The Ottoman army next advanced to the city of Canea itself, which fell on 22 August, after a siege that lasted for 56 days.[23] At the same time, however, the Venetians were strengthened, as the promised help started to arrive in the form of galleys from the Papal States, Tuscany, Malta and Naples. In September, the Ottoman fleet was in disarray, but the allied Christian fleet, under the cautious command of Niccolò Ludovisi, the Pope's nephew, failed to exploit the opportunity for a decisive strike.[24] When the Christian forces finally moved to retake Canea on 1 October, with a fleet of about 90 ships, the stout Ottoman defense and the Allies' lack of cooperation doomed the attack. Soon thereafter, the Venetian allies returned to their bases.[24]
In November, Silahdar Yusuf Pasha left behind a strong garrison and returned to Constantinople for the winter. There however, he fell foul of the Sultan and was executed.[25] Nevertheless, Ottoman preparations continued in order to renew and expand the war, while the Venetians were frantically trying to raise money and men, and attempting to induce other European powers to join them against the Ottomans. However, as most of Europe was locked into the fierce antagonisms of the Thirty Years' War, their pleas fell mostly on deaf ears.[26] The Venetians were hard pressed by the financial demands of the war: besides placing taxes on the Italian mainland possessions (the Terraferma), they resorted to the sale of nobility titles and state offices to fill their war coffer.[27] To lead the effort against the Ottomans, the Senate initially appointed the 80-year-old doge Francesco Erizzo, but after his death in early 1646, he was replaced by the 73-year-old Giovanni Cappello as Captain General of the Sea.[28]
Cappello's performance in 1646 was distinctly lackluster: he failed to interdict the arrival of Ottoman reinforcements under Koca Musa Pasha in June (see
Siege of Candia begins
The siege began in May 1648. The Ottomans spent three months investing the city, which included cutting off the water supply. Eventually, it would last until 1669, the second longest siege in history after the
The lack of supplies had forced the Ottoman commander
Early clashes, 1645–1654
Venice could not directly confront the large Ottoman expeditionary force on Crete, but it did possess a fine navy, that could intervene and cut the Ottoman supply routes.
The first Venetian operation was an attempt to blockade the Dardanelles in 1646. To interdict the supplies headed to the Ottoman forces in Crete, a force of 23 Venetian ships under Tommaso Morosini scoured the Aegean for Ottoman shipping, and attempted to capture the strategically important island of Tenedos at the entrance of the Dardanelles. The Kapudan Pasha Koca Musa led a fleet of 80 warships against the Venetians, but his fleet was driven back into the Dardanelles on 26 May.[44] However, the blockading fleet was unable to stop the next exit of the Ottoman fleet on 4 June, when the lack of wind enabled the Ottoman galleys to evade the Venetian sailing ships. The Ottomans were thus able to land new troops and supplies on Crete unopposed.[45] The efforts of the Venetian fleet to counter the Ottoman land operations in Crete likewise failed, through a combination of timidity on behalf of their commanders, the delays in payment for the crews, and the effects of a widespread plague.[46]
On 27 January 1647, the Venetians lost Tommaso Morosini, when his ship was forced to face the entire Ottoman fleet of 45 galleys. In the ensuing fight, Morosini was killed, but managed to cause significant casualties to the Ottomans, including Koca Musa Pasha himself. The ship itself was rescued by the timely arrival of the Venetian fleet under the new Captain General, Giovanni Battista Grimani. This stand-off, where a single ship had caused such damage and casualties to the entire Ottoman fleet, was a major blow to Ottoman morale.[47] Despite some successes like a raid in Çeşme, the remainder of the year was a failure for the Venetians, as several attempts to blockade Ottoman harbors failed to stem the flow of supplies and reinforcements to Crete.[48]
The Venetians returned to the Dardanelles in 1648. Despite losing many ships and admiral Grimani himself in a storm in mid-March,[49] reinforcements under Giacomo da Riva brought the Venetian fleet back up to strength (some 65 vessels), and allowed them to successfully blockade the Straits for a whole year.[35] The Ottomans countered this in part by building a new fleet at Çeşme, forcing the Venetians to divide their forces,[35] and in 1649, a strengthened Ottoman fleet under Kapudan Pasha Voinok Ahmed broke the blockade.[25] Despite scoring a victory over the Ottoman fleet in its anchorage at Phocaea on 12 May 1649, capturing or destroying several ships, da Riva was not able to prevent the Ottoman armada from eventually reaching Crete.[50] This highlighted the weakness of the Venetian position: maintaining long blockades with galleys was an inherently difficult task, and the Republic did not have enough ships to control both the Dardanelles and the passage of Chios at the same time.[40] In addition, in a major development, 1648 the Ottomans decided, in a meeting chaired by the Sultan himself, to build and employ galleons in their fleet, instead of relying exclusively on oared galleys as hitherto.[51]
For most of 1650, a Venetian fleet of 41 vessels maintained the blockade of the Dardanelles, prohibiting Haideragazade Mehmed Pasha from sailing for Crete. He was replaced late in the year by Hozamzade Ali Pasha, governor of Rhodes, who used a clever ploy to get through the blockade: waiting until winter, when the Venetians withdrew their forces, he assembled a small number of ships and embarked several thousand troops with many provisions on them, and sailed unmolested to Crete.[38]
On 10 July 1651, the first significant
Dardanelles, 1654–1657
For 1654, the Ottomans marshaled their strength: the Arsenal (
Morosini initiated a more energetic approach in the Venetian pursuit of the war: in the spring of 1655, he raided the Ottoman supply depot at
Although in the previous years the Venetians had generally held the upper hand against the Ottomans, largely controlling the Aegean and able to extract tribute and recruits from its islands,
In 1657, the Ottomans reversed the situation. A new and energetic
Stalemate, 1658–1666
In 1658, Ottoman power was redirected north in a
In the meantime, war-weariness had set in among the Venetians, who suffered from the disruption in trade. Peace feelers were sent to the Ottomans, but their demand for the full concession of Crete as a condition for peace was unacceptable to the Republic.[78][80] With the end of the war between France and Spain however, the Venetians became encouraged, hoping to receive increased assistance in money and men, especially from the French, whose traditionally good relations with the Porte had soured of late.[77]
This support did indeed soon develop, when individuals or whole companies of men from across Western Europe volunteered for the Republic's army, while Christian rulers also felt obliged to provide men, supplies and ships.
Final phase 1666–1669
If the Venetians were idle, the Ottomans were not: with the signing of the
On 8 March 1668, the Venetians were victorious in a hard-fought night battle off the island of St Pelagia, where 2,000 Ottoman troops and 12 galleys attempted to seize a small Venetian galley squadron. Forewarned of their intentions Morosini reinforced it, and won a costly victory, which was to be Venice's last victory at sea in this war.[88] Reinforced again with Papal and Hospitaller ships, the Venetians maintained a blockade of Canea, the Ottomans' main supply base, during summer. To secure their anchorage off St Todero island, the allied forces seized the fortress island of St Marina,[89] a minor success which did not in the end prevent the Kapudan pasha's fleet, bearing fresh troops and supplies, from reaching Canea in September, after the Maltese–Papal squadron had departed.[90]
Fall of Candia
The new Ottoman army arrived on the island during the winter of 1666/1667, and in 22 May, the final phase of the siege, overseen by the Grand Vizier himself, began. It lasted 28 months. In the assaults sorties that followed, 108,000 Turks and 29,088 Christians lost their lives. These casualties included 280 Venetian noblemen, a figure equivalent to roughly a quarter of the Grand Council.[41] Faced with the renewed Ottoman assault and a struggling economy, despite the prospect of considerable reinforcements from Western Europe, in 1668 the Signoria hoped to end the war by striking a peace settlement with the Ottomans.[91] Indeed, the Venetians hoped to use the imminent arrival of reinforcements to secure concessions from the Ottomans.[92] Admiral Andrea Valier was at first appointed as envoy, but fell ill and was quickly replaced by the elderly nobleman Alvise da Molin.[93] Molin and his embassy traveled to Larissa, where the Ottoman court resided during one of the Sultan's hunting expeditions.[94] The Ottomans proposed that Venice keep one half of Crete, but the Signoria, emboldened by further pledges of reinforcements, especially from France, and renewed turmoil at the Ottoman court and within the Empire, refused the offer.[95] Molin, in the meantime transported by the Ottomans to Canea in Crete, was ordered to continue negotiations and to continue observing the Ottomans' strength and intentions, but not commit himself or the Republic.[96]
On 19 June, the first part of the long-awaited French contingent (in total some 6,000 soldiers and 31 ships), under the command of
This failure, coupled with the disaster of the previous month, further soured the relations between the French and the Venetians. Cooperation was distinctly lacking in the few operations attempted during the next few weeks, while the bad supply situation, the spread of sickness among their troops and the continuous attrition of their forces in the everyday fighting at Candia made the French commanders especially keen to depart.[102] The French contingent eventually departed on 20 August. Two Ottoman assaults on the 25th were repulsed, but to Morosini, it was clear that the city could no longer be held.[103] After a council of war on 27 August, but without first consulting Venice, it was decided to capitulate. On 5 September 1669, the city was surrendered to the Ottomans, while the survivors of the garrison, the citizens and their treasures were evacuated.[104][105] On his own initiative, Morosini concluded a permanent peace agreement with the Ottomans, which, under the circumstances, was relatively generous: Venice would retain the Aegean islands of Tinos and Kythera and the isolated island fortresses of Spinalonga, Gramvousa and Souda off the Cretan coast, as well as the gains made in Dalmatia.[64][104]
War in Dalmatia
The
Greek uprisings
During the course of the war, the Venetians sought to instigate Greek uprisings in several regions against the Turks.
During the spring of 1659, Francesco Morosini departed for Sifnos, where he met the former Patriarch of Constantinople Joannicius II and several other Greek clerics; subsequently they went to the Mani Peninsula in order to encourage a rebellion.[111] In March 1959, although initially reluctant, the Maniots invaded and conquered Kalamata with support from the Christian allies. Several villages in northeastern Pelopponese, from Mani to Elis, rebelled around the same time.[111] However, when the Ottomans counter-attacked, Morosini left the Peloponnese with several Greek notables and went to Milos.[111] In August, in order to continue the uprisings, Morosini sent two Greek clerics from Crete to the Peloponnese, promising future military interventions from Venice, which never happened.[111] Ultimately, the Ottomans closed in on the rebels, forcing them to either surrender or flee to Italy (especially Cargèse, Corsica, in modern-day France).[111]
Aftermath
The surrender of Candia ended the four and a half centuries of Venetian rule in Crete, and brought the Ottoman Empire to its temporary territorial zenith.[112] At the same time, the cost and casualties incurred during this prolonged war contributed greatly to the decline of the Ottoman state during the latter 17th century.[43] On the other hand, Venice had lost its greatest and most prosperous colony, its pre-eminent trading position in the Mediterranean had diminished,[113] and its treasury was exhausted, having spent some 4,253,000 ducats on the defense of Candia alone.[33] To all this, the Dalmatian gains were insufficient compensation. Upon his return to Venice in 1670, Morosini was tried on charges of insubordination and treason, but was acquitted. Fifteen years later, he would lead the Venetian forces in the Morean War, where the Republic attempted, for the last time, to reverse its losses and reestablish itself as one of the major powers of the Eastern Mediterranean.[41][114] During that war, in 1692, a Venetian fleet attempted to retake Candia, but failed. The last Venetian strongholds off Crete fell in the last Ottoman–Venetian War in 1715.[33] Crete would remain under Ottoman control until 1897, when it became an autonomous state. The island continued under nominal Ottoman suzerainty until the Balkan Wars. In their aftermath, the Ottoman Sultan dropped any claim on the island, and on 1 December 1913 it was formally united to Greece.[115]
Following the fall of Candia, fears rose that the Ottomans would attack Malta. In 1670, the Order of St. John began to improve the island's defences with the construction of the Cottonera Lines and Fort Ricasoli.[116]
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{{cite book}}
: CS1 maint: location missing publisher (link - Vakalopoulos, Apostolos E. (1968). Ιστορία του νέου ελληνισμού, Τόμος Γ': Τουρκοκρατία 1453–1669 [History of modern Hellenism, Volume III: Turkish rule 1453–1669] (in Greek). Thessaloniki: Emm. Sfakianakis & Sons.
External links
- Media related to Cretan War (1645–69) at Wikimedia Commons
- Municipality of Heraklion: The Cretan War
- Venice and the Sea Archived 7 January 2021 at the Wayback Machine, by the VENIVA consortium (in English, Greek, Italian).
- Venice Republic: Renaissance, 1645–69