Crispin Wright

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Crispin Wright
Born (1942-12-21) 21 December 1942 (age 81)
Warrant transmission failure[6]
Cornerstone proposition[4]

Crispin James Garth Wright (

objectivity. He is Professor of Philosophical Research at the University of Stirling, and taught previously at the University of St Andrews, University of Aberdeen, New York University, Princeton University and University of Michigan.[7]

Life and career

Wright was born in Surrey and was educated at

Oxford University, Columbia University, and Princeton University. Crispin Wright was founder and director of Arché at the University of St. Andrews,[9] which he left in September 2009 to take up leadership of the Northern Institute of Philosophy (NIP) at the University of Aberdeen. Once NIP ceased operations in 2015,[10] Wright moved to the University of Stirling
.

Philosophical work

In the philosophy of mathematics, he is best known for his book Frege's Conception of Numbers as Objects (1983), where he argues that Frege's

neo-logicism, alongside his frequent collaborator Bob Hale
. He has also written Wittgenstein and the Foundations of Mathematics (1980).

In general metaphysics, his most important work is Truth and Objectivity (Harvard University Press, 1992). He argues in this book that there need be no single, discourse-invariant thing in which

warrant by whatever standards inform the discourse in question.[12] Many of his most important papers in philosophy of language, epistemology, philosophical logic, meta-ethics, and the interpretation of Wittgenstein have been collected in the two volumes published by Harvard University Press
in 2001 and 2003.

In epistemology, Wright has argued that

external world ("Here is one hand") is logically valid but cannot transmit warrant from its premise to the conclusion, as it instantiates a form of epistemic circularity called by him "warrant transmission failure".[13] Wright has also developed a variant of Ludwig Wittgenstein's hinge epistemology, introduced in Wittgenstein's On Certainty as a response to radical skepticism. According to hinge epistemology, there are assumptions or presuppositions of any enquiry – called "hinge propositions" – that cannot themselves be rationally doubted, challenged, established or defended. Wright contends that certain hinge propositions can actually be rationally held because there exists a type of non-evidential, a priori warrant – which Wright calls "epistemic entitlement" – for accepting them as true.[14]

Awards

Books

References

  1. ^ st-andrews.ac.uk Archived 2006-12-24 at the Wayback Machine
  2. ^ C. Wright (1989), "Wittgenstein's Rule-following Considerations and the Central Project of Theoretical Linguistics", in Reflections on Chomsky, ed. A. George, Oxford and New York: Basil Blackwell; reprinted in C. Wright (2001), Rails to Infinity, Cambridge, Mass., Harvard.
  3. ^ Pluralist Theories of Truth (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)
  4. ^ a b >Epistemic Entitlement – Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy
  5. ^ Dummett, Michael – Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy
  6. ^ Transmission of Justification and Warrant - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
  7. ^ "Career". 27 September 2017. Archived from the original on 19 February 2020. Retrieved 19 February 2020.[unreliable source?]
  8. ^ C. Wright (2009). "Foreword: on becoming a philosopher," Synthese, 171: 359–364.
  9. ^ C. Wright (2009). "Foreword: on becoming a philosopher," Synthese, 171: 359–364.
  10. ^ "crispinjwright.com". 27 September 2017. Archived from the original on 19 February 2020. Retrieved 19 February 2020.
  11. ^ G. Currie (1985). "Crispin Wright [1983]: Frege's Conception of Number as Objects. Scots Philosophical Monographs, no. 2, Aberdeen University Press. xxi+193 pp. Hardback £12.50. Paperback £8.50". The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 36:4, 475-479.
  12. ^ M. R. Sainsbury (1996). "Crispin Wright: Truth and Objectivity". Philosophy and Phenomenological Research Vol. 56, No. 4, pp. 899-904 .
  13. ^ C. Wright (2002). "(Anti-)Sceptics Simple and Subtle: G. E. Moore and John McDowell," Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 65: 330–348.
  14. ^ C. Wright (2004). "Warrant for Nothing (and Foundations for Free?)," Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Volume, 78: 167–212.
  15. ^ "amacad.org" (PDF). Archived from the original (PDF) on 9 December 2016. Retrieved 24 July 2016.
  16. ^ britac.ac.uk

External links