Deductive reasoning

Deductive reasoning is the process of drawing valid inferences. An inference is valid if its conclusion follows logically from its premises, meaning that it is impossible for the premises to be true and the conclusion to be false. For example, the inference from the premises "all men are mortal" and "Socrates is a man" to the conclusion "Socrates is mortal" is deductively valid. An argument is sound if it is valid and all its premises are true. One approach defines deduction in terms of the intentions of the author: they have to intend for the premises to offer deductive support to the conclusion. With the help of this modification, it is possible to distinguish valid from invalid deductive reasoning: it is invalid if the author's belief about the deductive support is false, but even invalid deductive reasoning is a form of deductive reasoning.

Deductive logic studies under what conditions an argument is valid. According to the

Deductive reasoning contrasts with non-deductive or ampliative reasoning. For ampliative arguments, such as inductive or abductive arguments, the premises offer weaker support to their conclusion: they indicate that it is most likely, but they do not guarantee its truth. They make up for this drawback with their ability to provide genuinely new information (that is, information not already found in the premises), unlike deductive arguments.

The problem of deduction is relevant to various fields and issues.

It has been argued against this and similar definitions that they fail to distinguish between valid and invalid deductive reasoning, i.e. they leave it open whether there are invalid deductive inferences and how to define them.[8]^[9] Some authors define deductive reasoning in psychological terms in order to avoid this problem. According to Mark Vorobey, whether an argument is deductive depends on the psychological state of the person making the argument: "An argument is deductive if, and only if, the author of the argument believes that the truth of the premises necessitates (guarantees) the truth of the conclusion".^[8] A similar formulation holds that the speaker claims or intends that the premises offer deductive support for their conclusion.^[10][11] This is sometimes categorized as a speaker-determined definition of deduction since it depends also on the speaker whether the argument in question is deductive or not. For speakerless definitions, on the other hand, only the argument itself matters independent of the speaker.^[9] One advantage of this type of formulation is that it makes it possible to distinguish between good or valid and bad or invalid deductive arguments: the argument is good if the author's belief concerning the relation between the premises and the conclusion is true, otherwise it is bad.^[8] One consequence of this approach is that deductive arguments cannot be identified by the law of inference they use. For example, an argument of the form modus ponens may be non-deductive if the author's beliefs are sufficiently confused. That brings with it an important drawback of this definition: it is difficult to apply to concrete cases since the intentions of the author are usually not explicitly stated.^[8]

Deductive reasoning is studied in

Modus ponens (also known as "affirming the antecedent" or "the law of detachment") is the primary deductive rule of inference. It applies to arguments that have as first premise a conditional statement (${\displaystyle P\rightarrow Q}$) and as second premise the antecedent (${\displaystyle P}$) of the conditional statement. It obtains the consequent (${\displaystyle Q}$) of the conditional statement as its conclusion. The argument form is listed below:

1. ${\displaystyle P\rightarrow Q}$  (First premise is a conditional statement)
2. ${\displaystyle P}$  (Second premise is the antecedent)
3. ${\displaystyle Q}$  (Conclusion deduced is the consequent)

In this form of deductive reasoning, the consequent (${\displaystyle Q}$) obtains as the conclusion from the premises of a conditional statement (${\displaystyle P\rightarrow Q}$) and its antecedent (${\displaystyle P}$). However, the antecedent (${\displaystyle P}$) cannot be similarly obtained as the conclusion from the premises of the conditional statement (${\displaystyle P\rightarrow Q}$) and the consequent (${\displaystyle Q}$). Such an argument commits the

Modus tollens (also known as "the law of contrapositive") is a deductive rule of inference. It validates an argument that has as premises a conditional statement (formula) and the negation of the consequent (${\displaystyle \lnot Q}$) and as conclusion the negation of the antecedent (${\displaystyle \lnot P}$). In contrast to modus ponens, reasoning with modus tollens goes in the opposite direction to that of the conditional. The general expression for modus tollens is the following:

1. ${\displaystyle P\rightarrow Q}$. (First premise is a conditional statement)
2. ${\displaystyle \lnot Q}$. (Second premise is the negation of the consequent)
3. ${\displaystyle \lnot P}$. (Conclusion deduced is the negation of the antecedent)

The following is an example of an argument using modus tollens:

1. If it is raining, then there are clouds in the sky.
2. There are no clouds in the sky.
3. Thus, it is not raining.

A hypothetical syllogism is an inference that takes two conditional statements and forms a conclusion by combining the hypothesis of one statement with the conclusion of another. Here is the general form:

1. ${\displaystyle P\rightarrow Q}$
2. ${\displaystyle Q\rightarrow R}$
3. Therefore, ${\displaystyle P\rightarrow R}$.

In there being a subformula in common between the two premises that does not occur in the consequence, this resembles syllogisms in term logic, although it differs in that this subformula is a proposition whereas in Aristotelian logic, this common element is a term and not a proposition.

The following is an example of an argument using a hypothetical syllogism:

1. If there had been a thunderstorm, it would have rained.
2. If it had rained, things would have gotten wet.
3. Thus, if there had been a thunderstorm, things would have gotten wet.^[21]

Various formal fallacies have been described. They are invalid forms of deductive reasoning.

Rules of inferences are definitory rules: they determine whether an argument is deductively valid or not. But reasoners are usually not just interested in making any kind of valid argument. Instead, they often have a specific point or conclusion that they wish to prove or refute. So given a set of premises, they are faced with the problem of choosing the relevant rules of inference for their deduction to arrive at their intended conclusion.[13]^[26][27] This issue belongs to the field of strategic rules: the question of which inferences need to be drawn to support one's conclusion. The distinction between definitory and strategic rules is not exclusive to logic: it is also found in various games.^[13][26][27] In chess, for example, the definitory rules state that bishops may only move diagonally while the strategic rules recommend that one should control the center and protect one's king if one intends to win. In this sense, definitory rules determine whether one plays chess or something else whereas strategic rules determine whether one is a good or a bad chess player.^[13][26] The same applies to deductive reasoning: to be an effective reasoner involves mastering both definitory and strategic rules.^[13]

Deductive arguments are evaluated in terms of their validity and soundness.

An argument is valid if it is impossible for its premises to be true while its conclusion is false. In other words, the conclusion must be true if the premises are true. An argument can be “valid” even if one or more of its premises are false.

An argument is sound if it is valid and the premises are true.

It is possible to have a deductive argument that is logically valid but is not sound. Fallacious arguments often take that form.

The following is an example of an argument that is “valid”, but not “sound”:

1. Everyone who eats carrots is a quarterback.
2. John eats carrots.
3. Therefore, John is a quarterback.

The example's first premise is false – there are people who eat carrots who are not quarterbacks – but the conclusion would necessarily be true, if the premises were true. In other words, it is impossible for the premises to be true and the conclusion false. Therefore, the argument is “valid”, but not “sound”. False generalizations – such as "Everyone who eats carrots is a quarterback" – are often used to make unsound arguments. The fact that there are some people who eat carrots but are not quarterbacks proves the flaw of the argument.

In this example, the first statement uses

Deductive reasoning can be contrasted with inductive reasoning, in regards to validity and soundness. In cases of inductive reasoning, even though the premises are true and the argument is “valid”, it is possible for the conclusion to be false (determined to be false with a counterexample or other means).

Deductive reasoning is usually contrasted with non-deductive or ampliative reasoning.^[13][28][29] The hallmark of valid deductive inferences is that it is impossible for their premises to be true and their conclusion to be false. In this way, the premises provide the strongest possible support to their conclusion.^[13][28][29] The premises of ampliative inferences also support their conclusion. But this support is weaker: they are not necessarily truth-preserving. So even for correct ampliative arguments, it is possible that their premises are true and their conclusion is false.^[11] Two important forms of ampliative reasoning are inductive and abductive reasoning.^[30] Sometimes the term "inductive reasoning" is used in a very wide sense to cover all forms of ampliative reasoning.^[11] However, in a more strict usage, inductive reasoning is just one form of ampliative reasoning.^[30] In the narrow sense, inductive inferences are forms of statistical generalization. They are usually based on many individual observations that all show a certain pattern. These observations are then used to form a conclusion either about a yet unobserved entity or about a general law.^[31][32][33] For abductive inferences, the premises support the conclusion because the conclusion is the best explanation of why the premises are true.^[30][34]

The support ampliative arguments provide for their conclusion comes in degrees: some ampliative arguments are stronger than others.^[11][35][30] This is often explained in terms of probability: the premises make it more likely that the conclusion is true.^[13][28][29] Strong ampliative arguments make their conclusion very likely, but not absolutely certain. An example of ampliative reasoning is the inference from the premise "every raven in a random sample of 3200 ravens is black" to the conclusion "all ravens are black": the extensive random sample makes the conclusion very likely, but it does not exclude that there are rare exceptions.^[35] In this sense, ampliative reasoning is defeasible: it may become necessary to retract an earlier conclusion upon receiving new related information.^[12][30] Ampliative reasoning is very common in everyday discourse and the sciences.^[13][36]

An important drawback of deductive reasoning is that it does not lead to genuinely new information.^[5] This means that the conclusion only repeats information already found in the premises. Ampliative reasoning, on the other hand, goes beyond the premises by arriving at genuinely new information.^[13][28][29] One difficulty for this characterization is that it makes deductive reasoning appear useless: if deduction is uninformative, it is not clear why people would engage in it and study it.^[13][37] It has been suggested that this problem can be solved by distinguishing between surface and depth information. On this view, deductive reasoning is uninformative on the depth level, in contrast to ampliative reasoning. But it may still be valuable on the surface level by presenting the information in the premises in a new and sometimes surprising way.^[13][5]

A popular misconception of the relation between deduction and induction identifies their difference on the level of particular and general claims.^[2][9][38] On this view, deductive inferences start from general premises and draw particular conclusions, while inductive inferences start from particular premises and draw general conclusions. This idea is often motivated by seeing deduction and induction as two inverse processes that complement each other: deduction is top-down while induction is bottom-up. But this is a misconception that does not reflect how valid deduction is defined in the field of logic: a deduction is valid if it is impossible for its premises to be true while its conclusion is false, independent of whether the premises or the conclusion are particular or general.^{[2][9][1][5][3]} Because of this, some deductive inferences have a general conclusion and some also have particular premises.^[2]

Another bias is called the "negative conclusion bias", which happens when one of the premises has the form of a negative material conditional,^[5][43][44] as in "If the card does not have an A on the left, then it has a 3 on the right. The card does not have a 3 on the right. Therefore, the card has an A on the left". The increased tendency to misjudge the validity of this type of argument is not present for positive material conditionals, as in "If the card has an A on the left, then it has a 3 on the right. The card does not have a 3 on the right. Therefore, the card does not have an A on the left".^[5]

Various psychological theories of deductive reasoning have been proposed. These theories aim to explain how deductive reasoning works in relation to the underlying psychological processes responsible. They are often used to explain the empirical findings, such as why human reasoners are more susceptible to some types of fallacies than to others.^[3][1][45]

An important distinction is between mental logic theories, sometimes also referred to as rule theories, and mental model theories. Mental logic theories see deductive reasoning as a language-like process that happens through the manipulation of representations.^{[3][1][46][45]} This is done by applying syntactic rules of inference in a way very similar to how systems of natural deduction transform their premises to arrive at a conclusion.^[45] On this view, some deductions are simpler than others since they involve fewer inferential steps.^[3] This idea can be used, for example, to explain why humans have more difficulties with some deductions, like the modus tollens, than with others, like the modus ponens: because the more error-prone forms do not have a native rule of inference but need to be calculated by combining several inferential steps with other rules of inference. In such cases, the additional cognitive labor makes the inferences more open to error.^[3]

Mental model theories, on the other hand, hold that deductive reasoning involves models or mental representations of possible states of the world without the medium of language or rules of inference.^[3][1][45] In order to assess whether a deductive inference is valid, the reasoner mentally constructs models that are compatible with the premises of the inference. The conclusion is then tested by looking at these models and trying to find a counterexample in which the conclusion is false. The inference is valid if no such counterexample can be found.^[3][1][45] In order to reduce cognitive labor, only such models are represented in which the premises are true. Because of this, the evaluation of some forms of inference only requires the construction of very few models while for others, many different models are necessary. In the latter case, the additional cognitive labor required makes deductive reasoning more error-prone, thereby explaining the increased rate of error observed.^[3][1] This theory can also explain why some errors depend on the content rather than the form of the argument. For example, when the conclusion of an argument is very plausible, the subjects may lack the motivation to search for counterexamples among the constructed models.^[3]

Both mental logic theories and mental model theories assume that there is one general-purpose reasoning mechanism that applies to all forms of deductive reasoning.^[3][46][47] But there are also alternative accounts that posit various different special-purpose reasoning mechanisms for different contents and contexts. In this sense, it has been claimed that humans possess a special mechanism for permissions and obligations, specifically for detecting cheating in social exchanges. This can be used to explain why humans are often more successful in drawing valid inferences if the contents involve human behavior in relation to social norms.^[3] Another example is the so-called dual-process theory.^[5][3] This theory posits that there are two distinct cognitive systems responsible for reasoning. Their interrelation can be used to explain commonly observed biases in deductive reasoning. System 1 is the older system in terms of evolution. It is based on associative learning and happens fast and automatically without demanding many cognitive resources.^[5][3] System 2, on the other hand, is of more recent evolutionary origin. It is slow and cognitively demanding, but also more flexible and under deliberate control.^[5][3] The dual-process theory posits that system 1 is the default system guiding most of our everyday reasoning in a pragmatic way. But for particularly difficult problems on the logical level, system 2 is employed. System 2 is mostly responsible for deductive reasoning.^[5][3]

The

Deductive reasoning plays an important role in epistemology. Epistemology is concerned with the question of justification, i.e. to point out which beliefs are justified and why.^[48][49] Deductive inferences are able to transfer the justification of the premises onto the conclusion.^[3] So while logic is interested in the truth-preserving nature of deduction, epistemology is interested in the justification-preserving nature of deduction. There are different theories trying to explain why deductive reasoning is justification-preserving.^[3] According to reliabilism, this is the case because deductions are truth-preserving: they are reliable processes that ensure a true conclusion given the premises are true.^[3][50][51] Some theorists hold that the thinker has to have explicit awareness of the truth-preserving nature of the inference for the justification to be transferred from the premises to the conclusion. One consequence of such a view is that, for young children, this deductive transference does not take place since they lack this specific awareness.^[3]

History

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Deductivism is a philosophical position that gives primacy to deductive reasoning or arguments over their non-deductive counterparts.[56]^[57] It is often understood as the evaluative claim that only deductive inferences are good or correct inferences. This theory would have wide-reaching consequences for various fields since it implies that the rules of deduction are "the only acceptable standard of evidence".^[56] This way, the rationality or correctness of the different forms of inductive reasoning is denied.^[57][58] Some forms of deductivism express this in terms of degrees of reasonableness or probability. Inductive inferences are usually seen as providing a certain degree of support for their conclusion: they make it more likely that their conclusion is true. Deductivism states that such inferences are not rational: the premises either ensure their conclusion, as in deductive reasoning, or they do not provide any support at all.^[59]

One motivation for deductivism is the

For example, the introduction rule for the logical constant "${\displaystyle \land }$" (and) is "${\displaystyle {\frac {A,B}{(A\land B)}}}$". It expresses that, given the premises "${\displaystyle A}$" and "${\displaystyle B}$" individually, one may draw the conclusion "${\displaystyle A\land B}$" and thereby include it in one's proof. This way, the symbol "${\displaystyle \land }$" is introduced into the proof. The removal of this symbol is governed by other rules of inference, such as the elimination rule "${\displaystyle {\frac {(A\land B)}{A}}}$", which states that one may deduce the sentence "${\displaystyle A}$" from the premise "${\displaystyle (A\land B)}$". Similar introduction and elimination rules are given for other logical constants, such as the propositional operator "${\displaystyle \lnot }$", the

"${\displaystyle \lor }$"

"${\displaystyle \rightarrow }$"

"${\displaystyle \exists }$"

"${\displaystyle \forall }$"

The focus on rules of inferences instead of axiom schemes is an important feature of natural deduction.

• Abductive reasoning – Inference seeking the simplest and most likely explanation
• Analogical reasoning
   – Cognitive process of transferring information or meaning from a particular subject to anotherPages displaying short descriptions of redirect targets
• Argument (logic)
   – Attempt to persuade or to determine the truth of a conclusionPages displaying short descriptions of redirect targets
• Argumentation theory – Academic field of logic and rhetoric
• Case-based reasoning – Process of solving new problems based on the solutions of similar past problems
• Correlation does not imply causation – Refutation of a logical fallacy
• Correspondence theory of truth – Theory that truth means correspondence with reality
• Decision making
   – Process to choose a course of actionPages displaying short descriptions of redirect targets
• Decision theory – Branch of applied probability theory
• Defeasible reasoning – Reasoning that is rationally compelling, though not deductively valid
• Extraordinary claims require extraordinary evidence – Evidentiary standard for extraordinary claims
• Fallacy – Argument that uses faulty reasoning
• Fault tree analysis – Failure analysis system used in safety engineering and reliability engineering
• Geometry – Branch of mathematics
• Hypothetico-deductive method
   – Proposed description of the scientific methodPages displaying short descriptions of redirect targets
• Inductive reasoning – Method of logical reasoning
• Inference – Steps in reasoning
• Inquiry – Any process that has the aim of augmenting knowledge, resolving doubt, or solving a problem
• Legal syllogism – Form of argument to test if an act is lawful
• Logic and rationality – Fundamental concepts in philosophy
• Logical consequence – Relationship where one statement follows from another
• Logical reasoning – Process of drawing correct inferences
• Mathematical logic – Subfield of mathematics
• Natural deduction – Kind of proof calculus
• Peirce's theory of deductive reasoning
   – Secondary statement which can be readily deduced from a previous, more notable statementPages displaying short descriptions of redirect targets
• Propositional calculus – Branch of logic
• Retroductive reasoning
   – Inference seeking the simplest and most likely explanationPages displaying short descriptions of redirect targets
• Scientific method – Interplay between observation, experiment, and theory in science
• Syllogism – Type of logical argument that applies deductive reasoning
• Subjective logic – Type of probabilistic logic
• Theory of justification
   – Concept in epistemologyPages displaying short descriptions of redirect targets

Further reading

• ISBN 87-991013-7-8
• ISBN 978-0-86377-149-1
• Zarefsky, David, Argumentation: The Study of Effective Reasoning Parts I and II, The Teaching Company 2002
• Bullemore, Thomas. The Pragmatic Problem of Induction.

External links

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• Deductive reasoning at PhilPapers
• Deductive reasoning at the
  Indiana Philosophy Ontology Project
• "Deductive reasoning". Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy.