Denial and deception

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Denial and deception (D&D) is a Western theoretical framework[1] for conceiving and analyzing military intelligence techniques pertaining to secrecy and deception.[2] Originating in the 1980s, it is roughly based on the more pragmatic Soviet practices of maskirovka (which preceded the D&D conceptualization by decades) but it has a more theoretical approach compared to the latter.[1]

Description

In the D&D framework, denial and deception are seen as distinct but complementary endeavors.

call signs effected by the Imperial Navy between 1 November and 1 December, but identifies as a deception measure the Japanese Foreign Office announcement that a large Japanese liner would sail to California on 2 December to evacuate Japanese citizens.[4]

Coordinated plan

A denial and deception campaign is most effective when numerous denial and deceptive efforts are coherently coordinated to advance a specific plan; however, the most effective such operations are very complex, involving numerous persons or organizations, and this can prove exceedingly difficult. A single failed denial measure or deception can easily jeopardize an entire operation.[3]

Dummy aircraft, like the one pictured (modelled after the Douglas A-20 Havoc) were used in the deception tactics of Operation Fortitude during World War II.

Mearsheimer

According to political scientist

public trust following their election. With this comparatively high level of trust, democratic leaders are the most likely to successfully target the public with deceptions, particularly with fearmongering. Following this successful deception, the two democratic leaders were effective in launching the Iraq War with little opposition.[5]

Shulsky

According to Abram Shulsky,

Nixon's rapprochement with China was negotiated (as example of secrecy/denial that did not cause a public outrage) with the uproar caused by the 2001 announcement of the creation of the Office of Strategic Influence (an institution that had among its stated goals the planting of false stories in the foreign press).[2]

United States Department of Defense

According to

iham instead, roughly with the meaning "deception of unbelievers".[13] Although the Chinese deception theory literature is vast and uses rather different terminology (relative to Western works), some recent surveys have identified that "seduction"—understood as convincing the enemy to make fatal mistakes—is considered the highest form of deception while confusing or denying information to the enemy are considered lesser forms.[14]

See also

References

  1. ^ .
  2. ^ .
  3. ^ a b Abram Shulsky, "Elements of Strategic Denial and Deception," in Strategic Denial and Deception: The Twenty-First Century Challenge, ed. Roy Godson and James J. Wirtz (Piscataway: Transaction Publishers, 2002), 15-17; Roy Godson and James J. Wirtz, "Strategic Denial and Deception," International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence 13 (2000): 425-426.
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  5. ^ Lozada, Carlos (15 April 2011). "John J. Mearsheimer's "Why Leaders Lie"". The Washington Post. Retrieved 9 June 2021.
  6. ^ Ibid., 427-428.
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  9. . Article previously published in Air Power History, vol. 37, no. 3, Fall 1990, pp. 15-22
  10. ^ Johnson, Mark, and Jessica Meyeraan. "Military deception: Hiding the real-showing the fake". Joint Forces Staff College, Joint and Combined Warfighting School, p. 4
  11. ^ a b c d John M. Roach, DECEPTION: Can information superiority be achieved with or without it? Archived 4 March 2016 at the Wayback Machine, Newsletter of the OPSEC Professionals Society, July 2012, Volume 3, Issue 2, p. 7. Also published in The Canadian Army Journal Vol. 10.3 Fall 2007, p. 117-120
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