Dezinformatsia (book)
Followed by | The Soviet Union and Revolutionary Warfare (1990) |
---|---|
[1][2][3] |
Dezinformatsia: Active Measures in Soviet Strategy (and a later edition published as Dezinformatsia: The Strategy of Soviet Disinformation) is a non-fiction book about disinformation and information warfare used by the KGB during the Soviet Union period, as part of their active measures tactics. The book was co-authored by Richard H. Shultz, professor of international politics at Tufts University, and Roy Godson, professor emeritus of government at Georgetown University.
Shultz and Godson discuss Soviet disinformation tactics including injection of
Foreign Affairs called the book a "useful survey" of how Soviet intelligence used disinformation "to further its strategic aims such as discrediting America and weakening NATO".[4] The Journal of Conflict Studies described it as "a useful introduction to a field of knowledge" of importance to security experts, the United States Intelligence Community, and diplomats.[1] Society called Dezinformatsia, "a highly readable and insightful book".[2] Political Science Quarterly gave the work a negative review, criticizing the book's writing style and methodological rigor.[3]
Background
Contents summary
Dezinformatsia describes disinformation tactics used by the intelligence services of the Soviet Union including the KGB, against foreign enemies including the United States. The authors define disinformation as: "false, incomplete, or misleading information that is passed, fed, or confirmed to a targeted individual, group, or country."[14]
The book explains the covert groups within the
Shultz and Godson note that manipulated groups involve both official departments of the Soviet state, as well as non-governmental organizations which lack independence from the state control itself. Specific goals exported by covert Soviet government channels and groups in the Western world were financed by Soviet intelligence operations. These covert operations were coordinated so as to have maximum impact related to major international incidents.[1][2][3]
As a case study of disinformation, the authors describe journalist Pierre-Charles Pathé , whose publication in France was secretly financed by Soviet intelligence. Its contents were biased against the Western world in favor of the Soviet agenda, and had considerable impact on public opinion. In another example, the authors bring forth an analysis of the World Peace Council, which operated as a front organization for Soviet intelligence. They discuss its operations negatively impacting both NATO and the U.S. Shultz and Godson back up their analyses with interviews from two Soviet officials who had defected from their posts in Soviet intelligence, and spoke of disinformation campaigns against Western interests.[1][2][3]
The authors detail commonly used disinformation tactics by the Soviet intelligence agencies, including
Shultz and Godson note that after the Soviet term dezinformatsia became widely known in the 1980s in the English language as disinformation, native speakers of English broadened the term as "any government communication (either overt or covert) containing intentionally false and misleading material, often combined selectively with true information, which seeks to mislead and
Release and reception
Dezinformatsia was released in a paperback edition in 1984.[15][16] It was issued again in paperback in 1986 under the same title,[17][18] and also with the different title — Dezinformatsia: The Strategy of Soviet Disinformation.[19]
John C. Campbell reviewed the book for the journal Foreign Affairs, and wrote: "The Shultz/Godson book is a useful survey of how the Soviet Union uses 'disinformation,' propaganda, agents, covert political techniques and front organizations to influence events in foreign countries and to further its strategic aims such as discrediting America and weakening NATO."[4] Campbell criticized the dry nature of some of the facts revealed in the book, "Parts of the presentation are novel, but the revelations are not particularly sensational."[4] Campbell concluded stories in the book should not be taken at face value, "The author's KGB experience and background doubtless give him a special vantage point, but most of this story can be taken with several grains of salt."[4]
Writing in Conflict Quarterly for The Journal of Conflict Studies, David Charters questioned why the book did not present more of an analysis on the aggregate impact of all of the disinformation campaigns, before noting such a task would be difficult to assess.[1] The reviewer asked why the book did not fully address questions including, "Did any of the forgeries described have a significant political impact on the intended target, and on U.S. relations with the country concerned, or were they merely of nuisance value?"[1] Conflict Quarterly criticized such absence in the book and identified it as an academic deficiency, writing, "Without answers to questions such as these, it is difficult to accept, at face value, the authors' conclusions."[1] Charters concluded the book was "a useful introduction to a field of knowledge which ... is likely to continue to expand in importance for diplomats, the intelligence community, and scholars of international security affairs.[1]
Stephen Sloan reviewed the book for the journal Society, writing: "Richard H. Shultz and Roy Godson are to be credited for writing a highly readable and insightful book that can enable policy-makers, academics, and concerned members of the public to understand a form of political warfare that until recently was only rarely recognized in the West."[2] He called the work "ground breaking research".[2] Sloan concluded, "Shultz and Godson have provided an awareness of a threat that should be acted upon."[2]
Political Science Quarterly gave a more critical assessment of the book, with reviewer Ellen Mickiewicz commenting, "In the second chapter, the discussion of the organization of Soviet foreign propaganda activities is so fuzzy as to be confusing."[3] She criticized the rigor of the book's research methodology.[3] Mickiewicz concluded, "This book is not the successor to Frederic Barghoorn's Soviet Foreign Propaganda (1964); the topic is timely and interesting, but it requires a more considered and informed analysis."[3]
See also
- Active measures
- Active Measures Working Group
- Counter Misinformation Team
- Denial and deception
- False flag
- Fear, uncertainty and doubt
- Forgery as covert operation
- Information warfare
- Internet manipulation
- Media censorship and disinformation during the Gezi Park protests
- Manufacturing Consent
- Operation Toucan (KGB)
- The Plot to Hack America
- Politico-media complex
- Post-truth politics
- Propaganda in the Soviet Union
- Russian military deception
- Social engineering (political science)
- Persuasion
References
- ^ OCLC 5127078304
- ^ a b c d e f g h i j Sloan, Stephen (January 1985), "Dezinformatsia: Active Measures in Soviet Strategy", Society, 22 (2): 84[dead link]
- ^ JSTOR 2150750
- ^ OCLC 5546902158
- ^ "Curriculum Vitae – Professor Richard H. Shultz, Jr" (PDF). The Fletcher School. Archived (PDF) from the original on 2014-04-24. Retrieved Aug 8, 2014.
- ^ a b Pfaltzgraff, Robert L.; Shultz, Richard H. (2013). "International Security Studies: Looking Back and Moving Ahead" (PDF). The Fletcher Forum of World Affairs. 37 (3): 95–109. Archived from the original (PDF) on 2014-02-21. Retrieved Jan 20, 2014.
- ISBN 978-0-8179-8712-1
- ISBN 978-0-89633-031-3
- ISBN 978-0-230-22126-0
- ^ Godson, Roy (March 30, 2017), "Disinformation: A Primer in Russian Active Measures and Influence Campaigns" (PDF), Written Testimony of Roy Godson to the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, Open Hearing, March 30, 2017, United States Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, United States Senate
- ISBN 978-1-61499-271-4
- ISBN 978-0-7658-0699-4
- ISBN 978-0-08-034702-8
- ISBN 978-1-4129-0898-6
- ISBN 978-0-08-031573-7
- OCLC 299387801
- ISBN 978-0-425-08772-5
- OCLC 493594237
- ISBN 978-0-425-08772-5
Further reading
- Additional book reviews
- Roger W. Barnett & Harold C. Hinton (1985), "Book reviews", Comparative Strategy, 5 (1): 93–103,
- Sinai, Joshua (1985), "Book review: Dezinformatsia: Active Measures in Soviet Strategy, by Richard H. Shultz and Roy Godson", Political Communication, 2 (4): 447–453,
- Sosin, Gene (1986), "Dezinformatsia: Richard H. Shultz and Roy Godson, (Washington: Pergamon-Brassey's, 1984), 210 pp.", Studies in Comparative Communism, 19 (2): 149–157, OCLC 4926779007
- "Dezinformatsia: Active measures in Soviet strategy:Shultz, Richard H., and Roy Godson.", Telematics and Informatics, 2 (1): 104, 1985, S2CID 116059436
- Reddaway, Norman (1984), "Book Review: Dezinformatsia: Active Measures in Soviet Strategy", OCLC 5548667581
- Ra'anan, Uri (1985), "Book Review: Dezinformatsia", The Russian Review, 44 (4): 434–435, JSTOR 129815
- Kuhlman, James R. (September 1, 1984), "Dezinformatsia (Book)", Library Journal, 109 (14): 1677, archived from the original on July 29, 2020
- Paraschos, Manny (March 1985), Dezinformatsia: Active Measures in Soviet Strategy (Book), vol. 62, p. 167
- Related works
- ISBN 978-0-08-031572-0
- Boghardt, Thomas (26 January 2010), "Operation INFEKTION – Soviet Bloc Intelligence and Its AIDS Disinformation Campaign" (PDF), Studies in Intelligence, 53 (4), retrieved 9 December 2016
- ISBN 978-0-396-08194-4
- ISBN 978-1-936488-60-5
- Fletcher Schoen; Christopher J. Lamb (June 1, 2012), "Deception, Disinformation, and Strategic. Communications: How One Interagency Group. Made a Major Difference" (PDF), Strategic Perspectives, 11, retrieved 9 December 2016
- Taylor, Adam (26 November 2016), "Before 'fake news,' there was Soviet 'disinformation'", The Washington Post, retrieved 3 December 2016
- OCLC 987592653
External links
- Godson, Roy (March 30, 2017), "Disinformation: A Primer in Russian Active Measures and Influence Campaigns" (PDF), Written Testimony of Roy Godson to the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, Open Hearing, March 30, 2017, United States Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, United States Senate