Mind–body dualism
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Dualism is closely associated with the thought of René Descartes (1641), who holds that the mind is a nonphysical—and therefore, non-spatial—substance. Descartes clearly identified the mind with consciousness and self-awareness and distinguished this from the physical brain as the seat of intelligence.[8] Hence, he was the first documented Western philosopher to formulate the mind–body problem in the form in which it exists today.[9] Dualism is contrasted with various kinds of monism. Substance dualism is contrasted with all forms of materialism, but property dualism may be considered a form of emergent materialism or non-reductive physicalism in some sense.
Types
Ontological dualism makes dual commitments about the nature of existence as it relates to mind and matter, and can be divided into three different types:
- Substance dualism asserts that mind and matter are fundamentally distinct kinds of foundations.[1]
- Property dualism suggests that the ontological distinction lies in the differences between properties of mind and matter (as in emergentism).[1]
- Predicate dualism claims the irreducibility of mental predicates to physical predicates.[1]
Substance or Cartesian dualism
Substance dualism, or Cartesian dualism, most famously defended by René Descartes, argues that there are two kinds of foundation: mental and physical.[8] Descartes states that the mental can exist outside of the body, and the body cannot think. Substance dualism is important historically for having given rise to much thought regarding the famous mind–body problem.
The Copernican Revolution and the scientific discoveries of the 17th century reinforced the belief that the scientific method was the unique way of knowledge. Bodies were seen as biological organisms to be studied in their constituent parts (materialism) by means of anatomy, physiology, biochemistry and physics (reductionism).[10] Mind-body dualism remained the biomedical paradigm and model for the following three centuries.[10]
Substance dualism is a philosophical position compatible with most
Property dualism
Property dualism asserts that an ontological distinction lies in the differences between properties of mind and matter, and that consciousness may be ontologically irreducible to
Epiphenomenalism
Epiphenomenalism is a form of property dualism, in which it is asserted that one or more mental states do not have any influence on physical states (both ontologically and causally irreducible). It asserts that while material causes give rise to
Predicate dualism
Predicate dualism is a view espoused by such
Predicate dualism is most easily defined as the negation of predicate monism. Predicate monism can be characterized as the view subscribed to by eliminative materialists, who maintain that such intentional predicates as believe, desire, think, feel, etc., will eventually be eliminated from both the language of science and from ordinary language because the entities to which they refer do not exist. Predicate dualists believe that so-called "folk psychology," with all of its propositional attitude ascriptions, is an ineliminable part of the enterprise of describing, explaining, and understanding human mental states and behavior.
For example, Davidson subscribes to anomalous monism, according to which there can be no strict psychophysical laws which connect mental and physical events under their descriptions as mental and physical events. However, all mental events also have physical descriptions. It is in terms of the latter that such events can be connected in law-like relations with other physical events. Mental predicates are irreducibly different in character (rational, holistic, and necessary) from physical predicates (contingent, atomic, and causal).[14]
Dualist views of mental causation
This part is about causation between properties and states of the thing under study, not its substances or predicates. Here a state is the set of all properties of what's being studied. Thus each state describes only one point in time.
Interactionism
Interactionism is the view that mental states, such as beliefs and desires, causally interact with physical states. This is a position which is very appealing to common-sense intuitions, notwithstanding the fact that it is very difficult to establish its validity or correctness by way of logical argumentation or empirical proof. It seems to appeal to common-sense because we are surrounded by such everyday occurrences as a child's touching a hot stove (physical event) which causes him to feel pain (mental event) and then yell and scream (physical event) which causes his parents to experience a sensation of fear and protectiveness (mental event) and so on.[8]
Non-reductive physicalism
Non-reductive physicalism is the idea that while there is one kind of substance (physical), it has two kinds of properties: mental and physical. Mental properties aren't reducible to physical properties, in that an ontological distinction lies in the differences between the properties of mind and matter. According to non-reductive physicalism all mental states may be causally reducible to physical states where mental properties map to physical properties and vice versa. A prominent form of non-reductive physicalism, called
Epiphenomenalism
The idea that even if the animal were conscious nothing would be added to the production of behavior, even in animals of the human type, was first voiced by
Parallelism
Psychophysical parallelism is a very unusual view about the interaction between mental and physical events which was most prominently, and perhaps only truly, advocated by
Occasionalism
Kantianism
According to the philosophy of Immanuel Kant, there is a distinction between actions done by desire and those performed by reason in liberty (categorical imperative). Thus, not all physical actions are caused either by matter alone or by freedom alone. Some actions are purely animal in nature, while others are the result of mind's free action on matter.
History
Ancient Greek philosophy
Hermotimus of Clazomenae (fl. c. 6th century BCE) was a philosopher who first proposed the idea of mind being fundamental in the cause of change.[19] He proposed that physical entities are static, while reason[20] causes the change. Sextus Empiricus places him with Hesiod, Parmenides, and Empedocles, as belonging to the class of philosophers who held a dualistic theory of a material and an active principle being together the origin of the universe.[21] Similar ideas were expounded by Anaxagoras.
In the dialogue Phaedo, Plato formulated his famous Theory of Forms as distinct and immaterial substances of which the objects and other phenomena that we perceive in the world are nothing more than mere shadows.[6]
In the Phaedo, Plato makes it clear that the Forms are the universalia ante res, i.e. they are ideal universals, by which we are able to understand the world. In his
Aristotle argued at length against many aspects of Plato's forms, creating his own doctrine of hylomorphism wherein form and matter coexist. Ultimately however, Aristotle's aim was to perfect a theory of forms, rather than to reject it. Although Aristotle strongly rejected the independent existence Plato attributed to forms, his metaphysics do agree with Plato's a priori considerations quite often. For example, Aristotle argues that changeless, eternal substantial form is necessarily immaterial. Because matter provides a stable substratum for a change in form, matter always has the potential to change. Thus, if given an eternity in which to do so, it will, necessarily, exercise that potential.
Part of Aristotle's psychology, the study of the soul, is his account of the ability of humans to reason and the ability of animals to perceive. In both cases, perfect copies of forms are acquired, either by direct impression of environmental forms, in the case of perception, or else by virtue of contemplation, understanding and recollection. He believed the mind can literally assume any form being contemplated or experienced, and it was unique in its ability to become a blank slate, having no essential form. As thoughts of earth are not heavy, any more than thoughts of fire are causally efficient, they provide an immaterial complement for the formless mind.[3]
From Neoplatonism to scholasticism
The philosophical school of Neoplatonism, most active in Late Antiquity, claimed that the physical and the spiritual are both emanations of the One. Neoplatonism exerted a considerable influence on Christianity, as did the philosophy of Aristotle via scholasticism.[22]
In the scholastic tradition of
While Aquinas defended the unity of human nature as a composite substance constituted by these two inextricable principles of form and matter, he also argued for the incorruptibility of the intellectual soul,[23] in contrast to the corruptibility of the vegetative and sensitive animation of plants and animals.[23] His argument for the subsistence and incorruptibility of the intellectual soul takes its point of departure from the metaphysical principle that operation follows upon being (agiture sequitur esse), i.e., the activity of a thing reveals the mode of being and existence it depends upon. Since the intellectual soul exercises its own per se intellectual operations without employing material faculties, i.e. intellectual operations are immaterial, the intellect itself and the intellectual soul, must likewise be immaterial and so incorruptible. Even though the intellectual soul of man is able to subsist upon the death of the human being, Aquinas does not hold that the human person is able to remain integrated at death. The separated intellectual soul is neither a man nor a human person. The intellectual soul by itself is not a human person (i.e., an individual supposit of a rational nature).[27] Hence, Aquinas held that "soul of St. Peter pray for us" would be more appropriate than "St. Peter pray for us", because all things connected with his person, including memories, ended with his corporeal life.[28]
The
Descartes and his disciples
In his
The central claim of what is often called Cartesian dualism, in honor of Descartes, is that the immaterial mind and the material body, while being ontologically distinct substances, causally interact. This is an idea that continues to feature prominently in many non-European philosophies. Mental events cause physical events, and vice versa. But this leads to a substantial problem for Cartesian dualism: How can an immaterial mind cause anything in a material body, and vice versa? This has often been called the "problem of interactionism."
Descartes himself struggled to come up with a feasible answer to this problem. In his letter to
Recent formulations
In addition to already discussed theories of dualism (particularly the Christian and Cartesian models) there are new theories in the defense of dualism.
A similar defense comes from Australian philosopher Frank Jackson (born 1943) who revived the theory of epiphenomenalism which argues that mental states do not play a role in physical states. Jackson argues that there are two kinds of dualism:
- substance dualism that assumes there is second, non-corporeal form of reality. In this form, body and soul are two different substances.
- property dualism that says that body and soul are different properties of the same body.
He claims that functions of the mind/soul are internal, very private experiences that are not accessible to observation by others, and therefore not accessible by science (at least not yet). We can know everything, for example, about a bat's facility for echolocation, but we will never know how the bat experiences that phenomenon.
Arguments for dualism
The subjective argument
An important fact is that minds perceive intra-mental states differently from sensory phenomena,[31] and this cognitive difference results in mental and physical phenomena having seemingly disparate properties. The subjective argument holds that these properties are irreconcilable under a physical mind.
Mental events have a certain subjective quality to them, whereas physical ones seem not to. So, for example, one may ask what a burned finger feels like, or what the blueness of the sky looks like, or what nice music sounds like.[32] Philosophers of mind call the subjective aspects of mental events qualia. There is something that it's like to feel pain, to see a familiar shade of blue, and so on. There are qualia involved in these mental events. And the claim is that qualia cannot be reduced to anything physical.[1]
Thomas Nagel first characterized the problem of qualia for physicalistic monism in his article, "What Is It Like to Be a Bat?". Nagel argued that even if we knew everything there was to know from a third-person, scientific perspective about a bat's sonar system, we still wouldn't know what it is like to be a bat. However, others argue that qualia are consequent of the same neurological processes that engender the bat's mind, and will be fully understood as the science develops.[33]
However, Jackson later rejected his argument and embraced
The zombie argument
The
Chalmers' argument is that it seems plausible that such a being could exist because all that is needed is that all and only the things that the physical sciences describe and observe about a human being must be true of the zombie. None of the concepts involved in these sciences make reference to consciousness or other mental phenomena, and any physical entity can be described scientifically via physics whether it is conscious or not. The mere logical possibility of a p-zombie demonstrates that consciousness is a natural phenomenon beyond the current unsatisfactory explanations. Chalmers states that one probably could not build a living p-zombie because living things seem to require a level of consciousness. However (unconscious?) robots built to simulate humans may become the first real p-zombies. Hence Chalmers half-joking calls for the need to build a "consciousness meter" to ascertain if any given entity, human or robot, is conscious or not.[37][38]
Others such as Dennett have argued that the notion of a philosophical zombie is an incoherent,[39] or unlikely,[40] concept. In particular, nothing proves that an entity (e.g., a computer or robot) which would perfectly mimic human beings, and especially perfectly mimic expressions of feelings (like joy, fear, anger, ...), would not indeed experience them, thus having similar states of consciousness to what a real human would have. It is argued that under physicalism, one must either believe that anyone including oneself might be a zombie, or that no one can be a zombie—following from the assertion that one's own conviction about being (or not being) a zombie is a product of the physical world and is therefore no different from anyone else's.
Special sciences argument
Howard Robinson argues that, if predicate dualism is correct, then there are "special sciences" that are irreducible to physics. These allegedly irreducible subjects, which contain irreducible predicates, differ from hard sciences in that they are interest-relative. Here, interest-relative fields depend on the existence of minds that can have interested perspectives.[13] Psychology is one such science; it completely depends on and presupposes the existence of the mind.
Physics is the general analysis of
However,
Argument from personal identity
This argument concerns the differences between the applicability of
- This printer could have been made of straw.
- This printer could have been made of some other kind of plastics and vacuum-tube transistors.
- This printer could have been made of 95% of what it is actually made of and 5% vacuum-tube transistors, etc..
Somewhere along the way from the printer's being made up exactly of the parts and materials which actually constitute it to the printer's being made up of some different matter at, say, 20%, the question of whether this printer is the same printer becomes a matter of arbitrary convention.
Imagine the case of a person, Frederick, who has a counterpart born from the same egg and a slightly genetically modified sperm. Imagine a series of counterfactual cases corresponding to the examples applied to the printer. Somewhere along the way, one is no longer sure about the identity of Frederick. In this latter case, it has been claimed, overlap of constitution cannot be applied to the identity of mind. As Madell puts it:[50]
- But while my present body can thus have its partial counterpart in some possible world, my present consciousness cannot. Any present state of consciousness that I can imagine either is or is not mine. There is no question of degree here.
If the counterpart of Frederick, Frederickus, is 70% constituted of the same physical substance as Frederick, does this mean that it is also 70% mentally identical with Frederick? Does it make sense to say that something is mentally 70% Frederick?[51] A possible solution to this dilemma is that of open individualism.
Richard Swinburne, in his book The Existence of God, put forward an argument for mind-body dualism based upon personal identity. He states that the brain is composed of two hemispheres and a cord linking the two and that, as modern science has shown, either of these can be removed without the person losing any memories or mental capacities.
He then cites a thought-experiment for the reader, asking what would happen if each of the two hemispheres of one person were placed inside two different people. Either, Swinburne claims, one of the two is me or neither is—and there is no way of telling which, as each will have similar memories and mental capacities to the other. In fact, Swinburne claims, even if one's mental capacities and memories are far more similar to the original person than the others' are, they still may not be him.
From here, he deduces that even if we know what has happened to every single atom inside a person's brain, we still do not know what has happened to 'them' as an identity. From here it follows that a part of our mind, or our soul, is immaterial, and, as a consequence, that mind-body dualism is true.[52]
Argument from reason
Philosophers and scientists such as
The argument postulates that if, as naturalism entails, all of our thoughts are the effect of a physical cause, then we have no reason for assuming that they are also the consequent of a reasonable ground. However, knowledge is apprehended by reasoning from ground to consequent. Therefore, if naturalism were true, there would be no way of knowing it (or anything else), except by a fluke.[53]
Through this logic, the statement "I have reason to believe naturalism is valid" is inconsistent in the same manner as "I never tell the truth."[54] That is, to conclude its truth would eliminate the grounds from which to reach it. To summarize the argument in the book, Lewis quotes J. B. S. Haldane, who appeals to a similar line of reasoning:[55]
If my mental processes are determined wholly by the motions of atoms in my brain, I have no reason to suppose that my beliefs are true...and hence I have no reason for supposing my brain to be composed of atoms.
— J. B. S. Haldane, Possible Worlds, p. 209
In his essay "Is Theology Poetry?", Lewis himself summarises the argument in a similar fashion when he writes:
If minds are wholly dependent on brains, and brains on biochemistry, and biochemistry (in the long run) on the meaningless flux of the atoms, I cannot understand how the thought of those minds should have any more significance than the sound of the wind in the trees.
— C. S. Lewis, The Weight of Glory and Other Addresses, p. 139
But Lewis later agreed with
Cartesian arguments
Descartes puts forward two main arguments for dualism in
It is imaginable that one's mind might exist without one's body. | |||
therefore | |||
It is conceivable that one's mind might exist without one's body. | |||
therefore | |||
It is possible one's mind might exist without one's body. | |||
therefore | |||
One's mind is a different entity from one's body. |
The argument is distinguished from the
The indivisibility argument for dualism was phrased by Descartes as follows:
Arguments against dualism
Arguments from causal interaction
One argument against dualism is with regard to causal interaction. If consciousness (the mind) can exist independently of physical reality (the brain), one must explain how physical memories are created concerning consciousness. Dualism must therefore explain how consciousness affects physical reality. One of the main objections to dualistic interactionism is lack of explanation of how the material and immaterial are able to interact. Varieties of dualism according to which an immaterial mind causally affects the material body and vice versa have come under strenuous attack from different quarters, especially in the 20th century. Critics of dualism have often asked how something totally immaterial can affect something totally material—this is the basic problem of causal interaction.
First, it is not clear where the interaction would take place. For example, burning one's finger causes pain. Apparently there is some chain of events, leading from the burning of skin, to the stimulation of nerve endings, to something happening in the peripheral nerves of one's body that lead to one's brain, to something happening in a particular part of one's brain, and finally resulting in the sensation of pain. But pain is not supposed to be spatially locatable. It might be responded that the pain "takes place in the brain." But evidently, the pain is in the finger. This may not be a devastating criticism.
However, there is a second problem about the interaction. Namely, the question of how the interaction takes place, where in dualism "the mind" is assumed to be non-physical and by definition outside of the realm of science. The mechanism which explains the connection between the mental and the physical would therefore be a philosophical proposition as compared to a scientific theory. For example, compare such a mechanism to a physical mechanism that is well understood. Take a very simple causal relation, such as when a cue ball strikes an eight ball and causes it to go into the pocket. What happens in this case is that the cue ball has a certain amount of momentum as its mass moves across the pool table with a certain velocity, and then that momentum is transferred to the eight ball, which then heads toward the pocket. Compare this to the situation in the brain, where one wants to say that a decision causes some neurons to fire and thus causes a body to move across the room. The intention to "cross the room now" is a mental event and, as such, it does not have physical properties such as force. If it has no force, then it would seem that it could not possibly cause any neuron to fire. However, with Dualism, an explanation is required of how something without any physical properties has physical effects.[66]
Replies
Alfred North Whitehead and, later, David Ray Griffin framed a new ontology (process philosophy) seeking precisely to avoid the pitfalls of ontological dualism.[67]
The explanation provided by Arnold Geulincx and Nicolas Malebranche is that of occasionalism, where all mind–body interactions require the direct intervention of God.
At the time C. S. Lewis wrote Miracles,[68] quantum mechanics (and physical indeterminism) was only in the initial stages of acceptance, but still Lewis stated the logical possibility that, if the physical world was proved to be indeterministic, this would provide an entry (interaction) point into the traditionally viewed closed system, where a scientifically described physically probable/improbable event could be philosophically described as an action of a non-physical entity on physical reality. He states, however, that none of the arguments in his book will rely on this. Although some interpretations of quantum mechanics consider wave function collapse to be indeterminate, in others this event is defined as deterministic.[69]
Argument from language
Argument from physics
The argument from physics is closely related to the argument from causal interaction. Many
By assuming a deterministic physical universe, the objection can be formulated more precisely. When a person decides to walk across a room, it is generally understood that the decision to do so, a mental event, immediately causes a group of neurons in that person's brain to fire, a physical event, which ultimately results in his walking across the room. The problem is that if there is something totally non-physical causing a bunch of neurons to fire, then there is no physical event which causes the firing. This means that some physical energy is required to be generated against the physical laws of the deterministic universe—this is by definition a miracle and there can be no scientific explanation of (repeatable experiment performed regarding) where the physical energy for the firing came from.
Replies
The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy[8] and the New Catholic Encyclopedia[82] provide two possible replies to the above objections. The first reply is that the mind may influence the distribution of energy, without altering its quantity. The second possibility is to deny that the human body is causally closed, as the conservation of energy applies only to closed systems. However, physicalists object that no evidence exists for the causal non-closure of the human body.[83] Robin Collins responds[84] that energy conservation objections misunderstand the role of energy conservation in physics. Well understood scenarios in general relativity violate energy conservation and quantum mechanics provides precedent for causal interactions, or correlation without energy or momentum exchange.[85] However, this does not mean the mind spends energy and, despite that, it still doesn't exclude the supernatural.
Another reply is akin to parallelism—Mills holds that behavioral events are causally overdetermined, and can be explained by either physical or mental causes alone.[86] An overdetermined event is fully accounted for by multiple causes at once.[87] However, J. J. C. Smart and Paul Churchland have pointed out that if physical phenomena fully determine behavioral events, then by Occam's razor an unphysical mind is unnecessary.[88]
Robinson suggests that the interaction may involve dark energy, dark matter or some other currently unknown scientific process.[13] However, such processes would necessarily be physical, and in this case dualism is replaced with physicalism, or the interaction point is left for study at a later time when these physical processes are understood.[citation needed]
Another reply is that the interaction taking place in the human body may not be described by "billiard ball"
Yet another reply to the interaction problem is to note that it doesn't seem that there is an interaction problem for all forms of substance dualism. For instance, Thomistic dualism doesn't obviously face any issue with regards to interaction, for in this view the soul and the body are related as form and matter.[91]
Argument from brain damage
This argument has been formulated by Paul Churchland, among others. The point is that, in instances of some sort of brain damage (e.g. caused by automobile accidents, drug abuse, pathological diseases, etc.), it is always the case that the mental substance and/or properties of the person are significantly changed or compromised. If the mind were a completely separate substance from the brain, how could it be possible that every single time the brain is injured, the mind is also injured? Indeed, it is very frequently the case that one can even predict and explain the kind of mental or psychological deterioration or change that human beings will undergo when specific parts of their brains are damaged. So the question for the dualist to try to confront is how can all of this be explained if the mind is a separate and immaterial substance from, or if its properties are ontologically independent of, the brain.[92]
Case studies aside, modern experiments have demonstrated that the relation between brain and mind is much more than simple correlation. By damaging, or manipulating, specific areas of the brain repeatedly under controlled conditions (e.g. in monkeys) and reliably obtaining the same results in measures of mental state and abilities, neuroscientists have shown that the relation between damage to the brain and mental deterioration is likely causal. This conclusion is further supported by data from the effects of neuro-active chemicals (e.g., those affecting
Replies
Property dualism and William Hasker's "emergent dualism"[102] seek to avoid this problem. They assert that the mind is a property or substance that emerges from the appropriate arrangement of physical matter, and therefore could be affected by any rearrangement of matter.
Writing in the 13th century, St. Thomas Aquinas writes that "the body is necessary for the action of the intellect, not as it's origin of action." Thus, if the body is disfunctional, the intellect will not actualize as it intends to.[103] According to the philosopher Stephen Evans:
We did not need neurophysiology to come to know that a person whose head is bashed in with a club quickly loses his or her ability to think or have any conscious processes. Why should we not think of neurophysiological findings as giving us detailed, precise knowledge of something that human beings have always known, or at least could have known, which is that the mind (at least in this mortal life) requires and depends on a functioning brain? We now know a lot more than we used to know about precisely how the mind depends on the body. However, that the mind depends on the body, at least prior to death, is surely not something discovered in the 20th century."[104]
Argument from biological development
Another common argument against dualism consists in the idea that since human beings (both
Argument from neuroscience
In some contexts, the decisions that a person makes can be detected up to 10 seconds in advance by means of scanning their brain activity.
Argument from simplicity
The argument from simplicity is probably the simplest and also the most common form of argument against dualism of the mental. The dualist is always faced with the question of why anyone should find it necessary to believe in the existence of two, ontologically distinct, entities (mind and brain), when it seems possible and would make for a simpler thesis to test against scientific evidence, to explain the same events and properties in terms of one. It is a heuristic principle in science and philosophy not to assume the existence of more entities than is necessary for clear explanation and prediction.
This argument was criticized by Peter Glassen in a debate with J. J. C. Smart in the pages of Philosophy in the late 1970s and early 1980s.[111][112][113] Glassen argued that, because it is not a physical entity, Occam's razor cannot consistently be appealed to by a physicalist or materialist as a justification of mental states or events, such as the belief that dualism is false. The idea is that Occam's razor may not be as "unrestricted" as it is normally described (applying to all qualitative postulates, even abstract ones) but instead concrete (only applies to physical objects). If one applies Occam's Razor unrestrictedly, then it recommends monism until pluralism either receives more support or is disproved. If one applies Occam's Razor only concretely, then it may not be used on abstract concepts (this route, however, has serious consequences for selecting between hypotheses about the abstract).[114]
This argument has also been criticized by Seyyed Jaaber Mousavirad, who argues that the principle of simplicity could only be applied when there is no need for an additional entity. Despite arguments indicating the need for the soul, the principle of simplicity does not apply. Therefore, if there were no argument establishing the existence of the soul, one could deny its existence based on the principle of simplicity. However, various arguments have been put forth to establish its existence. These arguments demonstrate that while neuroscience can explain the mysteries of the material brain, certain significant issues, such as personal identity and free will, remain beyond the scope of neuroscience. The crux of the matter lies in the essential limitations of neuroscience and the potency of substance dualism in explaining these phenomena.[115]
See also
- Mentalism (psychology)
- Nondualism
- Hard problem of consciousness
- Bipartite (theology)
- The Concept of Mind by Gilbert Ryle
- Trialism
- Vertiginous question
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{{cite web}}
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Further reading
- Amoroso, Richard L. 2010. Complementarity of Mind and Body: Realizing the Dream of Descartes, Einstein and Eccles. ISBN 978-1-61668-203-3. History making volume with first comprehensive model of dualism-interactionism, that is also empirically testable.
- Bracken, Patrick, and Philip Thomas. 2002. "Time to move beyond the mind–body split." . A controversial perspective on the use and possible overuse of the Mind–Body split and its application in medical practice.
- Damasio, Antonio. 1994. Descartes' Error.
- Sinclair, Alistair J. 2015. The Promise of Dualism. Almostic Publications. ASIN 0957404433. Introducing dualism as being interactive and distinct from the substance dualism of Descartes.
- Spenard, Michael. 2011. Dueling with Dualism: the forlorn quest for the immaterial soul. ISBN 978-0-578-08288-2. An historical account of mind body dualism and a comprehensive conceptual and an empirical critique of the position.
- Sperry, R. W. 1980. "Mind-brain interaction: Mentalism, yes; dualism, no." PMID 7374938.
External links
- Consciousness Studies at Wikibooks
- "Dualism." Dictionary of Philosophy of Mind
- "Dualism." the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
- "Zombies." Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
- "Dualism and Mind". Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
- Dualism at PhilPapers
- Dualism at the Indiana Philosophy Ontology Project
- Mind and body, Rene Descartes to William James
- Online Papers on Materialism and Dualism
- Prison of Mind Archived 24 May 2015 at the Wayback Machine
- Dualism Arguments: Pros & Cons