Edvard Beneš

During World War I, Beneš was one of the leading organizers of an independent Czechoslovakia from abroad. He organized a pro-independence and anti-Austrian secret resistance movement, Maffia. In September 1915, he went into exile in Paris, where he made intricate diplomatic efforts to gain recognition from France and the United Kingdom for Czechoslovak independence. From 1916 to 1918, he was a Secretary of the Czechoslovak National Council in Paris and Minister of the Interior and of Foreign Affairs in the Provisional Czechoslovak government.

In May 1917, Beneš,

From 1918 to 1935, Beneš was the first and longest-serving

Kramář very much resented the way in which Masaryk openly groomed Beneš as his successor, noting that Masaryk put articles into the Constitution that set 45 as the age limit for senators, but 35 as the age limit for the presidency, which conveniently made Beneš eligible for the presidency.^[15] The charge of Czech chauvinism against Kramář had some substance as he openly proclaimed his belief that the Czechs should be the dominant people in Czechoslovakia, denounced Masaryk and Beneš for their belief that the Sudeten Germans should be equal to the Czechs, and made clear his opposition to having German as one of the official languages of Czechoslovakia, views that made him abhorrent to Beneš.^[16]

In 1927 Beneš was initiated in freemasonry at the Ian Amos Komensky Lodge No. 1.^[17]

Between 1923 and 1927, Beneš was a member of the

Edvard Beneš opposed

In London in May 1938, Beneš came under diplomatic pressure from the British government to accede to the Karlsbad programme, which he initially refused. The British viewed the Sudetenland crisis as a domestic Czechoslovak crisis with international ramifications whereas Beneš saw the crisis as a matter between Czechoslovakia vs. Germany.

In July 1938, the British

On 4 September 1938, Beneš presented the "Fourth Plan", which, had it happened, would essentially have turned Czechoslovakia into a

Beneš agreed, despite opposition from within his country, after France and the United Kingdom warned that they would remain neutral in a war between Germany and Czechoslovakia, despite their previous guarantees to the contrary.[24] Beneš was forced to resign on 5 October 1938, under German pressure,^[24] and was replaced by Emil Hácha. On Hácha's watch, Czechoslovakia lost more land to Hungary in the First Vienna Award the following month.

Although many Czechs view the Munich Agreement as part of a "Western betrayal", some scholars such as George F. Kennan and John Holroyd-Doveton suggest that the Agreement may have been a surprisingly positive outcome for Czechoslovakia. They argue that, if war had broken out in 1938, Czechoslovakia would have faced a similar destruction as Poland did the following year. As Poland was attacked in 1939, France launched its unsuccessful Saar Offensive in western Germany. One can only assume France's attack would have been equally futile in 1938, had a Czech-German war been sparked.^[25] Kennan wrote in his memoirs:

The benefit of the Munich Agreement was that it has preserved for the exacting task of the future a magnificent younger generation disciplined, industrious and physically fit that would have undoubtedly been sacrificed if the solution had been the romantic one of hopeless resistance rather than the humiliating but true heroic one of realism.^[26]

It is the opinion of several Czech, Slovak and German historians that the

On 22 October 1938, Beneš went into exile in Putney, London. Czechoslovakia's intelligence service headed by František Moravec was still loyal to Beneš, which gave him a valuable bargaining chip in his dealings with the British as Paul Thümmel, a high ranking officer of the Abwehr, Germany's military intelligence, was still selling information to Moravec's group.^[31] In July 1939, Beneš realising that "information is power", started to share with the British some of the intelligence provided by "Agent A-54" as Thümmel was code-named.^[31] As the British lacked any spies in Germany comparable to Agent A-54, the British were intensely interested in the intelligence provided by him, which Beneš used to bargain with in dealings with the British.^[31]

By July 1939, the

On 23 August 1939, Beneš met Ivan Maisky, the Soviet ambassador to the Court of St. James, to ask for Soviet support. According to Maisky's diary, Beneš told him that he wanted a common frontier between Czechoslovakia and the Soviet Union.^[32] Furthermore, Maisky's diary had Beneš saying that if Czechoslovakia were restored, he would cede Ruthenia, whose people Beneš noted were mostly Ukrainian, to the Soviet Union to bring about a common frontier.^[32]

On the same day, Beneš learned of the

In October 1939, Beneš organised the Czechoslovak National Liberation Committee, which immediately declared itself the Provisional Government of Czechoslovakia. Britain and France withheld full recognition, though unofficial contacts were permitted.^[34] A major issue in wartime Anglo-Czechoslovak relations was the Munich Agreement, which the British still stood by, and which Beneš wanted the British to abrogate.^[35] The issue was important because as long the British continued to view the Munich Agreement as being in effect, they recognized the Sudetenland as part of Germany, a British war aim that Beneš naturally objected to. A problem for Beneš during the Phoney War in the winter of 1939–40 was the British Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain attached much hope to the idea that anti-Nazi conservatives in Germany would persuade the Wehrmacht to overthrow Hitler, and as the anti-Nazi conservatives were adamant that the Sudetenland remain part of Germany, Chamberlain made it clear that Britain was not at war to undo the Munich Agreement.^[36]

On 22 February 1940 during a secret meeting in Switzerland between Ulrich von Hassell representing the German conservatives and James Lonsdale-Bryans representing Great Britain, the former told the latter there was no possibility of a post-Nazi Germany ever agreeing to return the Sudetenland.^[37] In 1939 and 1940, Chamberlain repeatedly made public statements that Britain was willing to make an "honorable peace" with a post-Nazi Germany, which meant the Sudetenland would remain within the Reich.^[36] Beneš with his insistence on restoring Czechoslovakia to its pre-Munich borders was seen by Chamberlain as an obstacle that was standing in the way of his hope that the Wehrmacht would depose Hitler.

After the

The intelligence provided by Agent A-54 was greatly valued by MI6, the British intelligence service, and Beneš used it to improve his bargaining position, telling the British he would share more intelligence from Agent A-54 in return for concessions to his government-in-exile.^[38] As part of his efforts to improve his bargaining position, Beneš often exaggerated to the British the efficiency of Moravec's group, the Czechoslovak army in exile and the underground UVOD resistance group.^[38] Besides Agent A-54, the Prime Minister of the Czech government under the Protectorate, General Alois Eliáš, was in contact with Moravec's agents. Beneš's efforts paid off as he was invited to lunch, first at 10 Downing Street by Churchill (who was now Prime Minister), and then by King George VI at Buckingham Palace.^[38]

In September 1940, MI6 set up a communications center in Surrey for Czechoslovak intelligence and in October 1940 a Victorian mansion at Leamington Spa was given to the Czechoslovak brigade under General Miroslav.^[38] At the same time, Moravec's group began to work with the Special Operations Executive (SOE) to plan resistance in the Protectorate of Bohemia-Moravia, though the distance between Britain and the Protectorate made it difficult for the SOE to parachute in agents.^[38]

In November 1940, in the wake of the

Beneš's relations with the Polish government-in-exile headed by General Władysław Sikorski were difficult due to the Teschen dispute, as General Sikorski insisted on claiming the region for Poland, while Beneš argued that it should return to Czechoslovakia when the war was over.^[39] However, Beneš felt a Polish-Czechoslovak alliance was needed to counter Germany in the post-war world, and came around to the idea of a Polish-Czechoslovak federation as the best way of squaring the circle caused by the Teschen dispute.^[39] In November 1940, Beneš and Sikorski signed an agreement in principle calling for federation, though Beneš's insistence that the Slovaks were not a nation and Slovakia would not be a full member of the federation caused much tension between himself and Slovak members of the government-in-exile.^[39]

However, after Operation Barbarossa brought the Soviet Union into the war in June 1941, Beneš started to lose interest in the project, though a detailed agreement for the proposed federation was worked out and signed in January 1942.^[39] The Russophile Beneš always felt more comfortable with dealing with Russians rather than the Poles, whose behavior in September 1938 was a source of much resentment to Beneš.^[39] The promise from the Narkomindel that the Soviet Union supported returning Teschen to Czechoslovakia negated the whole purpose of the proposed federation for Beneš.^[39]

On 22 June 1941, Germany launched Operation Barbarossa and invaded the Soviet Union. President

During the war Beneš told Ilya Ehrenburg, the Soviet writer: "The only salvation lies in a close alliance with your country. The Czechs may have different political opinions, but on one point we can be sure. The Soviet Union will not only liberate us from the Germans. It will also allow us to live without constant fear of the future."^[41][42]

On 18 July 1941, the Soviet Union and UK

During the summer and fall of 1941, Beneš came under increasing pressure from the Allies to have the Czechs play a greater role in resistance work.^[44] The Narkomindel informed Beneš that the Soviets were disappointed that there was so little sabotage going on in the factories of the Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia, which were such an important source of arms and other material for the Wehrmacht.^[44] Likewise, the British started to demand that the Czechs do more resistance work.^[44] Moravec after meeting the MI6's Director, Stewart Menzies, told Beneš that the British viewpoint was that when the United Kingdom was fighting for its life that "placing violets at the grave of the unknown soldier was simply not good enough".^[44]

Making matters worse for Beneš was in late September 1941 that Reinhard Heydrich, who effectively taken over the Protectorate, launched a major crackdown on resistance.^[45] The Prime Minister, General Eliáš, was arrested on 27 September 1941 on Heydrich's orders; martial law was proclaimed in the Protectorate; thousands were arrested and executed including two prominent leaders of the UVOD resistance group, Josef Bílý (cs) and Hugo Vojta (cs) who were arrested and shot without trial.^[45]

On 5 October 1941, the lines of communication between the UVOD group and London were severed when the Gestapo, during the course of its raids, seized various radios and the codes for communicating with London.^[45] At the same time, the Gestapo also learned of the existence of Agent A-54 and after an investigation arrested Thümmel, depriving Beneš of one of his most valuable bargaining chips.^[45] Faced with this situation when the Allies were demanding more Czech resistance at the same time that Heydrich had launching a crackdown that was weakening the resistance, Beneš decided in October 1941 on a spectacular act of resistance that would prove to the world that the Czechs were still resisting.^[46]

Upon learning of the nature of the mission, resistance leaders begged the Czechoslovak government-in-exile to call off the attack, saying that "An attempt against Heydrich's life ... would be of no use to the Allies and its consequences for our people would be immeasurable."^[50] Beneš personally broadcast a message insisting that the attack go forwards,^[50] although he denied any involvement after the war.^[51] Historian Vojtěch Mastný argues that he "clung to the scheme as the last resort to dramatize Czech resistance."^[51] The 1942 assassination resulted in brutal German reprisals such as the execution of thousands of Czechs and the eradication of two villages: Lidice and Ležáky.

Arnold J. Toynbee, a prominent historian at the time, vehemently made the argument that the Czech regime was largely comparable to the situations in Germany, Poland and with the Magyars.^[52]

Britain rejects the Munich Agreement

In 1942, Beneš finally persuaded the

Though Beneš did not attend the Tehran Conference himself, the news of the mood of harmony that prevailed among the American, Soviet and British delegations at Tehran certainly gave him hope that the Big Three alliance would continue after the war.^[59] Beneš saw the role of Czechoslovakia and his own role as being that of a mediator between the Big Three.^[60] The fact that his old friend Churchill took him into his confidence concerning the post-war borders of Poland boosted Beneš's own perception of himself as an important diplomat, settling the disputes of Eastern Europe.^[61] After talking to Beneš for four hours on 4 January 1944 about Poland's post-war borders, Churchill cabled to American President Franklin D. Roosevelt: "Beneš may be most useful in trying to make the Poles see reason and in reconciling them to the Russians, whose confidence he has long possessed".^[61]

Second presidency

In April 1945, Beneš flew from London to

During the Prague uprising, which started on 5 May 1945, the city was surrounded by Wehrmacht and SS units, the latter in a vengeful mood. The Czech resistance appealed to the First Division of the German-sponsored Russian Liberation Army commanded by General Sergei Bunyachenko to switch sides, promising them that they be granted asylum in Czechoslovakia and would not be repatriated to the Soviet Union, where they faced execution for treason for fighting for Germany.^[65] As the Czech resistance lacked heavy arms such as tanks and artillery, the First Division was badly needed to help hold Prague.

General Bunyachenko and his First Division defected to the Allied side, where it played a key role in holding off the German forces intent on retaking Prague and prevented the SS from massacring the people of Prague.^[65] However, when General Bunyachenko learned on 7 May that he and his men would not be offered asylum after all, the First Division abandoned Prague in order to surrender to the American 3rd Army. Despite the promise that the men of First Division would be granted asylum, Beneš instead repatriated the First Division, and the rest of the ROA men in Czechoslovakia who were captured by his government, to the Soviet Union.^[65]

Return to Prague

After the Prague uprising at the end of

Beneš opposed the

On 15 March 1946, SS Obergruppenführer Karl Hermann Frank went on trial in Prague for war crimes.^[71] Beneš ensured that Frank's trial received maximum publicity, being broadcast live on state radio, and statements from Frank's interrogations being leaked to the press.^[71] On the stand, Frank remained a defiant Nazi, snarling insults at his Czech prosecutors, saying the Czechs were still Untermenschen ("sub-humans") as far he was concerned, and only expressing regret that he did not kill more Czechs when he had the chance. After Frank's conviction, he was publicly hanged before thousands of cheering people outside of Pankrác Prison on 22 May 1946.^[71] As Frank was a Sudeten German, the political purpose of his trial was to symbolize to the world what Beneš called the "collective criminality" of the Sudeten Germans, which thus justified their expulsions.^[71] The historian Mary Heimann wrote that though Frank was indeed guilty of war crimes and treason, his trial was used for a political purpose, namely to illustrate the collective criminality of the Sudeten Germans to the world.^[71]

Communist coup of 1948

Main article: 1948 Czechoslovak coup d'état

On 12 February 1948, the non-Communist ministers threatened to resign unless the "packing" of the police by the Communist interior minister, Václav Nosek (cs), stopped at once.^[68] The Communists set up "action committees", whom Nosek ordered the civil servants to take their orders from.^[69] Nosek also illegally had arms issued to the action committees.^[69] On 20 February, the Communists formed the "people's militia" of 15,000.^[69] On 21 February 1948, 12 non-Communist ministers resigned to protest Gottwald's refusal to stop the packing of the police with Communists despite the majority of the Cabinet having ordered it to end.^[68] The non-Communists believed that Beneš would side with them to allow them to stay in office as a caretaker government until new elections.

Beneš initially refused to accept their resignations and insisted that no government could be formed without the non-Communist parties. However, Gottwald had by this time dropped all pretense of working within the system. He threatened a general strike unless Beneš appointed a Communist-dominated government. The Communists also occupied the offices of the non-Communists who had resigned. Faced with the crisis, Beneš hesitated and sought more time.^[69]

On 22 February, a large parade by the Communist action committees took place in Prague, and ended with the people's militia attacking the offices of opposition parties and the

Sokols.^[69] Amid fears that civil war was imminent and rumours that the Red Army would sweep in to back Gottwald, Beneš gave way. On 25 February, he accepted the resignations of the non-Communist ministers and appointed a new Communist-dominated government in accordance with Gottwald's specifications.^[69] The non-Communist parties were still nominally represented, so the government was still technically a coalition. However, with the exception of Masaryk, the non-Communist ministers were fellow travellers. In effect, Beneš had given legal sanction to a Communist coup

.

During the crisis, Beneš failed to rally support as he could have done from the Sokols, the Legionnaire veterans' associations, the churches and many of the university students.^[69] Richard J. Crampton wrote: "In February 1948, Beneš still commanded enormous respect and authority", and if he had used his moral prestige, he could have rallied public opinion against the Communists.^[72] However, Beneš still saw Germany as the main danger to Czechoslovakia and ultimately believed that Czechoslovakia needed the alliance with the Soviet Union more than the other way around, and as such Prague could never afford a lasting rift with Moscow.^[69] Finally, Beneš was a deeply ill man in February 1948, suffering from hypertension, arteriosclerosis and Pott's disease, and his poor health contributed to the lack of fight in him.^[72]

Shortly afterward, elections were held in which voters were presented with a single list from the National Front, now a Communist-dominated organization. On 12 March 1948, professor Václav Černý visited Beneš at his villa at Sezimovo Ústí, where the president accused Joseph Stalin of using him. According to Černý, Beneš used such violent and vulgar language about Stalin that he did not bother writing down the president's commentary, believing it was unpublishable.^[73]

The Constituent National Assembly, now a subservient tool of the Communists, approved a new constitution on 9 May. Although it was not a completely Communist document, it was close enough to the Soviet Constitution that Beneš refused to sign it.^[74] He resigned as president on 7 June 1948, and Gottwald took over most presidential functions until being elected his successor a week later.^[72]

On 14 August 1948, the Soviet and Czechoslovak media launched a campaign of vilification against Beneš, accusing him of being an enemy of the Soviet Union and claimed that he refused a Soviet offer of unilateral military assistance in September 1938 because he wanted the Munich Agreement imposed on Czechoslovakia.^[75]

On his deathbed, Beneš became furious about the claim the Soviet Union had offered to help unilaterally in 1938 with the former presidential chancellor Jaromír Smutný (cs) writing: "He would like to know when, by whom and to whom was the offer made".^[75] During the Communist era in Czechoslovakia, Beneš was vilified as a traitor for turning down this purported offer.^[76]

Death and legacy

Beneš had been in poor health since the spring of 1945, when he suffered a minor

Radio Prague International, historian Igor Lukes recalled that by February 1948, Beneš' poor health left him "a shell of a man" who did not have the emotional or physical stamina to hold out against the "rough, rough players" of the KSČ.^[77][3]

He died of natural causes at his villa in Sezimovo Ústí on 3 September 1948, seven months after the communist coup.^[3] He is interred in the garden of his villa, and his bust is part of the headstone. His wife Hana, who lived until 2 December 1974, is interred next to him.

Much controversy remains on his character and policy.^{[78][needs update]} According to the SVR, Beneš had closely co-operated with the Soviet intelligence before the war especially with Soviet agent Pyotr Zubov.^[79]

Beneš's friend, the British historian A. J. P. Taylor, wrote in 1945: "Beck, Stojadinović, Antonescu, and Bonnet despised Beneš's integrity and prided themselves on their cunning; but their countries, too, fell before the German aggressor, and every step they took has made the resurrection of their countries more difficult. In contrast, the foreign policy of Dr. Beneš during the present war has won Czechoslovakia a secure future".^[80] The leaders to whom Taylor referred were Colonel Józef Beck, the Polish foreign minister 1932–39 and a leading figure in the Sanation military dictatorship, which at times worked with the Third Reich; Milan Stojadinović, who served as the prime minister of Yugoslavia 1935–39 and who followed a pro-German foreign policy; General Ion Antonescu, the Conducător (dictator) of Romania 1940–44; and Georges Bonnet, the French foreign minister 1938–39, who favored abandoning Eastern Europe to Nazi Germany. Taylor's assessment that Beneš was a man of integrity (unlike Bonnet, Antonescu, Beck and Stojadinović) and that he was leading Czechoslovakia in the right direction was widely shared in 1945.^[80]

Honors and awards

Benes was elected an International Member of the American Philosophical Society in 1939.^[81] He received awards and decorations before and after World War II.

National orders

Award or decoration		Country	Date
	Czechoslovak War Cross 1918[82]	Czechoslovakia	1919
	Czechoslovak Victory Medal[82]	Czechoslovakia	1920
	Czechoslovak Revolutionary Medal[82]	Czechoslovakia	1922
	Order of the White Lion[82]	Czechoslovakia	1936
	Czechoslovak War Cross 1939–1945[82]	Czechoslovakia	1945
	Military Order of the White Lion[82]	Czechoslovakia	1945

Foreign orders

Award or decoration		Country	Date
	Order of St. Sava[82]	Yugoslavia	1920
	Order of the Star of Romania[82]	Kingdom of Romania	1921
	Légion d'honneur[82]	France	1922
	Order of the Crown of Italy[83]	Kingdom of Italy	1921
	Order of the British Empire[82]	United Kingdom	1923
	Order of Leopold[82]	Belgium	1923
	Order of the Oak Crown[82]	Luxembourg	1923
	Order of Charles III[82]	Spain	1924
	Order of Polonia Restituta[82]	Poland	1925
	Decoration of Honour for Services to the Republic of Austria[82]	Austria	1926
	Order of the Three Stars[82]	Latvia	1927
	Order of the Rising Sun[82]	Empire of Japan	1928
	Order of Muhammad Ali[82]	Kingdom of Egypt	1928
	Order of the White Eagle[82]	Yugoslavia	1929
	Order of the Lithuanian Grand Duke Gediminas[82]	Lithuania	1929
	Order of the Cross of the Eagle[82]	Estonia	1931
	Military Order of Christ[82]	Portugal	1932
	Military Order of Saint James of the Sword[82]	Portugal	1933
	Order of the Redeemer[82]	Greece	1933
	Order of the Dannebrog[82]	Denmark	1933
	Order of Saint-Charles[82]	Monaco	1934
	Order of the Spanish Republic[82]	Spanish Republic	1935
	Order of the White Elephant[82]	Siam	1935
	Order of the Aztec Eagle[84]	Mexico	1935
	Order of Karađorđe's Star[82]	Yugoslavia	1936
	Order of Brilliant Jade[82]	China	1936
	Order of Boyacá[82]	Colombia	1937
	Order of Carol I[82]	Kingdom of Romania	1937
	Order of Pahlavi[82]	Iran	1937
	Order pro Merito Melitensi[82]	Sovereign Military Order of Malta	1938
	Order of St. Olav[82]	Norway	1945
	Order of Propitious Clouds[82]	China	1947

See also

• History of Czechoslovakia
• Little Entente

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  ISBN 0415164230
  .
• Hauner, Milan (2009). "'We Must Push Eastwards!' The Challenges and Dilemmas of President Beneš after Munich". Journal of Contemporary History. 44 (4): 619–656.
  S2CID 144521196
  .
• Heimann, Mary (2009). Czechoslovakia: The State That Failed. New Haven: Yale University Press.
  ISBN 978-0300172423
  .
• Lukes, Igor (1996). Czechoslovakia Between Stalin and Hitler: The Diplomacy of Edvard Beneš in the 1930s. Oxford University Press.
  ISBN 9780195102666
  .
• Lukes, Igor (1999). "Stalin and Czechoslovakia: An Autopsy of a Myth". In Igor Lukes; Erik Goldstein (eds.). The Munich Crisis, 1938 Prelude to World War II. London: Frank Cass. pp. 13–47.
  ISBN 9781136328329
  .
• ISBN 978-0-231-03303-9
  .
• Neville, Peter (2010). Benes & Masaryk: Czechoslovakia. Haus Publishing.
  JSTOR j.ctt1r6b055
  .
• Orzoff, Andrea (2009). The Battle for the Castle. Oxford University Press.
• Konrád, Ota; Küpper, René (2013). Edvard Beneš: Vorbild und Feindbild : politische, mediale und historiographische Deutungen (in German). Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht.
  ISBN 978-3-525-37302-6
  .
• Crampton, Richard (18 November 1999). "Central Europe Review – Book Review: The Life of Edvard Benes, 1884–1948". Ce-review.org. Archived from the original on 4 October 2009. Retrieved 19 November 2013.
• Wheeler-Bennett, John (1967). The Nemesis of Power The German Army In Politics 1918-1945. London: Macmillan.
• Taylor, A.J.P. (1976). The Origins of the Second World War. London: Penguin.
• Weinberg, Gerhard (2004). A World At Arms. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
  ISBN 0521618266
  .
• ISBN 978-0-19-820583-8
  .
• Zinner, Paul E. (1994). "Czechoslovakia: The Diplomacy of Eduard Benes". In
  OCLC 31484352
  .

Primary sources

• Hauner, Milan, ed. Edvard Beneš’ Memoirs: The Days of Munich (vol. 1), War and Resistance (vol. 2), Documents (vol. 3). First critical edition of reconstructed War Memoirs 1938–45 of President Beneš of Czechoslovakia (published by Academia Prague 2007
  ISBN 978-80-200-1529-7
  ).

External links

Wikimedia Commons has media related to Edvard Beneš.

• Article about Edvard Beneš in Encyclopædia Britannica.
• Küpper, René: Beneš, Edvard, in: 1914–1918-online. International Encyclopedia of the First World War.
• President Beneš in exile in England during World War II
• Biography at the Czech Ministry of Foreign Affairs (in Czech)
• "Sons of Death". Time. 26 September 1938. Archived from the original on 17 January 2008. Retrieved 14 August 2008. – an article published in Time on 26 September 1938 – free archive
• Pictures of Edvard Beneš funeral – lying in state (in the opened coffin)
• Pictures of Edvard Beneš funeral – funeral procession with wreaths and laying of coffin into grave
• Pictures of Edvard Beneš and his wife – archive of Šechtl and Voseček Museum of Photography
• Newspaper clippings about Edvard Beneš in the 20th Century Press Archives of the ZBW
• Beneš's speech on behalf of the 10th anniversary of
  University Library in Bratislava Digital Library
  (in Czech)

Political offices
Position established	Minister of Foreign Affairs of Czechoslovakia 1918–1935	Succeeded by Milan Hodža
Preceded by Jan Černý	Prime Minister of Czechoslovakia 1921–1922	Succeeded by Antonín Švehla
Preceded by Tomáš Masaryk	President of Czechoslovakia 1935–1938	Succeeded by Emil Hácha
Preceded by Emil Hácha	President of Czechoslovakia 1945–1948	Succeeded by Klement Gottwald
Awards and achievements
Preceded by Ferdinand Foch	Cover of Time magazine 23 March 1925	Succeeded by George Harold Sisler