Falaise pocket
Battle of the Falaise pocket | |||||||
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Part of the Normandy Campaign | |||||||
Map showing the course of the battle from 8–17 August 1944 | |||||||
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Belligerents | |||||||
Germany | |||||||
Commanders and leaders | |||||||
Bernard Montgomery Omar Bradley Harry Crerar Miles Dempsey Courtney Hodges George S. Patton |
Günther von Kluge † Walter Model Paul Hausser Heinrich Eberbach | ||||||
Units involved | |||||||
5th Panzer Army 7th Army Panzergruppe Eberbach | |||||||
Strength | |||||||
Up to 17 divisions | 14–15 divisions | ||||||
Casualties and losses | |||||||
United States: Unknown United Kingdom: Unknown Free French: Unknown Canada: 5,679 casualties[nb 1] Poland: est. 5,150 casualties in total[3] of which 2,300 for the 1st Armoured Division.[4] |
est. 60,000:
|
The Falaise pocket or battle of the Falaise pocket (
Overview
Six weeks after the 6 June 1944 Allied
However, the German Army expended irreplaceable resources defending the frontline. Allied air forces achieved
The Allied armies developed a multi-stage operation. It started with a British/Canadian attack along the eastern line around Caen in Operation Goodwood on 18 July. The German Army responded by sending a large portion of its armoured reserves to defend. On 25 July thousands of American bombers carpet bombed a 6,000-metre corridor on the western end of the German lines around Saint-Lô in Operation Cobra. American forces pushed into the resulting gap. The German forces were overwhelmed and the Americans broke through.
On 1 August, Lieutenant General
Hitler did not allow Army Group B commander Field Marshal
On 8 August, Allied ground forces commander General Bernard Montgomery ordered the Allied armies to converge on the Falaise–Chambois area to envelop Army Group B, with the First US Army forming the southern arm, the British the base, and the Canadians the northern arm of the encirclement. The Germans began to withdraw on 17 August, and on 19 August the Allies linked up in Chambois. Gaps were forced in the Allied lines by German counter-attacks. The biggest was a corridor forced past the 1st Polish Armoured Division on Hill 262, a commanding position at the pocket mouth. By the evening of 21 August, the pocket had been sealed, with est. 50,000 Germans trapped inside. Many Germans escaped, but losses were huge. The Allied Liberation of Paris came a few days later, and on 30 August the remnants of Army Group B retreated across the Seine, completing Operation Overlord.
Background
Operation Overlord
Early Allied objectives in the wake of the D-Day invasion of
General
Operation Lüttich
The US advance was swift and by 8 August, Le Mans, the former headquarters of the German 7th Army, had been captured.[17] After Operation Cobra, Operation Bluecoat and Operation Spring, the German army in Normandy was so reduced that "only a few SS fanatics still entertained hopes of avoiding defeat".[18] On the Eastern Front, Operation Bagration had begun against Army Group Centre which left no possibility of reinforcement of the Western Front.[18] Adolf Hitler sent a directive to Field Marshal Günther von Kluge, the replacement commander of Army Group B after the sacking of Gerd von Rundstedt, ordering "an immediate counter-attack between Mortain and Avranches" to "annihilate" the enemy and make contact with the west coast of the Cotentin peninsula.[19][20]
Eight of the nine
This is an opportunity that comes to a commander not more than once in a century. We're about to destroy an entire hostile army and go all the way from here to the German border.[28]
Operation Totalize
The
Allied plan
Still expecting Kluge to withdraw his forces from the tightening Allied noose, Montgomery had for some time been planning a "long envelopment", by which the British/Canadians would pivot left from Falaise toward the River Seine while the US Third Army blocked the escape route between the Seine and the Loire, trapping all surviving German forces in western France.[37][nb 3] In a telephone conversation on 8 August, the Supreme Allied Commander, General Dwight D. Eisenhower, recommended an American proposal for a shorter envelopment at Argentan. Montgomery and Patton had misgivings; if the Allies did not take Argentan, Alençon and Falaise quickly, many Germans might escape. Believing he could always fall back on the original plan if necessary, Montgomery accepted the wishes of Bradley as the man on the spot, and the proposal was adopted.[37]
Battle
It is also referred to as the battle of the Falaise gap (after the corridor which the Germans sought to maintain to allow their escape).[nb 4]
Operation Tractable
The Third Army advance from the south made good progress on 12 August; Alençon was captured and Kluge was forced to commit troops he had been gathering for a counter-attack. The next day, the US 5th Armored Division of the US XV Corps advanced 35 mi (56 km) and reached positions overlooking Argentan.[41] On 13 August, Bradley over-ruled orders by Patton for a further push northwards towards Falaise by the 5th Armored Division.[41] Bradley instead ordered the XV Corps to "concentrate for operations in another direction".[42] The US troops near Argentan were ordered to withdraw, which ended the pincer movement by the XV Corps.[43] Patton objected but complied, which left an exit for the German forces in the Falaise pocket.[43][nb 5]
With the Americans on the southern flank halted and then engaged with
Navigating through the smoke slowed progress, and the mistaken use by the First Canadian Army of yellow smoke to identify their positions—the same colour strategic bombers used to mark targets—led to some bombing of the Canadians and slower progress than planned.
At midday on 16 August, Kluge had refused an order from Hitler for another counter-attack, and in the afternoon Hitler agreed to a withdrawal but became suspicious that Kluge intended to surrender to the Allies.
Throughout the retreat, German columns were constantly harried by Allied
Encirclement
On 17 August the encirclement was still incomplete.[53] The 1st Polish Armoured Division, part of the First Canadian Army, was divided into three battlegroups and ordered to make a wide sweep to the south-east to meet American troops at Chambois.[53] Trun fell to the 4th Canadian Armoured Division on 18 August.[57] Having captured Champeaux on 19 August, the Polish battlegroups converged on Chambois, and with reinforcements from the 4th Canadian Armoured Division, the Poles secured the town and linked up with the US 90th and French 2nd Armoured divisions by evening.[58][59][60] The Allies were not yet astride the 7th Army escape route in any great strength, and their positions were attacked by German troops inside the pocket.[60] An armoured column of the 2nd Panzer Division broke through the Canadians in St. Lambert, took half the village and kept a road open for six hours until nightfall.[58] Many Germans escaped, and small parties made their way through to the Dives during the night.[61]
Having taken Chambois, two of the Polish battlegroups drove north-east and established themselves on part of Hill 262 (Mont Ormel ridge), spending the night of 19 August digging in.[62] The following morning, Model ordered elements of the 2nd SS Panzer Division and 9th SS Panzer Division to attack from outside the pocket towards the Polish positions.[63] Around midday, several units of the 10th SS Panzer Division, 12th SS Panzer Division and 116th Panzer Division managed to break through the Polish lines and open a corridor, while the 9th SS Panzer Division prevented the Canadians from intervening.[64] By mid-afternoon, about 10,000 German troops had passed out of the pocket.[65]
The Poles held on to Hill 262 (The Mace), and were able from their vantage point to direct artillery fire on to the retreating Germans.
German attacks resumed the next morning, but the Poles retained their foothold on the ridge. At about 11:00, a final attempt on the positions of the 9th Battalion was launched by nearby SS troops, which was defeated at close quarters.
By the evening of 21 August, tanks of the 4th Canadian Armoured Division had linked with Polish forces at Coudehard, and the 2nd and 3rd Canadian Infantry divisions had secured St. Lambert and the northern passage to Chambois; the Falaise pocket had been sealed.[70] Approximately 20–50,000 German troops, minus heavy equipment, escaped through the gap and were reorganized and rearmed, in time to slow the Allied advance into Eastern France, the Netherlands, Belgium and Germany.[43]
Aftermath
Analysis
The battle of the Falaise pocket ended the Battle of Normandy with a decisive German defeat.
The area in which the pocket had formed was full of the remains of battle.[74] Villages had been destroyed, and derelict equipment made some roads impassable. Corpses of soldiers and civilians littered the area, along with thousands of dead cattle and horses.[75] In the hot August weather, maggots crawled over the bodies, and swarms of flies descended on the area.[75][76] Pilots reported being able to smell the stench of the battlefield hundreds of feet above it.[75] General Eisenhower recorded that:
The battlefield at Falaise was unquestionably one of the greatest "killing fields" of any of the war areas. Forty-eight hours after the closing of the gap I was conducted through it on foot, to encounter scenes that could be described only by Dante. It was literally possible to walk for hundreds of yards at a time, stepping on nothing but dead and decaying flesh.[77]
— Dwight Eisenhower
Fear of infection from the rancid conditions led the Allies to declare the area an "unhealthy zone".[78] Clearing the area was a low priority though, and went on until well into November. Many swollen bodies had to be shot to expunge gases within them before they could be burnt, and bulldozers were used to clear the area of dead animals.[75][76]
Disappointed that a significant portion of the German army had escaped from the pocket, many Allied commanders, particularly among the Americans, were critical of what they perceived as Montgomery's lack of urgency in closing the pocket.[79] Writing shortly after the war, Ralph Ingersoll—a prominent peacetime journalist, who had served as a planner on Eisenhower's staff—expressed the prevailing American view at the time:
The international army boundary arbitrarily divided the British and American battlefields just beyond Argentan, on the Falaise side of it. Patton's troops, who thought they had the mission of closing the gap, took Argentan in their stride and crossed the international boundary without stopping. Montgomery, who was still nominally in charge of all ground forces, now chose to exercise his authority and ordered Patton back to his side of the international boundary line. For ten days, however, the beaten but still coherently organized German Army retreated through the Falaise gap.[80]
— Ralph Ingersoll
Some historians have thought that the gap could have been closed earlier; Wilmot wrote that despite having British divisions in reserve, Montgomery did not reinforce Guy Simonds and that the Canadian drive on Trun and Chambois was not as "vigorous and venturesome" as the situation demanded.[79] The British author and historian Max Hastings wrote that Montgomery, having witnessed what he called a poor Canadian performance during Totalize, should have brought up veteran British divisions to take the lead.[37] D'Este and Blumenson wrote that Montgomery and Harry Crerar might have done more to impart momentum to the British/Canadians. Patton's post-battle claim that the Americans could have prevented the German escape, had Bradley not ordered him to stop at Argentan, was "absurd over-simplification".[81]
Wilmot wrote that "contrary to contemporary reports, the Americans did not capture Argentan until 20 August, the day after the link up at Chambois".
Although Patton might have spun a line across the narrow neck, I doubted his ability to hold it. Nineteen German divisions were now stampeding to escape the trap. Meanwhile, with four divisions George was already blocking three principal escape routes through Alencon, Sees and Argentan. Had he stretched that line to include Falaise, he would have extended his roadblock a distance of 40 miles (64 km). The enemy could not only have broken through, but he might have trampled Patton's position in the onrush. I much preferred a solid shoulder at Argentan to the possibility of a broken neck at Falaise.[83]
— Omar Bradley
Casualties
By 22 August, all German forces west of the Allied lines were dead or in captivity.[84] Historians differ in their estimates of German losses in the pocket. The majority state that from 80,000 to 100,000 troops were caught in the encirclement, of whom 10,000–15,000 were killed, 40,000–50,000 were taken prisoner, and 20,000–50,000 escaped. Shulman, Wilmot and Ellis estimated that the remnants of 14–15 divisions were in the pocket. D'Este gave a figure of 80,000 troops trapped, of whom 10,000 were killed, 50,000 captured and 20,000 escaped.[85] Shulman gives est. 80,000 trapped, 10–15,000 killed and 45,000 captured.[86] Wilmot recorded 100,000 trapped, 10,000 killed and 50,000 captured.[87] Williams wrote that est. 100,000 German troops escaped.[1] Tamelander estimated that 50,000 German troops were caught, of whom 10,000 were killed and 40,000 taken prisoner, while perhaps another 50,000 escaped.[88] In the northern sector, German losses included 344 tanks, self-propelled guns and other light armoured vehicles, as well as 2,447 soft-skinned vehicles and 252 guns abandoned or destroyed.[70][89] In the fighting around Hill 262, German losses totalled 2,000 men killed, 5,000 taken prisoner and 55 tanks, 44 guns and 152 other armoured vehicles destroyed.[90] By 22 August 1944, the 12th SS-Panzer Division "Hitlerjugend" had lost around 8,000 men,[91] out of its initial strength of 20,540,[92] along with most of its tanks and vehicles, which had been redistributed among several Kampfgruppe in the previous weeks. Elements of several German formations had managed to escape to the east, but they left behind most of their equipment.[93] After the battle, Allied investigators estimated that the Germans lost around 500 tanks and assault guns in the pocket, and that little of the equipment able to be extricated was taken across the Seine.[79]
See also
- Battle of the Mons Pocket
- Colmar Pocket
- Liberation of France
- Operation Market Garden
- Siegfried Line campaign
Notes
Footnotes
- ^ From 8 until 21 August: 1,479 killed or died of wounds, 4,023 wounded or injured, and 177 captured.[2]
- ^ The Mulberry harbours built off the landing beaches were damaged in a storm on 19 June
- French 2nd Armoured Division, 90th Infantry Division.[38]
- ^ The engagement is also sometimes referred to as the Chambois pocket, the Falaise–Chambois pocket, the Argentan–Falaise pocket,[39] or the Trun-Chambois gap.[40]
- ^ Bradley later received much blame for "failing" to exploit the opportunity to envelop Army Group B.[41] General Hans Speidel, Chief of Staff of Army Group B, wrote that they would have been eliminated, if the 5th Armored Division had continued its advance to Falaise, although D'Este wrote that the order came from Montgomery.[43][44]
Citations
- ^ a b c Williams, p. 204
- ^ Stacey, p. 271
- ^ "World War II: Closing the Falaise Pocket". History Net. 12 June 2006. Retrieved 12 August 2017.
- ^ "The Canadians in the Falaise Pocket". Info-Poland. Archived from the original on 2 July 2010.
- ^ Van der Vat, p. 110
- ^ Williams, p. 114
- ^ Griess, pp. 308–310
- ^ Hastings, p. 165
- ^ Trew, p. 48
- ^ Hart, p. 38.
- ^ Wilmot, pp. 390–392
- ^ Hastings, p. 257.
- ^ Wilmot, p. 393.
- ^ Williams, p. 185
- ^ Wilmot, p. 394
- ^ Hastings, p. 280
- ^ Williams, p. 194
- ^ a b Hastings, p. 277
- ^ D'Este, p. 414
- ^ a b Williams, p. 196
- ^ Wilmot, p. 401
- ^ Hastings, p. 283
- ^ Hastings, p. 285
- ^ Messenger, pp. 213–217
- ^ Bennett 1979, pp. 112–119
- ^ Hastings, p. 286
- ^ Hastings, p. 335
- ^ a b Williams, p. 197
- ^ D'Este, p. 404
- ^ a b Hastings, p. 296
- ^ Zuehlke, p. 168
- ^ Williams, p. 198
- ^ Hastings, p. 299
- ^ a b c Hastings, p. 301
- ^ a b Bercuson, p. 230
- ^ Hastings, p. 300
- ^ a b c Hastings, p. 353.
- ^ Copp (2003), p. 234.
- ^ Keegan, p. 136
- ^ Ellis, p. 448
- ^ a b c Wilmot, p. 417
- ^ Essame, p. 168
- ^ a b c d Essame, p. 182
- ^ D'Este, p. 441
- ^ Wilmot, p. 419
- ^ a b Bercuson, p. 231
- ^ Hastings, p. 354
- ^ a b c Hastings, p. 302
- ^ Van Der Vat, p. 169
- ^ a b Bercuson, p. 232
- ^ Copp (2006), p. 104
- ^ Wilmot, p. 420
- ^ a b c d Hastings, p. 303
- ^ Moczarski, 1981, pp. 226–234
- ^ Trigg 2020, p. 262
- ^ Trigg 2020, p. 289-290
- ^ Zuehlke, p. 169
- ^ a b Wilmot, p. 422
- ^ Jarymowycz, p. 192
- ^ a b Hastings, p. 304
- ^ Wilmot, p.423
- ^ D'Este, p. 456
- ^ Jarymowycz, p. 195
- ^ Jarymowycz, p. 196
- ^ a b Van Der Vat, p. 168
- ^ a b D'Este, p. 458
- ^ a b c McGilvray, p. 54
- ^ Bercuson, p. 233
- ^ Copp (2003), p. 249
- ^ a b c Hastings, p. 313
- ^ a b Williams, p. 205
- ^ Tamelander, Zetterling, p. 341.
- ^ Hastings, p. 319
- ^ Hastings, p. 311
- ^ a b c d Lucas & Barker, p. 158
- ^ a b Hastings, p. 312
- ^ Eisenhower 1948, p. 279
- ^ Lucas & Barker, p. 159
- ^ a b c Wilmot, p. 424
- ^ Ingersoll 1946, pp. 190–191
- ^ a b Hastings, p. 369
- ^ Wilmot, p. 425
- ^ Bradley, p. 377
- ^ Hastings, p. 306
- ^ D'Este, pp. 430–431
- ^ Shulman, pp. 180, 184
- ^ Wilmot, pp. 422, 424
- ^ Tamelander, Zetterling, p. 342
- ^ Reynolds, p. 88
- ^ McGilvray, p. 55
- ^ Zetterling, p. 316
- ^ Zetterling, p. 311
- ^ Hastings, p. 314
References
- Bennett, R. (1979). Ultra in the West: The Normandy Campaign of 1944–1945. London: ISBN 0-09-139330-2.
- ISBN 0-88995-305-8.
- ISBN 978-037-575421-0.
- Copp, T. (2006). Cinderella Army: The Canadians in Northwest Europe, 1944–1945. Toronto: ISBN 0-8020-3925-1.
- ——— (2007) [2003]. Fields of Fire: The Canadians in Normandy. Toronto: University of Toronto Press. ISBN 978-0-8020-3780-0.
- ISBN 0-141-01761-9.
- Eisenhower, Dwight D. (1948). Crusade in Europe. New York: Doubleday.
- ISBN 1-84574-058-0.)
{{cite book}}
: CS1 maint: multiple names: authors list (link - ISBN 978-0-585-10019-7.
- Griess, T. (2002). The Second World War: Europe and the Mediterranean. United States Military Academy West Point, New York: ISBN 0-7570-0160-2.
- Hart, S.A. (2007) [2000]. Colossal Cracks: Montgomery's 21st Army Group in Northwest Europe, 1944–45. Mechanicsburg, Pennsylvania: ISBN 978-0-8117-3383-0.
- ISBN 0-307-27571-X.
- Ingersoll, Ralph (1946). Top Secret. New York: Harcourt Brace.
- ISBN 1-55587-950-0.
- Liddell Hart, B.H. (1953). The Rommel Papers (15 ed.). New York: Harcourt Brace.
- Lucas, James; Barker, James (1978). The Killing Ground, The Battle of the Falaise Gap, August 1944. London: ISBN 0-7134-0433-7.
- McGilvray, Evan (2004). The Black Devils' March – A Doomed Odyssey – The 1st Polish Armoured Division 1939–45. Solihull: ISBN 978-1-874622-42-0.
- Messenger, Charles (1999). The Illustrated Book of World War II. San Diego, California: ISBN 1-57145-217-6.
- ISBN 0-13-171918-1.
- Reynolds, Michael (2002). Sons of the Reich: The History of II SS Panzer Corps in Normandy, Arnhem, the Ardennes and on the Eastern Front. Philadelphia: ISBN 0-9711709-3-2.
- ISBN 978-0-548-43948-7.
- Stacey, Colonel C. P.; Bond, Major C.C.J. (1960). "The Victory Campaign: The operations in North-West Europe 1944–1945" (PDF). Official History of the Canadian Army in the Second World War. The Queen's Printer and Controller of Stationery, Ottawa. OCLC 606015967. Archived from the original(PDF) on 21 December 2020. Retrieved 6 April 2014.
- Tamelander, Michael; Zetterling, Niklas (2003) [1995]. Avgörandes ögonblick: Invasionen i Normandie 1944 [The moment of decision: The invasion of Normandy 1944] (in Swedish). Stockholm: ISBN 91-1-301204-5.
- Trew, Simon; Badsey, Stephen (2004). Battle for Caen. Battle Zone Normandy. Stroud: ISBN 0-7509-3010-1.
- Trigg, Jonathan (2020). D-Day Through German Eyes: How the Wehrmacht Lost France. Stroud, Gloucestershire: Amberley Publishing. ISBN 978-1398103238.
- ISBN 1-55192-586-9.
- ISBN 0-340-83397-1.
- ISBN 1-85326-677-9.
- Zetterling, Niklas (2019). Normandy, 1944: German Military Organization, Combat Power and Organizational Effectiveness. Philadelphia, Pennsylvania: ISBN 978-1612008165.
- Zuehlke, Mark (2001). The Canadian Military Atlas: Canada's Battlefields from the French and Indian Wars to Kosovo. North York, Ontario: ISBN 0-7737-3289-6.
Further reading
- ISBN 0-06-089077-0.
External links
- British Broadcasting Corporation. "Account of the Polish battle on hill 262".
- "canadiansoldiers.com: Falaise".
- "Canada at War: Canadians in the Falaise Gap". Archived from the original on 12 June 2013. Retrieved 26 May 2006.
- "Canada at War: The Battle of Hill 195". Archived from the original on 5 March 2016. Retrieved 26 May 2006.
- "Canada at War: The Battle at St. Lambert-Sur-dives". Archived from the original on 3 September 2014. Retrieved 26 May 2006.
- Richard, Duda; Steven, Duda. "Captain Kazimierz DUDA – 1st Polish Armoured Division". Archived from the original on 14 March 2007.
- Wiacek, Jacques. "Closing of the Falaise Pocket". Archived from the original on 28 September 2007.
- "Film footage of the battle".
- "Chapter 4. Polish military operations in West-Europe since 1944". Polish forces in the West. Archived from the original on 30 May 2016. Retrieved 10 January 2016.