Fall of the Fascist regime in Italy
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The fall of the Fascist regime in Italy, also known in Italy as 25 Luglio (
Background
At the beginning of 1943, Italy was facing defeat. The
In this situation, several groups belonging to four different circles (the Royal Court, the anti-Fascist parties, the Fascists and the General Staff) began to look for a way out. Aristocrats, such as Crown Princess Marie-José, members of the upper class, and politicians belonging to the pre-Fascist elite independently started plots to establish contact with the Allies. Following the declaration of Casablanca, the Allies would only accept unconditional surrender. Despite the Crown Princess' involvement, the Anglo-Americans expected a move from higher-placed personalities, like the King, and disregarded contact with these groups.[10]
The anti-Fascist parties, weakened by 20 years of dictatorship, were still in an embryonic state.
Victor Emmanuel III did retain his trust in Mussolini, and he hoped that the Duce could save the situation.[17] The King kept his own counsel and isolated himself from anyone who tried to learn his intentions.[18] General Vittorio Ambrosio, who was devoted to the King and hostile to the Germans, became the new Chief of the General Staff. Ambrosio was persuaded that the war was lost for Italy, but he never took personal initiative to change the situation without first consulting the King.[19] Ambrosio, with the help of Giuseppe Castellano and Giacomo Carboni (both of whom would play an important part in the events leading to the armistice of 8 September 1943), slowly proceeded to occupy several key positions in the armed forces with officials devoted to the King. He also tried to bring back from abroad as many as possible of Italy's forces, but it was difficult to do so without arousing suspicion in Germany.[20]
On 6 February 1943, Mussolini carried out the most wide-ranging government reshuffle in 21 years of Fascist power.[21] Almost all of the ministers were changed, including the Duce's son-in-law, Galeazzo Ciano, and Dino Grandi, Giuseppe Bottai, Guido Buffarini Guidi and Alessandro Pavolini. The situation was compromised, and the primary goal of the operation to placate public opinion about the Fascist Party failed. Among the new appointments, the new Undersecretary of Foreign Affairs (the Duce took over the department himself) Giuseppe Bastianini, was aware of the seriousness of the situation.[22] Bastianini's strategy was twofold: like Mussolini, he tried to argue in favor of a peace between Germany and the USSR.[23] He also aimed to create a block of Balkan countries (the junior Axis partners Hungary, Romania and Bulgaria) led by Italy who could act as a counterbalance to the excessive power of the German Reich in Europe. On 14 April, the Duce substituted the chief of police, Carmine Senise (a man of the King), with Lorenzo Chierici. Five days later he replaced the young and inexperienced secretary of the Party, Aldo Vidussoni, with Carlo Scorza. Mussolini wanted to galvanize the Party with the appointment of Scorza.[24]
The loss of Tunis
The
In mid-May, the King started to consider exiting the war after being persuaded by Duke
On 4 June, the King received Dino Grandi, who was still president of the
On 19 June 1943, the last cabinet meeting of the Fascist age took place.[47] The Minister of Communication, Senator Vittorio Cini, a powerful Italian industrialist, confronted Mussolini about finding a time and way to exit the war.[48] Cini resigned after the meeting which signaled the falter in Mussolini's charisma even among his own entourage. People devoted to him, including OVRA agents and the Germans, consistently told him that several plots were going on. The Duce never reacted, telling each one that they were reading too many crime novels or were affected by persecution mania.[49] On 24 June, Mussolini gave his last important speech as prime minister, known as the "boot topping" (Italian: bagnasciuga) speech. The Duce promised that the only part of Italy that the Anglo-Americans would be able to occupy was the shore-line. He was misspoken in his effort to say they would only occupy Italy as corpses, and he used incorrect vocabulary.[50] For many Italians, his confused and incoherent speech was the final proof that something was wrong with Mussolini.[35]
The landing in Sicily
On the night of 10 July the Allies landed in Sicily.[51] Despite expecting the invasion, the Italian forces were overwhelmed after initial resistance, and similar to Augusta (the island's most fortified stronghold), they collapsed without fighting.[52] Within days, it became apparent that Sicily was going to be lost. On 16 July, Bastianini went to Palazzo Venezia (the Duce's seat) to show Mussolini a telegram to be sent to Hitler where he reproached the Germans for not sending reinforcements.[53] After the Duce's approval, the undersecretary asked for authorization to establish contacts with the Allies. Mussolini agreed, under the condition of not being directly involved.[54][55] The secret emissary was the Vatican banker, Giovanni Fummi, who was supposed to reach London via Madrid or Lisbon.[56] On the same evening, Bastianini crossed the Tiber to meet Cardinal Maglione, Vatican Secretary of State, who received a document explaining the Italian position about a possible unilateral exit from the war.[57]
After the fall of Tunis and Pantelleria, the majority of Italy believed that the war had been lost.[58] The landing in Sicily accelerated the crisis, and the lack of resistance shocked the Fascists, who questioned why the Duce was not reacting. Those who looked to the King or Mussolini were at a standstill, and it was time for Italy to find an institution that was suitable to take political action.[59]
Among the four existing state institutions, the Party, the
The group was divided: Farinacci and Scorza were for a totalitarian solution together with Germany, the others were in favor of giving the emergency war powers back to the King.
The meeting in Feltre
The fall of Sicily occurred in a matter of days, and the armed forces appeared incapable of resisting an invasion of mainland Italy without massive German help. Mussolini wrote to Hitler to request a meeting to discuss the situation in Italy, but the letter was never sent since the Führer – who got daily reports on Italy from his ambassador to the Vatican and Himmler agent, Eugen Dollmann, and was worried about the apathy of the Duce and the ongoing Italian military catastrophe – asked him to meet as soon as possible.[68]
The meeting took place on 19 July in the villa of Senator Achille Gaggia in Feltre. Mussolini, Bastianini and Ambrosio met with Hitler and the generals of the OKW to discuss the situation and the possible countermeasures. The German delegation included several generals, but neither Göring nor Ribbentrop were present because the Germans were focusing on the military aspects of the situation. Ambrosio carefully prepared for the meeting, telling Mussolini that his duty was to exit the war in the next 15 days.[69] The Germans had lost faith in the Italians and were only interested in occupying northern and central Italy, leaving the Italian army alone to defend the country from the Allies. They also proposed that the Axis supreme command in the peninsula be taken over by a German general, such as Erwin Rommel. Hitler began the meeting by blaming the Italians for their weak military performance and asking for draconian measures.[70] The meeting was interrupted by an Italian aide telling Mussolini that the Allies were currently heavily bombing Rome for the first time.[71] Ambrosio and Bastianini pressed the Duce to tell Hitler that a political solution to the war was necessary for Italy, but Mussolini said that he had been tormented for months by the dilemma of leaving the alliance or continuing the war. Mussolini struggled to overcome the sense of inferiority he felt in the presence of Hitler and to speak frankly with his German colleague.[72][73] Eventually, the Duce interrupted the meeting, which was scheduled to last 3 days, to Hitler's chagrin. The delegations returned to Belluno via train and after greeting Hitler in the afternoon, Mussolini returned to Rome flying his personal aircraft where he could see the eastern quarters of the city still burning.[74]
Grandi decided to move as a result of the inaction.[75] In that same evening of 19 July, he left Bologna with a first draft of his Order of the Day (Ordine del Giorno, OdG) to be presented to the Grand Council.[46][76] He was able to reach Rome only one day later, and on the morning of the 21st he met Scorza, who told him that Mussolini had decided to convoke the Grand Council. It was finally the "gioco grosso", the great game, which Grandi had been waiting for.[77][78]
Two parallel plots
After the failure of the Feltre meeting and the first bombing of Rome, the crisis accelerated.[79] The day after Feltre, 20 July, Mussolini met Ambrosio twice. During the second meeting, the Duce told him that he had decided to write to Hitler, confessing the need for Italy to abandon the alliance. Ambrosio was still angry about the missed opportunity to do this in Feltre and offered his resignation to the Duce, who rejected it.[80] Mussolini was now useless for Ambrosio. Therefore, Ambrosio decided to set the putsch in motion.[81]
At the same time, Grandi and Luigi Federzoni, his close ally and Italian nationalist leader, were trying to estimate how many among the 27 members of the Grand Council would vote for his document. They concluded that of the 27 members, 4 were for it, 7 against and 16 undecided.[82][83] Grandi could not reveal to his colleagues the real consequences of the approval of his OdG: the dismissal of Mussolini, the end of the Fascist Party, and war against Germany.[82] Only a couple of gerarchi had the necessary political intelligence to understand it. The rest were still hopeful that the Duce, who had made their decisions for the last 21 years, could once again produce a miracle. Consequently, Grandi decided to write his OdG in a vague form and leave it open to interpretation.[84] The OdG was divided into three parts. It began with a long, rhetorical appeal to the nation and the armed forces, praising them for their resistance to the invaders. In the second part, the document asked for the restoration of the pre-Fascist institutions and laws. The end of the document was an appeal to the King; he should assume supreme civil and military power according to Article 5 of the constitution of the kingdom. Grandi believed that the approval of the OdG would be the signal that the King was waiting for. On 21 July, Mussolini ordered Scorza to convoke the Grand Council, and he sent the invitation one day later.[84] Grandi went to Scorza and explained his OdG on the same day, who agreed to support it.[85] Scorza asked Grandi for a copy of his document, and he met Mussolini and showed him the OdG the next day. The Duce called it a "not admissible and cowardly" document.[86] Afterwards, Scorza secretly prepared another OdG, similar to that of Grandi, but which asked for the concentration of power in the Fascist Party.
On 22 July, the King met with Mussolini, who wanted to report the outcome of Feltre.[66] According to Badoglio, Mussolini promised the King that he would disengage Italy from the war by 15 September.[87] The two-month delay can be explained by the fact that Bastianini had begun contact with the Allies which would need time to proceed, and Mussolini needed time to justify himself and Italy before the world for his betrayal. According to Badoglio, the King agreed with Mussolini, which is why the Duce was not worried about the outcome of the Grand Council meeting.[88] A coup d'état was destined to fail without the aid of the King. At the end of the meeting, Mussolini was convinced that the King would stand by his side, and Victor Emmanuel was disappointed after telling him in vain that he should resign.[89] The King was forced now to consider the putsch seriously, as he knew that Bastianini was trying to contact the Allies while Farinacci, the fascist hardliner, was organizing a putsch to depose him and Mussolini and bring Italy under direct German control.[90] The real decision was made after knowing that the Grand Council had approved Grandi's OdG.[91]
At 17:30 on the same day, Grandi went to Palazzo Venezia under the official reason of presenting a new book about the Italian participation in the non-intervention committee in Spain to Mussolini.
Events of 24–25 July 1943
The Grand Council of Fascism,
meeting in these hours of utmost trial, turns all its thoughts to the heroic fighters in every corps who, side by side with the people of Sicily in whom shines the unequivocal faith of the Italian people, renewing the noble traditions of strenuous valor and the indomitable spirit of sacrifice of our glorious Armed Forces, having examined the internal and international situation and the war's political and military leadership,
proclaimsthe sacred duty for all Italians to defend at all costs the homeland's unity, independence, and freedom, the fruits of sacrifice and the efforts of four generations from the Risorgimento to the present, the life and future of the Italian people;
affirmsthe necessity of moral and material unity of all Italians in this serious and decisive hour for the nation's destiny;
declaresthat to this end the immediate restoration of all state functions is necessary, assigning to the Crown, to the Grand Council, to the government, to the Parliament, and to the corporate groups the duties and responsibility established by our statutory and constitutional laws;
invitesthe government to beseech His Majesty the king, to whom turns the loyal and trusting heart of the whole nation, to assume effective command of the Armed Forces of land, sea, and air for the honor and salvation of the homeland, under article 5 of the Constitution, the supreme initiative that our institutions assign to him, and which have always been throughout our nation's history the glorious heritage of our august House of Savoy.
The night of the Grand Council
At 17:00 on 24 July 1943, the 28 members of the Grand Council met in the parrot room (the anteroom of the globe saloon, the office of Mussolini) in Palazzo Venezia. For the first time in the history of the Grand Council, neither the bodyguard of Mussolini, known as the Moschettieri del Duce, nor a detachment of the "M" battalions, were present in the Renaissance palace.[105] Fully armed blackshirts occupied the yard, the escalade and the antechamber.[106] Mussolini did not want a stenographer, so no minutes of the meeting were taken.[107]
Grandi brought two hidden Breda hand grenades with him, in addition to revising his will and going to confession before the meeting, because he was under the impression that he might not leave the palace alive.[108] Mussolini began the meeting by summarizing the history of the supreme command, trying to show that the attribution to him had been sponsored by Badoglio.[109] He summarized the war events in the previous months, saying that he was ready to move the government to the Po valley.[110] He concluded by asking the participants to give their personal opinion about what he called "il dilemma": the choice between war or peace. The Duce knew that, except for the three or four men against him, the "swamp" was undecided. He hoped that he could convince them to vote for the OdG Scorza, which gave only the military powers back to the King. After the Duce's introduction, De Bono (one of the two remaining living quadrumvirs) spoke, followed by Farinacci and De Vecchi (the other quadrumvir).[111]
Grandi then read out and explained his document, concluding his speech with Mussolini's citation: "Let perish all the factions, so that the Nation can live".[112] Next, Farinacci explained that his criticism ran opposite to Grandi's. While Grandi contended that Mussolini had betrayed the constitution, the real victim of betrayal was Fascism.[113] Farinacci said that in order to win the war it was necessary to wipe out the democrats and liberals still nested in the Party, as well as the generals. He wanted to give the supreme command of the armed forces back to the King and unify the war direction with Germany, all of which would strengthen the Party.[114][115] At the end of his speech he read his proposed OdG, which summarized all of these points. After some minor interventions, Bottai, the Fascist intellectual, made a purely political speech defending the OdG.[111] This was followed by Ciano summarizing the history of the alliance with the Germans, and declaring that the Italians were not the traitors, but the betrayed.[116] At 23:30, the Duce announced that, due to the length of the meeting, some comrades had asked for a postponement to the next day.[117] At this point, Grandi called for a vote on his OdG, saying that it was shameful to go to sleep when Italian soldiers were dying for their fatherland.[118] Never before in the 20-year history of the assembly had anyone asked for a vote. Since fascism was strongly anti-parliamentary, in all previous meetings only discussions summarized by the Duce had taken place. Mussolini unwillingly agreed, and at midnight the meeting was suspended for 10 minutes.[119] In the meantime, Grandi collected the signatures to his OdG.[120]
After other interventions for and against the OdG, Mussolini told the participants to reflect on their decision since the approval of Grandi's OdG would imply the end of Fascism. He also cautioned against the illusion that the Anglo-Americans would be content with that, whereas what they really wanted was the end of Italy, which under his rule had become too strong. He said this was not about him, but he was sure that the war could be won. He had a "key" to accomplish that which he could not disclose, and he was not willing to let his throat be cut by the King.[121][122] If the King would re-confirm his trust in him, the consequences for the supporters of Grandi's OdG would be dire.[122][123] At the end of his speech, many of the gerarchi were visibly shaken.[124] Grandi said that the Duce was blackmailing all of them, and if one must choose between fidelity to him and loyalty to the homeland, the choice was clear.[122][125] At this point, Scorza caught everyone by surprise by presenting his own OdG.[126][127] This proposed the nomination of the three war and interior ministers, all under Mussolini, and the concentration of power in the hands of the Fascist Party.[127]
His speech hurt the Duce's hopes of defeating Grandi since the Party was discredited among almost all the high-ranking Fascists. At the end of Scorza's intervention, Suardo announced that he was withdrawing his signature from the OdG Grandi and proposed to unify the three documents.[128] Ciano asked Farinacci to withdraw his OdG and to ask Grandi to unify their two documents, but Farinacci refused.[129] Bottai said that voting for Grandi had become a matter of honor.[130] After other interventions and nine hours of discussion, Mussolini declared the meeting closed at two o'clock in the morning and ordered Scorza to proceed with the vote. They voted on the OdG Grandi first since it had the most proponents.[131] Scorza was the first to vote, saying "no". After him, Marshal de Bono said "yes" and towed the undecided with him. In the end, the OdG Grandi obtained 19 votes for, with 8 against.[132] Mussolini declared the document approved and asked who should bring the result to the King. Grandi answered: "You". The Duce concluded: "You provoked the regime crisis".[1] After that, Scorza tried to call the "saluto al duce", but Mussolini stopped him.[1]
While all the other gerarchi left the palace, Mussolini remained with Scorza to discuss the legal value of the OdG. They concluded that it was just a "recommendation" to the King.
Arrest of Mussolini
Grandi met with Pietro d'Acquarone until 06:00 after the Grand Council meeting to give him one of the two copies of the OdG.[136] At 07:00, d'Acquarone informed the King.[137] The King called Badoglio and told him that he would be the successor to Mussolini.[138] The operation was due to start on 29 July. Mussolini went to work and found a letter on his desk from Tullio Cianetti, withdrawing his vote for the OdG Grandi. He ordered a search for Grandi from his office at Montecitorio, but he replied that he was not in Rome, potentially in an effort to give him the task of making contact with the Allies to prepare an armistice.[139][140] Mussolini contacted the royal household in order to request an audience with the King to report on the previous night's meeting. This call unsettled the King, who had decided to arrest the Duce on that same day.[4] The arrest occurred at 17:00 at Villa Savoia.
General Castellano contacted the Commander-General of the Carabinieri, General Angelo Cerica, who organized the arrest. Lieutenant Colonel Giovanni Frignani oversaw the arrest of Mussolini by order of the king. Captain Paolo Vigneri of the Carabinieri was commissioned to carry out the arrest. He was summoned by telephone with his colleague Captain Raffaele Aversa around 14:00 on 25 July by Lieutenant Colonel Frignani, who explored their method of carrying out the order of arrest issued against the Duce. Vigneri was told to deliver Mussolini and complete the mission at any cost.
In the meantime, Mussolini met the Japanese ambassador, Shinrokuro Hidaka, who had been waiting three weeks for a courtesy hearing. Hidaka heard Mussolini request that the Japanese Prime Minister, General Hideki Tojo, contact Hitler and convince him to reach an agreement with Stalin.[141] Otherwise, Italy would be forced to abandon the alliance.[142] In the afternoon, Mussolini visited the San Lorenzo quarter to observe the damage from the bombing.[143] Back at Villa Torlonia, his wife, Donna Rachele, told him not to go to the appointment with the King since Victor Emmanuel could not be trusted.[144] She told him: "You won’t be back", but he said that the King was his best friend.[144]
At 17:00, Mussolini, escorted by agents of the "presidenziale", arrived at the Villa Savoia where the King was waiting for him. He brought a copy of the law of the Grand Council, the OdG Grandi, and the letter of Cianetti. The Duce tried to convince Victor Emmanuel that the OdG had no legal value and that many of its supporters had changed their minds. The King told him that the country was broken, and the situation required him to quit his post; the new President of the Council of Ministers would be Marshal Badoglio. Mussolini feared for his future, but the King assured him that he would personally take care of his security and that of his family.
In the meantime, all the telephone centrals were blocked. The new Chief of the Police, Senise, who was appointed at 17:30 by Duke d’Acquarone, ordered the questore of Rome to arrest all the gerarchi present in the capital.[150] The EIAR, linked with the headquarters of the MVSN (the Blackshirts), was also isolated. The King had his first meeting with Badoglio. At 18:00, the Secretary of the Party, Scorza, was waiting to meet Mussolini and seeing that he did not come, he went to the headquarters of the Carabinieri. There he was arrested by Cerica, but released on his word after promising that both he and the Fascist party would be faithful to the new government.[151] The same fate befell the MVSN: its Chief of Staff, Lieutenant General Enzo Galbiati, advised Mussolini to arrest the 19 gerarchi who voted for the OdG Grandi, but he refused. After knowing about the arrest of Mussolini, he observed that the MVSN headquarters in Viale Romania had been surrounded by army units. Galbiati then ordered his men not to provoke incidents. Although the majority of his officers wanted to react, he called the Undersecretary to the Interior, Umberto Albini, after consulting with four generals and declaring that the MVSN would have "remained faithful to its principles, that is to serve the fatherland through its pair, Duce and King". Since the war against the Allies was continuing, the duty of each Blackshirt was to continue the fight.[152] Badoglio had nothing to fear from the Blackshirts. Immediately, Galbiati was replaced by Quirino Armellini, an Army general, and arrested a few days later.[152] The MVSN was then integrated into the Regio Esercito and disbanded.
Announcement and Italian public reaction
Attention. Attention. His Majesty the King and Emperor has accepted the resignation from office of the Head of Government, Prime Minister, and Secretary of State His Excellency il Cavaliere Benito Mussolini, and has named as Head of Government, Prime Minister, and Secretary of State the Marshal of Italy, Sir Pietro Badoglio.
— G. Arista, 25 July 1943
At 22:45 on 25 July 1943, Titta Arista (nicknamed the "voce littoria") announced that Mussolini had resigned and that Badoglio was the new premier.[2] The communique finished with the words: "La guerra continua. L'Italia tiene fede alla parola data" ("The war goes on. Italy will be true to its word"). After the end of the transmission, the population slowly understood what was going on. Thus Paolo Monelli, writer and journalist, describes what happened in the capital:
"The silence of the summer night is broken by songs, screams, clamors. A group exited by Caffè Aragno[153] climbs up Via del Tritone screaming with a crazy explosion: 'Citizens, wake up, they arrested Mussolini, Mussolini to death, down with Fascism!' It sounded like the scream of a mute who gets his voice back after twenty years. Windows illuminate violently, front doors burst open, houses empty, all are out embracing each other, telling each other the news, with those simple and exuberant gestures belonging to people overwhelmed by emotion. Hotheads throw themselves on the ones still wearing the Fascist pin, tearing it away, trampling on it. 'Off with the bug!' Columns of people go to acclaim the king at the Quirinal, Badoglio at Via XX Settembre."[154]
All over Italy, men and women went outside and chiseled away the Fascist emblems and removed propaganda posters from the buildings. In Rome, the government locked up high-ranking Fascists in Forte Boccea, Rome's military jail at the time.[155] The lack of violence was remarkable; the people's revenge was mostly limited to tearing off the "bug", the Fascist pin, from the jackets of the Fascists or forcing them to toast to Badoglio.
Without firing a shot, Mussolini and the Fascist party that dominated Italy for the last 21 years fell. As the Italian intellectual, Ranuccio Bianchi Bandinelli, wrote in his diary at the time: "Behind the façade there was nothing. The first actor took his large cardboard head off and his idiot servants could be sent home with a cuff".[156]
Aftermath
German reaction
The Germans received news about Mussolini's arrest around 7:30 PM and informed Berlin immediately. The Führer was infuriated.[157] Farinacci went to the German embassy, where Kesselring suggested that he join the armored Division "M", a group of devoted Fascists. They were encamped at Monterotondo where it could have been possible to march on Rome and free the Duce.[157] Farinacci refused and asked to be brought to Germany. He left Italy by plane from Frascati and landed in Munich.[158] Units of the 44th Infantry Division and of the 36th Mountain Brigade of the German Army broke through the Brenner, Reschen and Toblach passes, occupying South Tyrol.[159] Other German units also penetrated Italy from the Julian and Piedmontese borders. The trains transporting the troops were covered in praise for and images of Mussolini.[159] From 26 July until 8 August, eight German divisions and one brigade were moved without Italian consent to northern and central Italy: the same troops that Hitler denied to Mussolini two weeks before in Feltre.[154]
The "forty-six days", armistice and civil war
The forty-six days from the arrest of Mussolini on 25 July to the public notification on 8 September of the Armistice of Cassibile (signed 3 September, kept secret from the Italian people and from Italy's Nazi German allies) would set in motion numerous actions in Italy. The last sentence of the communiqué of 25 July ("The war goes on. Italy will be true to its word"), while puzzling to the Allies, did not deceive Hitler, who immediately understood that the change of regime would very likely lead to an Italian defection, which would endanger the German forces fighting in Southern Italy and the entire Wehrmacht presence in Southern Europe. However, the Badoglio government initially made no attempt to establish contact with the Anglo-Americans, while making alternating requests for help and obstructionism towards incoming German forces and requests to deploy German divisions in the South, on the frontline against the Allies. Germany increased troop movements into Italy, ostensibly done to support Italy against Allied troop movements from Southern Italy. The new foreign minister, Guariglia, was ambassador to Turkey, and time was lost while waiting for his return from Ankara.[160] The King, after his activism on 25 July, was inactive, delegating the political action to d'Acquarone and Badoglio.[161]
After letting the populace celebrate on 25 July, the Badoglio government proclaimed a
Grandi transmitted an account of the 2 August meeting to the foreign press representative on Sunday morning, but he knew it was blocked.
The conflicting actions of the Badoglio government over the forty-six days would bring about the national catastrophe of 8 September: the meltdown of the armed forces in the face of Nazi Germany's attack (occupying all of central and northern Italy by 19 September); the 9 September missing defense of Rome and flight of the royal family and the government; the 12 September freeing of Mussolini; the 23 September establishment of the Italian Social Republic; and the commencement of the Italian Civil War.[168]
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- ^ De Felice (1996), p. 1188
- ^ De Felice (1996), p. 1350
- ^ Bianchi (1963), p. 477
- ^ De Felice (1996), p. 1187
- ^ De Felice (1996), p. 1189
- ^ Bianchi (1963), p. 481
- ^ "Il significato reale del Comitato di non intervento negli affari di Spagna" (in Italian). international communist party. Retrieved 23 July 2013.
- ^ De Felice (1996), p. 1252
- ^ De Felice (1996), p. 1251
- ^ Bianchi (1963), p. 484
- ^ Bianchi (1963), p. 486
- ^ Bianchi (1963), p. 487
- ^ Bianchi (1963), p. 489
- ^ a b Bianchi (1963), p. 490
- ^ Bianchi (1963), p. 516
- ^ Grandi (1983), p. 243
- ^ Bianchi (1963), p. 496
- ^ Paolo Nello. "Un fedele disubbidiente: Dino Grandi da Palazzo Chigi al 25 luglio", Il Mulino, 1993.
- ^ Bianchi (1963), p. 510
- ^ Grandi (1983), p. 250
- ^ Grandi (1983), p. 249
- ^ Grandi (1983), p. 246
- ^ Monelli (1946), p. 120
- ^ Bianchi (1963), p. 536
- ^ a b Bianchi (1963), p. 540
- ^ Monelli (1946), p. 123
- ^ Grandi (1983), p. 256
- ^ Monelli (1946), p. 125
- ^ Grandi (1983), p. 257
- ^ Monelli (1946), p. 124
- ^ Bianchi (1963), p. 575
- ^ Grandi (1983), p. 260
- ^ Bianchi (1963), p. 576
- ^ Monelli (1946), p. 126
- ^ Grandi (1983), p. 263
- ^ a b c Monelli (1946), p. 128
- ^ Bianchi (1963), p. 588
- ^ Grandi (1983), p. 264
- ^ Bianchi (1963), p. 605
- ^ Bianchi (1963), p. 590
- ^ a b Grandi (1983), p. 265
- ^ Bianchi (1963), p. 596
- ^ Bianchi (1963), p. 597
- ^ Grandi (1983), p. 266
- ^ Bianchi (1963), p. 608
- ^ Grandi (1983), p. 268
- ^ Bianchi (1963), p. 615
- ^ De Felice (1996), p. 1382
- ^ Bianchi (1963), p. 616
- ^ Bianchi (1963), p. 611
- ^ De Felice (1996), p. 1388
- ^ De Felice (1996), p. 1390
- ^ Grandi (1983), p. 272
- ^ De Felice (1996), p. 1385
- ^ Bianchi (1963), p. 647
- ^ De Felice in Grandi (1983), p. 73
- ^ Bianchi (1963), p. 655
- ^ a b Bianchi (1963), p. 661
- ^ Bianchi (1963), p. 668
- ^ Bianchi (1963), p. 670
- ^ De Felice (1996), p. 1400
- ^ De Felice (1996), p. 1401
- ^ Monelli (1946), p. 142
- ^ Bianchi (1963), p. 687
- ^ Bianchi (1963), p. 694
- ^ a b Bianchi (1963), p. 732
- ^ At that time it was the most famous caffè in Rome, in Via del Corso, attended by artists and intellectuals
- ^ a b Bianchi (1963), p. 715
- ^ Bianchi (1963), p. 729
- ^ De Felice (1996), p. 1366
- ^ a b Bianchi (1963), p. 702
- ^ Bianchi (1963), p. 703
- ^ a b Bianchi (1963), p. 713
- ^ Bianchi (1963), p. 751
- ^ De Felice in Grandi (1983), p. 106
- ^ Bianchi (1963), p. 724
- ^ a b Bianchi (1963), p. 746
- ^ Bianchi (1963), p. 740
- ^ Grandi (1983), p. 282
- ^ Grandi (1983), p. 283
- ^ a b Grandi (1983), pp. 368–76
- ^ De Felice (2008), "La catastrofe nazionale dell'8 Settembre", passim
Sources
- Monelli, Paolo (1946). Roma 1943 (in Italian) (4 ed.). Roma: Migliaresi.
- Bianchi, Gianfranco (1989). 25 Luglio: crollo di un regime (in Italian). Milano: Mursia.
- Bottai, Giuseppe (1963). Diario 1935–1944 (in Italian) (1 ed.). Milano: Rizzoli.
- ISBN 8815003312.
- ISBN 8806195697.
- ISBN 978-8806195717.