Fengtian clique

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Fengtian clique
奉系
Fèngxì
Zhang Xueliang

The Fengtian clique (

Three Northeastern Provinces. The clique received support from Japan in exchange for protecting Japanese military and economic interests in Manchuria. The Fengtian Army
frequently intervened in many of the conflicts of the Warlord Era.

Following the

Nationalist Government in Nanjing. In practice, the Fengtian clique continued to independently govern Manchuria until the Japanese invasion
in 1931.

Foundations of the Fengtian clique

Map of the Three Northeast Provinces of Manchuria, 1911

During the late

Fengtian, and Heilongjiang. The capital was at Shenyang (then known as Mukden) in Fengtian.[3] When the Wuchang Uprising broke out, revolutionaries established networks in the Manchurian New Army. Unlike other provinces, the revolution had much less support from the populace. Governor Zhao Erxun and the local militia forged an alliance, collaborating with local elites and constitutionalists. After Puyi abdicated the throne in 1912, Manchu nobles in the area tried to establish an independent Manchu state, an attempt that failed.[4] Huang Xing, commander-in-chief of the Republic of China, was willing to cede Manchuria to Japan and mentioned the concept of China proper when asking for support from the empire.[5] (Previously, Manchuria had been the location of the Russo-Japanese War fought inside Qing territory, while the Three Northeastern Provinces hosted the politically tense Chinese Eastern Railway, a Russian concession, whose southern half had been ceded to Japan in 1905. This regional context influenced political and economic decisions in Manchuria.)[6]

Zhao Erxun, Viceroy (1911) and Governor (1912) of Fengtian

In a conference between the Manchurian revolutionaries, provincial assembly, Zhao Erxun, and officials, constitutionalist Wu Jinglian proposed that the Revolution was irresistible, but that Chinese people in Manchuria should not blindly join in the fight, and instead stand guard against Japan and Russia. Song Gong and border patrol leader Zhang Zuolin pursued this policy of restraint. When Yuan Shikai was declared President, Zhao pledged the Three Northeastern Provinces' loyalty to the Republic of China. Manchuria thus stayed as a part of China.[7][8]

A portrait of Zhang Zuolin

Zhang Zuolin, who had pacified the provincial assembly with the threat of force, was made the commander of the 27th Division. This Division would gradually grow into the Fengtian Army. During Yuan Shikai's attempt to restore the Empire of China, Yuan tried to gain Zhang's support by promoting him to the position of military governor of Fengtian. When Yuan died in 1916, Zhang seized the opportunity to expel the military governor of Manchuria, Duan Zhigui. Instead of being punished for his subtle threats of force and expulsion of the military governor, Zhang was promoted by Duan Qirui, as he needed Zhang's cooperation, to the Inspector General of the Three Northeastern Provinces by late 1918.[9]

Many local elites of Fengtian, such as Yuan Jinkai and Yu Chonghan, who were beneficiaries of political chaos, supported Zhang Zuolin in order to wrest power from their political enemies. Zhang and these elites formed an alliance against orders and appointments from the central government.[10] This alliance between Zhang, military figures, and the local elite became known as the Fengtian Clique. The elite in the Northeast formed different "political parties", such as the Democratic Party (Minzhudang). Zhang exploited anti-tax protests to strengthen his local civil authority and his position to the Central Government. In 1916, Yuan Jingkai discussed with Zhang to expel Duan Zhigui.[11] Zhang was assisted after his rise to power by local bureaucrats and civilian elites. However, he also invited people from the rest of China to Manchuria to serve as officials and officers.

Zhili–Anhui War

With Duan Qirui's Anhui clique using some funds from the Nishihara Loans to invade Outer Mongolia and build up his army, the Fengtian and Zhili cliques, feeling threatened by growing Anhui dominance, created an alliance and banded with the Southern Warlords to take down the Anhui Clique. On July 12, 1920, the warlord coalition officially denounced the Anhui Clique.[12]

A group photo of commanders of the Zhili–Fengtian united army, victors of the Zhili–Anhui war. From right to left, on the first row: Hua Shucheng, Zhu Yuxi, Zhang Zongchang, Yang Qingchen

The Zhili–Anhui War lasted for a week, with the remnants of the Anhui clique escaping to Zhejiang and Shanghai. While the Fengtian clique contributed little to the victory of the coalition, Zhang Zuolin did notably attack Shanhai Pass in the Great Wall. The Fengtian clique was allowed to form a joint government in Beijing with the Zhili Clique.

Shortly after, the

V. K. Wellington Koo
rejected adamantly, leading to France refusing to ratify the treaties.

Politics

Fengtian soldiers wearing ushankas
Zhang Zongchang's army equipped with Mauser C96s

As Inspector-General of the Three Northeastern Provinces, Zhang oversaw civil and military affairs for Manchuria. Additionally, he was both the civil and military governor of Fengtian Province. After the First Zhili–Fengtian War in 1922, Zhang distanced himself heavily from the Zhili clique who dominated Beijing and the National Government, creating the Three Northeastern Provinces Defense Headquarters (Dongsansheng Baoan Silingbu), merging the position of Inspector-General and the Fengtian Military Governor. Wang Yongjiang was given control of the civilian government of Fengtian Province. The military governors of Jilin and Heilongjiang provinces became deputy commanders-in-chief. Civilian governors were also put in Jilin and Heilongjiang so as to distribute power within their provincial governments.[14]

The Fengtian Army in 1917
Zhang Zuolin's troops in Tianjin

The Fengtian Army consisted of, at first, a tight-knit group of militia commanders. After Zhang Zuolin took power, new officers were brought in, all with different military and educational backgrounds. One of these, Yang Yuting, brought other Shikan Gakkou graduates to Fengtian, and became Zhang's Chief of Staff. Other officers were brought in from the Staff College of Beijing, their informal leader being Guo Songling. The officers broke into their own internal cliques - the "Shikan Clique" and the "Staff College Clique".[15] The Shikan Clique wanted to intervene in Chinese politics more directly and actively, while the Staff College Clique opposed many military ventures. In 1924, Guo was given no posts in China proper, and rebelled in November 1925, causing the Shikan Clique to take control of military affairs and Manchurian politics until the execution of Yang Yuting and Chang Yinhuai.[16]

Forces under the command of Zhang Zongchang, 1927

This civil–military system was rearranged in 1926 after the Fengtian victory in the

Mukden. In June 1927, Zhang Zuolin was appointed Grand Marshal (Generalissimo) of the Republic of China (not to be confused with Chiang Kai-shek). The Anguojun headquarters was reorganized into the Grand Marshal Government. The Three Northeastern Provinces Defense Headquarters was reorganized into the Grand Marshal Headquarters and was expanded to control the Anguojun under Yang Yuting. The Ministry of War controlled the operations of the Army, Navy, and Air Force.[17]
However, Zhang had the final say in everything, while power was delegated to his subordinates in these organizations, something which said subordinates exploited.

Administration and economy

In 1918, Zhang Zuolin revived the provincial assemblies, which allowed the elite to identify their interests with the state, with authorities representing bureaucratic, commercial, and educational interests. The local population of Manchuria participated in these assemblies too, as a way to advance their positions and receive government bribes.[18] Bribery played an important part in the elections, with regulations and institutionalization of it. In 1927, 800,000+ people were allowed to vote, electing 64 members to the provincial assembly. A county within the Kwantung Leased Territory also asked to join.

5 cent banknote from the Bank of Manchuria, 1923
10 cent banknote from the Bank of Manchuria, 1923

Fengtian chambers of commerce were also incredibly important. They were used to monitor the business environment and encourage commerce and trade. They assisted in supplying the Fengtian Army and levying taxes for Zhang Zuolin. Many business leaders came from the bureaucratic group that participated in the provincial assembly, so their interests were represented through Zhang Zuolin.[19] However, business interests did come into conflict with Zhang's political interests sometimes, especially during and after the Second Zhili–Fengtian War. When wars did not provide immediate benefits for the Manchurian economy, doubts started to surface about Zhang. However, Zhang still held authority over civilian organizations and government organs in Fengtian. Zhang used these organs for his own interest, including using the Fengtian Chamber of Commerce in protesting against Japanese demands in 1927.

Foreign relations

Renault FT tanks of the Fengtian army, c. 1928.

Manchuria, during the

Mantetsu, Nakamura Yoshikoto, believed that encouraging the revolutionaries would directly lead to an easy full occupation of Manchuria by Japan. Throughout the revolution, Zhao Erxun and Zhang Zuolin
managed to preserve order in the provinces, avoiding a Japanese invasion. In 1912, Zhang cracked down on a Japanese–Manchu plot to create an independent Manchuria.

In order to cement their control over Manchuria during the Republican era, Russia and Japan continued to invest in railroads. Japan forced the Twenty-One Demands (shortened to thirteen after initial negotiations) as an ultimatum to President Yuan Shikai, extending their territorial lease, allowing subjects to have land loaned to them, and giving them the rights to the Jilin–Changchun Railway. Another Japanese coup was planned in 1915 but was aborted.[21] The Japanese continued to exert their influence in China through loans, abandoning their aggressive stance. In 1918, the Japanese lent Duan Qirui the Nishihara Loans, of which ten million yen for the Jilin-Huining Railway and thirty million for developing industries in Jilin and Heilongjiang. Twenty more were used to invest in planned railways. However, most of the money was used to fund Duan Qirui's army and was used in the Zhili–Anhui War.[22] Zhang Zuolin in Mukden borrowed three million more from Japan to reorganize his finances.

Throughout the late 1910s and early 1920s, Western Great Powers tried to limit Japanese influence in China. The Washington Conference of 1921 was seen by the Imperial Japanese Army as an attempt by the West to obstruct Japanese influence.[23] In order to preserve their influence, Japan supported Zhang Zuolin as long as it benefited them. Sir Charles Elliot, British ambassador to Japan, noted that the Japanese, "while anxious to keep on good terms with [Zhang Zuolin], thought it unwise to commit themselves unreservedly to the support of any one Chinese party.”[24]

An ally and commander of the Fengtian clique, Zhang Zongchang recruited Russian White (tsarist) emigres for a detachment that he was forming in anticipation of the Second Zhili-Fengtian War. Russian mercenaries in China were numerous due to the previous Russian leased territory in Manchuria, the Chinese Eastern Railway, which still had many Russian employees. For many emigres, serving the northern warlords was a way to continue the fight against the Bolsheviks. Zhang's Russian forces were commanded by Konstantin Petrovich Nechaev from 1924 to 1927. Additionally, Zhang attached a Japanese company to his Russian company in 1924.[25] The Russian units had the extensive experience in the First World War and the Russian Civil War, were the brave warriors and had a reputation in 1924–1926 as "Invincible", nicknamed by the Chinese "Lamoza". Russian engineers built several armored trains in the city of Tsinan (Jinan), which were used as the strike forces in the capture of cities. By 1927, the enemy, the "southern" Chinese groups, also learned to fight thanks to the Soviet instructors, and the importance of the Russian White Detachment became small. In 1928–1929, the Russian detachment of General Nechaev was disbanded, the losses amounted to over 1800 people, most of whom were buried in the cemetery in Jinan.[26]

The Soviet Union, determined to retake the Chinese Eastern Railway and recover their influence in China, threatened Zhang Zuolin that they would recognize other warlords. The Soviets reached out to Zhang Zuolin in 1920 and 1921 to discuss Mongolia and the Chinese Eastern Railway, but Zhang maintained that he wanted to retake Outer Mongolia as soon as he could. In September 1924, an agreement was reached, in which Zhang agreed to recognize the Soviets and give them control over the railway in return for the Soviets withholding their plans for Outer Mongolia and subversive activities in China.[27]

See also

Notes

  1. ^ After the National Protection War and until 1928, two entities claimed to be the legitimate national government of the Republic of China: the Beiyang (Northern) Government based in Beijing and the Kuomintang (southern) government based in Guangdong. Various warlord factions expressed their recognition of one of these claims by flying the flag associated with that regime.[1][2]

References

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  2. . Retrieved 2019-10-12.
  3. . Retrieved 15 November 2022.
  4. ^ Zhao Zhongfu, “Xinhai geming qianhou de dongsansheng,” Bulletin of the Institute of Modern History, Academia Sinica, Vol. 11 (Jul, 1982), 117.
  5. ^ Yang Tianshi, Haiwai fangshi lu (1998), 100.
  6. S2CID 145135065
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  7. ^ Zhao Zhongfu, “Xinhai geming qianhou de dongsansheng,” 123
  8. ^ Li Peiji, “Xinhai Guanwai geming cimoji,” Zhou Kangxie (ed.), Xinhai geming ziliao huiji, Vol. 4 (1980),
  9. ^ Chang Cheng, “Zhang Zuixiang shengping lueshu,” Zhang Tingfan, Zhang Wenge.
  10. ^ Hōten mantetsu kōsho, “Shinnin minseichō no hyōban,” 3/11/1913, GK, JACAR, Ref: B03050178000, slides 58-59; Kantō totokufu rikugun sambōbu, “chō dai 466 gō,” 6/11/1913, GK, JACAR, Ref: B03050178000, slide 71; Sai Hōten sōryoji Ochiai Kentarō, Hōtenshō
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  12. ^ Min-chʻien Tuk Zung Tyau, "China Awakened"
  13. ^ Arthur Waldron, From War to Nationalism: China's Turning Point, 1924–1925, 31–32.
  14. ^ Hao Bingrang, 34–5.
  15. ^ Hu Yuhai, 129–30, 132–4.
  16. ^ Nishimura Nario, “Nihon seifu no chūka minkoku ninshiki to Chō Gakuryō seiken,” Yamamoto Yūzō, Manshūkoku no kenkyū (1995), 12-20.
  17. ^ Hao Bingrang, Fengxi junshi, 61–2.
  18. ^ Hōten kōshochō, “Hōten jōhō dai 102gō,” 5/9/1927, GK, JACAR, Ref: B02031766600, slides 204-5.
  19. .
  20. ^ “Benye zhu-e dashi (Japanese Minister to Russia Motono ichirō) yu e-guo zhongli dachen (Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Nikolayevich Kokovtsov) guanyu qingguo shiju zhi tanhua jiyao,” in Zhongguo shehui kexueyuan jindaishi yanjiusuo Zhonghua minguo shi yanjiushi, Riben waijiao wenshu xuanyi: guanyu xinhai geming (Beijing, 1980), 107; “The American chargé d’affaires at Tokyo to the Secretary of State,” 15/10/1911, No. 893.00/566, United States Department of State: Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States with the annual message of the president transmitted to Congress December 3, 1912 (FRUS) (Washington, D.C., 1912), 50
  21. ^ Hsü Shuhsi, Essays on the Manchurian Problem, 44; Huang Dingtian, 276-7
  22. ^ F 2348/7/10, FOCP, Vol. 34, 343; Hsü Shuhsi, Essays on the Manchurian Problem, 47
  23. ^ “Mr. MacDonald to Sir C. Eliot,” 22/9/1924, FOCP, Vol. 28, 280-1.
  24. ^ “Sir C. Eliot to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston, 8/1/1923,” FOCP, Vol. 5, 352-3.
  25. .
  26. ^ Mikhail Blinov. "Chinese Civil War Armies". Paris Guide - France in the old photos: famous sights, museums and WW1 - WW2 battlefields. Retrieved 2023-07-14.
  27. ^ Mr. MacDonald to Sir C. Eliot,” 22/9/1924, FOCP, Vol. 6, 282; Tony Saich, The Origins of the First United Front in China, 142; Tang Qihua, “1924 nian zhong-e xieding yu zhong-e jiuyue feizhi wenti: yi mijian yidingshu wei zhongxin de tantao,” in Jindaishi yanjiu (2006), No. 3, 22.