First Congo War
First Congo War | |||||||
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Part of the aftermath of the Rwandan genocide and the spillover of the Burundian Civil War and the Second Sudanese Civil War | |||||||
![]() Map showing the AFDL offensive | |||||||
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Belligerents | |||||||
CNDD-FDD[3]
![]() ![]() ![]() Supported by: ![]() ![]() ![]() ![]() ![]() Mai-Mai[a] |
Mai-Mai[a] | ||||||
Commanders and leaders | |||||||
![]() ![]() ![]() ![]() ![]() ![]() ![]() | |||||||
Strength | |||||||
Zaire: c. 50,000[b] Interahamwe: 40,000–100,000 total[22] UNITA: c. 1,000[22]–2,000[6] |
AFDL: 57,000[23]
Angola: 3,000+[25] Eritrea: 1 battalion[26] | ||||||
Casualties and losses | |||||||
10,000–15,000 killed 10,000 defected[25] thousands surrender | 3,000–5,000 killed | ||||||
222,000 refugees missing[27] Total: 250,000 dead[28] |
The First Congo War[c] (1996–1997), also nicknamed Africa's First World War,[29] was a civil war and international military conflict which took place mostly in Zaire (which was renamed the Democratic Republic of the Congo in the process), with major spillovers into Sudan and Uganda. The conflict culminated in a foreign invasion that replaced Zairean president Mobutu Sese Seko with the rebel leader Laurent-Désiré Kabila. Kabila's unstable government subsequently came into conflict with his allies, setting the stage for the Second Congo War in 1998–2003.
Following years of internal strife, dictatorship and economic decline, Zaire was a dying state by 1996. The eastern parts of the country had been destabilized due to the
The situation finally escalated when Rwanda invaded Zaire in 1996 to defeat a number of rebel groups which had found refuge in the country. This invasion quickly escalated, as more states (including Uganda, Burundi, Angola, and Eritrea) joined the invasion, while a Congolese alliance of anti-Mobutu rebels was assembled.[30] Though the Zairean government attempted to put up an effective resistance, and was supported by allied militias as well as Sudan, Mobutu's regime collapsed in a matter of months.[34] Despite the war's short duration, it was marked by widespread destruction and extensive ethnic violence, with hundreds of thousands killed in the fighting and accompanying pogroms.[35]
A new government was installed, and Zaire was renamed the Democratic Republic of the Congo, but the termination of the Mobutu regime brought little political change, and Kabila found himself uneasy in the position of a proxy of his former benefactors. To avert a coup, Kabila expelled all Rwandan, Ugandan and Burundian military units from the Congo, and moved to build a coalition including Namibian, Angolan, Zimbabwean and Zambian forces, soon encompassing a string of African nations from Libya to South Africa, although their support varied.[36] The tripartite coalition responded with a second invasion of the east, largely through proxy groups. These actions constituted the catalyst for the Second Congo War the following year, although some experts prefer to view the two conflicts as one continuous war whose aftereffects continue today.[37][38]
Background
Decline of Zaire
![](http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/thumb/3/3d/Mobutu.jpg/220px-Mobutu.jpg)
As ethnic
A wave of
Mobutu's rule encountered considerable internal resistance, and given the weak central state, rebel groups could find refuge in Zaire's eastern provinces, far from the capital,
Ethnic tensions
Tensions had existed between various ethnic groups in eastern Zaire for centuries, especially between the
Tutsi who emigrated to Zaire before Congolese independence in 1960 are known as Banyamulenge, meaning "from Mulenge", and had the right to citizenship under Zairian law.[46] Tutsi who emigrated to Zaire following independence are known as Banyarwanda, although the native locals often do not distinguish between the two, calling both Banyamulenge and considering them foreigners.[45]
After coming to power in 1965, Mobutu gave the Banyamulenge political power in the east in hopes that they, as a minority, would keep a tight grip on power and prevent more populous ethnicities from forming an opposition.
Despite a strong Rwandan presence in Mobutu's government, in 1981, Zaire adopted a restrictive citizenship law which denied the Banyamulenge and Banyarwanda citizenship and therewith all political rights.[51] Though never enforced, the law greatly angered individuals of Rwandan descent and contributed to a rising sense of ethnic hatred.[47] From 1993 to 1996 Hunde, Nande, and Nyanga youth regularly attacked the Banyamulenge, leading to a total of 14,000 deaths.[52] In 1995 the Zairian Parliament ordered all peoples of Rwandan or Burundian descent repatriated to their countries of origin, including the Banyamulenge.[53] Due to political exclusion and ethnic violence, as early as 1991 the Banyamulenge developed ties to the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF), a mainly Tutsi rebel movement based in Uganda but with aspirations to power in Rwanda.[54]
Rwandan genocide
![](http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/thumb/f/f0/Rwandan_refugee_camp_in_east_Zaire.jpg/250px-Rwandan_refugee_camp_in_east_Zaire.jpg)
The most deciding event in precipitating the war was the genocide in neighbouring Rwanda in 1994, which sparked a mass exodus of refugees known as the Great Lakes refugee crisis. During the 100-day genocide, hundreds of thousands of Tutsis and sympathizers were massacred at the hands of predominantly Hutu aggressors. The genocide ended when the Hutu government in Kigali was overthrown by the Tutsi-dominated Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF).
Of those who fled Rwanda during the crisis, about 1.5 million settled in eastern Zaire.
The Hutu set up camps in eastern Zaire from which they attacked both the newly arrived Rwandan Tutsi as well as the Banyamulenge and Banyarwanda. These attacks caused about one hundred deaths a month during the first half of 1996.[57] Furthermore, the newly arrived militants were intent on returning to power in Rwanda and began launching attacks against the new regime in Kigali, which represented a serious security threat to the infant state.[58] Not only was the Mobutu government incapable of controlling the former génocidaires for previously mentioned reasons but actually supported them in training and supplying for an invasion of Rwanda,[59] forcing Kigali to act.
Banyamulenge rebellion
Given the exacerbated
While there was general unrest in eastern Zaire, the rebellion was probably not a grassroots movement; Uganda president
Banyamulenge elements and non-Tutsi militias coalesced into the
Foreign involvement
Rwanda
![](http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/thumb/8/84/Zaire_96map.png/220px-Zaire_96map.png)
According to expert observers, as well as Kagame himself, Rwanda played the largest role of a foreign actor, if not the largest role of all, in the First Congo War. Kigali was instrumental in the formation of the AFDL and sent its own troops to fight alongside the rebels. While its actions were originally sparked by the security threat posed by the Zairian-based génocidaires, Kigali was pursuing multiple goals during its invasion of Zaire.
The first and foremost of these was the suppression of génocidaires who had been launching attacks against the new Rwandan state from Zaire. Kagame claimed that Rwandan agents had discovered the plans to invade Rwanda with support from Mobutu; in response, Kigali began its intervention with the intention of dismantling the refugee camps in which the génocidaires often took refuge and destroying the structure of these anti-Rwandan elements.[63]
A second goal cited by Kagame was the overthrow of Mobutu. While partially a means to minimize the threat in eastern Zaire, the new Rwandan state also sought to set up a puppet regime in Kinshasa.[40] This goal was not particularly threatening to other states in the region because it was ostensibly a means to securing Rwandan stability and because many of them also opposed Mobutu. Kigali was further aided by the tacit support of the United States, which supported Kagame as a member of the new generation of African leaders.[40]
However, the true intentions of Rwanda are not entirely clear. Some authors have proposed that dismantling refugee camps was a means of replenishing Rwanda's depleted population and workforce following the genocide; because the destruction of the camps was followed by forced repatriation of Tutsi regardless of whether they were Rwandan or Zairian.[64] The intervention may also have been motivated by revenge; the Rwandan forces, as well as the AFDL, massacred retreating Hutu refugees in several known instances.[65] A commonly cited factor for Rwandan actions is that the RPF, which had recently come to power in Kigali, had come to see itself as the protector of the Tutsi nation and was therefore partially acting in defense of its Zairian brethren.[66][47]
Rwanda possibly also harbored ambitions to annex portions of eastern Zaire. Pasteur Bizimungu, president of Rwanda from 1994 to 2000, presented the then-US ambassador to Rwanda, Robert Gribbin, with the idea of a "Greater Rwanda." This idea purports that the ancient state of Rwanda included parts of eastern Zaire that should actually belong to Rwanda.[67] However, it appears that Rwanda never seriously attempted to annex these territories. The history of conflict in the Congo is often associated with illegal resource exploitation but, although Rwanda did benefit financially by plundering Zaire's wealth,[68] this is not usually considered their initial motivation for Rwandan intervention in the First Congo War.[69]
Uganda
As a close ally of the RPF, Uganda also played a major role in the First Congo War. Prominent members of the RPF had fought alongside Yoweri Museveni in the Ugandan Bush War that brought him to power, and Museveni allowed the RPF to use Uganda as a base during the 1990 offensive into Rwanda and subsequent civil war. Given their historical ties, the Rwandan and Ugandan governments were closely allied and Museveni worked closely with Kagame throughout the First Congo War. Ugandan soldiers were present in Zaire throughout the conflict and Museveni likely helped Kagame plan and direct the AFDL.[60]
Lt. Col.
Angola
Angola remained on the sidelines until 1997, but its entrance into the fray greatly increased the already superior strength of anti-Mobutu forces. The Angolan government chose to act primarily through the original-
It is unclear exactly how the government benefited from this relationship, other than personal enrichment for several officials, but it is certainly possible that Mobutu was unable to control the actions of some members of his government. Regardless of the reasoning in Kinshasa, Angola entered the war on the side of the rebels and was determined to overthrow the Mobutu government, which it saw as the only way to address the threat posed by the Zairian-UNITA relationship.
UNITA
Due to its ties to the Mobutu government, UNITA also participated in the First Congo War. The greatest impact that it had on the war was probably that it gave Angola reason to join the anti-Mobutu coalition. However, UNITA forces fought alongside FAZ forces in at least several instances.[74] Among other examples, Kagame claimed that his forces fought a pitched battle against UNITA near Kinshasa towards the end of the war.[75]
Others
Numerous other external actors played lesser roles in the First Congo War.
In 1997
Course of the war
1996
With active support from Rwanda, Uganda,[82] and Eritrea,[15] Kabila's AFDL was able to capture 800 x 100 km[clarification needed] of territory along the border with Rwanda, Uganda, and Burundi by 25 December 1996.[82] This occupation temporarily satisfied the rebels, because it gave them power in the east and allowed them to defend themselves against the former génocidaires. Likewise, the external actors had successfully crippled the ability of the same génocidaires to use Zaire as a base for attacks. There was a pause in the rebel advance following the acquisition of this buffer territory that lasted until Angola entered the war in February 1997.[83]
During this time, Rwanda destroyed refugee camps the génocidaires had been using as safe-bases, and forcibly repatriated Tutsi to Rwanda. It also captured many lucrative diamond and
1997
Kabila's forces launched an offensive in March 1997, and demanded that the Kinshasa government surrender. The rebels took Kasenga on 27 March. The government denied the rebels' success, starting a long pattern of false statements from the Defense Minister on the progress and conduct of the war. Negotiations were proposed in late March, and on 2 April a new Prime Minister of Zaire, Étienne Tshisekedi—a longtime rival of Mobutu—was installed.[86] Kabila, by this point in control of roughly one-quarter of the country, dismissed this as irrelevant and warned Tshisekedi that he would have no part in a new government if he accepted the post.
![](http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/thumb/a/ae/Visit_of_Laurent_D%C3%A9sir%C3%A9_Kabila%2C_President_of_the_Democratic_Republic_of_Congo%2C_to_the_EC_%28cropped2%29.jpg/220px-Visit_of_Laurent_D%C3%A9sir%C3%A9_Kabila%2C_President_of_the_Democratic_Republic_of_Congo%2C_to_the_EC_%28cropped2%29.jpg)
There are two explanations for the restart of the rebel advance in 1997. The first, and most probable, is that Angola had joined the anti-Mobutu coalition, giving it numbers and strength far superior to the FAZ, and demanding that Mobutu be removed from power. Kagame presents another, possibly secondary, reason for the march on Kinshasa: that the employment of Serbian mercenaries in the battle for Walikale proved that "Mobutu intended to wage real war against Rwanda."[87] According to this logic, Rwanda's initial concerns had been to manage the security threat in eastern Zaire but it was now forced to dispose of the hostile government in Kinshasa.
Whatever the case, once the advance resumed in 1997, there was virtually no meaningful resistance from what was left of Mobutu's army. Kabila's forces were only held back by the dilapitated state of Zaire's infrastructure. In some areas, no real roads existed; the only means of transport were infrequently used dirt paths.[88] The AFDL committed grave human rights violations, such as the carnage at a refugee camp of Hutus at Tingi-Tingi near Kisangani, where tens of thousands of refugees were massacred.[89]
Coming from the east, the AFDL advanced westward in two pincer movements. The northern one took
Throughout the rebel advance, there were attempts by the international community to negotiate a settlement. However, the AFDL did not take these negotiations seriously but instead partook so as to avoid international criticism for being unwilling to attempt a diplomatic solution while actually continuing its steady advance.[90] The FAZ, which had been weak all along, was unable to mount any serious resistance to the strong AFDL and its foreign sponsors.
Mobutu fled first to his palace at Gbadolite and then to Rabat, Morocco, where he died on 7 September 1997.[91] Kabila proclaimed himself president on 17 May, and immediately ordered a violent crackdown to restore order. He then attempted to reorganise the nation as the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC).
Aftermath
The new Congolese state under Kabila's rule proved to be disappointingly similar to Zaire under Mobutu. The economy remained in a state of severe disrepair and deteriorated further under Kabila's corrupt rule.[92] He failed to improve the government, which continued to be weak and corrupt. Instead, Kabila began a vigorous centralisation campaign, bringing renewed conflict with minority groups in the east who demanded autonomy.
Kabila also came to be seen as an instrument of the foreign regimes that put him in power. To counter this image and increase domestic support, he began to turn against his allies abroad. This culminated in the expulsion of all foreign forces from the DRC on 26 July 1998. The states with armed forces still in the DRC begrudgingly complied although some of them saw this as undermining their interests, particularly Rwanda, which had hoped to install a proxy-regime in Kinshasa.
Several factors that led to the First Congo War remained in place after Kabila's accession to power. Prominent among these were ethnic tensions in eastern DRC, where the government still had little control. There the historical animosities remained and the opinion that Banyamulenge, as well as all Tutsi, were foreigners was reinforced by the foreign occupation in their defence.[93] Furthermore, Rwanda had not been able to satisfactorily address its security concerns. By forcibly repatriating refugees, Rwanda had imported the conflict.[94]
This manifested itself in the form of a predominantly Hutu insurgency in Rwanda's western provinces that was supported by extremist elements in eastern DRC. Without troops in the DRC, Rwanda was unable to successfully combat the insurgents. In the first days of August 1998, two brigades of the new Congolese army rebelled against the government and formed rebel groups that worked closely with Kigali and Kampala. This marked the beginning of the Second Congo War.
In addition, elements of Mobutu's army and loyalists as well as other groups involved in the First Congo War retreated into the Republic of the Congo (Congo-Brazzaville), where they fought in the 1997–1999 civil war.[95][96]
See also
- Child soldiers in the Democratic Republic of Congo
- Battle of Kinsangani (1997)
Notes
- ^ a b Many Mai-Mai militias in eastern Zaire initially allied themselves with Rwanda and the AFDL against Hutu militants and refugees.[10] As soon as most Hutu were driven away, however, many Mai-Mai groups turned against Rwanda and the AFDL.[11] Despite this, some anti-Hutu Mai-Mai remained allied with Rwanda and the AFDL.[12]
- ^ Officially, the FAZ had c. 80,000 soldiers by the war's start, though the actual number was closer to about 50,000.[21][22] Of these, just 25,000 were in a condition to fight, whereas the rest was likely to flee or desert upon the first signs of combat.[21]
- ^ French: Première guerre du Congo
References
- ^ a b c Prunier (2004), pp. 376–377.
- ^ a b Toïngar, Ésaïe (2014). Idriss Deby and the Darfur Conflict. p. 119.
In 1996, President Mobutu of Zaire requested that mercenaries be sent from Chad to help defend his government from rebel forces led by Lauren Desiré Kabila. ... When a number of the troops were ambushed by Kabila and killed in defense of Mobutu's government, Mobutu paid Déby a fee in honor of their service.
- ^ Prunier (2009), pp. 116–118.
- ^ Duke, Lynne (20 May 1997). "Congo Begins Process of Rebuilding Nation". The Washington Post. p. A10. Archived from the original on 24 February 2011.
Guerrillas of Angola's former rebel movement UNITA, long supported by Mobutu in an unsuccessful war against Angola's government, also fought for Mobutu against Kabila's forces.
- ^ a b Prunier (2004), pp. 375–377.
- ^ a b Reyntjens 2009, pp. 112–113.
- ^ a b "Strategic Review for Southern Africa". University of Pretoria. 20–21. 1998.
As the conflict developed, France provided financial support to Mobutu and pushed hard for foreign intervention. However, under US pressure, France eventually terminated its call for intervention.
- ^ a b c Carayannis, Tatiana (2015). Making Sense of the Central African Republic. Zed Books.
In the waning days of Mobutu's rule, while Kabila's Rwandan- and Ugandan-backed putsch was rapidly making its way across Congo, France sought to prop up Mobutu's dying regime through covert military aid to the ailing dictator ... This covert aid was facilitated by Patassé
- ^ a b c d Reyntjens 2009, pp. 112.
- ^ Prunier (2009), pp. 117, 130, 143.
- ^ Prunier (2009), p. 130.
- ^ Prunier (2009), p. 143.
- ^ Prunier (2004), pp. 375–376.
- ^ a b Duke, Lynne (15 April 1997). "Passive Protest Stops Zaire's Capital Cold". The Washington Post. p. A14. Archived from the original on 24 February 2011.
Kabila's forces – which are indeed backed by Rwanda, Angola, Uganda and Burundi, diplomats say – are slowly advancing toward the capital from the eastern half of the country, where they have captured all the regions that produce Zaire's diamonds, gold, copper and cobalt.
- ^ a b c Plaut (2016), pp. 54–55.
- ^ a b c "Consensual Democracy" in Post-genocide Rwanda. International Crisis Group. 2001. p. 8.
In that first struggle in the Congo, Rwanda, allied with Uganda, Angola, Zimbabwe, South Africa and Burundi, had brought Laurent Désiré Kabila to power in Kinshasa
- ^ a b Reyntjens 2009, pp. 65–66.
- ^ Usanov, Artur (2013). Coltan, Congo and Conflict. Hague Centre for Strategic Studies. p. 36.
- ^ a b Makikagile, Godfrey (2006). Nyerere and Africa. New Africa Press. p. 173.
- ^ a b Prunier (2009), pp. 118, 126–127.
- ^ a b c Prunier (2009), p. 128.
- ^ a b c Thom, William G. (1999). "Congo-Zaire's 1996–97 Civil War in the Context of Evolving Patterns of Military Conflict in Africa in the Era of Independence". Journal of Conflict Studies. 19 (2).
- ^ ISBN 978-3-86099-743-7
- ^ Prunier (2004), p. 251.
- ^ a b c Abbott (2014), p. 35.
- ^ a b Plaut (2016), p. 55.
- ^ CDI: The Center for Defense Information, The Defense Monitor, "The World At War: January 1, 1998".
- ^ "Democratic Republic of Congo: War against unarmed civilians". Amnesty International. AFR 62/036/1998. 23 November 1998.
- ^ Prunier (2009), p. 72.
- ^ a b Abbott (2014), pp. 33–35.
- ^ Prunier (2009), pp. 77, 83.
- ^ Abbott (2014), pp. 23–24, 33.
- ^ Abbott (2014), pp. 23–24, 33–35.
- ^ Abbott (2014), pp. 34–35.
- ^ Prunier (2009), pp. 143–148.
- ^ Abbott (2014), pp. 36–39.
- ^ Reyntjens 2009, p. 194.
- ^ "DISARMAMENT: SADC Moves into Unknown Territory". 19 August 1998. Archived from the original on 18 June 2020. Retrieved 23 November 2020.
- ^ Gondola, Ch. Didier. The History of Congo. Westport: Greenwood Press, 2002. p. 6
- ^ a b c Kennes 2005, p. 147.
- ^ a b Kennes 2005, p. 157.
- ^
"Congo's Curse". IRIN. 5 October 2010. Archived from the original on 27 August 2010. Retrieved 15 October 2015.
Ex-president Mobutu once asked his soldiers why they needed salaries when they had guns [...]
- ^ Gribbin 2005, p. 190.
- ^ Vlassenroot 2006, p. 53.
- ^ a b Lemarchand 2009, p. 32.
- ^ Vlassenroot 2002.
- ^ a b c d e f g Autesserre, Séverine (2008), "The Trouble With Congo: How Local Disputes Fuel Regional Conflict.", Foreign Affairs, vol. 87, no. 3
- ISBN 978-1-84813-786-8. Archivedfrom the original on 7 May 2018 – via Google Books.(no page numbers)
- ^ Lemarchand 2009, p. 13.
- ^ "Conflict and environmental insecurity in the North Kivu province of the Democratic Republic of the Congo – ACCORD". accord.org.za. Archived from the original on 29 January 2018. Retrieved 7 May 2018.
- ^ Lemarchand 2009, pp. 15–16.
- ^ Lemarchand 2009, pp. 13–14.
- ^ Lemarchand 2009, p. 16.
- ^ Vlassenroot 2002, p. 508.
- ^ Reyntjens 2009, p. 45.
- ^ Mugnier, David (3 December 2007). "North Kivu: How to End a War". International Crisis Group. Archived from the original on 14 October 2022. Retrieved 14 October 2022.
- ^ Gribbin 2005, p. 143.
- ^ Reyntjens 2009, p. 30.
- ^ Reyntjens 2009, p. 18.
- ^ a b c Reyntjens 2009, p. 48.
- ^ Reyntjens 2009, p. 49.
- ^ Afoaku, Osita. "Congo's Rebels: Their Origins, Motivations, and Strategies." Ed. John F. Clark. The Africa Stakes of the Congo War. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002. 109-28. p. 121
- ^ a b Pomfret, John. "Rwandans Led Revolt in Congo; Defense Minister Says Arms, Troops Supplied for Anti-Mobutu Drive." Washington Post. 9 July 1997: A1.
- ^ Gribbin 2005, pp. 107, 201.
- ^ a b Gribbin 2005, pp. 213–214.
- ^ Longman, Timothy. "The Complex Reasons for Rwanda's Engagement in Congo." Ed. John F. Clark. The African Stakes of the Congo War. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002. 129-44. p. 131
- ^ Gribbin 2005, pp. 175–176.
- ^ Reyntjens 2009, pp. 147–148.
- ^ a b Samset, Ingrid. 'Conflict of Interests or Interests in Conflict? Diamonds & War in the DRC.' Review of African Political Economy. 2002. 463–480. pp. 470–471
- ^ Reyntjens 2009, pp. 54, 58.
- ^ Reyntjens 2009, p. 59.
- ^ Gribbin 2005, p. 218.
- ^ Reyntjens 2009, p. 62.
- ^ Reyntjens 2009, p. 63.
- ^ Pomfret, John. "Rwandans Led Revolt in Congo; Defense Minister Says Arms, Troops Supplied for Anti-Mobutu Drive." Washington Post. 9 July 1997: A1
- ^ Reyntjens 2009, pp. 42, 61.
- ^ Reyntjens 2009, p. 44.
- ^ "26th Marine Expeditionary Unit deployment history". United States Marine Corps. Archived from the original on 26 October 2020. Retrieved 7 November 2020.
- ^ "III. Operational Primacy: 1997 in Review". United States Navy. Archived from the original on 22 March 2018. Retrieved 22 March 2018.
- ISBN 978-1-4299-0180-2.
- ISBN 978-0-16-054389-0. Archivedfrom the original on 1 March 2023. Retrieved 25 November 2022.
- ^ a b Reyntjens 2009, p. 55.
- ^ Reyntjens 2009, pp. 61–63.
- ^ Reyntjens 2009, p. 100.
- ^ Democratic Republic of Congo. A long-standing crisis spinning out of control Archived 22 November 2018 at the Wayback Machine . Amnesty International, 3 September 1998. p. 9. AI Index: AFR 62/33/98
- ^ Essays, UK (November 2018). "Study on the First And Second Congo War History Essay". Nottingham, UK: UKEssays.com. Archived from the original on 10 June 2020. Retrieved 29 October 2019.
- ^ Gribbin 2005, p. 213.
- ISBN 978-1-61048-881-5.
- ^ ISBN 978-0-06-220011-2.
- ^ Reyntjens 2009, p. 130.
- ^ Howard W. French (8 September 1997). "Mobutu Sese Seko, Zairian Ruler, Is Dead in Exile in Morocco at 66". The New York Times. Archived from the original on 31 December 2016. Retrieved 30 December 2016.
- ^ Kennes 2005, p. 154.
- ^ Longman, Timothy. "The Complex Reasons for Rwanda's Engagement in Congo." Ed. John F. Clark. The African Stakes of the Congo War. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002. 129-44. pp. 131–32
- ^ Vlassenroot 2002, p. 173.
- ^ Political Handbook of Africa. CQ Press. 2006. p. 259.
Lissouba's own fighters also were reported to include former Mobutu forces
- ^ Cook, Alethia (2017). Conflict Dynamics. University of Georgia Press. p. 61.
Angola came to his aid with 2,500 troops in August 1997. Sassou also received help from Chad, Gabon, France, and Elf-Congo ... as well as South African and Serbian mercenaries, the former Rwandan government forces, Rwandan Interahamwe militia and elements of Mobutu's Zairian army
Bibliography
- Abbott, Peter (2014). Modern African Wars (4): The Congo 1960–2002. Oxford; New York City: Osprey Publishing. ISBN 978-1-78200-076-1..
- Gribbin, Robert E. (2005). In the Aftermath of Genocide: The U.S. Role in Rwanda. Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training. ISBN 978-0-595-34411-6.
- Gondola, Ch. Didier. (2002) The History of Congo, Greenwood Press, ISBN 0-313-31696-1. Covers events up to January 2002.
- Kennes, Erik (2005). "The Democratic Republic of the Congo: Structures of Greed, Networks of Need". In Arnson, Cynthia; Zartman, I. William; Arnson, Cynthia J.; Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars (eds.). Rethinking the economics of war: the intersection of need, creed, and greed. Woodrow Wilson Center Press [u.a.] ISBN 978-0-8018-8297-5.
- Lemarchand, René (2009). The dynamics of violence in Central Africa. National and ethnic conflict in the 21st century. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania press. ISBN 978-0-8122-4120-4.
- Plaut, Martin (2016). Understanding Eritrea: Inside Africa's Most Repressive State. Oxford: ISBN 978-0-19-066959-1.
- Prunier, Gérard (July 2004). "Rebel Movements and Proxy Warfare: Uganda, Sudan and the Congo (1986-99)". African Affairs. 103 (412): 359–383. JSTOR 3518562.
- Prunier, Gérard (2009). Africa's World War: Congo, the Rwandan Genocide, and the Making of a Continental Catastrophe: Congo, the Rwandan Genocide, and the Making of a Continental Catastrophe. Oxford: Oxford University Press. ISBN 978-0-19-970583-2.
- Reyntjens, Filip (2009). The Great African War: Congo and Regional Geopolitics, 1996-2006. ISBN 978-0-521-11128-7.
- Vlassenroot, Koen (2002). "Citizenship, Identity Formation & Conflict in South Kivu: The Case of the Banyamulenge". Review of African Political Economy. 29 (93/94): 499–515. JSTOR 4006793.
- Vlassenroot, Koen (2006). "Conflict & Militia Formation in Eastern Congo". In Kaarsholm, Preben (ed.). Violence, political culture & development in Africa. Oxford: J. Currey. pp. 49–65. ISBN 978-0-85255-894-2.
Further reading
- Clark, John F. (2002) The African Stakes in the Congo War. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. ISBN 1-4039-6723-7.
- Edgerton, Robert G. (2002) The Troubled Heart of Africa: A History of the Congo St. Martin's Press. ISBN 0-312-30486-2.
- Michael Nest with François Grignon and Emizet F. Kisangani: The Democratic Republic of Congo: Economic Dimensions of War and Peace, Lynne Rienner, 2006 ISBN 1-58826-233-2
- Jackson, Stephen. 'Making a Killing: Criminality & Coping in the Kivu War Economy.' Review of African Political Economy. 2002.
- Samset, Ingrid. 'Conflict of Interests or Interests in Conflict? Diamonds & War in the DRC.' Review of African Political Economy. 2002. 463–480
- Stearns, Jason (2011). Dancing in the Glory of Monsters: The Collapse of the Congo and the Great War of Africa. New York: PublicAffairs. ISBN 978-1-58648-929-8.
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