First Punic War
First Punic War | |||||||||
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Part of the Punic Wars | |||||||||
The Western Mediterranean just before the start of the war in 264 BC: Rome is shown in red, Carthage in grey, and Syracuse in green | |||||||||
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Belligerents | |||||||||
Rome | Carthage |
The First Punic War (264–241 BC) was the first of
The war began in 264 BC with the Romans gaining a foothold on Sicily at
The war continued, with neither side able to gain a decisive advantage. The Carthaginians attacked and recaptured Akragas in 255 BC but, not believing they could hold the city, they razed and abandoned it. The Romans rapidly rebuilt their fleet, adding 220 new ships, and captured Panormus (modern
A treaty was agreed. By its terms Carthage paid large reparations and Sicily was annexed as a Roman province. Henceforth Rome was the leading military power in the western Mediterranean, and increasingly the Mediterranean region as a whole. The immense effort of building 1,000 galleys during the war laid the foundation for Rome's maritime dominance for 600 years. The end of the war sparked a major but unsuccessful revolt within the Carthaginian Empire. The unresolved strategic competition between Rome and Carthage led to the eruption of the Second Punic War in 218 BC.
Primary sources
The term Punic comes from the Latin word Punicus (or Poenicus), meaning "Phoenician", and is a reference to the Carthaginians' Phoenician ancestry.[1] The main source for almost every aspect of the First Punic War is the historian Polybius (c. 200 – c. 118 BC), a Greek sent to Rome in 167 BC as a hostage.[2][3] His works include a now-lost manual on military tactics,[4] but he is known today for The Histories, written sometime after 146 BC or about a century after the end of the war.[2][5] Polybius's work is considered broadly objective and largely neutral as between Carthaginian and Roman points of view.[6][7]
Carthaginian written records
Since 2010, 19 bronze warship
Background
The
In 289 BC a group of Italian
The war began with the Romans landing on Sicily in 264 BC. Despite the Carthaginian naval advantage, the Roman crossing of the
Armies
Adult male Roman citizens were liable for military service; most would serve as
Carthaginian citizens served in their army only if there was a direct threat to the city. In most circumstances Carthage recruited foreigners to make up its army. Many would be from North Africa which provided several types of fighters including: close-order infantry equipped with large shields, helmets, short swords and long thrusting spears; javelin-armed light infantry skirmishers; close-order shock cavalry[note 3] (also known as "heavy cavalry") carrying spears; and light cavalry skirmishers who threw javelins from a distance and avoided close combat.[50][51] Both Spain and Gaul provided experienced infantry; unarmoured troops who would charge ferociously, but had a reputation for breaking off if a combat was protracted.[50][52][note 4] Most of the Carthaginian infantry would fight in a tightly packed formation known as a phalanx, usually forming two or three lines.[51] Specialist slingers were recruited from the Balearic Islands.[50][53] The Carthaginians also employed war elephants; North Africa had indigenous African forest elephants at the time.[note 5][52][55] The sources are not clear as to whether they carried towers containing fighting men.[56]
Getting the oarsmen to row as a unit, let alone to execute more complex battle manoeuvres, required long and arduous training.
All warships were equipped with rams, a triple set of 60-centimetre-wide (2 ft) bronze blades weighing up to 270 kilograms (600 lb) positioned at the waterline. In the century prior to the Punic Wars, boarding had become increasingly common and ramming had declined, as the larger and heavier vessels adopted in this period lacked the speed and manoeuvrability necessary to ram, while their sturdier construction reduced the ram's effect even in case of a successful attack. The Roman adaptation of the corvus was a continuation of this trend and compensated for their initial disadvantage in ship-manoeuvring skills. The added weight in the prow compromised both the ship's manoeuvrability and its seaworthiness, and in rough sea conditions the corvus became useless.[66][67][68]
Sicily 264–256 BC
Much of the war was to be fought on, or in the waters near, Sicily. Away from the coasts, its hilly and rugged terrain made manoeuvring large forces difficult and favoured defence over offence. Land operations were largely confined to raids, sieges, and interdiction; in 23 years of war on Sicily there were only two full-scale pitched battles – Akragas in 262 BC and Panormus in 250 BC. Garrison duty and land blockades were the most common operations for both armies.[69]
It was the long-standing Roman procedure to appoint two men each year, known as consuls, to each lead an army. In 263 BC both consuls were sent to Sicily with a force of 40,000.[70] Syracuse was again besieged, and with no Carthaginian assistance anticipated, Syracuse rapidly made peace with the Romans: it became a Roman ally, paid an indemnity of 100 talents of silver[note 6] and, perhaps most importantly, agreed to help supply the Roman army in Sicily.[72] Following the defection of Syracuse, several small Carthaginian dependencies switched to the Romans.[46][73] Akragas (Latin: Agrigentum; modern Agrigento), a port city halfway along the south coast of Sicily, was chosen by the Carthaginians as their strategic centre. The Romans marched on it in 262 BC and besieged it.[45] The Romans had an inadequate supply system, partly because the Carthaginian naval supremacy prevented them from shipping supplies by sea, and they were not in any case accustomed to feeding an army as large as 40,000 men. At harvest time most of the army was dispersed over a wide area to harvest the crops and to forage. The Carthaginians, commanded by Hannibal Gisco, sortied in force, taking the Romans by surprise and penetrating their camp; the Romans rallied and routed the Carthaginians; after this experience both sides were more guarded.[74]
Meanwhile, Carthage had recruited an army, which assembled in Africa and was shipped to Sicily. It was composed of 50,000 infantry, 6,000 cavalry and 60 elephants, and was commanded by
After this success for the Romans, the war became fragmented for several years, with minor successes for each side, but no clear focus. In part this was because the Romans diverted many of their resources to an ultimately fruitless campaign against Corsica and Sardinia, and then into the equally fruitless expedition to Africa.
Rome builds a fleet
The war in Sicily reached a stalemate, as the Carthaginians focused on defending their well-fortified towns and cities; these were mostly on the coast and so could be supplied and reinforced without the Romans being able to use their superior army to interdict.[83][84] The focus of the war shifted to the sea, where the Romans had little experience; on the few occasions they had previously felt the need for a naval presence they had usually relied on small squadrons provided by their Latin or Greek allies.[45][85][86] In 260 BC Romans set out to construct a fleet and used a shipwrecked Carthaginian quinquereme as a blueprint for their own.[87] As novice shipwrights, the Romans built copies that were heavier than the Carthaginian vessels, making them much slower and less maneuvrable.[88]
The Romans built 120 warships and despatched them to Sicily in 260 BC for their crews to carry out basic training. One of the consuls for the year,
Scipio's fellow consul,
From early 262 BC Carthaginian ships had been raiding the Italian coast from bases on Sardinia and Corsica.[97] The year after Mylae, 259 BC, the consul Lucius Cornelius Scipio led part of the fleet against Aléria in Corsica and captured it. He then attacked Ulbia on Sardinia, but was repulsed,[77] and also lost Aléria.[98] In 258 BC a stronger Roman fleet engaged a smaller Carthaginian fleet at the Battle of Sulci off the city of Sulci, in western Sardinia, and inflicted a heavy defeat. The Carthaginian commander Hannibal Gisco, who abandoned his men and fled to Sulci, was later captured by his soldiers and crucified. Despite this victory, the Romans – who were attempting to support simultaneous offensives against both Sardinia and Sicily – were unable to exploit it, and the attack on Carthaginian-held Sardinia petered out.[77]
In 257 BC the Roman fleet happened to be anchored off Tyndaris in north-east Sicily when the Carthaginian fleet, unaware of its presence, sailed past in loose formation. The Roman commander, Gaius Atilius Regulus, ordered an immediate attack, initiating the Battle of Tyndaris. This led to the Roman fleet in turn putting to sea in a disordered manner. The Carthaginians responded rapidly, ramming and sinking nine of the leading ten Roman ships. As the main Roman force came into action they sank eight Carthaginian ships and captured ten. The Carthaginians withdrew, again being faster than the Romans and so able to make off without further loss.[99] The Romans then raided both the Liparis and Malta.[100]
Invasion of Africa
Rome's naval victories at Mylae and Sulci, and their frustration at the stalemate in Sicily, led them to adopt a sea-based strategy and to develop a plan to invade the Carthaginian heartland in North Africa and threaten Carthage (close to
The Carthaginians knew of the Romans' intentions and mustered all their 350 warships under Hanno the Great and Hamilcar, off the south coast of Sicily to intercept them. With a combined total of about 680 warships carrying up to 290,000 crew and marines, the ensuing Battle of Cape Ecnomus was possibly the largest naval battle in history by the number of combatants involved.[107][108][109] At the start of the battle the Carthaginians took the initiative, hoping their superior ship handling skills would tell.[110][111] After a day of prolonged and confused fighting the Carthaginians were defeated, losing 30 ships sunk and 64 captured to Roman losses of 24 ships sunk.[112]
After the victory the Roman army, commanded by Regulus, landed in Africa near Aspis (modern Kelibia) on the Cape Bon Peninsula and began ravaging the Carthaginian countryside. After a brief siege, Aspis was captured.[113][114] Most of the Roman ships returned to Sicily, leaving Regulus with 15,000 infantry and 500 cavalry to continue the war in Africa; Regulus laid siege to the city of Adys.[114] The Carthaginians had recalled Hamilcar from Sicily with 5,000 infantry and 500 cavalry. Hamilcar, Hasdrubal and a third general called Bostar were placed in joint command of an army which was strong in cavalry and elephants and was approximately the same size as the Roman force. The Carthaginians established a camp on a hill near Adys.[115] The Romans carried out a night march and launched a surprise dawn attack on the camp from two directions. After confused fighting the Carthaginians broke and fled. Their losses are unknown, although their elephants and cavalry escaped with few casualties.[116]
The Romans followed up and captured Tunis, only 16 km (10 mi) from Carthage. From Tunis the Romans raided and devastated the immediate area around Carthage. In despair, the Carthaginians
Sicily 255–248 BC
Having lost most of their fleet in the storm of 255 BC, the Romans rapidly rebuilt it, adding 220 new ships.
In 253 BC the Romans changed their focus to Africa again and carried out several raids. They lost another 150 ships, from a fleet of 220, to a storm while returning from raiding the North African coast east of Carthage. They rebuilt again.
In late summer 251 BC
Encouraged by their victory at Panormus, the Romans moved against the main Carthaginian base on Sicily, Lilybaeum, in 249 BC. A large army commanded by the year's consuls
Pulcher decided to attack the Carthaginian fleet, which was in the harbour of the nearby city of Drepana (modern Trapani). The Roman fleet sailed by night to carry out a surprise attack, but became scattered in the dark. The Carthaginian commander Adherbal was able to lead his fleet out to sea before they were trapped and counter-attacked in the Battle of Drepana. The Romans were pinned against the shore and after a hard day's fighting were heavily defeated by the more manoeuvrable Carthaginian ships with their better-trained crews. It was Carthage's greatest naval victory of the war.[141] Carthage turned to the maritime offensive, inflicting another heavy naval defeat at the Battle of Phintias and all but swept the Romans from the sea.[142] It was to be seven years before Rome again attempted to field a substantial fleet, while Carthage put most of its ships into reserve to save money and free up manpower.[143][144]
Conclusion
By 248 BC the Carthaginians held only two cities on Sicily: Lilybaeum and Drepana; these were well-fortified and situated on the west coast, where they could be supplied and reinforced without the Romans being able to use their superior army to interfere.[83][145] When Hamilcar Barca[note 9] took command of the Carthaginians on Sicily in 247 BC he was only given a small army and the Carthaginian fleet was gradually withdrawn. Hostilities between Roman and Carthaginian forces declined to small-scale land operations, which suited the Carthaginian strategy. Hamilcar employed combined arms tactics in a Fabian strategy from his base at Eryx, north of Drepana. This guerrilla warfare kept the Roman legions pinned down and preserved Carthage's foothold in Sicily.[147][148][149]
After more than 20 years of war, both states were financially and demographically exhausted.
In late 243 BC, realizing they would not capture Drepana and Lilybaeum unless they could extend their blockade to the sea, the Senate decided to build a new fleet.[154] With the state's coffers exhausted, the Senate approached Rome's wealthiest citizens for loans to finance the construction of one ship each, repayable from the reparations to be imposed on Carthage once the war was won. The result was a fleet of approximately 200 quinqueremes, built, equipped, and crewed without government expense.[155] The Romans modelled the ships of their new fleet on a captured blockade runner with especially good qualities.[154] By now, the Romans were experienced at shipbuilding, and with a proven vessel as a model produced high-quality quinqueremes.[156] Importantly, the corvus was abandoned,[154] which improved the ships' speed and handling but forced a change in tactics on the Romans; they would need to be superior sailors, rather than superior soldiers, to beat the Carthaginians.[157][158][159]
The Carthaginians raised a larger fleet which they intended to use to run supplies into Sicily. It would then embark much of the Carthaginian army stationed there to use as marines. It was intercepted by the Roman fleet under
Aftermath
The war lasted 23 years, the longest war in Romano-Greek history and the greatest naval war of the ancient world.[165] In its aftermath Carthage attempted to avoid paying in full the foreign troops who had fought its war. Eventually they rebelled and were joined by many disgruntled local groups.[166][167][168] They were put down with great difficulty and considerable savagery. In 237 BC Carthage prepared an expedition to recover the island of Sardinia, which had been lost to the rebels.[169][170] Cynically, the Romans stated they considered this an act of war. Their peace terms were the ceding of Sardinia and Corsica and the payment of an additional 1,200-talent indemnity.[note 12] Weakened by 30 years of war, Carthage agreed rather than enter into a conflict with Rome again; the additional payment and the renunciation of Sardinia and Corsica were added to the treaty as a codicil.[1][171] These actions by Rome fuelled resentment in Carthage, which was not reconciled to Rome's perception of its situation, and are considered contributory factors in the outbreak of the Second Punic War.[171]
The leading role of Hamilcar Barca in the defeat of the mutinous foreign troops and African rebels greatly enhanced the prestige and power of the
For Rome, the end of the First Punic War marked the start of its expansion beyond the Italian Peninsula. Sicily became the first
Notes, citations and sources
Notes
- ^ Sources other than Polybius are discussed by Bernard Mineo in "Principal Literary Sources for the Punic Wars (apart from Polybius)".[17]
- ^ This could be increased to 5,000 in some circumstances.[47]
- ^ "Shock" troops are those trained and used to close rapidly with an opponent, with the intention of breaking them before or immediately upon contact.[49]
- ^ The Spanish used a heavy throwing spear which the Romans were later to adopt as the pilum.[50]
- ^ These elephants were typically about 2.5-metre-high (8 ft) at the shoulder, and should not be confused with the larger African bush elephant.[54]
- ^ 100 talents was approximately 2,600 kilograms (2.6 long tons) of silver.[71]
- ^ The figures for Carthaginian losses are taken from Polybius. Other ancient sources give 30 or 31 ships captured and 13 or 14 sunk.[96]
- ^ This assumes, per G. K. Tipps, that all 114 captured Carthaginian vessels were sailing with the Romans.[119]
- ^ Hamilcar Barca was the father of Hannibal.[146]
- ^ 2,000 talents was approximately 52,000 kilograms (51 long tons) of silver.[71]
- ^ 3,200 talents was approximately 82,000 kilograms (81 long tons) of silver.[71]
- ^ 1,200 talents was approximately 30,000 kg (30 long tons) of silver.[71]
Citations
- ^ a b c Sidwell & Jones 1997, p. 16.
- ^ a b Goldsworthy 2006, p. 20.
- ^ a b Tipps 1985, p. 432.
- ^ Shutt 1938, p. 53.
- ^ Walbank 1990, pp. 11–12.
- ^ Lazenby 1996, pp. x–xi.
- ^ Hau 2016, pp. 23–24.
- ^ Goldsworthy 2006, p. 23.
- ^ Shutt 1938, p. 55.
- ^ a b Goldsworthy 2006, p. 21.
- ^ a b Goldsworthy 2006, pp. 20–21.
- ^ Lazenby 1996, pp. x–xi, 82–84.
- ^ Tipps 1985, pp. 432–433.
- ^ Curry 2012, p. 34.
- ^ Hoyos 2015, p. 102.
- ^ Goldsworthy 2006, p. 22.
- ^ a b Mineo 2015, pp. 111–127.
- ^ Goldsworthy 2006, pp. 23, 98.
- ^ RPM Foundation 2020.
- ^ Tusa & Royal 2012, p. 12.
- ^ Prag 2013.
- ^ a b Murray 2019.
- ^ Tusa & Royal 2012, pp. 12, 26, 31–32.
- ^ Tusa & Royal 2012, p. 39.
- ^ Tusa & Royal 2012, pp. 35–36.
- ^ Tusa & Royal 2012, pp. 39–42.
- ^ Tusa & Royal 2012, pp. 45–46.
- ^ Miles 2011, pp. 157–158.
- ^ Bagnall 1999, pp. 21–22.
- ^ Goldsworthy 2006, pp. 29–30.
- ^ Miles 2011, pp. 115, 132.
- ^ Goldsworthy 2006, pp. 25–26.
- ^ Miles 2011, pp. 94, 160, 163, 164–165.
- ^ Goldsworthy 2006, pp. 69–70.
- ^ Warmington 1993, p. 165.
- ^ Bagnall 1999, p. 44.
- ^ Bagnall 1999, pp. 42–45.
- ^ Rankov 2015, p. 150.
- ^ Scullard 2006, p. 544.
- ^ Starr 1991, p. 479.
- ^ Warmington 1993, pp. 168–169.
- ^ Lazenby 1996, pp. 48–49.
- ^ Bagnall 1999, p. 52.
- ^ Bagnall 1999, pp. 52–53.
- ^ a b c d e Miles 2011, p. 179.
- ^ a b Warmington 1993, p. 171.
- ^ Bagnall 1999, p. 23.
- ^ Bagnall 1999, pp. 22–25.
- ^ Jones 1987, p. 1.
- ^ a b c d Goldsworthy 2006, p. 32.
- ^ a b Koon 2015, p. 80.
- ^ a b Bagnall 1999, p. 9.
- ^ Bagnall 1999, p. 8.
- ^ Miles 2011, p. 240.
- ^ Lazenby 1996, p. 27.
- ^ Sabin 1996, p. 70, n. 76.
- ^ Goldsworthy 2006, p. 98.
- ^ Lazenby 1996, pp. 27–28.
- ^ Goldsworthy 2006, p. 104.
- ^ Goldsworthy 2006, p. 100.
- ^ a b Tipps 1985, p. 435.
- ^ a b Casson 1995, p. 121.
- ^ Goldsworthy 2006, pp. 102–103.
- ^ Casson 1995, pp. 278–280.
- ^ de Souza 2008, p. 358.
- ^ a b Miles 2011, p. 178.
- ^ Wallinga 1956, pp. 77–90.
- ^ Goldsworthy 2006, pp. 100–101, 103.
- ^ a b Goldsworthy 2006, p. 82.
- ^ Goldsworthy 2006, p. 74.
- ^ a b c d Lazenby 1996, p. 158.
- ^ Erdkamp 2015, p. 71.
- ^ Goldsworthy 2006, pp. 72–73.
- ^ Goldsworthy 2006, p. 77.
- ^ Warmington 1993, pp. 171–172.
- ^ Miles 2011, pp. 179–180.
- ^ a b c Bagnall 1999, p. 65.
- ^ Bagnall 1999, pp. 65–66.
- ^ Lazenby 1996, pp. 75, 79.
- ^ Goldsworthy 2006, pp. 82–83.
- ^ Lazenby 1996, p. 75.
- ^ Lazenby 1996, pp. 77–78.
- ^ a b Bagnall 1999, pp. 64–66.
- ^ Goldsworthy 2006, p. 97.
- ^ Bagnall 1999, p. 66.
- ^ Goldsworthy 2006, pp. 91–92, 97.
- ^ Goldsworthy 2006, pp. 97, 99–100.
- ^ Murray 2011, p. 69.
- ^ Harris 1979, pp. 184–185.
- ^ Miles 2011, p. 181.
- ^ Lazenby 1996, p. 67.
- ^ Lazenby 1996, p. 68.
- ^ Miles 2011, p. 182.
- ^ Lazenby 1996, pp. 70–71.
- ^ a b Bagnall 1999, p. 63.
- ^ Lazenby 1996, pp. 73–74.
- ^ Bagnall 1999, p. 58.
- ^ Rankov 2015, p. 154.
- ^ Goldsworthy 2006, pp. 109–110.
- ^ Lazenby 1996, p. 78.
- ^ Rankov 2015, p. 155.
- ^ Goldsworthy 2006, p. 110.
- ^ Lazenby 1996, p. 83.
- ^ Tipps 1985, p. 434.
- ^ Walbank 1959, p. 10.
- ^ Lazenby 1996, pp. 84–85.
- ^ Goldsworthy 2006, pp. 110–111.
- ^ Lazenby 1996, p. 87.
- ^ Tipps 1985, p. 436.
- ^ Goldsworthy 2006, pp. 112–113.
- ^ Tipps 1985, p. 459.
- ^ Bagnall 1999, p. 69.
- ^ Warmington 1993, p. 176.
- ^ a b Miles 2011, p. 186.
- ^ Goldsworthy 2006, p. 85.
- ^ Goldsworthy 2006, p. 86.
- ^ Goldsworthy 2006, p. 87.
- ^ a b Miles 2011, p. 188.
- ^ a b c Tipps 1985, p. 438.
- ^ Miles 2011, p. 189.
- ^ Erdkamp 2015, p. 66.
- ^ Lazenby 1996, pp. 112, 117.
- ^ a b Miles 2011, pp. 189–190.
- ^ Lazenby 1996, p. 114.
- ^ Lazenby 1996, pp. 114–116, 169.
- ^ Rankov 2015, p. 158.
- ^ Bagnall 1999, p. 80.
- ^ Lazenby 1996, p. 118.
- ^ a b Rankov 2015, p. 159.
- ^ Crawford 1974, p. 292, 293.
- ^ Goldsworthy 2006, p. 93.
- ^ Lazenby 1996, p. 169.
- ^ Bagnall 1999, p. 82.
- ^ Bagnall 1999, pp. 82–83.
- ^ Goldsworthy 2006, pp. 93–94.
- ^ Miles 2011, p. 190.
- ^ Goldsworthy 2006, p. 117.
- ^ Bagnall 1999, p. 85.
- ^ Bagnall 1999, pp. 84–86.
- ^ Goldsworthy 2006, pp. 117–118.
- ^ Goldsworthy 2006, pp. 117–121.
- ^ Bagnall 1999, pp. 88–91.
- ^ Goldsworthy 2006, pp. 121–122.
- ^ Rankov 2015, p. 163.
- ^ Goldsworthy 2006, pp. 94–95.
- ^ Lazenby 1996, p. 165.
- ^ Lazenby 1996, p. 144.
- ^ Bagnall 1999, pp. 92–94.
- ^ Goldsworthy 2006, p. 95.
- ^ Bringmann 2007, p. 127.
- ^ Bagnall 1999, p. 92.
- ^ Bagnall 1999, p. 91.
- ^ Goldsworthy 2006, p. 131.
- ^ a b c Miles 2011, p. 195.
- ^ Lazenby 1996, p. 49.
- ^ Goldsworthy 2006, p. 124.
- ^ Lazenby 1996, p. 150.
- ^ Casson 1991, p. 150.
- ^ Bagnall 1999, p. 95.
- ^ a b Miles 2011, p. 196.
- ^ Bagnall 1999, p. 96.
- ^ Goldsworthy 2006, pp. 125–126.
- ^ a b Bagnall 1999, p. 97.
- ^ Lazenby 1996, p. 157.
- ^ Lazenby 1996, p. x.
- ^ Bagnall 1999, pp. 112–114.
- ^ Goldsworthy 2006, pp. 133–134.
- ^ Hoyos 2000, p. 371.
- ^ Goldsworthy 2006, p. 135.
- ^ Miles 2011, pp. 209, 212–213.
- ^ a b Lazenby 1996, p. 175.
- ^ a b Collins 1998, p. 13.
- ^ Goldsworthy 2006, pp. 152–155.
- ^ Hoyos 2015, p. 211.
- ^ Goldsworthy 2006, p. 136.
- ^ Allen & Myers 1890, p. 111.
- ^ Miles 2011, p. 213.
- ^ Goldsworthy 2006, pp. 128–129, 357, 359–360.
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Further reading
- Biggs, T. (2017). "Primus Romanorum: Origin Stories, Fictions of Primacy, and the First Punic War". Classical Philology. 112 (3): 350–367. S2CID 164526422.
- Dexter, Hoyos (1998). Unplanned Wars: The Origins of the First and Second Punic Wars. Berlin and New York: Walter de Gruyter. ISBN 978-3-11-080835-3.
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