Food power
In
Food power is an integral part of the
Historical background
There are four nations in the world that export enough agriculture to exert this hypothetical food power: the
Policy
Food politics are the political aspects of the production, control, regulation, inspection and distribution of food. The politics can be affected by the ethical, cultural, medical and environmental disputes concerning proper farming, agricultural and retailing methods and regulations. Food power is an integral part of the politics of food.[3]
“Food is a weapon”, stated Earl Butz, the United States Secretary of Agriculture, in 1974.[4] OPEC's use of oil as a political weapon brought on the possibility for America to use food as a tool against other states and to further the US's goals.[4] There are alternative uses of food power as well. An importer can refuse to continue import unless political concessions are made. This would have the same effects that an exporter refusing to export would have.[3] An example of this would be American reduction of the Cuban sugar quota. In simple terms, the demand concentration (one importer being the dominant buyer) and supply dispersion (several exporters competing to sell the same product) an importer can try to use this exchange politically to their favor; this is especially effective if the exporter has little else so export (low action independence).[3]
Food power and food security
Food power and embargoes
An
In the early 1980s, the United States posed a
Another example of an embargo is the United States
Employment
Structural conditions
Food power can only be used effectively if certain structural conditions apply:[3]
- Scarcity: If demand is high and supply is limited the value of a given commodity increases. The price often reflects the potential of the goods as a weapon;[3] as it indicates the importance attached to it. Example: If a consumer is prepared to pay a high price for monetary terms he may also be willing to pay a high price in political concessions.
- Supply Concentration: Supply should only be in the hands of few producers/ sellers, as this makes possible for limited competition, price fixes, or potentially a monopoly.[3]
- Demand Dispersion: Allows sellers to play the consumers against each other as well as increase prices or make terms conditional.[3] This favors the use of economic goods food as a weapon.[3]
- Action Independence: In order to ensure affectivity the seller/producer most control his own assets. Either the seller/producer must be able to control the production process, perhaps through governmental control over companies carrying out the production), or he must have access to means on the other dimensions to ensure that he can maintain or extend control over his assets.[11]
The four conditions listed above MUST be simultaneously present in order to turn an economic asset food into a political instrument.[12] This does not necessarily mean that the asset will be used whenever the four conditions above are present. Such a decision would be considered only if there were further conditions, for example, the nature of a given conflict and judgment, goals, alternative means, and judgment of utility.[12]
Employment as an economic weapon
There are several uses for employing economic weapons against one country or another. One use for using economic weapons would concern the seller/buyer bargaining on the conditions of a business contract.[12] This would include price, transportation, timetable for consignment and payment, etc. Although this is an example of the successful application of food power, it is not a political objective.[12] Another use concerns the economic objectives other than these relating to the transaction of goods; to the general economic policy of the buyer.[12] This would be balance of payments, general problems, such as inflation or taxation and land holding. What distinguishes this from the first is the fact that there is no link between the conditions laid down and the transfer of product.[12] The conditions refer to the economic realm of life. A political use would be one concerning the buyer’s foreign and defense policies. Many believe there is a moral threshold between economy and politics, making the use of economic means for political gains questionable. Examples of the use of economic weapons for political aims are boycotts against certain countries as well as the buying of votes in the UN.[12] A fourth purpose pertains to the basic assumption of the third category: the governments no longer accept each other as legitimate. The economic goals are no longer seen as a means of influencing an opposite government but rather to stimulate opposition and achieve the overthrow or capitulation of the government.[12]
United States
During the time the United States was the most dominant in all areas like military, energy, exports, etc. Food Power was not really thought about.[13] However, since some of those powers have since diminished, the power of food has come to the surface.[13] In the realm of food, The United States remains at the top, unchallenged.[13] The United States has the position of being the largest producer and exporter of food.[14] While other nations, predominantly developing nations but even some of the richest oil-exporting nations,[13] are beginning to have food shortages and becoming more and more dependent on imported food from the United States, giving it more and more power.[13] This allows the United States to expect friendly behavior from the countries that import American food.[14] It is also likely that the United States would have some form of influence over these countries.[14] Even some of the poorest OPEC countries have become dependent on U.S. wheat.[15] Therefore, there is a possibility that the United States could restrict its food exports for political purposes.[15] The United States could use this Food power as a means of exerting pressure on OPEC countries.[15] Food power will be most effective in times of food shortage or famine because this is when those countries that have some dependence on the United States are most desperate.[14]
The U.S. frequently uses its economic power in order to punish other countries.[dubious ] One of the ways the U.S. does this is by holding back on exporting food. Reasons for the punishment of another country vary; however, they can be broken down into two main groups: Foreign containment objective and market development/humanitarian objectives.[16] The foreign containment objective tends to punish those countries who are threatening to the U.S. An example of such a threat would be countries under other forms of government. More examples related to the containment objective would be no aid to communist countries, socialist governments, countries who support radical regimes, regimes with an inadequate democracy who are too weak to be anti-communist (effectively), and countries who will not accept U.S. agreements.[16] An example of market development and humanitarian objectives would fall under a category of countries that are trying to compete with the U.S. economically. The U.S. will execute foreign aid punishments to countries trying to nationalize property of U.S. companies, countries who want to take over functions by U.S. companies, and countries trying to initiate nationalistic economic policies.[16]
The U.S. has modified its stance since the 1970s, when the State Department and the CIA issued reports exploring the potential of food embargoes.[17] Congressional Bill H.R. 5426, the Trade Sanctions Reform and Export Enhancement Act of 2000, removed agricultural export sanctions applied to Libya, Sudan, and North Korea (agricultural trade with Cuba remained under some restrictions) and gave Congress veto power over unilateral presidential actions in this regard.[18][19]
Africa
Food politics in Africa differs from the cases in North America and Europe in that there is a case of small scale food power in Africa, particularly in Sudan.[20] Some experts say that the cases of famine and food insecurity in Africa are due to inconsistent output of food production and the downward spiral of the interaction between population growth and environmental sustainability.[21] But upon closer inspection, it is revealed that nature is not the only catalyst for Africa’s numerous food insecurity issues.[21]
Sudan
Famine is shaped by generally two theories. The first is FAD, Food Availability Decline.[20] This is the result of a drought, a war, or some other drastic change to the agricultural system.[22] This is the natural cause for famine. The other theory deals primarily with the population’s ability to access or become entitled to food.[20] In this case, food power makes itself known on a small scale, as opposing political forces in Sudan compete for the votes of the people by instigating or encouraging the famine.[20]
For example, Sudan’s famine in the 1980s was completely intentional, and was only a pawn for a varied collection of different elites to improve their political and economic statuses.[23] These political parties weren’t the only beneficiaries, though. Merchants were also known to hoard grain and buy livestock at inappropriately low prices when the famines shifted the terms of trade.[22] Western Sudanese merchants during the famine of 1987 were described as heartless because they refused to sell grain to needy villages in Darfur at reasonable prices.[20] Ergo, the Sudanese Famine was another example of food power in which food was and used as a policy, and which completely ignored the needs of the people and fostered the political and power-hungry intentions of opposite warring forces in the country.[23]
The
See also
- List of countries by real population density based on food growing capacity
References
- ^ S2CID 109255177.
- ^ a b c d e Robert Paarlberg, Food Politics, The Oxford Companion to Politics of the World, 2008 [1] Archived 2014-10-20 at the Wayback Machine
- ^ a b c d e f g h Wallensteen 1976, p. 278.
- ^ a b Wallensteen 1976, p. 277.
- ^ .
- ^ Maxwell 1996, p. 158.
- ^ Robert A. Doughty and Harold E. Raugh, Embargoes in Historical Perspective, Parameters, 1991, pg. 24 [2]
- ^ a b c d Robert A. Doughty and Harold E. Raugh, Embargoes in Historical Perspective, Parameters, 1991, pg. 26 [3]
- ^ Robert A. Doughty and Harold E. Raugh, Embargoes in Historical Perspective, Parameters, 1991, pg. 27 [4]
- ^ Rémy Herrera, The Effects of the U.S. Embargo Against Cuba, Alternatives, 2003 [5]
- ^ Wallensteen 1976, p. 279.
- ^ a b c d e f g h Wallensteen 1976, p. 280.
- ^ JSTOR 1173726.
- ^ a b c d Paarlberg 1982, p. 26.
- ^ a b c Paarlberg 1982, p. 29.
- ^ a b c Wallensteen 1976, p. 292.
- ISBN 978-0-7099-4218-4.
- ^ "Exempting Food and Agriculture Products from U.S. Economic Sanctions: Status and Implementation" (PDF). Congressional Research Service, republished by National Agricultural Law Center at the University of Arkansas. 2006-06-29. Retrieved 2010-01-20.
- USDA. 2009-01-12. Archived from the originalon 2010-01-14. Retrieved 2010-01-20.
- ^ JSTOR 4006247.
- ^ a b Bush 1996, p. 170.
- ^ a b Bush 1996, p. 171.
- ^ a b Bush 1996, p. 189.
- ^ Famine In Sudan, 1998 Human Rights Watch, Accessed May 25, 2006
- ISBN 978-0-691-12237-3.
This article incorporates public domain material from Jasper Womach. Report for Congress: Agriculture: A Glossary of Terms, Programs, and Laws, 2005 Edition (PDF). Congressional Research Service. Paarlberg, Robert. "Food Politics." Oxford Companion to Politics (2008). Mywire. University of Oxford, 1 Jan. 2008. Web. 2 Nov. 2009. <http://www.mywire.com/a/Oxford-Companion-Politics-World/Food-Politics/9577797/?&pbl=105 Archived 2014-10-20 at the Wayback Machine>
Further reading
- Joseph D. Coffey (February 1981). "The Role of Food in the International Affairs of the United States" (PDF). Southern Journal of Agricultural Economics. 13 (1): 29–37. S2CID 53612927.
- Kevin Danaher (January 1989). "US food power in the 1990s". Race & Class. 30 (3): 31–46. S2CID 145333070.
- Robert L. Paarlberg (June 1978). "The Failure of Food Power". Policy Studies Journal. 6 (4): 537–542. .
- Robert L. Paarlberg, Food, Oil and Coercive Power, in Mark W. Zacher (ed.), The International political economy of natural resources., Edward Elgar Publishing, 1993,
- Thorald K. Warley (December 1976). "Agriculture in International Economic Relations" (PDF). American Journal of Agricultural Economics. 58 (5): 820–830. JSTOR 1239978.
External links
- Robert Paarlberg, Finance, Oxford Companion to the Politics of the World, Jan 1, 2008