Foreign policy of the Russian Empire
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The foreign policy of the Russian Empire covers Russian foreign relations from their origins in the policies of the
Russia played a relatively minor role in the Napoleonic Wars until 1812, when the Imperial Russian Army virtually destroyed Napoleon's huge army when it invaded Russia. Russia played a major role in the eventual defeat of Napoleon and in setting conservative terms for the restoration of aristocratic Europe during the period of 1815 to 1848 as the Holy Alliance. Russia conducted several wars with the Ottoman Empire between 1568 and 1918, and in 1856 Russia lost the Crimean War to a coalition of Britain, France and the Ottoman Empire. More small wars followed in the late-19th century, as well as the large-scale Balkan War of 1877-1878.
For three centuries, from the days of
Russia entered
Strategy
Geographical expansion by warfare and treaty was the central strategy of Russian foreign policy from the small
West: Poland and the Baltic
To the northwest, Russia engaged in a century long struggle against Sweden for control of the Baltic Sea. The Empire succeeded by the 1720s, obtaining not just access to the sea but ownership of Finland and the Baltic states of Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia. To the west, there were a series of wars with Poland and Lithuania, followed by negotiated settlements with Prussia and Austria that gave Russia control of most of Ukraine, and a large slice of Poland. Napoleon unsuccessfully challenged the Russians directly with his 1812 invasion of Russia. Russia seized more territory and became a great power, with a strong voice in the affairs of Europe from 1814 to the 1840s.
South: Ottomans and the Caucasus
To the south, the conflict with the
Central Asia
To the southeast, Russia seized power in large swaths of territory in Central Asia inhabited by Muslims of Turkic ethnicity. Although some Russian settlers were sent into Kazakhstan, generally leading local elites were left in power as long as it was clear that Russia controlled foreign and military policies.[2] The mainstream of expansion finally reached Afghanistan in the middle of the 19th century, leading to the Great Game with repeated wars against the Afghan tribes, and increasingly involved threats and counterthreats with the British, who were determined to protect their large holdings on the Indian subcontinent.
Far East: China and Japan
Finally, there was expansion to the Far East, as Russian settlers moved into the mining and agricultural districts of Siberia, taking control of local tribes and building towns, mines, prison camps along the Trans-Siberian Railway. The total Siberian population was only a half-million in 1800, but reached 9 million in 1914, of whom 1 million were criminals and political exiles.[3]
To build up a presence on the Pacific Ocean, Russia seized some 400,000 square miles of almost uninhabited territory from Qing dynasty China in 1858–1860. It sent in settlers and prisoners, so that its holdings from Vladivostok north along the Sea of Japan reached 310,000 in 1897.[4] Russia established an economic role east into the Sinkiang and Manchuria regions of China peacefully, using the Treaty of Saint Petersburg (1881), loans to the Chinese government, networks of merchants, and by building the Chinese Eastern Railway, a branch of the Trans-Siberian railroad, through Manchuria to the ocean.[5][6][7] Meanwhile, in the late 19th century, the Empire of Japan was expanding into Manchuria and especially Korea. It proposed a deal whereby the Russians would have the predominant role in Manchuria, and Japan in Korea. The tsar, contemptuous of the Japanese, bluntly refused. In the Russo-Japanese War, Japan attacked, pushing back the Russian army on the ground, and sinking the main Russian battle fleet. Japan took control of Korea and of the southern half of the Chinese Eastern Railway.[8][9]
Russian expansion jumped to North America, with small fur-trade operations in Alaska, coupled with missionaries to the natives. By 1861 the project lost money, threatened to antagonize the Americans, and could not be defended from Britain. In the Alaska Purchase of 1867, it was sold to the United States for $7.2 million.[10][11]
Before 1793
The tsar so shaped foreign policy that a transition could mean an overnight radical turnabout. The most famous example came when in 1762, during the Seven Years' War, Empress Elizabeth had almost destroyed Frederick the Great of the Kingdom of Prussia. Then she suddenly died. The new tsar Peter III was a friend of Frederick, who unexpectedly survived. He called it the "Miracle of the House of Brandenburg."[12]
Relations with Sweden
During the Middle Ages several wars were fought between the Swedes and Russians and
The central theme of the 1600–1725 era was the struggle between Sweden and Russia for control of the Baltic, as well as territories around it. Russia was ultimately the winner, and Sweden lost its status as a major power.
Peter the Great
In 1695 Peter attacked the Turkish forces that controlled the River Don. He failed because he lacked a navy or competent engineers to conduct a siege, and had no unity of command in his forces. He quickly remedied the defects and captured Azov in 1696. In 1697 he went to Western Europe to study the latest methods of warfare. On his return in 1698 he commenced reforming the country, turning the Russian tsardom into a modernized empire by copying models from Western Europe with the goal of creating a strong, professional army and navy, as well as a strong economic base. At first he relied on hired officers, especially Germans. He soon built a network of military schools in Russia to produce fresh leadership. His favorite enterprise was building a modern fleet of the sort Russia had never known.[19]
In 1700 Peter launched the
Charles' subsequent
Relations with Britain, 1553–1792
The Kingdom of England and Tsardom of Russia established relations in 1553 when English navigator Richard Chancellor arrived in Arkhangelsk, when Ivan the Terrible ruled Russia. In 1555 the Muscovy Company was established. The Muscovy Company held a monopoly over trade between England and Russia until 1698.
From the 1720s Peter invited British engineers to Saint Petersburg, leading to the establishment of a small but commercially influential Anglo-Russian expatriate merchant community from 1730 to 1921. During the series of general European wars of the 18th century, the two empires found themselves as sometime allies and sometime enemies. The two states fought on the same side during War of the Austrian Succession (1740–1748). They were on opposite sides during Seven Years' War (1756–1763), although they did not at any time engage in the field.
Ochakov issue
Prime Minister William Pitt the Younger was alarmed at Russian expansion in Crimea in the 1780s at the expense of his Ottoman ally.[22] He tried to get Parliamentary support for reversing it. In peace talks with the Ottomans, Russia refused to return the key Ochakov fortress. Pitt wanted to threaten military retaliation. However Russia's ambassador Semyon Vorontsov organized Pitt's enemies and launched a public opinion campaign. Pitt won the vote so narrowly that he gave up and Vorontsov secured a renewal of the commercial treaty between Britain and Russia.[23]
Napoleonic era: 1793–1815
In foreign policy, tsar
As part of the winning coalition against Napoleon Russia gained some spoils in Finland and Poland at the Congress of Vienna in 1814–1815. The tsar attended and was deeply involved in the diplomatic wrangling over the fates of Poland, Saxony and the Kingdom of Naples. He helped establish alliances that defeated Napoleon's attempt to regain power in 1815 and helped foster a spirit of cooperation among the conservative leaders of Britain, France, Austria, and Prussia.[25][26] The major territorial gain was control of Poland, which Napoleon had made an independent state. The tsar became king of Poland and (at first) allowed it considerable autonomy.[27]
Britain
The outbreak of the French Revolution and its attendant wars temporarily united constitutionalist Britain and autocratic Russia in an ideological alliance against French republicanism. Britain and Russia attempted to halt the French but the failure of their joint invasion of the Netherlands in 1799 precipitated a change in attitudes.
The two countries were at war, with some very limited naval combat during the Anglo-Russian War (1807–1812). In 1812 Britain and Russia became allies against Napoleon in the Napoleonic Wars.[28]
1815–1917
After 1815, Russia strongly promoted conservatism and political reaction in Western Europe.[29] It had all the land it wanted, so a high priority was to protect the frontiers. In practice the main issue was Poland, which had been partitioned among Russia, Germany, and Austria. A strong sense of Polish nationalism as well tensions on language and religion (Roman Catholics versus Eastern Orthodox) cause dissatisfaction in the Polish population. The Poles opened major revolts in 1830–31, and 1863–64, and were crushed by the Russian army. The Empire responded with a program of Russification. To the south and southwest, the increasing vulnerability of the Ottoman Empire led Russia to support Orthodox Christian revolts against the Ottomans in the Balkans and Greece. A major long-term goal was control of the Straits, which would allow full access to the Mediterranean. Britain, and also France, took the Ottoman side, leading to the Crimean war, 1853-56 which left Russia seriously weakened. Russia had much less difficulty in expanding to the south, including the conquest of Turkestan. However, Britain became alarmed when Russia threatened Afghanistan, with the implicit threat to India, and decades of diplomatic maneuvering finally ended with an Anglo-Russian Entente in 1907. Expansion into the vast stretches of Siberia was slow and expensive, but finally became possible with the building of the trans-Siberian Railway, 1890 to 1904. This opened up East Asia, and Russian interests focused on Mongolia, Manchuria, and Korea. China was too weak to resist, and Was pulled increasingly into the Russian sphere. Japan strongly opposed Russian expansion, and defeated Russia in a war in 1904–1905. Japan took over Korea, and Manchuria remained a contested area. Meanwhile, France, looking for allies against Germany after 1871, formed a military alliance in 1894, with large-scale loans to Russia, sales of arms, and warships, as well as diplomatic support. Once Afghanistan was informally partitioned in 1907, Britain, France and Russia came increasingly close together in opposition to Germany and Austria. They formed a loose Triple Entente that played a central role in the First World War. That war broke out when the Austro-Hungarian Empire, with strong German support, tried to suppress Serbian nationalism, and Russia supported Serbia. Everyone began to mobilize, and Berlin decided to act before the others were ready to fight, first invading Belgium and France in the west, and then Russia in the east.[30]
Nicholas I, 1825–1855
After 1815 Russia formed the Holy Alliance to suppress revolutionary movements in Europe that it saw as immoral threats to legitimate Christian monarchs.[31] Russia under Tsar Nicholas I helped Austria's Klemens von Metternich in suppressing national and liberal movements. The most important intervention came when the Russian army played a decisive role in crushing the revolution in Hungary in 1849.[32][33]
Nicholas I, who ruled 1825–1855, was among the most reactionary of all Russian leaders.
Crimean War 1853–1856
The immediate cause of the Crimean War involved the rights of Christian minorities in the
For much of Nicholas's reign, Russia was seen as a major military power, with considerable strength. At last the Crimean war at the end of his reign demonstrated to the world what no one had previously realized: Russia was militarily weak, technologically backward, and administratively incompetent. Despite his grand ambitions toward the south and Turkey, Russia had not built its railroad network in that direction, and communications were bad. The bureaucracy was riddled with graft, corruption and inefficiency and was unprepared for war. The Navy was weak and technologically backward; the Army, although very large, was good only for parades, suffered from colonels who pocketed their men's pay, poor morale, and was even more out of touch with the latest technology as developed by Britain and France. By war's end, the Russian leadership was determined to reform the Army and the society. As Fuller notes, "Russia had been beaten on the Crimean peninsula, and the military feared that it would inevitably be beaten again unless steps were taken to surmount its military weakness."
Foreign affairs after the Crimean War
Tsar Nicholas I died during the war and was succeeded by Tsar Alexander II. He gave Prince Gorchakov full control of foreign policy. The new policy was to keep a low profile in Europe while rebuilding the military and reforming the domestic economy. Gorchakov pursued cautious and well-calculated policies. A high priority was regaining naval access to the Black Sea. The policy concentrated on good relations with France, Prussia, and the United States. Russian statesmen achieved the goal by 1870 despite opposition from Britain and Austria-Hungary.[42]
Russia turned its expansionist plans to the south and east. Russian troops first moved to gain control of the
Russia followed the United States, Britain, and France in establishing relations with Japan, and, together with Britain and France, Russia obtained concessions from China consequent to the
As part of the foreign policy goals in Europe, Russia initially gave guarded support to France's anti-Austrian diplomacy. A weak Franco-Russian entente soured, however, when France backed a Polish uprising against Russian rule in 1863. Russia then aligned itself more closely with Prussia by approving the unification of Germany in exchange for a revision of the Treaty of Paris and the remilitarization of the Black Sea. These diplomatic achievements came at a London conference in 1871, following France's defeat in the Franco-Prussian War. After 1871 Germany, united under Prussian leadership, was the strongest continental power in Europe. In 1873 Germany formed the loosely knit League of the Three Emperors with Russia and Austria-Hungary to prevent them from forming an alliance with France. Nevertheless, Austro-Hungarian and Russian ambitions clashed in the Balkans, where rivalries among Slavic nationalities and anti-Ottoman sentiments seethed.[45]
In the 1870s, Russian nationalist opinion became a serious domestic factor in its support for liberating Balkan Christians from Ottoman rule and making
Another significant result of the 1877–78
Russian diplomatic and military interests subsequently re-focussed on Central Asia, where Russia had quelled a series of uprisings in the 1870s, and Russia incorporated hitherto independent emirates into the empire. Britain renewed its concerns in 1881 when Russian troops occupied Turkmen lands on the Persian and Afghan borders, but Germany lent diplomatic support to Russian advances, and an Anglo-Russian war was averted.
Meanwhile, Russia's sponsorship of Bulgarian independence brought negative results as the Bulgarians, angry at Russia's continuing interference in domestic affairs, sought the support of Austria-Hungary. In the dispute that arose between Austria-Hungary and Russia, Germany took a firm position toward Russia while mollifying the tsar with a bilateral defensive alliance, the Reinsurance Treaty of 1887 between Germany and Russia.[48]
Within a year, Russo-German acrimony led to Otto von Bismarck's forbidding further loans to Russia, and France replaced Germany as Russia's financier. When Wilhelm II dismissed Bismarck in 1890, the loose Russo-Prussian entente collapsed after having lasted for more than twenty-five years. Three years later, Russia allied itself with France by entering into a joint military convention, which matched the dual alliance formed in 1879 by Germany and Austria-Hungary.[49]
Relations with Britain
Russophobia
From 1820 to 1907, a new element emerged: Russophobia. British elite sentiment turned increasingly hostile towards Russia, with a high degree of anxiety for the safety of India, With the fear that Russia would push south through Afghanistan. In addition, there was a growing concern that Russia would destabilize Eastern Europe by its attacks on the faltering
Russia intervened on behalf of Orthodox Greeks in the Greek War of Independence (1821–1829); the London peace treaty favoured Greece but heightened Russophobia in Britain and France. In 1851 the Great Exhibition of the Works of Industry of All Nations held in London's Crystal Palace, including over 100,000 exhibits from forty nations. It was the world's first international exposition. Russia took the opportunity to dispel growing Russophobia by refuting stereotypes of Russia as a backward, militaristic repressive tyranny. Its sumptuous exhibits of luxury products and large 'objets d'art' with little in the way of advanced technology, however, did little to change its reputation. Britain considered its navy too weak to worry about, but saw its large army as a major threat.[52]
The Russian pressures on the Ottoman Empire continued, leaving Britain and France to ally with the Ottomans and push back against Russia in the Crimean War (1853–1856). Russophobia was an element in generating popular British and French support for the far-off war.[53] Elite opinion in Britain, especially among Liberals, supported Poles against harsh Russian rule, after 1830. The British government watched nervously as Russia suppressed revolts in the 1860s but refused to intervene.[54]
In 1874, tension lessened as Queen Victoria's second son married the only daughter of tsar Alexander II, followed by a cordial state visit by the tsar. The superficial goodwill lasted no more than three years, when structural forces again pushed the two nations to the verge of war.[55]
The Great Game and Asian affairs
Rivalry between Britain and Russia grew steadily over Central Asia in the Great Game of the late 19th century. Russia desired warm-water ports on the Indian Ocean while Britain wanted to prevent Russian troops from gaining a potential invasion route to India.[56] In 1885 Russia annexed part of Afghanistan in the Panjdeh incident, which caused a war scare. However Russia's foreign minister Nikolay Girs and its ambassador to London Baron de Staal set up an agreement in 1887 which established a buffer zone in Central Asia. Russian diplomacy thereby won grudging British acceptance of its expansionism.[57] Persia was also an arena of tension, and was divided into spheres of influence without warfare.[58]
Russia followed the lead of the major powers in sending an occupation force to protect international subjects in China during the Boxer Rebellion (1899–1901).[59]
Peaceful policies
Diplomat Nikolay Girs, scion of a rich and powerful family of Scandinavian descent, served as Foreign Minister, 1882–1895, during the reign of Alexander III. He was one of the architects of the Franco-Russian Alliance of 1891, which was later expanded into the Triple Entente with the addition of Great Britain. That alliance brought France out of diplomatic isolation, and moved Russia from the German orbit to a coalition with France, that was strongly supported by French financial assistance to Russia's economic modernization. Tsar Alexander took credit for peaceful policies but according to Margaret Maxwell, historians have underrated his success in a diplomacy that featured numerous negotiated settlements, treaties and conventions. These agreements defined Russian boundaries and restored equilibrium to dangerously unstable situations. He supported numerous international commissions and made many goodwill missions, during which he repeatedly stressed Russia's peaceful intentions. His most dramatic success came in 1885, settling long-standing tensions with Great Britain, which was fearful that Russian expansion to the South would be a threat to India.[60] Girs was usually successful in restraining the aggressive inclinations of Tsar Alexander III, convincing him that the very survival of the czarist system depended on avoiding major wars. With a deep insight into the tsar's moods and views, Girs typically shaped the final decisions by outmaneuvering hostile journalists, ministers, and even the czarina, as well as his own ambassadors. Under Giers and Alexander, Russia fought no major wars.[61]
War with Japan over Korea, 1904–05
The
Britain remained strictly neutral, as allowed by its treaty with Japan.[65] However, there was a brief war scare in October 1905 when the Russian battle fleet headed to fight Japan mistakenly engaged a number of British fishing vessels in the North Sea. The misunderstanding was quickly resolved.[66][67]
Not only was Russia humiliated by its defeat at the hands of an oriental power, but there was massive unrest at home, typified by the
The Anglo-Russian Convention of 1907 ended the long-standing rivalry in central Asia, and then enabled the two countries to outflank the Germans, who were threatening to connect Berlin in Baghdad by new railroad that would probably align the Turkish Empire with Great Britain. It ended the dispute over Persia, with Britain promising to stay out of the northern half, while Russia recognized southern Persia as part of the British sphere of influence. Russia also promised to stay out of Tibet and Afghanistan. In exchange London extended loans and some political support.[68][69]
Approach of the First World War
Allies, 1907–1917
Diplomacy became delicate in the early 20th century.
Russia and Japan developed friendly relations after their war ended. Developing an informal military alliance became possible because Britain, which had a military alliance with Japan, became increasingly alienated from Germany, and increasingly close to Russia. Britain and Russia resolve their outstanding difficulties by 1907. In addition, Japan and Russia had a strong interest in developing railroads in Manchuria and China. As a result, it was easy for Japan to join Russia, France, and Britain as an ally in the
A relatively new factor influencing Russian policy was the growth of
See also
- Diplomatic history of World War I
- International relations (1814–1919)
- Internationalization of the Danube River
- Military history of Russia
- Great Game (1830–1907), competition with Britain for control of Central Asia
Notes
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- ^ Martin Gilbert, Atlas of Russian history (1993) p 62–63.
- ^ Gilbert, Atlas of Russian History (1993) p 60.
- ^ Gilbert, Atlas of Russian history (1993) pp 65–66.
- ^ Immanuel C.Y. Hsu, The Rise of Modern China (1995) pp 317–325.
- ^ Charles Jelavich and Barbara Jelavich, Russia and the East, 1876–1880 (1959).
- ^ Gilbert, Atlas of Russian history (1993) pp 66–67.
- ^ Brian Catchpole, A Map History of Russia (1983) pp 26–31.
- ^ James R. Gibson, "Why the Russians Sold Alaska." Wilson Quarterly 3.3 (1979): 179-188 online.
- ^ Thomas A. Bailey, "Why the United States Purchased Alaska." Pacific Historical Review 3.1 (1934): 39-49. online
- ^ David Fraser, Frederick the Great. King of Prussia (2000), p. 459.
- ^ D.G. Kirby, Northern Europe in the Early Modern Period: The Baltic World 1492–1772 (1990).
- ^ Jill Lisk, The struggle for supremacy in the Baltic, 1600–1725 (1968).
- ^ Robert I. Frost, The Northern Wars: War, State and Society in Northeastern Europe, 1558–1721 (2000)
- ^ Gary Dean Peterson, Warrior Kings of Sweden: The Rise of an Empire in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries (McFarland, 2007).
- ^ Lindsey Hughes, Russia in the Age of Peter the Great (1998) pp 21-62.
- ^ Derek McKay, and Hamish M. Scott, The Rise of the Great Powers 1648–1815 (1983) pp 80–81.
- ^ M.S. Anderson, "Russia under Peter the Great and the changed relations of East and West." in J.S. Bromley, ed., The New Cambridge Modern History: VI: 1688–1715 (1970) pp 716–740.
- ^ R.M. Hatton, Charles XII of Sweden (1968).
- ^ F.G. Bengtsson, The Life of Charles XII, King of Sweden, 1697–1718 (1960).
- ^ John Holland Rose, William Pitt and National Revival (1911) pp 589–607.
- ISBN 9780521466844.
- ^ Dominic Lieven, Russia Against Napoleon: The True Story of the Campaigns of War and Peace (2010).
- ^ David King, Vienna, 1814: How the Conquerors of Napoleon Made Love, War, and Peace at the Congress of Vienna (2009).
- ^ Harold Nicolson, The Congress of Vienna: a Study in Allied Unity, 1812–1822 (2000).
- ^ Frank W. Thackeray, Antecedents of Revolution: Alexander I and the Polish kingdom, 1815–1825 (1980)
- ^ Dominic Lieven, Russia against Napoleon: The Battle for Europe, 1807 to 1814 (Penguin UK), 2009.
- ^ David Schimmelpenninck Van Der Oye, "Russian foreign policy, 1815-1917" in D. C. B. Lieven, ed. The Cambridge History of Russia vol 2 (2006) pp 554-574 .
- ^ Barbara Jelavich, St. Petersburg and Moscow: Tsarist and Soviet Foreign Policy, 1814–1974 (1974) pp 34-279.
- ^ Frederick B. Artz, Reaction and Revolution: 1814–1832 (1934)
- ^ Eugene Horváth, "Russia and the Hungarian Revolution (1848-9)." Slavonic and East European Review 12.36 (1934): 628-645. online
- ^ Ian W. Roberts, Nicholas I and the Russian intervention in Hungary (1991).
- ISBN 9780313363078.
- ISBN 978-0495913245.
- ^ W. Bruce Lincoln, Nicholas I: Emperor and Autocrat of All the Russias (1989)
- ^ William C. Fuller, Jr., Strategy and Power in Russia 1600-1914 (1998) p 243
- ^ Andrew C. Rath, The Crimean War in Imperial Context, 1854–1856 (2015).
- ^ Peter Young, "Historiography of the Origins of the Crimean War", International History: Diplomatic and Military History since the Middle Ages (2012) online
- ISBN 9781439105771.
- ^ Flemming Splidsboel-Hansen, "Past and Future Meet: Aleksandr Gorchakov and Russian Foreign Policy" Europe-Asia Studies 54#3 (May, 2002), pp. 377–396 at pp 379-80.
- ^ Hugh Seton-Watson, The Russian Empire, 1801–1917 (1967) pp 430–438.
- ^ Seton-Watson, The Russian Empire, 1801–1917 (1967) pp 438–445.
- ^ T. C. Lin, "The Amur Frontier Question between China and Russia, 1850–1860." Pacific Historical Review 3#1 (1934): 1–27. in JSTOR
- ^ Hugh Seton-Watson, The Russian Empire, 1801–1917 (1967) pp 445–460.
- ^ Barbara Jelavich, "Great Britain and the Russian Acquisition of Batum, 1878–1886." Slavonic and East European Review 48.110 (1970): 44–66.
- ^ Barbara Jelavich, St. Petersburg and Moscow: Tsarist and Soviet Foreign Policy, 1814–1974 (1974) pp 157–188.
- ^ Jelavich, St. Petersburg and Moscow: Tsarist and Soviet Foreign Policy, 1814–1974 (1974) pp 201–212.
- ^ Jelavich, St. Petersburg and Moscow: Tsarist and Soviet Foreign Policy, 1814–1974 (1974) pp 212–221.
- ^ Roman Golicz, "The Russians shall not have Constantinople: English Attitudes to Russia, 1870–1878", History Today (November 2003) 53#9 pp 39-45.
- ^ John Howes Gleason, The Genesis of Russophobia in Great Britain: A Study of the Interaction of Policy and Opinion (1950) online
- ^ Anthony Swift, "Russia and the Great Exhibition of 1851: Representations, perceptions, and a missed opportunity." Jahrbücher für Geschichte Osteuropas (2007): 242–263, in English.
- ^ Andrew D. Lambert, The Crimean War: British Grand Strategy Against Russia, 1853–56 (2011).
- ^ L. R. Lewitter, "The Polish Cause as seen in Great Britain, 1830–1863." Oxford Slavonic Papers (1995): 35–61.
- ^ Sir Sidney Lee (1903). Queen Victoria. Macmillan Company. p. 421.
- ^ David Fromkin, "The Great Game in Asia," Foreign Affairs (1980) 58#4 pp. 936–951 in JSTOR
- ^ Raymond Mohl, "Confrontation in Central Asia" History Today 19 (1969) 176–183
- ^ Firuz Kazemzadeh, Russia and Britain in Persia, 1864–1914: A Study in Imperialism (Yale UP, 1968).
- ^ Alena N. Eskridge-Kosmach, "Russia in the Boxer Rebellion." Journal of Slavic Military Studies 21#1 (2008): 38–52.
- ^ Raymond A. Mohl, "Confrontation in Central Asia, 1885," History Today (1969) 119#3 pp 176-183.
- ^ Margaret Maxwell, "A Re-examination of the Rôle of N.K. Giers as Russian Foreign Minister under Alexander III." European Studies Review 1.4 (1971): 351-376.
- ^ Nicholas Papastratigakis, Russian Imperialism and Naval Power: Military Strategy and the Build-Up to the Russo-Japanese War (I. B. Tauris, 2011).
- ^ Richard M. Connaughton, The War of the Rising Sun and Tumbling Bear: A Military History of the Russo-Japanese War, 1904–05 (1991).
- ^ John Albert White, The Diplomacy of the Russo-Japanese War (Princeton UP, 1964).
- ^ B. J. C. McKercher, "Diplomatic Equipoise: The Lansdowne Foreign Office the Russo-Japanese War of 1904–1905, and the Global Balance of Power." Canadian Journal of History 24#3 (1989): 299–340. online
- ^ Keith Neilson, Britain and the last tsar: British policy and Russia, 1894–1917 (Oxford UP, 1995) p 243.
- ^ Keith Neilson, "'A dangerous game of American Poker': The Russo‐Japanese war and British policy." Journal of Strategic Studies 12#1 (1989): 63–87. online
- ^ Jelavich, St. Petersburg and Moscow (1974), pp 247-49, 254-56.
- ^ Ewen W. Edwards, "The Far Eastern Agreements of 1907." Journal of Modern History 26.4 (1954): 340-355. Online
- ^ Dominic C.B. Lieven, Russia and the origins of the First World War (Macmillan, 1983).
- ^ Jelavich, St. Petersburg and Moscow: Tsarist and Soviet Foreign Policy, 1814–1974 (1974) pp 249–255.
- ^ Neilson, Britain and the Last Tsar: British Policy and Russia, 1894–1917 (1995).
- ^ Sergey Tolstoguzov, "Russian–Japanese relations after the Russo-Japanese war in the context of world politics" Japan Forum (2016) 28#3 pp 282-298.
- ^ Katrin Boeckh, "The Rebirth of Pan-Slavism in the Russian Empire, 1912–13." in Katrin Boeckh and Sabine Rutar, eds. The Balkan Wars from Contemporary Perception to Historic Memory (2016) pp. 105-137.
- ^ Christopher Clark, The Sleepwalkers: How Europe Went to War in 1914 (2014) pp 185-90, 293-300, 438-442, 480-487, 506-514, 561.
- ^ Richard F. Hamilton and Holger H. Herwig, Decisions for War, 1914-1917 (2004), pp 92-111.
Further reading
Surveys
- Ascher, Abraham. Russia: A Short History (2011) excerpt and text search; university textbook
- Bromley, Jonathan. Russia 1848-1917. (Heinemann, 2002). Short textbook
- Bushkovitch, Paul. A Concise History of Russia (2011) excerpt and text search. Short textbook
- Cracraft, James. ed. Major Problems in the History of Imperial Russia (1993).
- Dallin, David J. The Rise of Russia in Asia (1950).
- De Madariaga, Isabel. Russia in the Age of Catherine the Great (2002), comprehensive topical survey
- Dowling, Timothy C. (2014). Russia at War: From the Mongol Conquest to Afghanistan, Chechnya, and Beyond [2 volumes]. ABC-CLIO. ISBN 978-1-59884-948-6.
- Gaddis, John Lewis. Russia, the Soviet Union, and the United States (2nd ed. 1990) online free to borrow covers 1781-1988
- Geyer, Dietrich, and Bruce Little. Russian Imperialism: The Interaction of Domestic and Foreign Policy, 1860–1914 (Yale UP, 1987).
- Hall, Richard C. ed. War in the Balkans: An Encyclopedic History from the Fall of the Ottoman Empire to the Breakup of Yugoslavia (2014)
- ISBN 978-0-300-08266-1.
- Jelavich, Barbara. St. Petersburg and Moscow: Tsarist and Soviet Foreign Policy, 1814–1974 (1974).
- Kagan, Frederick, and Robin Higham, eds. The Military History of Tsarist Russia (2008) excerpts
- Khodarkovsky, Michael. Russia's Steppe Frontier: The Making of a Colonial Empire, 1500-1800 (2002).
- Lieven, Dominic, ed. The Cambridge History of Russia: vol 2: Imperial Russia, 1689–1917 (2006)
- Lincoln, W. Bruce. The Romanovs: Autocrats of All the Russias (1983) excerpt and text search, sweeping narrative history
- Longley, David (2000). The Longman Companion to Imperial Russia, 1689–1917. New York, NY: Longman Publishing Group. p. 496. ISBN 978-0-582-31990-5.
- MacKenzie, David. Imperial Dreams/Harsh Realities: Tsarist Russian Foreign Policy, 1815–1917 (1994).
- Moss, Walter G. A History of Russia. Vol. 1: To 1917. (2d ed. Anthem Press, 2002); . University
- Perrie, Maureen, et al. The Cambridge History of Russia. (3 vol. Cambridge University Press, 2006). excerpt and text search
- Petro, Nicolai N. Russian foreign policy: from empire to nation-state (Pearson, 1997), textbook
- Quested, Rosemary K.I. Sino-Russian relations: a short history (Routledge, 2014) online
- Ragsdale, Hugh. Imperial Russian Foreign Policy (1993) excerpt
- Riasanovsky, Nicholas V. and Mark D. Steinberg. A History of Russia (7th ed. Oxford UP, 2004), 800 pages. ; university textbook
- Rywkin, Michael. Russian colonial expansion to 1917 (1988).
- Saul, Norman E. Historical Dictionary of Russian and Soviet Foreign Policy (2014) excerpt and text search
- Seton-Watson, Hugh. The Russian Empire 1801–1917 (1967) pp 41–68, 83–182, 280–331, 430–460, 567–597, 677–697.
- Stone, David. A Military History of Russia: From Ivan the Terrible to the War in Chechnya excerpts
- Suny, Ronald Grigor, ed. The Cambridge History of Russia: vol 3: The Twentieth Century (2006)
- Ziegler; Charles E. The History of Russia (Greenwood Press, 1999) online edition ; university textbook
Geography, topical maps
- Barnes, Ian. Restless Empire: A Historical Atlas of Russia (2015), copies of historic maps
- Catchpole, Brian. A Map History of Russia (Heinemann Educational Publishers, 1974), new topical maps.
- Channon, John, and Robert Hudson. The Penguin historical atlas of Russia (Viking, 1995), new topical maps.
- Chew, Allen F. An atlas of Russian history: eleven centuries of changing borders (Yale UP, 1970), new topical maps.
- Gilbert, Martin. Atlas of Russian history (Oxford UP, 1993), new topical maps.
- Parker, William Henry. An historical geography of Russia (Aldine, 1968).
Topics
- Adams, Michael. Napoleon and Russia (2006).
- Boeckh, Katrin. "The Rebirth of Pan-Slavism in the Russian Empire, 1912–13." in Katrin Boeckh and Sabine Rutar, eds. The Balkan Wars from Contemporary Perception to Historic Memory (2016) pp. 105–137.
- Davies, Brian L. "The Development of Russian Military Power 1453–1815." in Jeremy Black, ed., European Warfare 1453–1815 (Macmillan Education UK, 1999) pp. 145–179.
- Fuller, William C. Strategy and Power in Russia 1600–1914 (1998); excerpts; military strategy
- Esthus, Raymond A. "Nicholas II and the Russo-Japanese War." Russian Review 40.4 (1981): 396–411. online
- Gatrell, Peter. "Tsarist Russia at War: The View from Above, 1914 – February 1917." Journal of Modern History 87#3 (2015): 668–700.
- Kennan, George F. The fateful alliance: France, Russia, and the coming of the First World War (1984), focus on the early 1890s Online free to borrow
- Lieven, Dominic. Empire: The Russian empire and its rivals (Yale UP, 2002), comparisons with British, Habsburg & Ottoman empires.excerpt
- Lieven, D.C.B. Russia and the Origins of the First World War (1983).
- Lieven, Dominic. Russia Against Napoleon: The True Story of the Campaigns of War and Peace (2011).
- Lincoln, W.B. "Russia and the European Revolutions of 1848" History Today (Jan 1973), Vol. 23 Issue 1, pp 53–59 online.
- McMeekin, Sean. The Russian Origins of the First World War (2011).
- Neumann, Iver B. "Russia as a great power, 1815–2007." Journal of International Relations and Development 11#2 (2008): 128–151.
- Olson, Gust, and Aleksei I. Miller. "Between Local and Inter-Imperial: Russian Imperial History in Search of Scope and Paradigm." Kritika: Explorations in Russian and Eurasian History (2004) 5#1 pp: 7–26.
- Palmer, A. W. "Lord Salisbury's Approach to Russia, 1898." Oxford Slavonic Papers 6 (1955): 102–14.
- Saul, Norman E. Distant Friends: The United States and Russia, 1763-1867 (1991)
- Saul, Norman E. Concord and Conflict: The United States and Russia, 1867-1914 (1996)
- Saul, Norman E. War and Revolution: The United States and Russia, 1914-1921 (2001)
- Stolberg, Eva-Maria. (2004) "The Siberian Frontier and Russia's Position in World History," Review: A Journal of the Fernand Braudel Center 27#3 pp 243–267.
- Sumner, B.H. Russia and the Balkans 1870-1880 (1937)
- Wells, David and Sandra Wilson. The Russo-Japanese War in Cultural Perspective, 1904-05 (1999)