Gamal Abdel Nasser
Gamal Abdel Nasser | |||||||||||||||||||
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جمال عبد الناصر | |||||||||||||||||||
![]() Nasser in 1962 | |||||||||||||||||||
2nd President of Egypt | |||||||||||||||||||
In office 23 June 1956 – 28 September 1970 | |||||||||||||||||||
Prime Minister | See list
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Vice President | See list
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Preceded by | Mohamed Naguib | ||||||||||||||||||
Succeeded by | Anwar Sadat | ||||||||||||||||||
31st Prime Minister of Egypt | |||||||||||||||||||
In office 19 June 1967 – 28 September 1970 | |||||||||||||||||||
President | Himself | ||||||||||||||||||
Preceded by | Mohamed Sedki Sulayman | ||||||||||||||||||
Succeeded by | Mahmoud Fawzi | ||||||||||||||||||
In office 18 April 1954 – 29 September 1962 | |||||||||||||||||||
President |
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Preceded by | Mohamed Naguib | ||||||||||||||||||
Succeeded by | Ali Sabri | ||||||||||||||||||
In office 25 February 1954 – 8 March 1954 | |||||||||||||||||||
President | Mohamed Naguib | ||||||||||||||||||
Preceded by | Mohamed Naguib | ||||||||||||||||||
Succeeded by | Mohamed Naguib | ||||||||||||||||||
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Personal details | |||||||||||||||||||
Born | Gamal Abdel Nasser Hussein جمال عبد الناصر حسين 15 January 1918 Alexandria, Sultanate of Egypt | ||||||||||||||||||
Died | 28 September 1970 Cairo, United Arab Republic | (aged 52)||||||||||||||||||
Resting place | Gamal Abdel Nasser Mosque | ||||||||||||||||||
Political party | Arab Socialist Union | ||||||||||||||||||
Spouse | |||||||||||||||||||
Children | 5, including Khalid Abdel | ||||||||||||||||||
Profession |
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Signature | ![]() | ||||||||||||||||||
Military service | |||||||||||||||||||
Allegiance | |||||||||||||||||||
Branch/service | Egyptian Armed Forces | ||||||||||||||||||
Years of service | 1938–1952 | ||||||||||||||||||
Rank | Lieutenant colonel | ||||||||||||||||||
Battles/wars | 1948 Arab–Israeli War | ||||||||||||||||||
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President (1956–1970)
List
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Gamal Abdel Nasser Hussein
Nasser's popularity in Egypt and the
Nasser remains an iconic figure in the Arab world, particularly for his strides towards
Early life
Gamal Abdel Nasser Hussein
Nasser's family traveled frequently due to his father's work. In 1921, they moved to Asyut and, in 1923, to Khatatba, where Nasser's father ran a post office. Nasser attended a primary school for the children of railway employees until 1924, when he was sent to live with his paternal uncle in Cairo, and to attend the Nahhasin elementary school.[10]
Nasser exchanged letters with his mother and visited her on holidays. He stopped receiving messages at the end of April 1926. Upon returning to Khatatba, he learned that his mother had died after giving birth to his third brother, Shawki, and that his family had kept the news from him.[11][12] Nasser later stated that "losing her this way was a shock so deep that time failed to remedy".[13] He adored his mother and the injury of her death deepened when his father remarried before the year's end.[11][14][15]
In 1928, Nasser went to Alexandria to live with his maternal grandfather and attend the city's Attarin elementary school.
When his father was transferred to Cairo in 1933, Nasser joined him and attended al-Nahda al-Masria school.[13][23] He took up acting in school plays for a brief period and wrote articles for the school's paper, including a piece on French philosopher Voltaire titled "Voltaire, the Man of Freedom".[13][23] On 13 November 1935, Nasser led a student demonstration against British rule, protesting against a statement made four days prior by UK foreign minister Samuel Hoare that rejected prospects for the 1923 Constitution's restoration.[13] Two protesters were killed and Nasser received a graze to the head from a policeman's bullet.[18] The incident garnered his first mention in the press: the nationalist newspaper Al Gihad reported that Nasser led the protest and was among the wounded.[13][24] On 12 December, the new king, Farouk, issued a decree restoring the constitution.[13]
Nasser's involvement in political activity increased throughout his school years, such that he only attended 45 days of classes during his last year of secondary school.
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Nasser in 1931
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Nasser's name circled in Al-Gihad
Early influences
Aburish asserts that Nasser was not distressed by his frequent relocations, which broadened his horizons and showed him Egyptian society's
Nasser was greatly influenced by
Military career

In 1937, Nasser applied to the Royal Military Academy for army officer training,
Convinced that he needed a
In 1941, Nasser was posted to
1948 Arab–Israeli War

Nasser's first battlefield experience was in
In May 1948, following the
Still stationed after the war in the Faluja enclave, Nasser agreed to an Israeli request to identify 67 killed soldiers of the
The Egyptian singer Umm Kulthum hosted a public celebration for the officers' return despite reservations from the royal government, which had been pressured by the British to prevent the reception. The apparent difference in attitude between the government and the general public increased Nasser's determination to topple the monarchy.[52] Nasser had also felt bitter that his brigade had not been relieved despite the resilience it displayed.[53] He started writing his book Philosophy of the Revolution during the siege.[49]
After the war, Nasser returned to his role as an instructor at the Royal Military Academy.[54] He sent emissaries to forge an alliance with the Muslim Brotherhood in October 1948, but soon concluded that the religious agenda of the Brotherhood was not compatible with his nationalism. From then on, Nasser prevented the Brotherhood's influence over his cadres' activities without severing ties with the organization.[45] Nasser was sent as a member of the Egyptian delegation to Rhodes in February 1949 to negotiate a formal armistice with Israel, and reportedly considered the terms to be humiliating, particularly because the Israelis were able to easily occupy the Eilat region while negotiating with the Arabs in March.[55]
Revolution
Free Officers
Nasser's return to Egypt coincided with
After 1949, the group adopted the name "
In the 1950 parliamentary elections, the
On 11 October 1951, the Wafd government abrogated the unpopular Anglo-Egyptian Treaty of 1936 by which the United Kingdom had the right to maintain its military forces in the Suez Canal Zone.[58] The popularity of this move, as well as that of government-sponsored guerrilla attacks against the British, put pressure on Nasser to act.[58] According to Sadat, Nasser decided to wage "a large scale assassination campaign".[59] In January 1952, he and Hassan Ibrahim attempted to kill the royalist general Hussein Sirri Amer by firing their submachine guns at his car as he drove through the streets of Cairo.[59] Instead of killing the general, the attackers wounded an innocent female passerby.[59] Nasser recalled that her wails "haunted" him and firmly dissuaded him from undertaking similar actions in the future.[59]
Sirri Amer was close to King Farouk, and was nominated for the presidency of the Officer's Club—normally a ceremonial office—with the king's backing.[59] Nasser was determined to establish the independence of the army from the monarchy, and with Amer as the intercessor, resolved to field a nominee for the Free Officers.[59] They selected Mohamed Naguib, a popular general who had offered his resignation to Farouk in 1942 over British high-handedness and was wounded three times in the Palestine War.[60] Naguib won overwhelmingly and the Free Officers, through their connection with a leading Egyptian daily, al-Misri, publicized his victory while praising the nationalistic spirit of the army.[60]
Revolution of 1952

On 25 January 1952, at a time of growing
The Free Officers' intention was not to install themselves in government, but to re-establish a parliamentary democracy. Nasser did not believe that a low-ranking officer like himself (a lieutenant colonel) would be accepted by the Egyptian people, and so selected General Naguib to be his "boss" and lead the coup in name. The revolution they had long sought was launched on 22 July and was declared a success the next day. The Free Officers seized control of all government buildings, radio stations, and police stations, as well as army headquarters in Cairo. While many of the rebel officers were leading their units, Nasser donned civilian clothing to avoid detection by royalists and moved around Cairo monitoring the situation.[61] In a move to stave off foreign intervention two days before the revolution, Nasser had notified the American and British governments of his intentions, and both had agreed not to aid Farouk.[61][62] Under pressure from the Americans, Nasser had agreed to exile the deposed king with an honorary ceremony.[63]
On 18 June 1953, the monarchy was abolished and the Republic of Egypt declared, with Naguib as its first president.[61] According to Aburish, after assuming power, Nasser and the Free Officers expected to become the "guardians of the people's interests" against the monarchy and the pasha class while leaving the day-to-day tasks of government to civilians.[64] They asked former prime minister Ali Maher to accept reappointment to his previous position, and to form an all-civilian cabinet.[64] The Free Officers then governed as the Revolutionary Command Council (RCC) with Naguib as chairman and Nasser as vice-chairman.[65] Relations between the RCC and Maher grew tense, however, as the latter viewed many of Nasser's schemes—agrarian reform, abolition of the monarchy, reorganization of political parties[66]—as too radical, culminating in Maher's resignation on 7 September. Naguib assumed the additional role of prime minister, and Nasser that of deputy prime minister.[67][68] In September, the Agrarian Reform Law was put into effect.[66] In Nasser's eyes, this law gave the RCC its own identity and transformed the coup into a revolution.[69]
Preceding the reform law, in August 1952, communist-led riots broke out at textile factories in
Road to presidency
Disputes with Naguib


In January 1953, Nasser overcame opposition from Naguib and banned all political parties,
When Naguib began showing signs of independence from Nasser by distancing himself from the RCC's land reform decrees and drawing closer to Egypt's established political forces, namely the Wafd and the Brotherhood,[74] Nasser resolved to depose him.[73] In June, Nasser took control of the interior ministry post from Naguib loyalist Sulayman Hafez,[74] and pressured Naguib to conclude the abolition of the monarchy.[73]
On 25 February 1954, Naguib announced his resignation after the RCC held an official meeting without his presence two days prior.[75] On 26 February, Nasser accepted the resignation, put Naguib under house arrest,[75] and the RCC proclaimed Nasser as both RCC chairman and prime minister.[76] As Naguib intended, a mutiny immediately followed, demanding Naguib's reinstatement and the RCC's dissolution.[75] While visiting the striking officers at Military Headquarters (GHQ) to call for the mutiny's end, Nasser was initially intimidated into accepting their demands.[77] However, on 27 February, Nasser's supporters in the army launched a raid on the GHQ, ending the mutiny.[78] Later that day, hundreds of thousands of protesters, mainly belonging to the Brotherhood, called for Naguib's return and Nasser's imprisonment.[79] In response, a sizable group within the RCC, led by Khaled Mohieddin, demanded Naguib's release and return to the presidency.[73] Nasser acquiesced, but delayed Naguib's reinstatement until 4 March, allowing him to promote Amer to Commander of the Armed Forces—a position formerly occupied by Naguib.[80]
On 5 March, Nasser's security coterie arrested thousands of participants in the uprising.
Assuming chairmanship of RCC

On 26 October 1954, Muslim Brotherhood member Mahmoud Abdel-Latif attempted to assassinate Nasser while he was delivering a speech in Alexandria, broadcast to the Arab world by radio, to celebrate the British military withdrawal. The gunman was 25 feet (7.6 m) away from him and fired eight shots, but all missed Nasser. Panic broke out in the mass audience, but Nasser maintained his posture and raised his voice to appeal for calm.[85][86] With great emotion he exclaimed the following:
My countrymen, my blood spills for you and for Egypt. I will live for your sake and die for the sake of your freedom and honor. Let them kill me; it does not concern me so long as I have instilled pride, honor, and freedom in you. If Gamal Abdel Nasser should die, each of you shall be Gamal Abdel Nasser ... Gamal Abdel Nasser is of you and from you and he is willing to sacrifice his life for the nation.[86]

The crowd roared in approval and Arab audiences were electrified. The assassination attempt backfired, quickly playing into Nasser's hands.[87] Upon returning to Cairo, he ordered one of the largest political crackdowns in the modern history of Egypt,[87] with the arrests of thousands of dissenters, mostly members of the Brotherhood, but also communists, and the dismissal of 140 officers loyal to Naguib.[87] Eight Brotherhood leaders were sentenced to death,[87] although the sentence of its chief ideologue, Sayyid Qutb, was commuted to a 15-year imprisonment.[88] Naguib was removed from the presidency and put under house arrest, but was never tried or sentenced, and no one in the army rose to defend him. With his rivals neutralized, Nasser became the undisputed leader of Egypt.[86]
Nasser's street following was still too small to sustain his plans for reform and to secure him in office.

Nasser made secret contacts with Israel in 1954–55, but determined that peace with Israel would be impossible, considering it an "expansionist state that viewed the Arabs with disdain".[92] On 28 February 1955, Israeli troops attacked the Egyptian-held Gaza Strip with the stated aim of suppressing Palestinian fedayeen raids. Nasser did not feel that the Egyptian Army was ready for a confrontation and did not retaliate militarily. His failure to respond to Israeli military action demonstrated the ineffectiveness of his armed forces and constituted a blow to his growing popularity.[93][94] Nasser subsequently ordered the tightening of the blockade on Israeli shipping through the Straits of Tiran and restricted the use of airspace over the Gulf of Aqaba by Israeli aircraft in early September.[93] The Israelis re-militarized the al-Auja Demilitarized Zone on the Egyptian border on 21 September.[94]
Simultaneous with Israel's February raid, the
Adoption of neutralism
At the
Nasser mediated discussions between the pro-Western, pro-Soviet, and neutralist conference factions over the composition of the "Final Communique"
Following Bandung, Nasser officially adopted the "positive neutralism" of Yugoslavian president Josip Broz Tito and Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru as a principal theme of Egyptian foreign policy regarding the Cold War.[98][104] Nasser was welcomed by large crowds of people lining the streets of Cairo on his return to Egypt on 2 May and was widely heralded in the press for his achievements and leadership in the conference. Consequently, Nasser's prestige was greatly boosted, as was his self-confidence and image.[105]
1956 constitution and presidency

With his domestic position considerably strengthened, Nasser was able to secure primacy over his RCC colleagues and gained relatively unchallenged decision-making authority,[101] particularly over foreign policy.[106]
In January 1956, the new Constitution of Egypt was drafted, entailing the establishment of a single-party system under the National Union (NU),[106] a movement Nasser described as the "cadre through which we will realize our revolution".[107] The NU was a reconfiguration of the Liberation Rally,[108] which Nasser determined had failed in generating mass public participation.[109] In the new movement, Nasser attempted to incorporate more citizens, approved by local-level party committees, in order to solidify popular backing for his government.[109] The NU would select a nominee for the presidential election whose name would be provided for public approval.[106]
Nasser's nomination for the post and the new constitution were put to
Nationalization of the Suez Canal Company


After the three-year transition period ended with Nasser's official assumption of power, his domestic and independent foreign policies increasingly collided with the regional interests of the UK and France. The latter condemned his strong support for
Nasser was informed of the British–American withdrawal in a news statement while aboard a plane returning to Cairo from Belgrade, and took great offense.[114] Although ideas for nationalizing the Suez Canal Company were in the offing after the UK agreed to withdraw its military from Egypt in 1954 (the last British troops left on 13 June 1956), journalist Mohamed Hassanein Heikal asserts that Nasser made the final decision to nationalize the company that operated the waterway between 19 and 20 July.[114] Nasser himself would later state that he decided on 23 July, after studying the issue and deliberating with some of his advisers from the dissolved RCC, namely Boghdadi and technical specialist Mahmoud Younis, beginning on 21 July.[114] The rest of the RCC's former members were informed of the decision on 24 July, while the bulk of the cabinet was unaware of the nationalization scheme until hours before Nasser publicly announced it.[114] According to Ramadan, Nasser's decision to nationalize the canal was a solitary decision, taken without consultation.[115]
On 26 July 1956, Nasser gave a speech in Alexandria announcing the nationalization of the
The nationalization announcement was greeted very emotionally by the audience and, throughout the Arab world, thousands entered the streets shouting slogans of support.[119] US ambassador Henry A. Byroade stated, "I cannot overemphasize [the] popularity of the Canal Company nationalization within Egypt, even among Nasser's enemies."[117] Egyptian political scientist Mahmoud Hamad wrote that, prior to 1956, Nasser had consolidated control over Egypt's military and civilian bureaucracies, but it was only after the canal's nationalization that he gained near-total popular legitimacy and firmly established himself as the "charismatic leader" and "spokesman for the masses not only in Egypt, but all over the Third World".[120] According to Aburish, this was Nasser's largest pan-Arab triumph at the time and "soon his pictures were to be found in the tents of Yemen, the souks of Marrakesh, and the posh villas of Syria".[119] The official reason given for the nationalization was that funds from the canal would be used for the construction of the dam in Aswan.[117] That same day, Egypt closed the canal to Israeli shipping.[118]
Suez Crisis
France and the UK, the largest shareholders in the Suez Canal Company, saw its nationalization as yet another hostile measure aimed at them by the Egyptian government. Nasser was aware that the canal's nationalization would instigate an international crisis and believed the prospect of military intervention by the two countries was 80 percent likely.[121] Nasser dismissed their claims,[122] and believed that the UK would not be able to intervene militarily for at least two months after the announcement, and dismissed Israeli action as "impossible".[123] In early October, the UN Security Council met on the matter of the canal's nationalization and adopted a resolution recognizing Egypt's right to control the canal as long as it continued to allow passage through it for foreign ships.[124] According to Heikal, after this agreement, "Nasser estimated that the danger of invasion had dropped to 10 percent".[125] Shortly thereafter, however, the UK, France, and Israel made a secret agreement to take over the Suez Canal, occupy the Suez Canal zone,[117][126] and topple Nasser.[127][128][129]
On 29 October 1956, Israeli forces crossed the Sinai Peninsula, overwhelmed Egyptian army posts, and quickly advanced to their objectives. Two days later, British and French planes bombarded Egyptian airfields in the canal zone.[130] Nasser ordered the military's high command to withdraw the Egyptian Army from Sinai to bolster the canal's defenses.[131] Moreover, he feared that if the armored corps was dispatched to confront the Israeli invading force and the British and French subsequently landed in the canal city of Port Said, Egyptian armor in the Sinai would be cut off from the canal and destroyed by the combined tripartite forces.[131] Amer strongly disagreed, insisting that Egyptian tanks meet the Israelis in battle.[131] The two had a heated exchange on 3 November, and Amer conceded.[131] Nasser also ordered blockage of the canal by sinking or otherwise disabling forty-nine ships at its entrance.[130]
Despite the commanded withdrawal of Egyptian troops, about 2,000 Egyptian soldiers were killed during engagement with Israeli forces,[132] and some 5,000 Egyptian soldiers were captured by the Israeli Army.[131] Amer and Salah Salem proposed requesting a ceasefire, with Salem further recommending that Nasser surrender himself to British forces.[117] Nasser berated Amer and Salem, and vowed, "Nobody is going to surrender."[130] Nasser assumed military command. Despite the relative ease in which Sinai was occupied, Nasser's prestige at home and among Arabs was undamaged.[133] To counterbalance the Egyptian Army's dismal performance, Nasser authorized the distribution of about 400,000 rifles to civilian volunteers and hundreds of militias were formed throughout Egypt, many led by Nasser's political opponents.[134]
It was at Port Said that Nasser saw a confrontation with the invading forces as being the strategic and psychological focal point of Egypt's defense.[135] A third infantry battalion and hundreds of national guardsmen were sent to the city as reinforcements, while two regular companies were dispatched to organize popular resistance.[135] Nasser and Boghdadi traveled to the canal zone to boost the morale of the armed volunteers. According to Boghdadi's memoirs, Nasser described the Egyptian Army as "shattered" as he saw the wreckage of Egyptian military equipment en route.[135] When British and French forces landed in Port Said on 5–6 November, its local militia put up a stiff resistance, resulting in street-to-street fighting.[134][136] The Egyptian Army commander in the city was preparing to request terms for a ceasefire, but Nasser ordered him to desist. The British-French forces managed to largely secure the city by 7 November.[136] Between 750 and 1,000 Egyptians were killed in the battle for Port Said.[132]
The US
After the fighting ended, Amer accused Nasser of provoking an unnecessary war and then blaming the military for the result.
Pan-Arabism and socialism
By 1957,
In January 1957, the US adopted the
Relations between Nasser and King Hussein of Jordan deteriorated in April when Hussein implicated Nasser in two coup attempts against him[152][153]—although Nasser's involvement was never established[154][155]—and dissolved al-Nabulsi's cabinet.[152][153] Nasser subsequently slammed Hussein on Cairo radio as being "a tool of the imperialists".[156] Relations with King Saud also became antagonistic as the latter began to fear that Nasser's increasing popularity in Saudi Arabia was a genuine threat to the royal family's survival.[152] Despite opposition from the governments of Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Iraq, and Lebanon, Nasser maintained his prestige among their citizens and those of other Arab countries.[147]
By the end of 1957, Nasser nationalized all remaining British and French assets in Egypt, including the tobacco, cement, pharmaceutical, and phosphate industries.[157] When efforts to offer tax incentives and attract outside investments yielded no tangible results, he nationalized more companies and made them a part of his economic development organization.[157] He stopped short of total government control: two-thirds of the economy was still in private hands.[157] This effort achieved a measure of success, with increased agricultural production and investment in industrialization.[157] Nasser initiated the Helwan steelworks, which subsequently became Egypt's largest enterprise, providing the country with product and tens of thousands of jobs.[157] Nasser also decided to cooperate with the Soviet Union in the construction of the Aswan Dam to replace the withdrawal of US funds.[157]
United Arab Republic
Despite his popularity with the people of the Arab world, by mid-1957 his only regional ally was Syria.
As political instability grew in Syria, delegations from the country were sent to Nasser demanding immediate unification with Egypt.[159] Nasser initially turned down the request, citing the two countries' incompatible political and economic systems, lack of contiguity, the Syrian military's record of intervention in politics, and the deep factionalism among Syria's political forces.[159] However, in January 1958, a second Syrian delegation managed to convince Nasser of an impending communist takeover and a consequent slide to civil strife.[160] Nasser subsequently opted for union, albeit on the condition that it would be a total political merger with him as its president, to which the delegates and Syrian president Shukri al-Quwatli agreed.[161] On 1 February, the United Arab Republic (UAR) was proclaimed and, according to Dawisha, the Arab world reacted in "stunned amazement, which quickly turned into uncontrolled euphoria."[162] Nasser ordered a crackdown against Syrian communists, dismissing many of them from their governmental posts.[163][164]

On a surprise visit to Damascus to celebrate the union on 24 February, Nasser was welcomed by crowds in the hundreds of thousands.
A day after announcing the attempt on his life, Nasser established a new provisional constitution proclaiming a 600-member National Assembly (400 from Egypt and 200 from Syria) and the dissolution of all political parties.
With the establishment of the United Arab Republic, the United States under President Eisenhower attempted to build better relations and initiate a rapprochement between the two countries, contrasting with the previously cautious stance of the American government towards Nasser.
Influence on the Arab world
The holy march on which the Arab nation insists, will carry us forward from one victory to another ... the flag of freedom which flies over Baghdad today will fly over Amman and Riyadh. Yes, the flag of freedom which flies over Cairo, Damascus, and Baghdad today will fly over the rest of the Middle East ...
In Lebanon, clashes between pro-Nasser factions and supporters of staunch Nasser opponent, then-President Camille Chamoun, culminated in civil strife by May.[174] The former sought to unite with the UAR, while the latter sought Lebanon's continued independence.[174] Nasser delegated oversight of the issue to Sarraj, who provided limited aid to Nasser's Lebanese supporters through money, light arms, and officer training[175]—short of the large-scale support that Chamoun alleged.[176][177] Nasser did not covet Lebanon, seeing it as a "special case", but sought to prevent Chamoun from a second presidential term.[178] In Oman, the Jebel Akhdar War between the rebels in the interior of Oman against the British-backed Sultanate of Oman prompted Nasser to support the rebels in what was considered a war against colonialism between 1954 and 1959.[179][180]
On 14 July 1958, Iraqi army officers Abdel Karim Qasim and
In the fall of 1958, Nasser formed a tripartite committee consisting of Zakaria Mohieddin, al-Hawrani, and

Relations between Nasser and Qasim grew increasingly bitter on 9 March,
By December, the political situation in Syria was faltering and Nasser responded by appointing Amer as governor-general alongside Sarraj. Syria's leaders opposed the appointment and many resigned from their government posts. Nasser later met with the opposition leaders and in a heated moment, exclaimed that he was the elected president of the UAR and those who did not accept his authority could "walk away".[185]
Collapse of the union and aftermath
Opposition to the union mounted among some of Syria's key elements,
On 28 September 1961, secessionist army units launched a coup in Damascus, declaring Syria's secession from the UAR.
Revival on regional stage
Nasser's regional position changed unexpectedly when Yemeni officers led by Nasser supporter
In July 1962, Algeria became
On 8 February 1963, a military coup in Iraq led by a Ba'athist–Nasserist alliance toppled Qasim, who was subsequently shot dead. Abdel Salam Aref, a Nasserist, was chosen to be the new president.[200] A similar alliance toppled the Syrian government on 8 March.[202] On 14 March, the new Iraqi and Syrian governments sent Nasser delegations to push for a new Arab union.[203] At the meeting, Nasser lambasted the Ba'athists for "facilitating" Syria's split from the UAR,[204] and asserted that he was the "leader of the Arabs".[203] A transitional unity agreement stipulating a federal system[203] was signed by the parties on 17 April and the new union was set to be established in May 1965.[205] However, the agreement fell apart weeks later when Syria's Ba'athists purged Nasser's supporters from the officers corps. A failed counter-coup by a Nasserist colonel followed, after which Nasser condemned the Ba'athists as "fascists".[206]
In January 1964, Nasser called for an Arab League summit in Cairo to establish a unified Arab response against Israel's plans to divert the Jordan River's waters for economic purposes, which Syria and Jordan deemed an act of war.[207] Nasser blamed Arab divisions for what he deemed "the disastrous situation".[208] He discouraged Syria and Palestinian guerrillas from provoking the Israelis, conceding that he had no plans for war with Israel.[208] During the summit, Nasser developed cordial relations with King Hussein, and ties were mended with the rulers of Saudi Arabia, Syria, and Morocco.[207] In May, Nasser moved to formally share his leadership position over the Palestine issue[208] by initiating the creation of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO).[208][209] In practice, Nasser used the PLO to wield control over the Palestinian fedayeen.[209] Its head was to be Ahmad Shukeiri, Nasser's personal nominee.[208]
After years of foreign policy coordination and developing ties, Nasser, President Sukarno of Indonesia, President Tito of Yugoslavia, and Prime Minister Nehru of India founded the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) in 1961.[210] Its declared purpose was to solidify international non-alignment and promote world peace amid the Cold War, end colonization, and increase economic cooperation among developing countries.[211] In 1964, Nasser was made president of the NAM and held the second conference of the organization in Cairo.[212]
Nasser played a significant part in the strengthening of African solidarity in the late 1950s and early 1960s, although his continental leadership role had increasingly passed to Algeria since 1962.[213] During this period, Nasser made Egypt a refuge for anti-colonial leaders from several African countries and allowed the broadcast of anti-colonial propaganda from Cairo.[213] Beginning in 1958, Nasser had a key role in the discussions among African leaders that led to the establishment of the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) in 1963.[213]
Modernization efforts and internal dissent

Al-Azhar
In 1961, Nasser sought to firmly establish Egypt as the leader of the Arab world and to promote a second revolution in Egypt with the purpose of merging Islamic and socialist thinking.
Nasser instructed al-Azhar to create changes in its syllabus that trickled to the lower levels of Egyptian education, consequently allowing the establishment of coeducational schools and the introduction of
Rivalry with Amer
Following Syria's secession, Nasser grew concerned with Amer's inability to train and modernize the army, and with the
In early 1962 Nasser again attempted to wrest control of the military command from Amer.
National Charter and second term

In October 1961, Nasser embarked on a major nationalization program for Egypt, believing the total adoption of socialism was the answer to his country's problems and would have prevented Syria's secession.
Nasser also attempted to maintain oversight of the country's civil service to prevent it from inflating and consequently becoming a burden to the state.
During the presidential referendum in Egypt, Nasser was re-elected to a second term as UAR president and took his oath on 25 March 1965. He was the only candidate for the position, with virtually all of his political opponents forbidden by law from running for office, and his fellow party members reduced to mere followers. That same year, Nasser had the Muslim Brotherhood chief ideologue Sayyed Qutb imprisoned.[226] Qutb was charged and found guilty by the court of plotting to assassinate Nasser, and was executed in 1966.[226] Beginning in 1966, as Egypt's economy slowed and government debt became increasingly burdensome, Nasser began to ease state control over the private sector, encouraging state-owned bank loans to private business and introducing incentives to increase exports.[227] During the '60s, the Egyptian economy went from sluggishness to the verge of collapse, the society became less free, and Nasser's appeal waned considerably.[228]
Six-Day War

In mid May 1967, the Soviet Union issued warnings to Nasser of an impending Israeli attack on Syria, although Chief of Staff Mohamed Fawzi considered the warnings to be "baseless".[229][230] According to Kandil, without Nasser's authorization, Amer used the Soviet warnings as a pretext to dispatch troops to Sinai on 14 May, and Nasser subsequently demanded UNEF's withdrawal.[230][231] Earlier that day, Nasser received a warning from King Hussein of Israeli-American collusion to drag Egypt into war.[232] The message had been originally received by Amer on 2 May, but was withheld from Nasser until the Sinai deployment on 14 May.[232][233] Although in the preceding months, Hussein and Nasser had been accusing each other of avoiding a fight with Israel,[234] Hussein was nonetheless wary that an Egyptian–Israeli war would risk the West Bank's occupation by Israel.[232] Nasser still felt that the US would restrain Israel from attacking due to assurances that he received from the US and Soviet Union.[235] In turn, he also reassured both powers that Egypt would only act defensively.[235]
On 21 May, Amer asked Nasser to order the Straits of Tiran blockaded, a move Nasser believed Israel would use as a casus belli.[232] Amer reassured him that the army was prepared for confrontation,[236][237] but Nasser doubted Amer's assessment of the military's readiness.[236] According to Nasser's vice president Zakaria Mohieddin, although "Amer had absolute authority over the armed forces, Nasser had his ways of knowing what was really going on".[238] Moreover, Amer anticipated an impending Israeli attack and advocated a preemptive strike.[239][240] Nasser refused the call[240][241] upon determination that the air force lacked pilots and Amer's handpicked officers were incompetent.[241] Still, Nasser concluded that if Israel attacked, Egypt's quantitative advantage in manpower and arms could stave off Israeli forces for at least two weeks, allowing for diplomacy towards a ceasefire.[242] Israel repeated declarations it had made in 1957 that any closure of the Straits would be considered an act of war, or justification for war, but Nasser closed the Straits to Israeli shipping on 22–23 May. Towards the end of May, Nasser increasingly exchanged his positions of deterrence for deference to the inevitability of war,[242][243] under increased pressure to act by both the general Arab populace and various Arab governments.[229][244] On 26 May Nasser declared, "our basic objective will be to destroy Israel".[245] On 30 May, King Hussein committed Jordan in an alliance with Egypt and Syria.[246]

On the morning of 5 June, the
According to Sadat, it was only when the Israelis cut off the Egyptian garrison at
Resignation and aftermath

I have taken a decision with which I need your help. I have decided to withdraw totally and for good from any official post or political role, and to return to the ranks of the masses, performing my duty in their midst, like any other citizen. This is a time for action, not grief. ... My whole heart is with you, and let your hearts be with me. May God be with us—hope, light, and guidance in our hearts.
During the first four days of the war, the general population of the Arab world believed Arab radio station fabrications of imminent Arab victory.[251] On 9 June, Nasser appeared on television to inform Egypt's citizens of their country's defeat.[251][252] He announced his resignation on television later that day, and ceded all presidential powers to his then-Vice President Zakaria Mohieddin, who had no prior information of this decision and refused to accept the post.[252] It was in this resignation speech that the Six Day War was first called the "setback". The second sentence of his speech ran: "We cannot hide from ourselves the fact that we have met with a grave setback [naksa] in the last few days"—the "naksa" or "setback" for Egypt being the destruction of its armed forces, the loss of the entire Sinai Peninsula and the Gaza region, and the national humiliation and disgrace of losing a war to the vastly smaller Israeli Army.
Hundreds of thousands of sympathizers poured into the streets in mass demonstrations throughout Egypt and across the Arab world rejecting his resignation,[253] chanting, "We are your soldiers, Gamal!"[254] Nasser retracted his decision the next day.[254]
On 11 July, Nasser replaced Amer with Mohamed Fawzi as general commander,[255][256] over the protestations of Amer's loyalists in the military, 600 of whom marched on army headquarters and demanded Amer's reinstatement.[257] After Nasser sacked thirty of the loyalists in response,[257] Amer and his allies devised a plan to topple him on 27 August.[258] Nasser was tipped off about their activities and, after several invitations, he convinced Amer to meet him at his home on 24 August.[258] Nasser confronted Amer about the coup plot, which he denied before being arrested by Mohieddin. Amer committed suicide on 14 September.[259] Despite his souring relationship with Amer, Nasser spoke of losing "the person closest to [him]".[260] Thereafter, Nasser began a process of depoliticizing the armed forces, arresting dozens of leading military and intelligence figures loyal to Amer.[259]
At the 29 August Arab League summit in Khartoum, Nasser's usual commanding position had receded as the attending heads of state expected Saudi King Faisal to lead. A ceasefire in the Yemen War was declared and the summit concluded with the Khartoum Resolution,[261] which, according to Abd al Azim Ramadan, left only one option—a war with Israel.[262]
The Soviet Union soon resupplied the Egyptian military with about half of its former arsenals and broke diplomatic relations with Israel. Nasser cut relations with the US following the war, and, according to Aburish, his policy of "playing the superpowers against each other" ended.[263] In November, Nasser accepted UN Resolution 242, which called for Israel's withdrawal from territories acquired in the war. His supporters claimed Nasser's move was meant to buy time to prepare for another confrontation with Israel, while his detractors believed his acceptance of the resolution signaled a waning interest in Palestinian independence.[264]
Final years of presidency
Domestic reforms and governmental changes
Nasser appointed himself the additional roles of prime minister and supreme commander of the armed forces on 19 June 1967.
On 30 March, Nasser proclaimed a manifesto stipulating the restoration of civil liberties, greater parliamentary independence from the executive,[267] major structural changes to the ASU, and a campaign to rid the government of corrupt elements.[268] A public referendum approved the proposed measures in May, and held subsequent elections for the Supreme Executive Committee, the ASU's highest decision-making body.[267] Observers noted that the declaration signaled an important shift from political repression to liberalization, although its promises would largely go unfulfilled.[268]
Nasser appointed Sadat and Hussein el-Shafei as his vice presidents in December 1969. By then, relations with his other original military comrades, namely Khaled and Zakaria Mohieddin and former vice president Sabri, had become strained.[270] By mid-1970, Nasser pondered replacing Sadat with Boghdadi after reconciling with the latter.[271]
War of Attrition and regional diplomatic initiatives

Israel retaliated against Egyptian shelling with commando raids, artillery shelling and air strikes. This resulted in an exodus of civilians from Egyptian cities along the Suez Canal's western bank.[274][275][276] Nasser ceased all military activities and began a program to build a network of internal defenses, while receiving the financial backing of various Arab states.[276] The war resumed in March 1969.[276] In November, Nasser brokered an agreement between the PLO and the Lebanese military that granted Palestinian guerrillas the right to use Lebanese territory to attack Israel.[277]
In June 1970, Nasser accepted the US-sponsored Rogers Plan, which called for an end to hostilities and an Israeli withdrawal from Egyptian territory, but it was rejected by Israel, the PLO, and most Arab states except Jordan.[271] Nasser had initially rejected the plan, but conceded under pressure from the Soviet Union, which feared that escalating regional conflict could drag it into a war with the US.[278][279] He also determined that a ceasefire could serve as a tactical step toward the strategic goal of recapturing the Suez Canal.[280] Nasser forestalled any movement toward direct negotiations with Israel. In dozens of speeches and statements, Nasser posited the equation that any direct peace talks with Israel were tantamount to surrender.[281] Following Nasser's acceptance, Israel agreed to a ceasefire and Nasser used the lull in fighting to move surface-to-air missiles towards the canal zone.[278][279]
Meanwhile, tensions in Jordan between an increasingly autonomous PLO and King Hussein's government had been simmering;
Death and funeral

As the Arab League summit closed on 28 September 1970, hours after escorting the last Arab leader to leave, Nasser suffered a heart attack. He was immediately transported to his house, where his physicians tended to him. Nasser died several hours later, around 6 p.m. at age 52.[285] Heikal, Sadat, and Nasser's wife Tahia were at his deathbed.[286] According to his doctor, al-Sawi Habibi, Nasser's likely cause of death was arteriosclerosis, varicose veins, and complications from long-standing diabetes. Nasser was also a heavy smoker with a family history of heart disease—two of his brothers died in their fifties from the same condition.[287] The state of Nasser's health was not known to the public prior to his death.[287][288] He had suffered heart attacks before, in 1966 and September 1969.
Following the announcement of Nasser's death, most Arabs were in a state of shock.

Almost immediately after the procession began, mourners engulfed Nasser's coffin chanting, "There is no God but Allah, and Nasser is God's beloved... Each of us is Nasser."[291] Police unsuccessfully attempted to quell the crowds and, as a result, most of the foreign dignitaries were evacuated.[291] The final destination was the Nasr Mosque, which was afterwards renamed Abdel Nasser Mosque, where Nasser was buried.[291]
Because of his ability to motivate nationalistic passions, "men, women, and children wept and wailed in the streets" after hearing of his death, according to Nutting.
Legacy
Nasser made Egypt fully independent of
However, these advances came at the expense of civil liberties. In Nasser's Egypt, the media were tightly controlled, mail was opened, and telephones were wiretapped.[300] He was elected in 1956, 1958 and 1965 in plebiscites in which he was the sole candidate, each time claiming unanimous or near-unanimous support. With few exceptions, the legislature did little more than approve Nasser's policies. As the legislature was made up almost entirely of government supporters, Nasser effectively held all governing power in the nation.
By the end of his presidency, employment and working conditions improved considerably, although poverty was still high in the country and substantial resources allocated for social welfare had been diverted to the war effort.[298]
The national economy grew significantly through
During Mubarak's presidency, Nasserist political parties began to emerge in Egypt, the first being the Arab Democratic Nasserist Party (ADNP).[303][304] The party carried minor political influence,[305] and splits between its members beginning in 1995 resulted in the gradual establishment of splinter parties,[306] including Hamdeen Sabahi's 1997 founding of Al-Karama.[307] Sabahi came in third place during the 2012 presidential election.[308] Nasserist activists were among the founders of Kefaya, a major opposition force during Mubarak's rule.[307] On 19 September 2012, four Nasserist parties (the ADNP, Karama, the National Conciliation Party, and the Popular Nasserist Congress Party) merged to form the United Nasserist Party.[309]
Public image

Nasser was known for his accessibility and direct relationship with ordinary Egyptians.[310][311] His availability to the public, despite assassination attempts against him, was unparalleled among his successors.[312] A skilled orator,[313] Nasser gave 1,359 speeches between 1953 and 1970, a record for any Egyptian head of state.[314] Historian Elie Podeh wrote that a constant theme of Nasser's image was "his ability to represent Egyptian authenticity, in triumph or defeat".[310] The national press also helped to foster his popularity and profile—more so after the nationalization of state media.[312] Historian Tarek Osman wrote:
The interplay in the Nasser 'phenomenon' between genuine expression of popular feeling and state-sponsored propaganda may sometimes be hard to disentangle. But behind it lies a vital historical fact: that Gamal Abdel Nasser signifies the only truly Egyptian developmental project in the country's history since the fall of the Pharaonic state. There had been other projects ... But this was different—in origin, meaning and impact. For Nasser was a man of the Egyptian soil who had overthrown the Middle East's most established and sophisticated monarchy in a swift and bloodless move—to the acclaim of millions of poor, oppressed Egyptians—and ushered in a programme of 'social justice', 'progress and development', and 'dignity'.[315]
While Nasser was increasingly criticized by Egyptian intellectuals following the Six-Day War and his death in 1970, the general public was persistently sympathetic both during and after Nasser's life.[310] According to political scientist Mahmoud Hamad, writing in 2008, "nostalgia for Nasser is easily sensed in Egypt and all Arab countries today".[316] General malaise in Egyptian society, particularly during the Mubarak era, augmented nostalgia for Nasser's presidency, which increasingly became associated with the ideals of national purpose, hope, social cohesion, and vibrant culture.[302]
Until the present day, Nasser serves as an iconic figure throughout the Arab world,
Historian
Criticism
Sadat declared his intention to "continue the path of Nasser" in his 7 October 1970 presidential inauguration speech,
Nasser's Egyptian detractors considered him a dictator who thwarted democratic progress, imprisoned thousands of dissidents, and led a repressive administration responsible for numerous human rights violations.[299] Islamists in Egypt, particularly members of the politically persecuted Brotherhood, viewed Nasser as oppressive, tyrannical, and demonic.[328] Samer S. Shehata, who wrote an article on "The Politics of Laughter: Nasser, Sadat, and Mubarek in Egyptian Political Jokes" noted that "with the new regime came the end of parliamentary politics and political freedoms, including the right to organize political parties, and freedoms of speech and the press".[329] Liberal writer Tawfiq al-Hakim described Nasser as a "confused Sultan" who employed stirring rhetoric, but had no actual plan to achieve his stated goals.[327]
Some of Nasser's
Zakaria Mohieddin, who was Nasser's vice president, said that Nasser gradually changed during his reign. He ceased consulting his colleagues and made more and more of the decisions himself. Although Nasser repeatedly said that a war with Israel will start at a time of his, or Arab, choosing, in 1967 he started a bluffing game "but a successful bluff means your opponent must not know which cards you are holding. In this case Nasser's opponent could see his hand in the mirror and knew he was only holding a pair of deuces" and Nasser knew that his army is not prepared yet. "All of this was out of character...His tendencies in this regard may have been accentuated by diabetes... That was the only rational explanation for his actions in 1967".[238]
Antisemitism
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Nasser told a German neo-Nazi newspaper in 1964 that "no person, not even the most simple one, takes seriously the lie of the six million Jews that were murdered [in the Holocaust]."[336][337][338] However, he is not known to have ever again publicly called the figure of six million into question, perhaps because his advisors and East German contacts had advised him on the subject.[339] Nasser, convinced of its authenticity, also encouraged the distribution of the antisemitic fabrication The Protocols of the Elders of Zion. He believed that the Jews greatly influenced the global financial market and that they ultimately strove for world domination. Nasser also hired former Nazi officials like Johann von Leers to distribute antisemitic propaganda. He is, however, thought to have been more moderate in that regard than contemporary political powers like Young Egypt or the Muslim Brotherhood.[340][341]
Regional leadership
Through his actions and speeches, and because he was able to symbolize the popular Arab will, Nasser inspired several nationalist revolutions in the Arab world.[315] He defined the politics of his generation and communicated directly with the public masses of the Arab world, bypassing the various heads of states of those countries—an accomplishment not repeated by other Arab leaders.[330] The extent of Nasser's centrality in the region made it a priority for incoming Arab nationalist heads of state to seek good relations with Egypt, in order to gain popular legitimacy from their own citizens.[342]
To varying degrees,[37] Nasser's statist system of government was continued in Egypt and emulated by virtually all Arab republics,[343] namely Algeria, Syria, Iraq, Tunisia, Yemen, Sudan, and Libya.[37][343] Ahmed Ben Bella, Algeria's first president, was a staunch Nasserist.[344] Abdullah al-Sallal drove out the king of North Yemen in the name of Nasser's pan-Arabism.[197] Other coups influenced by Nasser included those that occurred in Iraq in July 1958 and Syria in 1963.[345] Muammar Gaddafi, who overthrew the Libyan monarchy in 1969, considered Nasser his hero and sought to succeed him as "leader of the Arabs".[346] Also in 1969, Colonel Gaafar Nimeiry, a supporter of Nasser, took power in Sudan.[347] The Arab Nationalist Movement (ANM) helped spread Nasser's pan-Arabist ideas throughout the Arab world, particularly among the Palestinians, Syrians, and Lebanese,[348][349] and in South Yemen, the Persian Gulf, and Iraq.[349] While many regional heads of state tried to emulate Nasser, Podeh opined that the "parochialism" of successive Arab leaders "transformed imitation [of Nasser] into parody".[343]
Portrayal in film
In 1963, Egyptian director
Personal life
In 1944, Nasser married
Nasser and Tahia had two daughters and three sons:[357]
- Hoda, b. 1945.
- Mona, b. 1947.
- Khalid, (13 December 1949 – 15 September 2011). The most active politically. Said to have co-founded (with Egyptian diplomat Mahmud Nur Eddin) an organization called "the Revolution of Egypt," which was accused of assassinating Israeli members of the Shin Bet stationed in Egypt in the late 1980s. Khalid took refuge in Yugoslavia and was eventually pardoned by President Hosni Mubarak.
- Abd al-Hamid, b. 1951.
- Abd al-Hakim, b. 1955. Appears regularly in Egyptian and regional media, heads the museum dedicated to the life of his father.
Although he was a proponent of secular politics, Nasser was an observant Muslim who made the Hajj pilgrimage to Mecca in 1954 and 1965.[358][359] He was known to be personally incorruptible,[360][361][362][363] a characteristic which further enhanced his reputation among the citizens of Egypt and the Arab world.[362] Nasser's personal hobbies included playing chess, photography, watching American films, reading Arabic, English, and French magazines, and listening to classical music.[364][365]

Nasser was a chain smoker.[287][361][366] He maintained 18-hour workdays and rarely took time off for vacations. The combination of smoking and working long hours contributed to his poor health. He was diagnosed with diabetes in the early 1960s and by the time of his death in 1970, he also had arteriosclerosis, heart disease, and high blood pressure. He suffered two major heart attacks (in 1966 and 1969), and was on bed rest for six weeks after the second episode. State media reported that Nasser's absence from the public view at that time was a result of influenza.[287]
Writings
Nasser wrote the following books, published during his lifetime:[367]
- Memoirs of the First Palestine War (Akher Sa'a)
- "Memoirs of the First Palestine War", in 2, no. 2 (Win. 73): 3–32 (First English translation, 1973, pdf-file from Journal of Palestine Studies)
- Egypt's Liberation: The Philosophy of the Revolution (Arabic: فلسفة الثورة) (1955; Dar al-Maaref)
- Egypt's liberation; the philosophy of the revolution, introduced by Dorothy Thompson (Washington: Public Affairs Press, 1955)
- Arabic: في سبيل الحرية) (1959; Cairo-Arabian Company)
Honours
- Foreign honours
- Czechoslovakia: Collar Grand Cross of the Order of the White Lion (1966)[368]
- East Germany: First Class of the Star of People's Friendship (1965)[369]
- Finland: Grand Cross with Collar of the Order of the White Rose of Finland (1967)[370]
- Malaysia: Honorary Recipient of the Order of the Crown of the Realm (DMN (K)) (1965)[371]
- Polish People's Republic: Grand Cross of the Order of Polonia Restituta[372]
- South Africa: Supreme Commander of the Order of the Companions of O. R. Tambo (2004)[373]
- Soviet Union:
- Tunisia: Grand Cordon of the Order of the Republic (1965)
- Yugoslavia: Great Star of the Order of the Yugoslav Star (1955)[375]
See also
- History of Egypt under Gamal Abdel Nasser
- List of presidents of Egypt
- List of prime ministers of Egypt
- Suez Crisis
- Six-Day War
- War of Attrition
- Closure of the Suez Canal (1967–1975)
Notes
- .
References
Citations
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Further reading
- Beattie, Kirk J. "Nasser's Egypt: A Quest for National Power and Prosperity." in Nation Building, State Building, and Economic Development: Case Studies and Comparisons (Routledge, 2015) pp. 146–164.
- Hasou, Tawfig Y. The struggle for the Arab world: Egypt's Nasser and the Arab League (Routledge, 2019).
- Joya, Angela. The Roots of Revolt: A Political Economy of Egypt from Nasser to Mubarak (Cambridge University Press, 2020).
- Khalifah, Omar. Nasser in the Egyptian Imaginary (Edinburgh University Press, 2016), Nasser in Egyptian literature.
- McAlexander, Richard J., “Couscous Mussolini: US Perceptions of Gamal Abdel Nasser, the 1958 Intervention in Lebanon and the Origins of the U.S.-Israeli Special Relationship,” Cold War History 11 (Aug. 2011), 363–85.
- McNamara, Robert. "The Nasser factor: Anglo-Egyptian relations and Yemen/Aden crisis 1962–65." Middle Eastern Studies 53.1 (2017): 51–68.
- Salem, Sara. "Four Women of Egypt: Memory, Geopolitics, and the Egyptian Women's Movement during the Nasser and Sadat Eras." Hypatia 32.3 (2017): 593–608. online
- Šćepanović, Janko. "Unwanted Conflict? The Analysis of the Impact of Misperception, Beliefs and Psychology of President Nasser at the Outbreak of the Six Day War." Chinese Journal of International Review 1.02 (2019): 1950003. online
- Shechter, Relli. The rise of the Egyptian middle class: socio-economic mobility and public discontent from Nasser to Sadat (Cambridge University Press, 2018).
- Waterbury, John. The Egypt of Nasser and Sadat (Princeton University Press, 2014).
External links
- Site for President Gamal Abdel Nasser. Bibliotheca Alexandrina and the Gamal Abdel Nasser Foundation. 8 October 2012. An archive of speeches, photos and documents related to Nasser.
- Presidency biography