German invasion of Belgium (1940)
Battle of Belgium | |||||||||
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Part of the fall of Fort Eben-Emael on 11 May 1940 | |||||||||
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Belligerents | |||||||||
Belgium France United Kingdom Netherlands[a] Luxembourg | Germany | ||||||||
Commanders and leaders | |||||||||
Leopold III Hubert Pierlot Maurice Gamelin Maxime Weygand Lord Gort Émile Speller |
Adolf Hitler Fedor von Bock | ||||||||
Strength | |||||||||
144 divisions[b] 13,974 guns[c] 3,384 tanks[d] 2,249 aircraft[e] |
141 divisions[1] 7,378 guns [1] 2,445 tanks[1] 5,446 aircraft (4,020 operational)[1] | ||||||||
Casualties and losses | |||||||||
222,443+ casualties (200,000 captured)[f] ~900 aircraft[g] | Uncertain (see German casualties)[h] |
The invasion of Belgium or Belgian campaign
On 10 May 1940, Germany
The Battle of Belgium included the first tank battle of the war, the
The German official history stated that in the 18 days of bitter fighting, the Belgian Army were tough opponents, and spoke of the "extraordinary bravery" of its soldiers.[5] The Belgian collapse forced the Allied withdrawal from continental Europe. The British Royal Navy subsequently evacuated Belgian ports during Operation Dynamo, allowing the British Expeditionary Force (BEF), along with many Belgian and French soldiers, to escape capture and continue military operations. France reached its own armistice with Germany in June 1940. Belgium was occupied by the Germans until the autumn of 1944, when it was liberated by the Western Allies.
Pre-battle plans
Belgium's strained alliances
The Belgian strategy for a defence against German aggression faced political as well as military problems. In terms of
Belgium was wary of continuing its alliance with France[citation needed]. Marshal Philippe Pétain had suggested a French strike at Germany's Ruhr area using Belgium as a spring-board in October 1930 and again in January 1933. Belgium feared it would be drawn into a war regardless, and sought to avoid that eventuality. The Belgians also feared being drawn into a war as a result of the French–Soviet pact of May 1935. The Franco-Belgian agreement stipulated Belgium was to mobilise if the Germans did, but what was not clear was whether Belgium would have to mobilise in the event of a German invasion of Poland.[6]
The Belgians much preferred an alliance with the
Belgian place in Allied strategy
The French government was infuriated at
The Allied plan to aid Belgium was the
The British, with no army in the field and behind in rearmament, were in no position to challenge French strategy, which had assumed the prominent role of the Western Alliance. Having little ability to overrule the French, the British strategy for military action came in the form of strategic bombing of the Ruhr industry.[13]
Belgian military strategy
On the official Belgian withdrawal from the Western Alliance, the Belgians refused to engage in any official staff meetings with French or British military staff for fear of compromising their neutrality. The Belgians did not regard a German invasion as inevitable and were determined that if an invasion did take place it would be effectively resisted by new
King Leopold III made a speech on 14 October 1936 before the Council of Ministers to persuade the people and their government that Belgium's defences needed strengthening.[17] He outlined three main military points for Belgium's increased rearmament:
a) German rearmament and the complete re-militarisation of Italy and Russia had caused most other states, even pacifists like Switzerland and the Netherlands, to take exceptional precautions.
b) Vast changes in military methods, particularly in aviation and mechanization, meant that initial operations could now be of alarming force, speed and magnitude.
c) The lightning reoccupation of the Rhineland came with bases for the start of a possible German invasion moving close to the Belgian frontier.[18]
On 24 April 1937, the French and British publicly declared that Belgium's security was paramount to the Western Allies and that they would defend their borders against aggression of any sort, whether directed solely at Belgium, or to obtain bases to wage war against "other states". The British and French released Belgium from her Locarno obligations to render mutual assistance in the event of German aggression toward Poland, while the British and French maintained their military obligations to Belgium.[19]
Militarily, the Belgians considered the Wehrmacht stronger than the Allies, and that engaging in overtures to the Allies would make Belgium a battleground without adequate allies.[20] The Belgians and French remained confused about what was expected of whom if or when hostilities commenced. The Belgians were determined to hold the border fortifications along the Albert Canal and the Meuse, without withdrawing, until the French Army arrived to support them. Gamelin was not keen on pushing his Dyle plan that far. He was concerned that the Belgians would be driven out of their defences and would retreat to Antwerp, as in 1914. In fact, the Belgian divisions protecting the border were to withdraw and retreat southward to link up with French forces. This information was not given to Gamelin.[21] As far as the Belgians were concerned, the Dyle Plan had advantages. Instead of the limited Allied advance to the Scheldt, or meeting the Germans on the Franco-Belgian border, the move to the Dyle river would reduce the Allied front in central Belgium by 70 kilometres (43 mi), freeing more forces for use as a strategic reserve. Belgium felt this would save more Belgian territory, in particular the eastern industrial regions. It also had the advantage of absorbing Dutch and Belgian Army formations (including some 20 Belgian divisions). Gamelin justified the Dyle Plan after the defeat using these arguments.[22]
On 10 January 1940, in an episode known as the
The Belgians suspected a ruse, but the plans were taken seriously. Belgian intelligence and the military attaché in Cologne correctly suggested the Germans would not commence the invasion with this plan. It suggested that the Germans would try an attack through the Belgian Ardennes and advance to Calais to encircle the Allied armies in Belgium. The Belgians correctly predicted that the Germans would attempt a Kesselschlacht (literally "Cauldron battle", meaning encirclement), to destroy its enemies. The Belgians had predicted the exact German plan as offered by Erich von Manstein.[25]
The Belgian High Command warned the French and British of their concerns. They feared that the Dyle plan would put not just the Belgian strategic position in danger, but also the entire left wing of the Allied front. King Leopold and General Raoul Van Overstraeten, the King's aide de camp, warned Gamelin and the French Army Command of their concerns on 8 March and 14 April. They were ignored.[26]
Belgian plans for defensive operations
The Belgian plan, in the event of German aggression [italics in original] provided for:
(a) A delaying position along the Albert Canal from Antwerp to Liège and the Meuse from Liège to Namur, which was to be held long enough to allow French and British troops to occupy the line Antwerp–Namur–Givet. It was anticipated that the forces of the guarantor Powers would be in action on the third day of an invasion.
(b) Withdrawal to the Antwerp–Namur position.
(c) The Belgian Army was to hold the sector–excluding Leuven, but including Antwerp–as part of the main Allied defensive position.[27]
In an agreement with the British and French Armies, the
Further east, delaying positions were constructed in the immediate tactical zones along the Albert Canal, which joined with the defences of the Meuse west of Maastricht. The line deviated southward, and continued to Liège. The Maastricht–Liège gap was heavily protected.
German operational plans
The German plan of attack required that
This plan would still fail if sufficient ground could not be quickly taken in Belgium to squeeze the allies against two fronts. Preventing this from happening were the defences of Fort Eben-Emael and the Albert Canal. The three bridges over the canal were the key to allowing Army Group B to move at high speed. The bridges at Veldwezelt, Vroenhoven and Kanne in Belgium, and Maastricht on the Dutch border were the targets.[30] Failure to capture the bridges would leave Walter von Reichenau's German 6th Army, the southernmost army of Group B, trapped in the Maastricht-Albert Canal enclave and subject to the fire of Eben-Emael. The fort had to be captured or destroyed.[30]
Adolf Hitler summoned Lieutenant-General
Hitler had noticed one potential flaw in the defences.[30] The roofs were flat and unprotected; he demanded to know if a glider, such as the DFS 230, could land on them. Student replied that it could be done, but only by 12 aircraft and in daylight; this would deliver 80–90 paratroopers onto the target.[30] Hitler then revealed the tactical weapon that would make this strategic operation work, introducing the Hohlladungwaffe (hollow-charge) – a 50 kilograms (110 lb) explosive weapon which would destroy the Belgian gun emplacements. This tactical unit spearheaded the first strategic airborne operation in history.[31]
Forces involved
Belgian forces
The
The Belgians began mobilisation on 25 August 1939 and by May 1940 mounted a field army of 18 infantry divisions, two divisions of partly motorised Chasseurs Ardennais and two motorised cavalry divisions, a force totaling some 600,000 men.[34] Belgian reserves may have been able to field 900,000 men.[35] The army lacked armour and anti-aircraft guns.[34][36]
After the completion of the Belgian Army's mobilisation, it could muster five Regular Corps and two reserve Army Corps consisting of 12 regular infantry divisions, two divisions of Chasseurs Ardennais, six reserve infantry divisions, one brigade of Cyclist Frontier Guards, one Cavalry Corps of two divisions, and one brigade of motorised cavalry.[37] The Army contained two anti-aircraft artillery and four artillery regiments, and an unknown number of fortress, engineer, and signals force personnel.[37]
The
The
The AéMI was commanded by Paul Hiernaux, who had received his pilot's license just before the outbreak of World War I, and had risen to the position of Commander-in-Chief in 1938.[40] Hiernaux organised the service into three Régiments d'Aéronautique (air regiments): the 1er with 60 aircraft, the 2ème with 53 aircraft, and the 3ème with 79 aircraft.[43]
French forces
The Belgians were afforded substantial support by the French Army. The French 1st Army included General
The French 7th Army was assigned to protect the northernmost part of the Allied front. It contained the
The third French army to see action on Belgian soil was the 9th. It was weaker than both the 7th and the 1st Armies. The 9th Army was allocated infantry divisions, with the exception of the 5th Motorised Infantry Division (5e DIM). Its mission was to protect the southern flank of the Allied armies, south of the Sambre river and just north of Sedan. Further south, in France, was the French 2nd Army, protecting the Franco-Belgian border between Sedan and Montmédy. The two weakest French armies were thus protecting the area of the main German thrust.[46]
British forces
The British contributed the weakest force to Belgium. The BEF, under the command of Gort, consisted of just 152,000 men in two
German forces
Army Group B was commanded by
Armoured strength in Army Group B amounted to 808 tanks, of which 282 were
The initial air strikes over Belgian air space were to be conducted by IV. Fliegerkorps under General der Flieger Generaloberst Alfred Keller. Keller's force consisted of Lehrgeschwader 1 (Stab. I., II., III., IV.), Kampfgeschwader 30 (Stab. I., II., III.) and Kampfgeschwader 27 (III.).[54] On 10 May Keller had 363 aircraft (224 serviceable) augmented by Generalmajor Wolfram von Richthofen's VIII. Fliegerkorps with 550 (420 serviceable) aircraft. They in turn were supported by Oberst Kurt-Bertram von Döring's Jagdfliegerführer 2, with 462 fighters (313 serviceable).[55]
Keller's IV. Fliegerkorps headquarters would operate from Düsseldorf, LG 1. Kampfgeschwader 30 which was based at Oldenburg and its III. Gruppe were based at Marx. Support for Döring and Richthofen came from present-day North Rhine-Westphalia and bases in Grevenbroich, Mönchengladbach, Dortmund and Essen.[54]
Battle
Luftwaffe operations: 10 May
During the evening of 9 May, the Belgian military attaché in Berlin intimated that the Germans intended to attack the following day. Offensive movements of enemy forces were detected on the border. At 00:10 on 10 May 1940 at General Headquarters, an unspecified squadron in Brussels gave the alarm.[56] A full state of alert was instigated at 01:30 am.[57] Belgian forces took up their deployment positions.[56] The Allied armies had enacted their Dyle plan on the morning of 10 May, and were approaching the Belgian rear.
The Luftwaffe was to spearhead the aerial battle in the low countries. Its first task was to eliminate the Belgian air contingent. Despite an overwhelming numerical superiority — 1,375 aircraft, 957 of which were serviceable — the air campaign in Belgium had limited success overall on the first day.[55] At roughly 04:00, the first air raids were conducted against airfields and communication centres.[56] It still had a tremendous impact on the AéMI, which had only 179 aircraft on 10 May.[58]
Much of the success achieved was down to Richthofen's subordinates, particularly
In aerial combat the battles were also one-sided. Two He 111s, two Do 17s and three Messerschmitt Bf 109s were shot down by Gloster Gladiators and Hurricanes. In return, eight Belgian Gladiators, five Fairey Foxes and one CR42 were shot down by JG 1, 21 and 27. No. 18 Squadron RAF sent two Bristol Blenheims on operations over the Belgian front, but lost both to Bf 109s. By the end of 10 May, the official German figures indicate claims for 30 Belgian aircraft destroyed on the ground, and 14 (plus the two RAF bombers) in the air for 10 losses.[60] The victory claims are likely an undercount. A total of 83 Belgian machines–mostly trainers and "squadron hacks", were destroyed.[58] The AéMI flew only 146 sorties in the first six days.[61] Between 16 May and 28 May, the AéMI flew just 77 operations.[61] It spent most of its time retreating and fuel withdrawing in the face of Luftwaffe attacks.[61]
10–11 May: Border battles
The German planners had recognised the need to eliminate Fort Eben-Emael if their army was to break into the interior of Belgium. It decided to deploy airborne forces (
Further successful German airborne offensive operations were carried out in Luxembourg, seizing five crossings and communication routes into central Belgium. The offensive, carried out by 125 volunteers of the 34th Infantry Division under the command of Wenner Hedderich, achieved their missions by flying to their objectives using
A little known third airborne operation,
1. Cut signal communications and message links on the Neufchâteau–Bastogne and Neufchâteau–Martelange roads. [Neufchâteau being the largest southernmost city in Belgium]
2. Prevent the approach of reserves from the Neufchâteau area
3. Facilitate the capture of pillboxes and the advance by exerting pressure against the line of pillboxes along the border from the rear.[67]
The German infantry were engaged by several Belgian patrols equipped with
The failure of the Franco–Belgian forces to hold the Ardennes gap was fatal. The Belgians had withdrawn laterally upon the initial invasion and had demolished and blocked routes of advance, which held up the French 2nd Army units moving north toward Namur and Huy. Devoid of any centre of resistance, the German assault engineers had cleared the obstacles unchallenged. The delay that the Belgian Ardennes Light Infantry, considered to be an elite formation, could have inflicted upon the advancing German armour was proved by the fight for Bodange, where the 1st Panzer Division was held up for a total of eight hours. This battle was a result of a breakdown in communications and ran contrary to the operational intentions of the Belgian Army.[69]
Meanwhile, in the central Belgian sector, having failed to restore their front by means of ground attack, the Belgians attempted to bomb the bridges and positions that the Germans had captured intact and were holding on 11 May. Belgian Fairey Battles of 5/III/3 escorted by six Gloster Gladiators attacked the Albert Canal bridges. Bf 109s from I./
The German counter-air operations were spearheaded by Jagdgeschwader 26 (JG 26) under the command of Hans-Hugo Witt, which was responsible for 82 of the German claims in aerial combat between 11 and 13 May.[72] Despite the apparent success of the German fighter units, the air battle was not one-sided.[72] On the morning of 11 May ten Ju 87s of StG 2 were shot down attacking Belgian forces in the Namur–Dinant gap, despite the presence of two Jagdgeschwader—27 and 51.[72] Nevertheless, the Germans reported a weakening in Allied air resistance in northern Belgium by 13 May.[72]
During the night of 11 May, the British
After holding onto the Albert Canal's west bank for nearly 36 hours, the 4th and 7th Belgian infantry divisions withdrew. The capture of Eben-Emael allowed the Germans to force through the Panzers of the 6th Army. The situation for the Belgian divisions was either to withdraw or be encircled. The Germans had advanced beyond Tongeren and were now in a position to sweep south to Namur, which would threaten to envelop the entire Albert Canal and Liège positions. Under the circumstances, both divisions withdrew.[74] On the evening of 11 May, the Belgian Command withdrew its forces behind the Namur–Antwerp line. The following day, the French 1st Army arrived at Gembloux, between Wavre and Namur, to cover the "Gembloux gap". It was a flat area, devoid of prepared or entrenched positions.[74]
The French 7th Army, on the northern flank of the Belgian line, protected the
The French 7th Army turned east and met the 9th Panzer Division about 20 kilometres (12 mi) east of Breda at Tilburg. The battle resulted in the French retiring, in the face of Luftwaffe air assaults, to Antwerp. It would later help in the defence of the city.[76] The Luftwaffe had given priority to attacking the French 7th Army's spearhead into the Netherlands as it threatened the Moerdijk bridgehead. Kampfgeschwader 40 and 54 supported by Ju 87s from VIII. Fliegerkorps helped drive them back.[77] Fears of Allied reinforcements reaching Antwerp forced the Luftwaffe to cover the Scheldt estuary. KG 30 bombed and sank two Dutch gunboats and three Dutch destroyers, as well as badly damaging two Royal Navy destroyers. But overall the bombing had a limited effect.[77]
12–14 May: Battles of the central Belgian plain
During the night of 11/12 May, the Belgians were fully engaged in withdrawing to the Dyle line, covered by a network of demolitions and rearguards astride Tongeren. During the morning of 12 May, King Leopold III, General van Overstraeten,
The Belgian III Corps, and its 1st Chasseurs Ardennais, 2nd Infantry and 3rd Infantry Divisions had withdrawn from the Liège fortifications to avoid being encircled. One regiment, the Liège Fortress Regiment, stayed behind to disrupt German communications. Further to the south, the
Belgian soldiers fought rearguard actions while other Belgian units already on the Dyle line worked tirelessly to organise better defensive positions in the Leuven–Antwerp gap. The 2nd Regiment of Guides and the 2nd Carabineers Cyclists of the 2nd Belgian Cavalry Division covered the retreat of the 4th and 7th Belgian divisions and were particularly distinguished at the Battle of Tirlemont and the Battle of Halen.[80][81]
In support of Belgian forces in the area, the RAF and French flew air defence operations in the Tirlemont and Louvain area. The RAF Advanced Air Striking Force committed 3, 504, 79, 57, 59, 85, 87, 605, and 242 squadrons to battle. A series of air battles were fought with JG 1, 2, 26, 27 and 3. Messerschmitt Bf 110s from Zerstörergeschwader 26 (ZG 26), and bomber units LG 1, 2 and KG 27 were also involved.[82] Over Belgium and France, the day was disastrous for the British: 27 Hurricanes were shot down.[83] In light of the withdrawal to the main defensive line, which was now being supported by the British and French Armies, King Leopold issued the following proclamation to improve morale after the defeats at the Albert Canal:
Soldiers
The Belgian Army, brutally assailed by an unparalleled surprise attack, grappling with forces that are better equipped and have the advantage of a formidable air force, has for three days carried out difficult operations, the success of which is of the utmost importance to the general conduct of the battle and to the result of war.
These operations require from all of us – officers and men – exceptional efforts, sustained day and night, despite a moral tension tested to its limits by the sight of the devastation wrought by a pitiless invader. However severe the trial may be, you will come through it gallantly.
Our position improves with every hour; our ranks are closing up. In the critical days that are ahead of us, you will summon up all your energies, you will make every sacrifice, to stem the invasion.
Just as they did in 1914 on the Yser, so now the French and British troops are counting on you: the safety and honour of the country are in your hands.
Leopold.[80]
To the Allies, the Belgian failure to hold onto its eastern frontiers (they were thought to be capable of holding out for two weeks), was a disappointment. The Allied Chiefs of Staff had sought to avoid an encounter mobile battle without any strong fixed defences to fall back on and hoped Belgian resistance would last long enough for a defensive line to be established.
On the morning of 12 May, in response to Belgian pressure and necessity, the Royal Air Force and the
The results of the bombing is difficult to determine. The German XIX Corps war diary's situation summary at 20:00 on 14 May noted:
The completion of the military bridge at Donchery had not yet been carried out owing to heavy flanking artillery fire and long bombing attacks on the bridging point ... Throughout the day all three divisions have had to endure constant air attack — especially at the crossing and bridging points. Our fighter cover is inadequate. Requests [for increased fighter protection] are still unsuccessful.
The Luftwaffe's operations includes a note of "vigorous enemy fighter activity through which our close reconnaissance in particular is severely impeded". Nevertheless, inadequate protection was given to cover RAF bombers against the strength of German opposition over the target area.[87] In all, out of 109 Battles and Blenheims which had attacked enemy columns and communications in the Sedan area, 45 had been lost.[87] On 15 May, daylight bombing was significantly reduced.[87] Of 23 aircraft employed, four failed to return. Equally, owing to the Allied fighter presence, the German XIX Corps War Diary states, "Corps no longer has at its disposal its own long-range reconnaissance ... [Reconnaissance squadrons] are no longer in a position to carry out vigorous, extensive reconnaissance, as, owing to casualties, more than half of their aircraft are not now available."[87]
The most serious combat to evolve on 12 May 1940 was the beginning of the Battle of Hannut (12–14 May). While the German Army Group A advanced through the Belgian Ardennes, Army Group B's 6th Army launched an offensive operation toward the Gembloux gap. Gembloux occupied a position in the Belgian plain; it was an unfortified, untrenched space in the main Belgian defensive line.[88] The Gap stretched from the southern end of the Dyle line, from Wavre in the north, to Namur in the south, 20 kilometres (12 mi) to 30 kilometres (19 mi). After attacking out of the Maastricht bulge and defeating the Belgian defences at Liege, which compelled the Belgian I Corps to retreat, the German 6th Army's XVI Panzer-Motorized Corps, under the command of General Erich Hoepner and containing the 3rd and 4th Panzer Divisions, launched an offensive in the area where the French mistakenly expected the main German thrust.[89][90]
The Gembloux gap was defended by the French 1st Army, with six elite divisions including the 2nd (2e Division Légère Mécanique, or 2e DLM) and 3rd Light Mechanized Divisions.
Hoepner's Panzer Corps and Prioux' Cavalry clashed head-on near Hannut, Belgium, on 12 May. Contrary to popular belief, the Germans did not outnumber the French.
The German forces were able to communicate by radio during the battle and they could shift the point of the main effort unexpectedly. The Germans also practiced combined arms tactics, while the French tactical deployment was a rigid and linear leftover from the First World War. French tanks did not possess radios and often the commanders had to dismount to issue orders.[92] Despite the disadvantages experienced by the Germans in armour, they were able to gain the upper hand in the morning battle on 12 May, encircling several French battalions. The combat power of the French 2e DLM managed to defeat the German defences guarding the pockets and freeing the trapped units.[93] Contrary to German reports, the French were victorious on that first day, preventing a Wehrmacht break-through to Gembloux or seizing Hannut.[92] The result of the first day's battle was:
The effect on the German light tanks was catastrophic. Virtually every French weapon from 25mm upward penetrated the 7-13mm of the Panzer I. Although the Panzer II fared somewhat better, especially those that had been up-armoured since the Polish Campaign, their losses were high. Such was the sheer frustration of the crews of these light Panzers in [the] face of heavier armoured French machines that some resorted to desperate expedients. One account speaks of a German Panzer commander attempting to climb on a Hotchkiss H-35 with a hammer, presumably to smash the machine's periscopes, but falling off and being crushed by the tank's tracks. Certainly by day's end, Prioux had reason to claim that his tanks had come off best. The battlefield around Hannut was littered with knocked-out tanks–the bulk of which were German Panzers–with by far and away the bulk of them being Panzer Is and IIs.[94]
The following day, 13 May, the French were undone by their poor tactical deployment. They strung their armour out in a thin line between Hannut and Huy, leaving no defence in depth, which was the point of sending the French armour to the Gembloux gap in the first place. This left Hoepner with a chance to mass against one of the French Light Divisions (the 3e DLM) and achieve a breakthrough in that sector. Moreover, with no reserves behind the front, the French denied themselves the chance of a counterattack. The victory saw the Panzer Corps out-manoeuvre the 2e DLM on its left flank.[92] The Belgian III Corps, retreating from Liege, offered to support the French front held by the 3e DLM. This offer was rejected.[95]
On 12 and 13 May, 2e DLM lost no AFVs, but the 3e DLM lost 30 SOMUAs and 75 Hotchkisses. The French had disabled 160 German tanks.[96] But as the poor linear deployment had allowed the Germans the chance of breaking through in one spot, the entire battlefield had to be abandoned,[96] the Germans repaired nearly three-quarters of their tanks; 49 were destroyed and 111 were repaired. They had 60 men killed and another 80 wounded.[97] In terms of battlefield casualties, the Hannut battle had resulted in the French knocking-out 160 German tanks, losing 105 themselves. Prioux had achieved his tactical mission and withdrew.[98]
Hoepner now pursued the retreating French. Being impatient, he did not wait for his infantry divisions to catch up. Instead, he hoped to continue pushing the French back and not give them time to construct a coherent defence line. German formations pursued the enemy to Gembloux. The Panzer Corps ran into retreating French columns and inflicted heavy losses on them. The pursuit created severe problems for the French artillery. The combat was so closely fought that the danger of friendly fire incidents were very real. Nevertheless, the French, setting up new anti-tank screens and Hoepner, lacking infantry support, caused the Germans to attack positions head-on. During the following Battle of Gembloux the two Panzer Divisions reported heavy losses during 14 May and were forced to slow their pursuit. The German attempts to capture Gembloux were repulsed.[99]
Although suffering numerous tactical reverses, operationally the Germans diverted the Allied First Army Group from the lower Ardennes area. In the process his forces, along with the Luftwaffe depleted Prioux' Cavalry Corps. When news of the German breakthrough at Sedan reached Prioux, he withdrew from Gembloux. With the Gembloux gap breached, the German Panzer Corps, the 3rd and 4th Panzer Divisions, were no longer required by Army Group B and were handed over to Army Group A. Army Group B would continue its own offensive to force the collapse of the Meuse front. The Army Group was in a position to advance westward to Mons, outflank the BEF and Belgian Army protecting the Dyle–Brussels sector, or turn south to outflank the French 9th Army. German losses had been heavy at Hannut and Gembloux.[100] The 4th Panzer Division was down to 137 tanks on 16 May, including just four Panzer IVs. The 3rd Panzer Division was down by 20–25 percent of its operational force; for the 4th Panzer Division 45–50 percent of its tanks were not combat ready.[100] Damaged tanks were quickly repaired, but its strength was initially greatly weakened.[100] The French 1st Army had also taken a battering and despite winning several tactical defensive victories it was forced to retreat on 15 May owing to developments elsewhere, leaving its tanks on the battlefield, while the Germans were free to recover theirs.[101]
15–21 May: Counterattacks and retreat to the coast
On the morning of 15 May, German Army Group A broke the defences at Sedan and was now free to drive for the English Channel. The Allies considered a wholesale withdrawal from the Belgian trap. The withdrawal would reflect three stages: the night of 16/17 May to the River
The situation called for the French and British to abandon the Antwerp–Namur line and strong positions in favour of improvised positions behind the Scheldt, without facing any real resistance.[105] In the South, General Deffontaine of the Belgian VII Corps retreated from the Namur and Liège regions,[105] the Liège fortress region put up stiff resistance to the German 6th Army.[106] In the North, the 7th Army was diverted to Antwerp after the surrender of the Dutch on 15 May, but was then diverted to support the French 1st Army.[105] In the centre, the Belgian Army and the BEF suffered little German pressure. On 15 May, the only sector to really be tested was around Leuven, which was held by the British 3rd Division. The BEF was not pursued vigorously to the Scheldt.[102]
After the withdrawal of the French Army from the northern sector, the Belgians were left to guard the fortified city of Antwerp. Four infantry divisions (including the
Between 16 and 17 May, the British and French withdrew behind the
By 19 May, the Germans were hours away from reaching the French Channel coast. Gort had discovered the French had neither plan nor reserves and little hope for stopping the German thrust to the channel. He was concerned that the French 1st Army on its southern flank had been reduced to a disorganized mass of "
The proposal of a British strategic withdrawal from the continent was rejected by the
The Belgian position on any offensive move was made clear by Leopold III. As far as he was concerned, the Belgian Army could not conduct offensive operations as it lacked tanks and aircraft; it existed solely for defence.[111][112] The King also made clear that in the rapidly shrinking area of Belgium still free, there was only enough food for two weeks.[111] Leopold did not expect the BEF to jeopardize its own position in order to keep contact with the Belgian Army, but he warned the British that if it persisted with the southern offensive the Belgians would be overstretched and their army would collapse.[111][112] King Leopold suggested the best recourse was to establish a beach-head covering Dunkirk and the Belgian channel ports.[111] The will of the CIGS won out. Gort committed just two infantry battalions and the only armoured battalion in the BEF to the attack, which despite some initial tactical success, failed to break the German defensive line at the Battle of Arras on 21 May.[113]
In the aftermath of this failure, the Belgians were asked to fall back to the
At this time, the Belgians and the British concluded that the French were beaten and the Allied Armies in the pocket on the Belgian–Franco border would be destroyed if action was not taken. The British, having lost confidence in their Allies, decided to look to the survival of the BEF.[115]
22–28 May: Last defensive battles
The Belgian battle-front on the morning of 22 May extended some 90 kilometres (56 mi) from north to south, beginning with the Cavalry Corps, which checked its advance at Terneuzen. V, II, VI, VII and IV Corps (all Belgian) were drawn up side by side. Two further signal Corps were guarding the coast.[116] These formations were then largely holding the eastern front as the BEF and French forces withdrew to the west to protect Dunkirk, which was vulnerable to German assault on 22 May. The eastern front remained intact, but the Belgians now occupied their last fortified position at Leie.[117] The Belgian I Corps, with only two incomplete divisions, had been heavily engaged in the fighting and their line was wearing thin. On that day, Winston Churchill visited the front and pressed for the French and British Armies to break out from the north-east. He assumed that the Belgian Cavalry Corps could support the offensives' right flank. Churchill dispatched the following message to Gort:
1. That the Belgian Army should withdraw to the line of the Yser and stand there, the sluices being opened.
2. That the British Army and French 1st Army should attack south-west toward Bapaume and Cambrai at the earliest moment, certainly tomorrow, with about eight divisions, and with the Belgian Cavalry Corps on the right of the British.[118]
Such an order ignored the fact that the Belgian Army could not withdraw to the Yser, and there was little chance of any Belgian Cavalry joining in the attack.
On 23 May, the French tried to conduct a series of offensives against the German defensive line on the Ardennes–Calais axis but failed to make any meaningful gains. Meanwhile, on the Belgian front, the Belgians, under pressure, retreated further, and the Germans captured Terneuzen and Ghent that day. The Belgians also had trouble moving the oil, food and ammunition that they had left.[120] The Luftwaffe had air superiority and made everyday life hazardous in logistical terms. Air support could only be called in by "wireless" and the RAF was operating from bases in southern England which made communication more difficult.[120] The French denied the use of the Dunkirk, Bourbourg and Gravelines bases to the Belgians, which had initially been placed at its disposal. The Belgians were forced to use the only harbours left to them, at Nieuwpoort and Ostend.[120]
Churchill and
On the afternoon of 24 May, Bock had thrown four divisions, of Reichenau's 6th Army, against the Belgian IV Corps position at the Kortrijk area of the Leie during the Battle of the Lys (1940). The Germans managed, against fierce resistance, to cross the river at night and force a one-mile penetration along a 13-mile front between Wervik and Kortrijk. The Germans, with superior numbers and in command of the air, had won the bridgehead.[121] Nevertheless, the Belgians had inflicted many casualties and several tactical defeats on the Germans. The 1st, 3rd, 9th and 10th Infantry Divisions, acting as reinforcements, had counterattacked several times and managed to capture 200 German prisoners.[123] Belgian artillery and infantry were then heavily attacked by the Luftwaffe, which forced their defeat. The Belgians blamed the French and British for not providing air cover.[123] The German bridgehead dangerously exposed the eastern flank of the southward stretched BEF's 4th Infantry Division. Montgomery dispatched several units of the 3rd Infantry Division (including the heavy infantry of the 1st and 7th Middlesex battalions and the 99th Battery, 20th Anti-Tank Regiment), as an improvised defence.[124]
A critical point of the "Weygand Plan" and the British government and French Army's argument for a thrust south, was the withdrawal of forces to see the offensive through which had left the Belgian Army over-extended and was instrumental in its collapse. It was forced to cover the areas held by the BEF in order to enable the latter to engage in the offensive.[121] Such a collapse could have resulted in the loss of the Channel ports behind the Allied front, leading to a complete strategic encirclement. The BEF could have done more to counterattack Bock's left flank to relieve the Belgians as Bock attacked across the fortified British position at Kortrijk.[125] The Belgian High Command made at least five appeals for the British to attack the vulnerable left flank of the German divisions between the Scheldt and the Leie to avert disaster.[125]
Admiral Sir Roger Keyes transmitted the following message to GHQ:
Van Overstraten is desperately keen for strong British counterattack. Either north or south of Leie could help restore the situation. Belgians expect to be attacked on the Ghent front tomorrow. Germans already have a bridgehead over canal west of Eecloo. There can be no question of the Belgian withdrawal to Yser. One battalion on march NE of Ypres was practically wiped out today in attack by sixty aircraft. Withdrawal over open roads without adequate fighter support very costly. Whole of their supplies are east of Yser. They strongly represent attempt should be made to restore the situation on Leie by British counter-attack for which opportunity may last another few hours only.[126]
No such attack came. The Germans brought fresh reserves to cover the gap (Menen–Ypres). This nearly cut the Belgians off from the British. The 2nd, 6th and 10th Cavalry Divisions frustrated German attempts to exploit the gap in depth but the situation was still critical.[123] On 26 May, Operation Dynamo officially commenced, in which large French and British contingents were to be evacuated to the United Kingdom. By that time, the Royal Navy had already withdrawn 28,000 British non-fighting troops. Boulogne had fallen and Calais was about to, leaving Dunkirk, Ostend and Zeebrugge as the only viable ports which could be used for evacuation. The advance of the 14th German Army would not leave Ostend available for much longer. To the west, the German Army Group A had reached Dunkirk and were 4 miles (6.4 km) from its centre on the morning of 27 May, bringing the port within artillery range.[127]
The situation on 27 May had changed considerably from just 24 hours earlier. The Belgian Army had been forced from the Leie line on 26 May, and
The fighting of 26–27 May had brought the Belgian Army to the brink of collapse. The Belgians still held the Ypres–Roulers line to the west, and the Bruges–Thelt line to the east. However, on 27 May, the central front collapsed in the Izegem–Thelt sector. There was now nothing to prevent a German thrust to the east to take Ostend and Bruges, or west to take the ports at Nieuwpoort or
Belgian surrender
The Belgian Army was stretched from
Churchill sent a message to Keyes the same day, and made clear what he thought of the request:
Belgian Embassy here assumes from King's decision to remain that he regards the war as lost and contemplates [a] separate peace. It is in order to dissociate itself from this that the constitutional Belgian Government has reassembled on foreign soil. Even if present Belgian Army has to lay down its arms, there are 200,000 Belgians of military age in France, and greater resources than Belgium had in 1914 which to fight back. By present decision the King is dividing the Nation and delivering it into Hitler's protection. Please convey these considerations to the King, and impress upon him the disastrous consequences to the Allies and to Belgium of his present choice.[132]
The Royal Navy evacuated General Headquarters at
Churchill's and the British response was officially restrained. This was due to the strong-willed defence of the Belgian defensive campaign presented to the cabinet by Sir Roger Keyes at 11:30 am 28 May.[135] The French and Belgian ministers had referred to Leopold's actions as treacherous, but they were unaware of the true events: Leopold had not signed an agreement with Hitler in order to form a collaborative government, but an unconditional surrender as Commander-in-Chief of the Belgian Armed Forces.[136]
Casualties
The casualty reports include total losses at this point in the campaign. The figures for the Battle of Belgium, 10–28 May 1940, cannot be known with any certainty.
Belgian
Belgian casualties stood at:
- Killed in action: 6,093 and 2,000 Belgian prisoners died in captivity[38]
- Missing: more than 500[38]
- Captured: 200,000[137]
- Wounded: 15,850[137]
- Aircraft: 112 destroyed[58]
French
Numbers for the Battle of Belgium are unknown, but the French suffered the following losses throughout the entire western campaign, 10 May – 22 June:
- Killed in action: 90,000[138]
- Wounded: 200,000[138]
- Prisoners of War: 1,900,000.[138]
- Total French losses in aircraft numbered 264 from 12 to 25 May, and 50 for 26 May to 1 June.[139]
British
Numbers for the Battle of Belgium are unknown, but the British suffered the following losses throughout the entire campaign, 10 May – 22 June:
- 68,111 killed in action, wounded or captured.[140]
- 64,000 vehicles destroyed or abandoned[140]
- 2,472 guns destroyed or abandoned[140]
- RAF losses throughout the entire campaign (10 May – 22 June) amounted to 931 aircraft and 1,526 casualties. Casualties to 28 May are unknown.[140] Total British losses in the air numbered 344 between 12 and 25 May, and 138 between 26 May and 1 June.[139]
German
The consolidated report of the Oberkommando der Wehrmacht regarding the operations in the west from 10 May to 4 June (German: Zusammenfassender Bericht des Oberkommandos der Wehrmacht über die Operationen im Westen vom 10. Mai bis 4. Juni) reports:[141]
- Killed in action: 10,232 officers and soldiers[141]
- Missing: 8,463 officers and soldiers[141]
- Wounded: 42,523 officers and soldiers[141]
- Losses of the Luftwaffe from 10 May to 3 June: 432 aircraft[141]
- Losses of the Kriegsmarine: none[141]
See also
- German invasion of Luxembourg
- Mechelen incident
- List of Belgian military equipment of World War II
- List of French military equipment of World War II
- List of British military equipment of World War II
- List of German military equipment of World War II
References
Notes
- ^ Contributed lightly armed infantry units retreating from Dutch territory. Also committed the Dutch Air Force on few, ineffective and costly missions. Gunsburg 1992, p. 216.
- ^ The Belgian Army consisted of 22 divisions, the French provided 104, the British provided 10, and the Dutch 8 divisions. Holmes 2001, p. 324.
- ^ The Belgian Army had 1,338 guns, the French 10,700, the British 1,280, and the Dutch 656. Holmes 2001, p. 324.
- ^ The Belgian Army had 10 tanks, the French 3,063, the British 310 and the Dutch 1 tank. Holmes 2001, p. 324.
- ^ The Belgian Air Force consisted of 250 aircraft, the French Air Force 1,368, the British Royal Air Force provided 456 aircraft and the Dutch Air Force 175. Holmes 2001, p. 324.
- ^ The Belgian Army sustained 6,093 men killed, 15,850 men wounded in action, more than 500 men missing and 200,000 men captured, of which 2,000 died in captivity. Keegan 2005, p. 96; Ellis 1993, p. 255. French and British losses on Belgian territory are unknown. Keegan 2005, p. 96.
- ^ The Belgian Air Force lost 83 planes on the ground on 10 May, 25 lost in aerial combat between 10–15 May, and four lost in the air between 16–28 May. Hooton 2007, pp. 49, 52, 53. French and British losses are not certain, however the French Air Force lost 264 aircraft between 12–25 May and 50 for 26 May – 1 June while the British Royal Air Force lost 344 and 138 aircraft in these respective periods. Hooton 2007, p. 57.
- ^ German air units doubled up and flew missions over the Netherlands and Belgium. Case specific loss totals for Belgium only cannot be certain. Total German losses in the air numbered 469 in 12–25 May, and 126 for 26 May – 1 June, but at least 43 paratroopers were killed and a further 100 wounded. Hooton 2007, p. 57; Dunstan 2005, p. 57.
Citations
- ^ a b c d Holmes 2001, p. 324.
- ^ Belgian American Educational Foundation 1941.
- ^ a b c d Shirer 1990, p. 729.
- ^ Healy 2008, p. 36.
- ^ Keegan 2005, pp. 95–96.
- ^ a b c d Bond 1990, p. 8.
- ^ Ellis 2004, p. 8.
- ^ Bond 1990, p. 9.
- ^ Bond 1990, p. 21.
- ^ Bond & Taylor 2001, p. 14.
- ^ Bond 1990, pp. 9–10.
- ^ a b Bond 1990, p. 22.
- ^ Bond 1990, pp. 22–23.
- ^ Bond 1990, p. 24.
- ^ a b Belgium, Ministère des Affaires Étrangères 1941, p. 2.
- ^ a b c Belgium, Ministère des Affaires Étrangères 1941, p. 3.
- ^ a b Belgium, Ministère des Affaires Étrangères 1941, p. 4.
- ^ Belgium, Ministère des Affaires Étrangères 1941, p. 53.
- ^ Belgium, Ministère des Affaires Étrangères 1941, pp. 4–5.
- ^ Bond 1990, pp. 24–25.
- ^ Bond 1990, p. 25.
- ^ Bond 1990, p. 28.
- ^ Bond 1990, p. 35.
- ^ Bond 1990, pp. 28–36.
- ^ Bond 1990, p. 36.
- ^ Bond 1990, pp. 46–47.
- ^ a b c Belgium, Ministère des Affaires Étrangères 1941, pp. 32–33.
- ^ Holmes 2001, p. 313.
- ^ Bond 1990, pp. 100–101.
- ^ a b c d e f g Dunstan 2005, p. 34.
- ^ Dunstan 2005, p. 36.
- ^ Bond & Taylor 2001, p. 37.
- ^ Keegan 2005, p. 324.
- ^ a b Keegan 2005, p. 95.
- ^ Fowler 2002, p. 12.
- ^ Frieser & Greenwood 2005, p. 36.
- ^ a b Belgium, Ministère des Affaires Étrangères 1941, p. 32.
- ^ a b c Keegan 2005, p. 96.
- ^ a b Hooton 2007, pp. 48–49.
- ^ Keegan 2005, pp. 95, 324.
- ^ Frieser & Greenwood 2005, pp. 46–47.
- ^ Holleman, Rosseels & Welting 2008.
- ^ a b c Healy 2008, p. 37.
- ^ a b c d e Bond 1990, p. 58.
- ^ Foot 2005, p. 322. (map of French dispositions is available in Keegan's book)
- ^ Foot 2005, p. 130.
- ^ Foot 2005, p. 324.
- ^ a b Bond 1975, p. 20.
- ^ a b c d e Healy 2008, p. 32.
- ^ Harclerode 2006, p. 51.
- ^ Tugwell 2006, p. 52.
- ^ Hooton 2007, p. 47.
- ^ a b Hooton 2007, pp. 45–46.
- ^ a b Hooton 2007, p. 48.
- ^ a b c Belgium, Ministère des Affaires Étrangères 1941, p. 33.
- ^ Sebag-Montefiore 2006, pp. 50–51.
- ^ a b c d e f g Hooton 2007, p. 52.
- ^ Cull 1999, p. 19.
- ^ Cull 1999, pp. 19–20.
- ^ a b c Hooton 2007, p. 53.
- ^ Belgium, Ministère des Affaires Étrangères 1941, p. 34.
- ^ Bond 1990, p. 59.
- ^ Cull 1999, p. 18.
- ^ Hooton 2007, p. 54.
- ^ a b c d Belgium, Ministère des Affaires Étrangères 1941, p. 35.
- ^ Frieser & Greenwood 2005, p. 123.
- ^ a b c d Frieser & Greenwood 2005, pp. 126–127.
- ^ Frieser & Greenwood 2005, pp. 138–139.
- ^ Cull 1999, p. 61.
- ^ Cull 1999, pp. 61–62.
- ^ a b c d Hooton 2007, p. 56.
- ^ Ellis 1993, p. 37.
- ^ a b Belgium, Ministère des Affaires Étrangères 1941, p. 36.
- ^ Jackson 2003, p. 37.
- ^ Shepperd 1990, p. 38.
- ^ a b Hooton 2007, p. 51.
- ^ Belgium, Ministère des Affaires Étrangères 1941, pp. 36–37.
- ^ a b Belgium, Ministère des Affaires Étrangères 1941, p. 37.
- ^ a b Belgium, Ministère des Affaires Étrangères 1941, p. 38.
- ^ Niehorster, Order of Battle, Army.
- ^ Cull 1999, pp. 116–121.
- ^ Cull 1999, p. 135.
- ^ Bond 1990, pp. 59–60.
- ^ Bond 1990, p. 60.
- ^ Hooton 2007, p. 55.
- ^ a b c d Ellis 1993, pp. 56–57.
- ^ a b c d Frieser & Greenwood 2005, p. 240.
- ^ Frieser & Greenwood 2005, p. 239.
- ^ Ellis 1993, pp. 37–38.
- ^ a b c d e f g Frieser & Greenwood 2005, p. 241.
- ^ a b c Frieser & Greenwood 2005, p. 242.
- ^ Gunsburg 1992, pp. 221–224.
- ^ Healy 2008, pp. 37–38.
- ^ Gunsburg 1992, p. 228.
- ^ a b Frieser & Greenwood 2005, p. 243.
- ^ Gunsburg 1992, p. 237.
- ^ Healy 2008, p. 38.
- ^ Frieser & Greenwood 2005, pp. 243–244.
- ^ a b c Frieser & Greenwood 2005, p. 246.
- ^ Sebag-Montefiore 2006, p. 71.
- ^ a b c Bond 1990, p. 64.
- ^ Ellis 2004, p. 59.
- ^ Belgian American Educational Foundation 1941, p. 30.
- ^ a b c Belgium, Ministère des Affaires Étrangères 1941, p. 39.
- ^ a b c Belgium, Ministère des Affaires Étrangères 1941, p. 40.
- ^ Bloock 2003.
- ^ Sebag-Montefiore 2006, pp. 70–71.
- ^ a b c Bond 1990, p. 67.
- ^ a b c Bond 1990, p. 69.
- ^ a b c d Bond 1990, p. 70.
- ^ a b Ellis 2004, p. 105.
- ^ Bond 1990, pp. 71–72.
- ^ Bond 1990, p. 72.
- ^ Bond 1990, p. 73.
- ^ Belgian American Educational Foundation 1941, p. 54.
- ^ Bond 1990, p. 75.
- ^ a b Bond 1990, p. 76.
- ^ Bond 1990, p. 78.
- ^ a b c Belgium, Ministère des Affaires Étrangères 1941, p. 43.
- ^ a b c d e Bond 1990, p. 84.
- ^ Ellis 1993, p. 172.
- ^ a b c Belgium, Ministère des Affaires Étrangères 1941, p. 44.
- ^ Ellis 2004, pp. 135–136.
- ^ a b Bond 1990, p. 85.
- ^ Bond 1990, p. 86.
- ^ Bond 1990, p. 88.
- ^ a b Belgium, Ministère des Affaires Étrangères 1941, pp. 44–45.
- ^ Bond 1990, p. 89.
- ^ a b c d e Bond 1990, p. 92.
- ^ Belgian American Educational Foundation 1941, p. 60.
- ^ a b Bond 1990, p. 93.
- ^ Bond 1990, p. 94.
- ^ Sebag-Montefiore 2006, p. 304.
- ^ Bond 1990, p. 95.
- ^ Bond 1990, p. 96.
- ^ a b Ellis 1993, p. 255.
- ^ a b c Keegan 2005, p. 326.
- ^ a b Hooton 2007, p. 57.
- ^ a b c d Holmes 2001, p. 130.
- ^ a b c d e f Oberkommando der Wehrmacht 1985, p. 189.
Bibliography
- Belgian American Educational Foundation (1941), The Belgian Campaign and the Surrender of the Belgian Army, 10–28 May 1940 (Third ed.), University of Michigan
- Belgium, Ministère des Affaires Étrangères (1941), Belgium : The Official Account of What Happened 1939–1940, Evans Brothers, OCLC 42016037
- Bloock, Bernard (2003), Belgian Fortifications, May 1940, archived from the original on 27 March 2013, retrieved 10 May 2014
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- Bond, Brian; Taylor, Michael (2001), The Battle of France and Flanders 1940, London: Leo Cooper, ISBN 978-0-85052-811-4
- Cull, Brian (1999), Twelve Days in May, London: Grub Street Publishing (UK), ISBN 978-1-902304-12-0
- Dunstan, Simon (2005), Fort Eben Emael, Oxford: Osprey Publishing (UK), ISBN 978-1-84176-821-2
- Ellis, John (1993), The World War II Data Book, Aurum Press, ISBN 978-1-85410-254-6
- Ellis, Major L.F. (2004) [1954], ISBN 978-1-84574-056-6
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- Frieser, Karl-Heinz; Greenwood, John T. (2005), The Blitzkrieg Legend: The 1940 Campaign in the West, Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, ISBN 978-1-59114-294-2
- Gunsburg, Jeffrey A. (April 1992), "The Battle of the Belgian Plain, 12–14 May 1940: The First Great Tank Battle", The Journal of Military History, 56 (2): 207–244, JSTOR 1985797
- Harclerode, Peter (2006), Wings Of War: Airborne Warfare 1918-1945, Arizona: Phoenix, ISBN 978-0-304-36730-6
- Healy, Mark (2008), Prigent, John (ed.), Panzerwaffe: The Campaigns in the West 1940, vol. 1, Shepperton: Ian Allan, ISBN 978-0-7110-3240-8
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- ISBN 978-0-19-866209-9
- Hooton, Edward R. (2007), Luftwaffe at War; Blitzkrieg in the West 1939 -1940, Leicester: Midland Publishing, ISBN 978-1-85780-272-6
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- ISBN 978-0-671-72868-7
Further reading
- Blatt, Joel (1998). The French Defeat of 1940: Reassessments. Providence: Berghahn Books. ISBN 978-1-57181-109-7.
- ISBN 978-0-19-860446-4.
- Harman, Nicholas (1980). Dunkirk. London: Hodder and Stoughton. ISBN 978-0-340-24299-5.
- Krause, Michael; Cody, P. (2006). Historical Perspectives of the Operational Art. Washington: Center of Military History Publication – Dept. of the Army. ISBN 978-0-16-072564-7.
- ISBN 978-0-471-39431-0.
- ISBN 978-0-7064-0399-2.
- Weal, John (1997). Junkers Ju 87 Stukageschwader 1937–1941. Oxford: Osprey. ISBN 978-1-85532-636-1.