Germany–Soviet Union relations, 1918–1941
Germany |
Soviet Union |
---|
German–Soviet Union relations date to the
From the outset, both states sought to overturn the new order that was established by the victors of World War I. Germany, laboring under onerous reparations and stung by the collective responsibility provisions of the
Few questions concerning the
The Soviet Union and Weimar Germany
Revolution and end of World War I
The outcome of the First World War was disastrous for both Germany's future and for the
Initially, the Soviet leadership hoped for a successful socialist revolution in Germany as part of the "
In the 1920s, many in the leadership of
On April 16, 1920, Victor Kopp, the
By early 1921, a special group in the Reichswehr Ministry devoted to Soviet affairs, Sondergruppe R, had been created.[19]
Weimar Germany's army had been limited to 100,000 men by the Treaty of Versailles, which also forbade the Germans to have aircraft, tanks, submarines, heavy artillery, poison gas, anti-tank weapons or many anti-aircraft guns. A team of inspectors from the League of Nations patrolled many German factories and workshops to ensure that these weapons were not being manufactured.
Treaty of Rapallo 1922 and secret military cooperation
The
Rumors of a secret military supplement to the treaty soon spread. However, for a long time the consensus was that those rumors were wrong, and that Soviet-German military negotiations were independent of Rapallo and kept secret from the
The Soviets offered Weimar Germany facilities deep inside the USSR for building and testing arms and for military training, well away from Treaty inspectors' eyes. In return, the Soviets asked for access to German technical developments, and for assistance in creating a Red Army General Staff.[25]
The first German officers went to Soviet Russia for these purposes in March 1922. One month later,
The great artillery manufacturer
The Soviets offered submarine-building facilities at a port on the Black Sea, but this was not taken up. The Kriegsmarine did take up a later offer of a base near Murmansk, where German vessels could hide from the British. During the Cold War, this base at Polyarnyy (which had been built especially for the Germans) became the largest weapons store in the world.
Documentation
Most of the documents pertaining to secret German-Soviet military cooperation were systematically destroyed in Germany.[30] The Polish and French intelligence communities of the 1920s were remarkably well-informed regarding the cooperation. This did not, however, have any immediate effect upon German relations with other European powers. After World War II, the papers of General Hans von Seeckt and memoirs of other German officers became available,[19] and after the dissolution of the Soviet Union, a handful of Soviet documents regarding this were published.[31]
Relations in the 1920s
Trade
Since the late nineteenth century, Germany, which has few natural resources,
Germany's fear of international isolation due to a possible Soviet rapprochement with France, the main German adversary, was a key factor in the acceleration of economic negotiations. On October 12, 1925, a commercial agreement between the two nations was concluded.[36]
Plans for Poland
Alongside Soviet Russia's military and economic assistance, there was also political backing for Germany's aspirations. On July 19, 1920, Victor Kopp told the German Foreign Office that Soviet Russia wanted "a common frontier with Germany, south of Lithuania, approximately on a line with Białystok".[37] In other words, Poland was to be partitioned once again. These promptings were repeated over the years, with the Soviets always anxious to stress that ideological differences between the two governments were of no account; all that mattered was that the two countries were pursuing the same foreign policy objectives.
On December 4, 1924, Victor Kopp, worried that the expected admission of Germany to the
Diplomatic relations
By 1919, both Germany and Russia were pariah nations in the eyes of democratic leaders. Both were excluded from major conferences and were deeply distrusted. The effect was to bring Moscow and Berlin closer together, most notably at Rapallo. German diplomats worried at the revolutionary nature of the Soviet Union, but were reassured by Lenin's New Economic Policy that seem to restore a semblance of capitalism. Berlin officials concluded that their policy of engagement was a success. However, in 1927 Berlin realized that the Comintern, and Stalin, did not reflect a retreat from revolutionary Marxist–Leninism.[38]
In 1925, Germany broke its diplomatic isolation and took part in the
On April 24, 1926, Weimar Germany and the Soviet Union concluded another treaty (
Third Period
In 1928, the 9th Plenum of the
Stalin's order that the German Communist party must never again vote with the Social Democrats coincided with his agreement, in December 1928, with what was termed the 'Union of Industrialists'. Under this agreement the Union of Industrialists agreed to provide the Soviet Union with an up-to-date armaments industry and the industrial base to support it, on two conditions:[42]
Firstly, they required paying in hard currency or in goods, not in
Yet the Union of Industrialists were not only interested in cash for their weapons, they wanted a political concession. They feared the arrival of socialism in Germany and were irate at the KPD and Social Democrats objecting to providing funds for the development of new
Relying on the foreign affairs doctrine pursued by the Soviet leadership in the 1920s, in his report of the
Early 1930s
The most intensive period of Soviet military collaboration with Weimar Germany was 1930–1932. On June 24, 1931, an extension of the 1926 Berlin Treaty was signed, though it was not until 1933 that it was ratified by the
The conflict between the Communist Party of Germany and the Social Democratic Party of Germany fundamentally contributed to the demise of the Weimar Republic.[citation needed] It is, however, disputed whether Hitler's seizure of power came as a surprise to the USSR. Some authors claim that Stalin deliberately aided Hitler's rise by directing the policy of the Communist Party of Germany on a suicidal course in order to foster an inter-imperialist war,[45] a theory dismissed by many others.[46]
During this period, trade between Germany and the Soviet Union declined as the more isolationist Stalinist regime asserted its power and as the abandonment of post-World War I military control decreased Germany's reliance on Soviet imports,[35] such that Soviet imports fell to 223 million ℛ︁ℳ︁ by 1934.[47]
Persecution of ethnic Germans in the Soviet Union
The USSR had a large population of
Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union before World War II
German documents pertaining to Soviet-German relations were captured by the American and British armies in 1945, and published by the U.S.
Initial relations after Hitler's election
After
Moscow's reaction to these steps of Berlin was initially restrained, with the exception of several tentative attacks on the new German government in the Soviet press. However, as the heavy-handed anti-Soviet actions of the German government continued unabated, the Soviets unleashed their own propaganda campaign against the Nazis, but by May the possibility of conflict appeared to have receded. The 1931 extension of the
Hermann Rauschning in his 1940 book Hitler Speaks: A Series of Political Conversations With Adolf Hitler on His Real Aims 1934 records Adolf Hitler as speaking of an inescapable battle against both Pan-Slavism and Neo-Slavism. The authenticity of the book is controversial: some historians, such as Wolfgang Hänel, claim that the book is a fabrication, whereas others, such as Richard Steigmann-Gall, Ian Kershaw and Hugh Trevor-Roper, have avoided using it as a reference due to its questionable authenticity. Rauschning records Hitler as saying of the Slavs:[55]
We cannot in any way evade the final battle between German race ideals and pan-Slav mass ideals. Here yawns the eternal abyss which no political interests can bridge. We must win the victory of German race-consciousness over the masses eternally fated to serve and obey. We alone can conquer the great continental space, and it will be done by us singly and alone, not through a pact with Moscow. We shall take this struggle upon us. It would open to us the door to permanent mastery of the world. That doesn't mean that I will refuse to walk part of the road with the Russians, if that will help us. But it will be only in order to return the more swiftly to our true aims.
— Adolf Hitler (1934)[56]
Historian Eric D. Weitz discussed the areas of collaboration between the regimes in which hundreds of German citizens, the majority of whom were Communists, had been handed over to the Gestapo from Stalin's administration. Weitz also stated that a higher proportion of the KPD Politburo members had died in the Soviet Union than in Nazi Germany.[57]
Relations in the mid-1930s
On May 2, 1935, France and the USSR signed a five-year
The 7th World Congress of the
On November 25, 1936, Nazi Germany and
Economically, the Soviet Union made repeated efforts to reestablish closer contacts with Germany in the mid-1930s.[60] The Soviet Union chiefly sought to repay debts from earlier trade with raw materials, while Germany sought to rearm. The two countries signed a credit agreement in 1935.[61] By 1936, crises in the supply of raw materials and foodstuffs forced Hitler to decree a Four Year Plan for rearmament "without regard to costs".[62] However, despite those issues, Hitler rebuffed the Soviet Union's attempts to seek closer political ties to Germany along with an additional credit agreement.[61]
Litvinov's strategy faced ideological and political obstacles. The ruling Conservatives in Britain, who dominated the House of Commons from 1931 onwards, continued to regard the Soviet Union as no less of a threat than Nazi Germany (some saw the USSR as the greater threat). At the same time, as the Soviet Union underwent upheavals in the midst of the Great Purge of 1934–1940, the West or even Western leftists did not perceive it as a potentially valuable ally.[4][52]
Further complicating matters, the purge of the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs forced the Soviet Union to close down quite a number of embassies abroad.[63][64] At the same time, the purges made the signing of an economic deal with Germany less likely: they disrupted the already confused Soviet administrative structure necessary for negotiations and thus prompted Hitler to regard the Soviets as militarily weak.[65]
Spanish Civil War
The Nationalists led by General Francisco Franco defeated the Republican government for control of Spain in a very bloody civil war, 1936–1939. Germany sent in elite air and tank units to the Nationalist forces; and Italy sent in several combat divisions. The Soviet Union sent military and political advisors, and sold munitions in support of the "Loyalist," or Republican, side. The Comnitern helped Communist parties around the world send in volunteers to the International Brigades that fought for the Loyalists. The other major powers were neutral.[66]
Collective security failures
Litvinov's policy of containing Germany via collective security failed utterly with the conclusion of the Munich Agreement on September 29, 1938, when Britain and France favored self-determination of the Sudetenland Germans over Czechoslovakia's territorial integrity, disregarding the Soviet position.[67] However, it is still disputed whether, even before Munich, the Soviet Union would actually have fulfilled its guarantees to Czechoslovakia, in the case of an actual German invasion resisted by France.[68][69]
In April 1939, Litvinov launched the tripartite alliance negotiations with the new British and French ambassadors, (William Seeds, assisted by William Strang, and Paul-Emile Naggiar), in an attempt to contain Germany. However, they were constantly dragged out and proceeded with major delays.[70]
The Western powers believed that war could still be avoided and the USSR, much weakened by the purges, could not act as a main military participant. The USSR more or less disagreed with them on both issues, approaching the negotiations with caution because of the traditional hostility of the capitalist powers.[71][72] The Soviet Union also engaged in secret talks with Nazi Germany, while conducting official ones with United Kingdom and France.[73] From the beginning of the negotiations with France and Britain, the Soviets demanded that Finland be included in the Soviet sphere of influence.[74]
Molotov–Ribbentrop Pact
1939 needs and discussions
By the late 1930s, because a German autarkic economic approach or an alliance with Britain was impossible, closer relations with the Soviet Union were necessary, if not just for economic reasons alone.[32] Germany lacked oil, and could only supply 25 percent of its own needs, leaving Germany 2 million tons short a year and a staggering 10 million tons below planned mobilization totals,[32] while the Soviet Union was required for numerous key other raw materials, such as ores (including iron and manganese), rubber and food fat and oils.[32][75][76][77] While Soviet imports into Germany had fallen to 52.8 million ℛ︁ℳ︁ in 1937,[47] massive armament production increases and critical raw material shortages caused Germany to turn to reverse their prior attitude, pushing forward economic talks in early 1939.[78]
On May 3, 1939, Litvinov was dismissed and Vyacheslav Molotov, who had strained relations with Litvinov, was not of Jewish origin (unlike Litvinov), and had always been in favour of neutrality towards Germany, was put in charge of foreign affairs. The Foreign Affairs Commissariat was purged of Litvinov's supporters and Jews.[79][51] All this could well have purely internal reasons, but it could also be a signal to Germany that the era of anti-German collective security was past,[80] or a signal to the British and French that Moscow should be taken more seriously in the tripartite alliance negotiations[81][82][83] and that it was ready for arrangements without the old baggage of collective security, or even both.[71][72]
The reshuffle was warily perceived by Germany as an opportunity.[84][85]
It is sometimes argued that Molotov continued the talks with Britain and France to stimulate the Germans into making an offer of a non-aggression treaty and that the triple alliance failed because of the Soviet determination to conclude a pact with Germany.[86][87] Another point of view is that the Soviet's pursuit of a triple alliance was sincere and that the Soviet government turned to Germany only when an alliance with the Western powers proved impossible.[88][89][90][91]
Additional factors that drove the Soviet Union towards a rapprochement with Germany might be the signing of a non-aggression pact between Germany, Latvia and Estonia on June 7, 1939
In July, open Soviet–German trade negotiations were under way.[96] In late July and early August, talks between the parties turned to a potential deal, but Soviet negotiators made clear that an economic deal must first be worked out.[96][97] After Germany had scheduled its invasion of Poland on August 25, and prepared for the resulting war with France, German war planners estimated that a British naval blockade would further exacerbate critical German raw material shortages for which the Soviet Union was the only potential supplier.[96]
Then, on August 3, German Foreign Minister
Pact and commercial deal signings
By August 10, the countries had worked out the last minor technical details to make all but final their economic arrangement, but the Soviets delayed signing that agreement for almost ten days until they were sure that they had reached a political agreement with Germany.[103] The Soviet ambassador explained to German officials that the Soviets had begun their British negotiations "without much enthusiasm" at a time when they felt Germany would not "come to an understanding", and the parallel talks with the British could not be simply broken off when they had been initiated after 'mature consideration.'[104] Meanwhile, every internal German military and economic study had argued that Germany was doomed to defeat without at least Soviet neutrality.[105]
On August 19, the
On August 22 the secret political negotiations[110] were revealed when German newspapers announced that the Soviet Union and Nazi Germany were about to conclude a non-aggression pact, and that the Soviet Union's prolonged negotiations regarding a Triple Alliance with France and Britain had been suspended. The Soviets blamed on the Western powers their reluctance to take the Soviet Union's military assistance seriously and to acknowledge the Soviet right to cross Poland and Romania, if necessary against their will,[111] and furthermore their failure to send representatives with more importance and clearly defined powers and to resolve the disagreement over the notion of "indirect aggression".[95]
On August 23, 1939, a German delegation headed by Foreign Minister
1. In the event of a territorial and political rearrangement in the areas belonging to the Baltic States (Finland, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania), the northern boundary of Lithuania shall represent the boundary of the spheres of influence of Germany and the U.S.S.R. In this connection the interest of Lithuania in the Vilna area is recognized by each party.
2. In the event of a territorial and political rearrangement of the areas belonging to the
San.The question of whether the interests of both parties make desirable the maintenance of an independent Polish state and how such a state should be bounded can only be definitely determined in the course of further political developments.
In any event both Governments will resolve this question by means of a friendly agreement.
3. With regard to Southeastern Europe attention is called by the Soviet side to its interest in Bessarabia. The German side declares its complete political disinterestedness in these areas.
The secret protocol shall be treated by both parties as strictly secret.[114]
Though the parties denied its existence,[115] the protocol was rumored to exist from the very beginning.[116]
The news of the Pact, which was announced by Pravda and Izvestia on August 24, was met with utter shock and surprise by government leaders and media worldwide, most of whom were aware of only the British-French-Soviet negotiations, which had taken place for months.[98] British and French negotiators, who were in Moscow negotiating what they thought would be the military part of an alliance with the Soviet Union, were told "no useful purpose can be served in continuing the conversation."[117] On August 25, Hitler told the British ambassador to Berlin that the pact with the Soviets freed Germany from the prospect of a two front war, thereby changing the strategic situation from that which had prevailed in World War I, and that therefore Britain should accept his demands regarding Poland.[118] However, Hitler was surprised when Britain signed a mutual-assistance treaty with Poland that day, causing Hitler to delay the planned August 26 invasion of western Poland.[118]
The pact was ratified by the Supreme Soviet of the Soviet Union on August 31, 1939.
World War II
German invasion of western Poland
A week after having signed the Molotov–Ribbentrop pact, on September 1, 1939, Nazi Germany invaded its zone of influence in Poland. On September 3, the United Kingdom, Australia, New Zealand and France, fulfilling their obligations to the Second Polish Republic, declared war on Germany. The Second World War broke out in Europe.
On September 4, as Britain blockaded Germany at sea, German cargo ships heading towards German ports were diverted to the Soviet Arctic port of
Von der Schulenburg reported to Berlin that attacks on the conduct of Germany in the Soviet press had ceased completely and the portrayal of events in the field of foreign politics largely coincided with the German point of view, while anti-German literature had been removed from the trade.[119]
On September 7 Stalin once again outlined a new line for the Comintern that was now based on the idea that the war was an inter-imperialist conflict and hence there was no reason for the working class to side with Britain, France, or Poland against Germany, thus departing from the Comintern's anti-fascist popular front policy of 1934–1939.[120] He labeled Poland as a fascist state oppressing Belarusians and Ukrainians.[citation needed]
German diplomats had urged the Soviet Union to intervene against Poland from the east since the beginning of the war,
Soviet invasion of eastern Poland
On September 17 the Soviet Union finally entered the Polish territories that had been granted to it by the secret protocol of non-aggression pact from the east. As the pretexts to justify their actions, the Soviets cited the collapse of the
The territory of Poland had been completely occupied by the two powers by October 6, and the Polish state was liquidated. In early November the
Amendment of the Secret Protocols
On September 25, when Hitler was still going to proceed to Lithuania, the Soviet Union proposed to renegotiate the spheres of interest. On September 28, 1939, in Moscow Molotov and Ribbentrop signed the
Expanded commercial pact
Germany and the Soviet Union entered an
Soviet war with Finland
The last negotiations with Finland had been initiated by the Soviet side as part of its collective security policy in April 1938, and aimed to reach an understanding and to secure a favorable Finnish position in case of a German attack on the Soviet Union through Finnish territory, but this had proven futile due to the Finnish reluctance to break its neutrality, and negotiations ended in April 1939, shortly before Litvinov's dismissal. On October 13, 1939, new negotiations started in Moscow, and the Soviet Union (represented by Stalin, Molotov, and Vladimir Potyomkin) presented Finland with proposals including a mutual assistance pact, the lease of the military base of
On November 26, the Soviet Union staged the
The
The consequences of the conflict were multiple: Although the Soviet Union gained new territories, the war pushed neutral Finland towards an accommodation with Nazi Germany. Furthermore, the invasion had revealed the striking military weaknesses of the Red Army. This prompted the Soviet Union to reorganize its military forces, but it also dealt yet another blow to the international prestige of the USSR.
As a result of having suffered disproportionately high losses compared to the Finnish troops — despite a fourfold Soviet superiority in troops and nearly absolute superiority in heavy weapons and aircraft — the Red Army appeared to be an easy target, which contributed to Hitler's decision to plan an attack against the Soviet Union. Soviet official casualty counts in the war exceeded 200,000,[134] while Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev later claimed the casualties may have been one million.[135]
Soviets take the three Baltic countries
From the beginning, there was tension over the Soviets' moves in Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, which were in the Soviet sphere of influence. All three governments were presented with Stalin's ultimatums threatening with war, and had no other choice but to sign a so-called "Treaty of defence and mutual assistance" which permitted the Soviet Union to establish a number of military bases on their soil.[136] Nazi Germany advised them to accept the conditions. The three Baltic countries acceded to the Soviet demands and signed the "mutual assistance treaties" on September 28, October 5, and October 10, 1939, respectively (for 10 years for Estonia and Latvia and 15 years for Lithuania). The tension included the internment of a submarine crew in the Orzeł incident. On October 18, October 29, and November 3, 1939, the first Soviet troops moved into the military bases in Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania under the treaties.[137][138][139]
The Soviet Union had expressed discontent with the three Baltic countries' leaning toward Britain and France, and the so-called
Lithuanian President Antanas Smetona insisted on armed resistance, but was not supported by the military leadership, so Lithuania acceded to the ultimatum. The government was reshuffled and additional Soviet troops entered Lithuania. Vladimir Dekanozov was sent to Kaunas as the Soviet special envoy. The following night, Smetona fled to Germany (and later to Switzerland, and then to the United States). On June 16, Molotov presented similar ultimatums to Latvia and Estonia, citing Soviet concerns over the Baltic Entente, and they acceded as well. At the same time, the Wehrmacht started concentrating along the Lithuanian border.
In mid-June 1940, when international attention was focused on the German invasion of France, Soviet NKVD troops raided border posts in Lithuania, Estonia and Latvia.[136][140] State administrations were liquidated and replaced by Soviet cadres;[136] as a result, 34,250 Latvians, 75,000 Lithuanians and almost 60,000 Estonians were deported or killed.[141] Elections were held with single pro-Soviet candidates listed for many positions, with resulting peoples assemblies immediately requested admission into the USSR, which was granted by the Soviet Union.[136]
Soviet occupation of Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina
With France no longer in a position to be the guarantor of the status quo in Eastern Europe, and the Third Reich pushing Romania to make concessions to the Soviet Union, the Romanian government gave in, following Italy's counsel and Vichy France's recent example. (see Soviet occupation of Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina)
August tensions
The Finnish and Baltic invasions caused a deterioration of relations between Germany and the Soviet Union.
Soviet negotiations regarding joining the Axis
After Germany entered a
Ribbentrop asked Molotov to sign another secret protocol with the statement: "The focal point of the territorial aspirations of the Soviet Union would presumably be centered south of the territory of the Soviet Union in the direction of the Indian Ocean."[148] Molotov took the position that he could not take a "definite stand" on this without Stalin's agreement.[148] In response to a written German draft four powers agreement, Stalin presented a written counterproposal, including the Soviets joining the four power Axis if Germany foreclosed acting in the Soviet's sphere of influence.[149][150] Germany never responded to the counterproposal.[151][152]
January 1941 Border and Commercial Agreement
On January 10, 1941, Germany and the Soviet Union signed an agreement that settled several ongoing issues.[153] The agreement formally set the border between Germany and the Soviet Union between the Igorka river and the Baltic Sea,[154] It extended trade regulation of the 1940 German-Soviet Commercial Agreement until August 1, 1942, increased deliveries above the levels of year one of that agreement,[154] settled trading rights in the Baltics and Bessarabia, calculated the compensation for German property interests in the Baltic States now occupied by the Soviets and other issues.[153] It also covered the migration to Germany within two and a half months of ethnic Germans and German citizens in Soviet-held Baltic territories, and the migration to the Soviet Union of Baltic and "White Russian" "nationals" in German-held territories.[154] Secret protocols in the new agreement stated that Germany would renounce its claims to one piece of Lithuanian territory in the "Secret Additional Protocols" of the German–Soviet Boundary and Friendship Treaty and would be paid 7.5 million dollars (31.5 million ℛ︁ℳ︁).[153]
The agreements provided the USSR with new weapons, while in return it provided Germany with a million tons of feed grains, nine hundred thousand tons of oil, half a million tons of phosphate, half a million tons of iron ore, plus chromium and other raw materials.[155]
Mid-1941 relations
In an effort to demonstrate peaceful intentions toward Germany, on April 13, 1941, the Soviets
Stalin felt that there was a growing split in German circles about whether Germany should initiate a war with the Soviet Union.[157] Stalin did not know that Hitler had been secretly discussing an invasion of the Soviet Union since the summer of 1940,[158] and that Hitler had ordered his military in late 1940 to prepare for war in the east regardless of the parties' talks of a potential Soviet entry as a fourth Axis power.[159]
On 1 May 1941, German military delegation, including Ernst August Köstring and Hans Krebs, attended the Soviet military parade in Moscow in honour of International Workers' Day.[160]
Further development
During 1940, Nazi Germany pursued its conquest of western Europe: On April 9, 1940, Germany invaded Denmark and Norway. On May 15, the Netherlands capitulated. By June 2, Germany had occupied Belgium. On June 14, Wehrmacht entered Paris. On June 22, France surrendered.
The British historians
According to Mr. Rapoport, "one of Stalin's first gifts to the Nazis was to turn over some 600 German Communists, most of them Jews, to the Gestapo at Brest-Litovsk in German-occupied Poland."[164] The Soviets also offered support to the Nazis in official statements: Joseph Stalin himself emphasized that it was the Anglo-French alliance that had attacked Germany, not the other way around,[165] and Molotov claimed that Germany had made peace efforts, which had been turned down by 'Anglo-French imperialists'.[166]
By invading Poland and annexing the Baltic States, Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union eliminated the buffer states between them and magnified the threat of war.[167]
Volksdeutsche in the Soviet Union
Ethnic Germans in the Soviet Union of the 1920s enjoyed a certain degree of cultural autonomy, there were 8 national
In September 1929, discontented with the reintroduction of
The first mass arrests and show trials specifically targeting Soviet Germans (those who were considered
In 1933–1934, a campaign was launched in Germany to help Soviet
Deeply concerned over cross-border ethnic ties of national minorities (such as Germans, Poles, Finns), in 1934 the Soviet Union decided to create a new border security zone along its western border, and in 1935–1937 potentially disloyal nationalities (including German) were mostly (albeit not completely) deported from this strip of land to the inner parts of the Soviet Union by NKVD.[170] German national institutions were gradually abolished.[172]
In 1937–1938 NKVD conducted mass operations "for the destruction of espionage and sabotage contingents" (known as
The Soviet government had made a prior decision to evacuate the entire population of German origin in case of German invasion, which was immediately implemented after the actual invasion by
Aftermath
Hitler breaks the Pact
Nazi Germany terminated the Molotov–Ribbentrop Pact with its invasion of the Soviet Union in Operation Barbarossa on June 22, 1941.[176] After the launch of the invasion, the territories that had been gained by the Soviet Union as a result of the Molotov–Ribbentrop Pact were lost in a matter of weeks. In the three weeks following the breaking of the Pact, the Soviet Union attempted to defend itself against vast German advances; in the process, the Soviet Union suffered 750,000 casualties, and lost 10,000 tanks and 4,000 aircraft.[177] Within six months, the Soviet military had suffered 4.3 million casualties[178] and the Germans had captured three million Soviet prisoners, two million of which would die in German captivity by February 1942.[177] German forces had advanced 1,050 miles (1,690 kilometers), and maintained a linearly-measured front of 1,900 miles (3,058 kilometers).[179]
Denial of the Secret Protocol's existence by the Soviet Union
German officials found a microfilmed copy of the secret protocols of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact in 1945 and provided it to United States military forces.[115] Despite publication of the recovered copy in western media, for decades it was the official policy of the Soviet Union to deny the existence of the secret protocol.[115][116]
After the Baltic Way demonstrations of August 23, 1989, a Soviet commission concluded in December 1989 that the protocol had existed.[180] In 1992, only after the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the document itself was declassified.
Post-war commentary regarding the timing of rapprochement
After the war, historians have argued about the start of Soviet-German rapprochement. There are many conflicting points of view in historiography as to when the Soviet side began to seek rapprochement and when the secret political negotiations started.[181]
Some scholars argue that for a long time the collective security doctrine was a sincere and unanimous position of the Soviet leadership, pursuing a purely defensive line,[89][182] whereas others contend that from the very beginning the Soviet Union intended to cooperate with Nazi Germany, collective security being merely tactical counter to some unfriendly German moves.[69][183][184][185] However, perhaps Moscow sought to avoid a great war in Europe because it was not strong enough to fight an offensive war; but there was much disagreement over the policy between Litvinov and Molotov about how to attain that goal, and Stalin alternated between their positions, initially pursuing both contradictory lines simultaneously quite early and abandoning collective security only at some point in 1939.[79][186]
Nazi Germany started its quest for a pact with the Soviet Union at some point in the spring of 1939 in order to prevent an English–Soviet–French alliance and to secure Soviet neutrality in a future Polish–German war.[187]
Some argue that the rapprochement could start as early as in 1935–1936, when Soviet trade representative in Berlin David Kandelaki made attempts at political negotiations on behalf of Stalin and Molotov, behind Litvinov's back.[4][188] Molotov's speech to the Central Executive Committee of the Supreme Soviet in January 1936 is usually taken to mark this change of policy.[189] Thus, Litvinov's anti-German line did not enjoy unanimous support by the Soviet leadership long before his dismissal.[79] Walter Krivitsky, an NKVD agent, who defected in the Netherlands in 1937, reported in his memoires in 1938 that already then Stalin had sought better relations with Germany.[190][191] According to other historians, these were merely responses to German overtures for détente.[192]
It is also possible that the change of foreign policy occurred in 1938, after the Munich Agreement, which became the final defeat of Litvinov's anti-German policy of collective security, which was marked by the reported remark about an inevitable fourth partition of Poland made by Litvinov's deputy Vladimir Potemkin in a conversation with French ambassador Robert Coulondre shortly thereafter.[193]
The turn towards Germany could also have been made in early 1939, marked by Stalin's speech to the 18th
According to others, the first sign of a Soviet–German political détente was the conversation between Soviet ambassador Aleksey Merekalov and
Soviet ambassadors (chargés) to Berlin
- Adolf Ioffe(1918)
- Nikolay Krestinsky (1921–1930)
- Lev Khinchuk (1930–1934)
- Yakov Surits(1934–1937)
- Konstantin Yurenev (1937)
- Alexey Merekalov (1938–1939)
- Georgy Astakhov (1939)
- Alexey Shkvartsev (1939–1940)
- Vladimir Dekanozov (1940–1941)
German ambassadors to Moscow
- Wilhelm Mirbach(1918)
- Karl Helfferich
- Kurt Wiedenfeld
- Ulrich Graf von Brockdorff-Rantzau(1922–1928)
- Herbert von Dirksen (1928–1933)
- Rudolf Nadolny (1933–1934)
- Friedrich Werner von der Schulenburg(1934–1941)
See also
- Foreign relations of the Soviet Union
- Germany–Russia relations
- International relations (1919–1939)
- Timeline of the Molotov–Ribbentrop Pact
- Treaty of Berlin (August 27, 1918)
Notes
- ^ Full text in English: The Peace Treaty of Brest-Litovsk; March 3, 1918
- ^ a b c Gasiorowski, Zygmunt J. (1958). The Russian Overture to Germany of December 1924. The Journal of Modern History 30 (2), 99–117.
- ^ Soviet Studies30 (2), 212–236.
- ^ a b c Haslam, Jonathan (1997). "Soviet-German Relations and the Origins of the Second World War: The Jury Is Still Out". The Journal of Modern History 69: 785–797.
- ^ Raack, R. C. Stalin's Drive to the West, 1938–1945: The Origins of the Cold War. Stanford, California, 1995, p. 12.
- ^ Geoffrey Roberts, The Soviet Union and the Origins of the Second World War: Russo-German Relations and the Road to War 1933–1941 (New York, 1995), p. 73.
- ^ Haslam, Jonathan. The Soviet Union and the Struggle for Collective Security in Europe, 1933–39. New York, 1985, pp. 140–41.
- ^ Lukacs, John, June 1941: Hitler and Stalin, Yale University Press, 2006.
- ^ "The Peace Treaty of Brest-Litovsk - World War I Document Archive". wwi.lib.byu.edu.
- ^ Montefiore 2005, p. 32
- ^ Grau, Bernhard (4 March 2020). "Stages of the Revolution III: The "Bavarian" Soviet Republic (7 April - 1 May 1919)". Historisches Lexikon Bayerns. Retrieved 27 December 2023.
- ^ "100 Jahre Neubeginn in Bremen. Wie die Revolution sich selbst fraß" [100 Years Since a New Beginning in Bremen. How the Revolution Devoured Itself]. taz (in German). Retrieved 27 December 2023.
- ^ Krampitz, Karsten (2019). "1919: Fidele Geiselnahme" [1919: Merry Hostage-Taking]. der Freitag (in German). Retrieved 27 December 2023.
- ^ "The Spartacist Revolt". BBC Bitesize. Retrieved 27 December 2023.
- ^ Kochan, Lionel (1950). The Russian Road to Rapallo. Soviet Studies 2 (2), 109–122.
- ^ Smith, Arthur L. (1956). The German General Staff and Russia, 1919–1926. Soviet Studies 8 (2), 125–133.
- ^ Hallgarten, George W. F. (1949) General Hans von Seeckt and Russia, 1920–1922. The Journal of Modern History 21 (1), 28–34.
- ^ John Erickson, ed., The Soviet High Command: A Military-Political History, 1918–1941, 3rd ed. (London, England: Frank Cass Publishers, 2001), p. 148.
- ^ a b c Gatzke, Hans W. (1958). Russo-German Military Collaboration during the Weimar Republic. The American Historical Review 63 (3), 565–597. online Archived 2019-12-09 at the Wayback Machine
- ^ Full text in English: German-Russian Agreement; April 16, 1922 (Treaty of Rapallo) Archived May 15, 2007, at the Wayback Machine.
- Military Affairs (1976) 40#3, 109–117. excerpt
- ^ Kretschmer, Ernst (1930). Germano-Russian trade relations and the Five-Year Plan. Annals of Public and Cooperative Economics 6 (1), 111–133.
- ^ Fraenkel, Ernst (1940). German-Russian Relations Since 1918: From Brest-Litovsk to Moscow. The Review of Politics 2 (1), 34–62
- ^ Full text in English: Supplementary Agreement to the German-Russian Agreement; November 5, 1922 Archived October 13, 2007, at the Wayback Machine
- ^ Gatzke, Hans W. (1958). Russo-German Military Collaboration during the Weimar Republic. The American Historical Review 63 (3), 565–597.
- ^ ISBN 978-1-135-25186-4.
- ^ ISBN 978-0-8018-5126-1.
- ISBN 978-1-135-25186-4.
- ^ Dyakov, Yu. L. & T. S. Bushueva. The Red Army and the Wehrmacht. How the Soviets Militarized Germany, 1922–1933, and Paved the Way for Fascism. New York: Prometheus Books, 1995.
- ^ Speidel, Helm (1953). Reichswehr und Rote Armee. Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte I (Jan., 1953), 9–45
- ^ Dyakov, Yu. L. & T. S. Bushueva, The Red Army and the Wehrmacht: How the Soviets Militarised Germany, 1922–1933, and Paved the Way for Fascism, New York: Prometheus Books, 1995.
- ^ a b c d Ericson 1999, pp. 1–2
- ^ Hehn 2005, p. 15
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- ^ Morgan, R. P. (1963). The Political Significance of German-Soviet Trade Negotiations, 1922-5. The Historical Journal 6 (2), 253–271.
- ^ Richard K. Debo, Survival and Consolidation: The Foreign Policy of Soviet Russia, 1918–1921 (Montreal, Quebec & Kingston, Ontario: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1992), page 302.
- ^ J. David Cameron, "To Transform the Revolution into an Evolution: Underlying Assumptions of German Foreign Policy toward Soviet Russia, 1919-27." Journal of Contemporary History 40.1 (2005): 7-24.
- ^ Full text in English: Treaty of Berlin Between the Soviet Union and Germany; April 24, 1926 Archived October 13, 2007, at the Wayback Machine.
- The American Journal of International Law20 (3), 530–533.
- ^ Fischer, Ruth. Stalin and German Communism: a Study in the Origins of the State Party (1949).
- ^ a b Kevin McDermott, and J. Agnew, The Comintern: a History of International Communism from Lenin to Stalin (1996).
- ^ See Full text of the report in Russian
- ^ a b c d Stein, George H. (1962) Russo-German Military Collaboration: The Last Phase, 1933. Political Science Quarterly 77 (1), 54–71.
- ^ Tucker
- ^ Uldricks, Teddy J. (1977) Stalin and Nazi Germany. Slavic Review 36 (4), 599–603.
- ^ a b Hehn 2005, p. 212
- ^ J. Otto Pohl, Eric J. Schmaltz, and Ronald J. Vossler. "'In our hearts we felt the sentence of death': ethnic German recollections of mass violence in the USSR, 1928–48." Journal of Genocide Research 11.2-3 (2009): 323-354. online[dead link]
- ^ Published as Documents on German Foreign Policy 1918–1945. Series D, Volume 1: From Neurath to Ribbentrop. Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1949 and Sontag, Raymond James & James Stuart Beddie. Nazi-Soviet Relations 1939–1941: Documents from the Archives of The German Foreign Office Archived 2007-09-08 at the Wayback Machine. Washington, D.C.: Department of State, 1948.
- ^ Bracher, Karl D., The German Dictatorship, Praeger, New York, 1976, p.425; Parrish, Thomas (ed.), The Simon and Schuster Encyclopedia of World War II, Simon and Schuster, New York, 1978, p. 398; Taylor, James, and Warren Shaw, The Third Reich Almanac, World Almanac, New York, 1987, p.212.
- ^ a b Haslam, The Soviet Union and the Struggle, p. 22.
- ^ a b Carr, E. H. (1949) From Munich to Moscow. I. Soviet Studies 1 (1), 3–17.
- ^ A. B. Ulam, Expansion and Co-existence (New York, 1968), p. 195
- ^ M. Beloff, The Foreign Policy of Soviet Russia, 1929–1941, vol. I (London, 1947). p. 89.
- ISBN 1-4286-0034-5, pages 136–7
- ISBN 978-1-4286-0034-8. p.136-137.
- ISBN 978-0-691-22812-9.
- The American Journal of International Law30 (4), Supplement: Official Documents. (Oct. 1936), pp. 177–180.
- ^ Haslam, The Soviet Union and the Struggle, p. 46.
- ^ Ericson 1999, pp. 17–18
- ^ a b Ericson 1999, pp. 23–24
- ^ Hehn 2005, p. 36: "By 1936 raw material and foodstuff shortages reached the crisis stage forcing Hitler to decree a Four Year Plan for rearmament 'without regard to costs.'"
- ^ Uldricks, Teddy J. (1977) The Impact of the Great Purges on the People's Commissariat of Foreign Affairs. Slavic Review 36 (2), 187–204.
- ^ See The German Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Schulenburg) to the German Foreign Ministry Archived 2007-11-22 at the Wayback Machine of January 13, 1938, and The German Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Schulenburg) to the German Foreign Ministry Archived 2007-08-08 at the Wayback Machine of January 17, 1938 @ Avalon Project
- ^ Ericson 1999, pp. 27–28
- ^ Michael Alpert, A New International History of the Spanish Civil War (2nd ed. 2004) excerpt and text search
- ^ Haslam, The Soviet Union and the Struggle, chap. 10.
- ^ Jonathan Haslam (1979). The Soviet Union and the Czechoslovakian Crisis of 1938. Journal of Contemporary History 14 (3), 441–461.
- ^ a b Hochman, Jiri. The Soviet Union and the Failure of Collective Security, 1934–1938. London – Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1984.
- ^ Michael Jabara Carley (1993). End of the 'Low, Dishonest Decade': Failure of the Anglo-Franco-Soviet Alliance in 1939. Europe-Asia Studies 45 (2), 303–341.
- ^ a b Watson, Derek (2000). Molotov's Apprenticeship in Foreign Policy: The Triple Alliance Negotiations in 1939. Europe-Asia Studies 52.4, 695–722.
- ^ a b Resis, Albert (2000). The Fall of Litvinov: Harbinger of the German-Soviet Non-Aggression Pact. Europe-Asia Studies 52 (1), 33–56.
- ^ Natural Enemies: The United States and the Soviet Union in the Cold War 1917–1991 by Robert C. Grogin. 2001, Lexington Books page 28
- ^ Hehn 2005, pp. 215–6
- ^ Hehn 2005, p. 35
- ^ Ericson 1999, p. 3
- ^ Ericson 1999, pp. 31–32
- ^ a b c d Haslam, Jonathan (1997). Review: Soviet-German Relations and the Origins of the Second World War: The Jury Is Still Out. The Journal of Modern History 69.4, 785–797.
- ^ Richard Overy and Andrew Wheatcroft, The Road to War
- ^ Roberts, Geoffrey (1992). "The Soviet Decision for a Pact with Nazi Germany". Soviet Studies 44.1, 57–78.
- ^ Roberts, Geoffrey (1992). "The Fall of Litvinov: A Revisionist View". Journal of Contemporary History 27, pp. 639–657.
- ^ Roberts, Geoffrey. The Alliance that Failed, p. 397.
- ) @ Avalon Project
- ^ Cf. also the German diplomatic documents, Germany and The Soviet Union – November 1937 to July 1938 Archived 2007-10-13 at the Wayback Machine @ Avalon Project
- ^ W. Strang. Home and Abroad. London, 1956. p. 198
- ^ Aleksandr M. Nekrich, Pariahs, Partners, Predators: German–Soviet Relations, 1922–1941. New York: Columbia University Press, 1997.
- ^ Taylor (1962), The Origins of the Second World War, pp. 229, 232, 240–241.
- ^ a b Roberts, Geoffrey. Unholy Alliance (1989)
- ^ Roberts, Geoffrey. The Soviet Union and the Origins of the Second World War: Russo-German Relations and the Road to War, 1933–1941. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1995. p. 73.
- ^ Geoffrey Roberts (1998) "On Soviet-German Relations: The Debate Continues. A Review Article". Europe-Asia Studies, Vol. 50, No. 8. pp. 1471–1475.
- ^ Roberts, Geoffrey (1995). Soviet Policy and the Baltic States, 1939–1940: A Reappraisal. Diplomacy and Statecraft 6 (3).
- ^ Haslam, Jonathan. The Soviet Union and the Threat from the East, 1933–41: Moscow, Tokyo and the Prelude to the Pacific War. Basingstoke, 1994, pp. 129–134
- ^ Sella, A. (1983) "Khalkhin-Gol: The Forgotten War". Journal of Contemporary History 18, pp. 651–687.
- ^ a b c d Watson, Derek (2000). Molotov's Apprenticeship in Foreign Policy: The Triple Alliance Negotiations in 1939. Europe-Asia Studies 52 (4), 695–722.
- ^ a b c Ericson 1999, pp. 54–55
- ^ a b Nekrich, Ulam & Freeze 1997, p. 116
- ^ a b Roberts 2006, p. 30
- ^ ISBN 0-15-602754-2, pp. 589–90
- ISBN 0-333-80149-0, page 30
- ISBN 90-420-0890-3page 131
- ^ Nekrich, Ulam & Freeze 1997, p. 115
- ^ Ericson 1999, pp. 56–7
- ^ Erickson 2001, p. 539-30
- ^ Ericson 1999, pp. 56–58
- ^ Ericson 1999, p. 57
- ^ a b Wegner 1997, p. 99
- ^ Grenville & Wasserstein 2001, p. 227
- ^ Ericson 1999, p. 61
- ^ See also the German diplomatic documents, Agreement Achieved, August 14 – August 23, 1939 Archived September 8, 2007, at the Wayback Machine @ Avalon Project
- ^ Poland declined to accept any help from the Soviet Union. The Soviets did not try to approach Poland and Romania directly and entirely relied on the British and French mediation.
- ^ Treaty of Nonaggression Between Germany and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics Archived 2007-06-23 at the Wayback Machine @ Avalon Project
- ^ Secret Additional Protocol Archived 2007-06-25 at the Wayback Machine @ Avalon Project
- ^ Text of the Nazi-Soviet Non-Aggression Pact, executed August 23, 1939
- ^ ISBN 1-58046-137-9, pages 147
- ^ a b Sontag, Raymond James & James Stuart Beddie. Nazi-Soviet Relations 1939–1941: Documents from the Archives of The German Foreign Office. Washington, D.C.: Department of State, 1948. P. 78.
- ^ Shirer 1990, pp. 541–2
- ^ a b Nekrich, Ulam & Freeze 1997, p. 123
- ^ The German Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Schulenburg) to the German Foreign Office Archived 2007-08-06 at the Wayback Machine @ Avalon Project
- ^ a b c d Roberts, Geoffrey (1992). The Soviet Decision for a Pact with Nazi Germany. Soviet Studies 44 (1), 57–78.
- ^ The Reich Foreign Minister to the German Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Schulenburg) Archived 2007-06-29 at the Wayback Machine @ Avalon Project and some following documents
- ^ The German Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Schulenburg) to the German Foreign Office Archived 2007-11-05 at the Wayback Machine @ Avalon Project
- ISBN 978-0465054923.
- ISBN 0-670-84089-0
- Hitler-Stalin Pactof 1939.
- ^ Moorhouse (2014), p. 38, Collaboration.
- ^ "Stolpersteine in Berlin | Orte & Biografien der Stolpersteine in Berlin". www.stolpersteine-berlin.de. Retrieved 2020-05-09.
- ^ German-Soviet Boundary and Friendship Treaty Archived 2016-08-20 at the Wayback Machine @ Avalon Project
- ^ Secret Supplementary Protocol Archived 2007-11-05 at the Wayback Machine @ Avalon Project
- ^ a b c d e Shirer 1990, pp. 668–9
- ^ ISBN 0-7914-0018-2, page 110
- ISBN 0-333-80149-0.
- ISBN 0-7146-4314-9.
- ^ Roberts 2006, p. 52
- ISBN 0-06-000977-2, page 88
- ^ ISBN 0-7425-5542-9, page 20-21
- ^ Moscow's Week at Time magazine on Monday, October 9, 1939
- ISBN 0-415-28580-1
- ^ Tannberg. Tarvel. Documents on the Soviet Military Occupation of Estonia, Trames, 2006.
- ISBN 978-90-420-2225-6
- ^ Simon Sebag Montefiore. Stalin: The Court of the Red Tsar. p. 334.
- ^ Kennan, George. Russian and the West, under Lenin and Stalin, New York Mentor Books, 1961 pp 318,319
- ^ a b Philbin III 1994, p. 48 & 59
- ^ Philbin III 1994, p. 60
- ^ Philbin III 1994, pp. 49–50
- ^ Roberts 2006, p. 58
- ISBN 0-7146-5050-1, page 341
- ^ ISBN 0-7146-5050-1, page 343
- ^ Roberts 2006, p. 59
- ^ Nekrich, Ulam & Freeze 1997, p. 203
- ISBN 0-7656-1568-1, pages 65–66
- ISBN 0-395-41056-8, pages 520–21
- ^ a b c Ericson 1999, pp. 150–3
- ^ ISBN 81-7488-491-2pages 134–137
- ISBN 9780679768128.
- ^ Roberts 2006, p. 63
- ^ a b Roberts 2006, p. 66
- ^ Ericson 1999, pp. 129–130
- ISBN 0-7425-2192-3, page 74-5
- ^ "История военных парадов на Красной площади, Фильм 2" [History of military parades on Red Square, part 2]. Zvezda (TV channel). Archived from the original on 2021-05-12.
- ^ Milward, German Economy at War. London 1965, pp. 2–18; Medicott, The Economic Blockade. Vol I, London 1952, pp. 47–48.
- ^ Hillgruber, Germany at two World Wars. Harvard University Press, 1981, p. 75
- ^ Hillgruber, Hitlers Strategie. Politik und Kriegsführung 1940–1941. Frankfurt am Main, 1965. S.667–671
- ^ Shipler, David K. (November 18, 1990). "Anatomies of a Murderer". The New York Times – via NYTimes.com.
- ^ "И.Сталин. Ответ редактору "Правды"". www.magister.msk.ru.
- ^ [1] It is generally known, however, that the British and French governments turned down German peace efforts, made public by her already at the end of last year, which for its part, owed to preparations to escalate the war. Molotov's report on March 29, 1940
- ^ Aleksandr M. Nekrich, Pariahs, Partners, Predators: German-Soviet Relations, 1922–1941. New York: Columbia University Press, 1997. p. 144
- ^ Dyck, Harvey. Weimar Germany and Soviet Russia, 1926–1933 (New York, 1966), pp. 162–174
- ^ Buchsweiler, Meir. Volksdeutsche in der Ukraine am Vorabend und Beginn des Zweiten Weltkriegs – ein Fall doppelter Loyalität? (Gerlingen, 1984), pp. 58–64.
- ^ a b c d e Martin, Terry (1998). The Origins of Soviet Ethnic Cleansing. The Journal of Modern History 70 ( 4), 813–861.
- ^ Buchsweiler, Meir. Volksdeutsche in der Ukraine am Vorabend und Beginn des Zweiten Weltkriegs – ein Fall doppelter Loyalität? (Gerlingen, 1984), pp. 64–71.
- ^ Martin, An Affirmative Action Empire, pp. 757–759.
- ^ See also The German Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Schulenburg) to the German Foreign Ministry Archived 2007-11-22 at the Wayback Machine (February 7, 1938) @ Avalon Project
- ^ Бугай, Н.Ф. (ред.) Л. Берия – И. Сталину: Согласно вашему указанию. М, 1995. p. 27-55
- ^ Fleischhauer, Ingeborg. "Operation Barbarossa". In: Rogovin Frunkel, Edith (ed.), The Soviet Germans: Past and Present. New York: St. Martin's, 1986.
- ^ Roberts 2006, p. 82
- ^ a b Roberts 2006, p. 85
- ^ Roberts 2006, pp. 116–7
- ^ Glantz, David, The Soviet-German War 1941–45: Myths and Realities: A Survey Essay, October 11, 2001, page 7
- ISBN 0-521-55537-X, page 34-35
- ^ a b Geoffrey Roberts (1992). "The Soviet Decision for a Pact with Nazi Germany". Soviet Studies 44.1, 57–78.
- ^ Roberts, Geoffrey. The Soviet Union and the Origins of the Second World War: Russo-German Relations and the Road to War, 1933–1941. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1995.
- ^ R. C. Raack, Stalin's Drive to the West, 1938–1945: The Origins of the Cold War (Stanford, California, 1995), p. 12.
- ^ Robert C. Tucker, Stalin in Power: The Revolution from Above, 1928–1941 (New York, 1990).
- ^ Aleksandr M. Nekrich, Pariahs, Partners, Predators: German-Soviet Relations, 1922–1941. New York: Columbia University Press, 1997.
- ^ Jonathan Haslam, The Soviet Union and the Struggle for Collective Security in Europe, 1933–39 (New York, 1985), pp. 140–141.
- ^ Geoffrey Roberts (1992). "The Soviet Decision for a Pact with Nazi Germany". Soviet Studies 44.1, 57–78.
- ^ Haslam, The Soviet Union and the Struggle, p. 86, 127–128.
- ^ D. C. Watt, 'The Initiation of the Negotiations Leading to the Nazi-Soviet Pact: A Historical Problem', in C. Abramsky, ed., Essays in Honour of E.H. Carr (London, Macmillan, 1974)
- ^ Кривицкий, Вальтер (1938). Из воспоминаний советского коммуниста. Социалистический вестник 7, April 15, 1938.
- ^ W. G. Krivitsky, I Was Stalin's Agent (London, 1940).
- ^ Roberts, Geoffrey. The Soviet Union and the Origins of the Second World War (London, 1995), chap. 3.
- ^ D. C. Watt, 'The Initiation of the Negotiations Leading to the Nazi-Soviet Pact: A Historical Problem', in C. Abramsky, ed., Essays in Honour of E.H. Carr (London, Macmillan, 1974).
- ^ R.C. Tucker, Stalin in Power: The Revolution from Above, 1928–1941 (New York, W.W. Norton, 1991).
- ^ Watt, p. 164. in How War Came: The Immediate Origins of the Second World War (London, Heinemann, 1989)
- ^ Carr, E. H. (1949) From Munich to Moscow. II. Soviet Studies 1 (2), 93–105.
- ^ See Ernst von Weizsäcker, Memorandum by the State Secretary in the German Foreign Office. April 17, 1939 Archived July 3, 2007, at the Wayback Machine @ Avalon Project
- ^ Geoffrey Roberts. "Infamous Encounter? The Merekalov-Weizsacker Meeting of 17 April 1939". The Historical Journal, Vol. 35, No. 4 (Dec. 1992), pp. 921–926.
- ^ Jonathan Haslam. "Review: Soviet–German Relations and the Origins of the Second World War: The Jury Is Still Out". The Journal of Modern History, Vol. 69, No. 4 (Dec., 1997), pp. 785–797
References
- Erickson, John (2001), The Soviet High Command: A Military-political History, 1918–1941, Routledge, ISBN 0-7146-5178-8
- Ericson, Edward E. (1999), Feeding the German Eagle: Soviet Economic Aid to Nazi Germany, 1933–1941, Greenwood Publishing Group, ISBN 0-275-96337-3
- Grenville, John Ashley Soames; Wasserstein, Bernard (2001), The Major International Treaties of the Twentieth Century: A History and Guide with Texts, Taylor & Francis, ISBN 0-415-23798-X
- Hehn, Paul N. (2005), A Low Dishonest Decade: The Great Powers, Eastern Europe, and the Economic Origins of World War II, 1930–1941, Continuum International Publishing Group, ISBN 0-8264-1761-2
- Nekrich, Aleksandr Moiseevich; Ulam, Adam Bruno; Freeze, Gregory L. (1997), Pariahs, Partners, Predators: German-Soviet Relations, 1922–1941, Columbia University Press, ISBN 0-231-10676-9
- ISBN 0-7538-1766-7.
- Philbin III, Tobias R. (1994), The Lure of Neptune: German-Soviet Naval Collaboration and Ambitions, 1919 – 1941, University of South Carolina Press, ISBN 0-87249-992-8
- ISBN 0-300-11204-1
- Shirer, William L. (1990), The Rise and Fall of the Third Reich: A History of Nazi Germany, Simon and Schuster, ISBN 0-671-72868-7
- Wegner, Bernd (1997), From Peace to War: Germany, Soviet Russia, and the World, 1939–1941, Berghahn Books, ISBN 1-57181-882-0
External links
- Nazi-Soviet Relations 1939–1941 @ Avalon Project
- Nazi-Soviet Relations 1939–1941 @ All World Wars
- (in Russian)Пронин А.А., Советско-германские соглашения 1939 г. Истоки и последствия//Международный исторический журнал, №№ 10–12, 2000
Further reading
- Carr, Edward Hallett. German-Soviet Relations between the Two World Wars. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1951.
- Ericson, Edward E. Feeding the German Eagle: Soviet Economic Aid to Nazi Germany, 1933–1941. New York: Praeger, 1999. ISBN 0-275-96337-3
- Everett, Rob. "The Enemy of My Enemy is My Friend: Soviet Foreign Policy in Europe, 1933-1939." Wittenberg History Journal 43 (2014): 53–64. online
- Gorodetsky, Gabriel. "The impact of the Ribbentrop-Molotov pact on the course of Soviet foreign policy." Cahiers du monde russe et soviétique (1990): 27–41. online
- Hill, Alexander. "Soviet Planning for War, 1928–June 1941." in by Thomas W. Zeiler and Daniel M. DuBois, eds. A Companion to World War II (2013): 93–101.
- Himmer, Robert "Rathenau, Russia, and Rapallo." Central European History 9#2 (1976): 146–183.
- Hoppe, Bert, and Mark Keck-Szajbel. "Iron Revolutionaries and Salon Socialists: Bolsheviks and German Communists in the 1920s and 1930s." Kritika: Explorations in Russian and Eurasian History 10.3 (2009): 499–526.
- Jelavich, Barbara. St. Petersburg and Moscow: tsarist and Soviet foreign policy, 1814-1974 (Indiana UP, 1974) pp 311–58.
- Kochan, Lionel. Russia and the Weimar Republic. Cambridge: Bowes & Bowes, 1954.
- Kocho-Williams, Alastair. Russian and Soviet Diplomacy, 1900-39 (Springer, 2011).
- Kshyk, Christopher J. "Did Stalin Plan to Attack Hitler in 1941? The Historiographical Controversy Surrounding the Origins of the Nazi-Soviet War." Inquiries Journal 7.11 (2015). online
- Mueller, Gordon H. "Rapallo Reexamined: a new look at Germany's secret military collaboration with Russia in 1922." Military Affairs 40#3 (1976): 109–117. in JSTOR
- Nekrich, Aleksandr Moiseevich. Pariahs, partners, predators: German-Soviet relations, 1922-1941 (Columbia University Press, 1997).
- Pohl, J. Otto, Eric J. Schmaltz, and Ronald J. Vossler. "'In our hearts we felt the sentence of death': ethnic German recollections of mass violence in the USSR, 1928–48." Journal of Genocide Research 11.2-3 (2009): 323–354. online[dead link]
- Pons, Silvio. Stalin and the inevitable war, 1936-1941 (Routledge, 2002).
- Rosenbaum, Kurt. Community of Fate: German-Soviet Diplomatic Relations 1922-1928 Syracuse University Press, 1965
- Saul, Norman E. Historical Dictionary of Russian and Soviet Foreign Policy (Rowman & Littlefield, 2014). 700 entries, 326pp
- Shore, Zachary. What Hitler Knew: The Battle for Information in Nazi Foreign Policy (Oxford UP, 2002).
- Ulam, Adam B. Expansion and Coexistence: The History of Soviet Foreign Policy, 1917-1973 (1974) pp 126–313.
- Uldricks, Teddy J. "The Icebreaker Controversy: Did Stalin Plan to Attack Hitler?." Slavic Review 58.3 (1999): 626–643.
- Uldricks, Teddy J. "War, politics and memory: Russian historians reevaluate the origins of world war II." History & Memory 21.2 (2009): 60–82. online
- Weinberg, Gerhard L. Germany and the Soviet Union: 1939-1941 (Brill, 1972).
- Weinberg, Gerhard L. The Foreign Policy of Hitler's Germany: Starting World War II 1937-1939 (1980)
- Weinberg, Gerhard L. Hitler's Foreign Policy 1933-1939: The Road to World War II (2005)
- Wheeler-Bennett, John W. "Twenty Years of Russo-German Relations: 1919-1939" Foreign Affairs 25#1 (1946), pp. 23–43 online
Primary sources
- Sontag, Raymond James, and James Stuart Beddie, eds. Nazi-Soviet relations, 1939-1941: Documents from the archives of the German foreign office (US Department of State, 1948) online.