Goldwater–Nichols Act

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Goldwater–Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986
William Flynt Nichols (D–AL) on October 24, 1985
  • Committee consideration by United States House Committee on Armed Services
  • Passed the House on November 20, 1985 (383–27)
  • Passed the Senate on May 5, 1986 (95–0)
  • Signed into law by President Ronald Reagan
    • on October 1, 1986
    William Flynt Nichols (D—AL-4
    ), the co-sponsors of the Goldwater–Nichols Act of 1986.

    The Goldwater–Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of October 4, 1986 (

    unified combatant commands
    .

    Named after Senator

    William Flynt "Bill" Nichols (D-Alabama), the bill passed the House of Representatives, 383–27, and the Senate, 95–0. It was signed into law by President Reagan on October 1, 1986. Admiral William J. Crowe
    was the first chairman to serve under this new legislation.

    History

    The Goldwater–Nichols Act was an attempt to fix problems caused by

    invasion of Grenada in 1983.[1][2]

    Such problems existed as well in World War II, during which two independent lines of command flowed from the president, one through the

    secretary of the Navy to naval forces, and the other through the secretary of war to land and air forces. In 1947, the military restructuring placed all military forces, including the newly independent Air Force, under a single civilian secretary of defense
    .

    However, the United States military was still organized along the lines of command that reported to their respective service chiefs (Commandant of the Marine Corps, Chiefs of Staff of the Army and Air Force, and Chief of Naval Operations). These service chiefs in turn made up the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The Joint Chiefs of Staff elected a chairman to communicate with the civilian government. The chairman of the Joint Chiefs in turn reported to the secretary of defense, the civilian head of the military. Both the chairman of the Joint Chiefs and the secretary of defense reported to the president of the United States who holds the position of Commander-in-Chief (CINC) of all U.S. Armed Forces.

    This system led to counter-productive inter-service rivalry. Peacetime activities (such as procurement and creation of

    doctrine, etc.) were tailored for each service in isolation. Additionally, wartime activities of each service were largely planned, executed, and evaluated independently. These practices resulted in division of effort and an inability to profit from economies of scale
    , and inhibited the development of modern warfare doctrine.

    The formulation of the AirLand Battle doctrine in the late 1970s and early 1980s laid bare the difficulty of coordinating efforts among various service branches. AirLand Battle attempted to synthesize all of the capabilities of the service arms of the military into a single doctrine. The system envisioned ground, naval, air, and space based systems acting in concert to attack and defeat an opponent in depth. The structure of the armed forces effectively blocked realization of this ideal. The U.S. invasion of Grenada in 1983 further exposed the problems with the military command structure. Although the United States forces easily prevailed, its leaders expressed major concerns over different service branches' inability to coordinate and communicate with each other and the consequences of a lack of coordination if faced with a more threatening foe.

    Effects

    The Goldwater–Nichols Act brought sweeping changes to the way the U.S. military forces were organized. The first successful test of Goldwater–Nichols was the 1989

    Maxwell Reid Thurman, to exercise full control over Marine Corps, Army, Air Force and Navy
    assets without having to negotiate with the individual services.

    Chain of command and military advice

    Under the Goldwater–Nichols Act, military advice was centralized in the

    National Security Council and Secretary of Defense. The act also established the position of vice chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and simplified the chain of command. Additionally, the act states that the chairman and vice chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff cannot be representatives from the same service branch. It increased the ability of the chairman to direct overall strategy, but provided greater command authority to "unified" and "specified" field commanders. According to the act, the chairman may not exercise military command over the Joint Chiefs of Staff or any of the armed forces.[3]

    Section 162(b) of the act prescribes that "unless otherwise directed by the president, the chain of command to a unified or specified combatant command runs—

    1. "from the president to the secretary of defense," and
    2. "from the secretary of defense to the commander of the combatant command".[4]

    Interaction of services

    Goldwater–Nichols changed the way the services interact. The services themselves "organize, train and equip" forces for use by the

    Operation Desert Storm
    in 1991.

    Personnel management of officers

    Another major effect of the Act is the way it has dramatically changed the personnel management of military officers.[5] Many officers are assigned to joint duty positions (occasionally more than once), and are educated in Department of Defense Joint Professional Military Education (JPME) schools as part of their career development and progression. For example, in order to be competitive for promotion to general or flag officer (admiral) (pay grade O-7 or above/NATO OF-6), active component colonels (pay grade O-6/NATO OF-5) (Army, Marine Corps, and Air Force) or Navy captains must have completed at least one joint duty assignment, as well as having completed (or currently be enrolled in) a JPME school that grants JPME Level II credit.[6]

    Shared procurement

    Shared procurement allowed the various branches to share technological advances such as

    Network Centric Warfare
    (NCW).

    Changes since 1986

    On October 24, 2002, Secretary of Defense

    military's subordination to civilian government.[7]

    On November 10, 2015, Senator

    Senate Armed Services Committee, the beginning of a new effort to "reconsider, and possibly update" Goldwater–Nichols.[8]

    On January 4, 2016, the

    deputy secretary of defense issued a memorandum directing an internal review with the objective "to make recommendations for updates or adjustments to organizational relationships and authorities" based on 30 years of experience under Goldwater–Nichols.[9]

    On April 5, 2016, Defense Secretary Ash Carter outlined reforms in a speech at the Center for Strategic and International Studies.[10]

    References

    1. ^ Cole, Ronald H. (1999). "Grenada, Panama, and Haiti: Joint Operational Reform" (PDF). Joint Force Quarterly (20 (Autumn/Winter 1998-99)): 57–74. Archived (PDF) from the original on March 27, 2020. Retrieved October 20, 2017.
    2. ^ Richard W. Stewart, ed. (2005). "Chapter 12: Rebuilding the Army Vietnam to Desert Storm". American Military History, Volume II. United States Army Center of Military History. Archived from the original on May 18, 2015. Retrieved December 1, 2008.
    3. ^ Section 152c of the Act.
    4. ^ Goldwater–Nicholls DOD Reorganization Act, 10 USC 162, Combatant Commands; Assigned Forces; Chain of Command, Section (b), Chain of Command.
    5. ^ "U.S.C. Title 10 - ARMED FORCES". www.gpo.gov.
    6. ^ "10 U.S. Code § 2155 - Joint professional military education Phase II program of instruction". LII / Legal Information Institute.
    7. American Forces Press Service. Archived from the original
      on August 7, 2020. Retrieved November 20, 2016.
    8. ^ "Hearing to Receive Testimony on 30 Years of Goldwater-Nichols Reform" (PDF). Alderson Reporting Company. November 10, 2015. Retrieved January 12, 2016.
    9. ^ "Review of the Organization and Responsibilities of the DoD" (PDF). Inside Defense. January 4, 2016. Retrieved January 12, 2016.
    10. ^ "Breaking New Ground: Preparing DoD for the Future with Secretary Ash Carter [Transcript]" (PDF). Center for Strategic and International Studies. April 5, 2016. Retrieved November 24, 2019.

    Sources

    External links

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