Green armies
Green armies | |
---|---|
Leaders | requisitioning. |
Active regions | Throughout Russia and Ukraine |
Ideology | Agrarianism Anti-Bolshevism Factions: Agrarian socialism Neo-narodism Anarchism Revolutionary socialism |
Political position | Left-wing |
Opponents | Bolsheviks
White Movement
|
Battles and wars | Southern Russia Intervention West Siberian rebellion |
The Green armies (
Background
The Russian peasantry lived through two wars against the Russian state, the product of revolutions that ended with state victory:
The conflict between the cities and a countryside was one of the main edges of the civil war.[5] This resistance was interpreted by many as a mere expression of the "social anarchy" that existed in the country.[6] The communist influence on the peasants and workers was negligible. The Bolsheviks controlled some soviets, but without coercive power over the majority of the population, who opposed them in a passive and disorganized way.[7]
Between late 1917 and early 1918 there was no serious opposition to the Bolsheviks, who controlled central Russia, Baku and Tashkent. The only opposition force was the Volunteer Army (Russian: Добровольческая армия ), barely 3,000 men, still organized in southern Russia.[8] All the White movement's hopes were on winning over the Don and Kuban Cossacks, who were initially more interested in obtaining their own independence. For their part, Ukraine and Finland were in the process of becoming independent, but the Whites refused to recognize their secession.[9] Only the violent Bolshevik repression of the Cossacks in early 1918 made it possible to win them over to the White cause.[10]
After the
The farmers' first reaction was to bury their grain, feed it to cattle, or clandestinely distill it into
The first
Objectives
At the outbreak of the
Russia rapidly polarized during 1917. Very soon, large masses of the population were in favor of smaller and less organized revolutionary groups than the Bolsheviks, the
Agricultural distribution
The greens were driven by the ideal of the SR "black division",
The ideology of the Greens was very uniform, representing the common aspirations and goals of peasant revolutions in Russia and Ukraine. They wanted to regain the self-government maintained until 1918,[33] seize the nobility's lands, maintain rural market-economies and govern their communities with soviets chosen by them.[34] The peasants rejected the growing authority that the new state was gaining.[35] Four years after the Revolution they watched as the Soviet state centralized, with the autonomy of their Soviets integrated into the growing organs of the state. Their own small agricultural holdings were replaced by large state collectivizations, with the product produced on their farms requisitioned and the land promised to them in the Revolution occupied by the State.[36] With these worries and concerns growing, they began to accept the SR proposals: the end of Bolshevik rule, land redistribution and an end to the civil war.[37] Their opposition to the Bolsheviks was due to, rather than a political plan or national alternative, a desire to protect and preserve their communal land.[38] Interested in defending local interests,[39] these movements took a defensive stance: incapable and unwilling to march on Moscow, they hoped to remove the Bolshevik state's central influence.[33]
Rejection of the Whites
The greens were always hostile to the Whites, which is why their uprisings against the reds only became massive after ensuring the defeat of the Whites.[40] Many White officers were members of the former Tsarist Nobility, and had lost the land they had or could inherit in the peasant revolution of 1917. With deeply entrenched classism against the peasants they once ruled over, the Whites sought to turn back time and take revenge against every symbol of change. They would never recognize new national realities or the attempts at agrarian revolution.[41]
One of the main causes of the White defeat was being identified by the people with the restoration of the old regime, signaled by the treatment that their officers and officials gave to the peasants.
The robberies and massacres at the hands of the Cossack cavalry also contributed to turning the countryside against the White advance in 1919.
Finally, they failed to properly capitalize on the propaganda front.
Cooperation with other groups
The Greens collaborated several times with other opposition groups, such as anarchists and SRs,[67] in a more strategic than ideological effort against the Reds.[68] White deserters joined their cause and came to lead bands of peasants, which served as a pretext for the Bolsheviks to exaggerate the relations between the two elements.[69] More likely to follow aggressive rhetoric and promises of violent revenge, peasants tended to reject leaders with purely political or more moderate goals, that is, any close to the Russian Provisional Government of 1917. "They prefer to fight a desperate and lonely war on their own, rather than to help the oppressors of the past [the Whites] defeat the oppressors of the present [the reds].”[70]
Organisation
A union network emerged in the villages, replacing the Soviets and helping provide supplies to the rebels.
At the beginning of 1920, when the Red victory was practically assured after the defeat of the armies of
However, by that time both Greens and Blacks could only dream of damaging the Red Army, with its experience and size making it a true "military giant",
Territory | Month | Deserters | Captured |
---|---|---|---|
Kaluga | July | 10,000 | - |
Petrograd | - | 65,000 | |
Ryazan | - | 54,697 | - |
Saratov | - | 35,000 | - |
Tambov | - | 60,000 | - |
Tver | October | 50,000 | 5,430 |
Yaroslavl | July September |
9,500 s / i |
s / i 1,529 |
Ivanovo-Voznesensk | - | - | 3,000 |
Moscow | June September |
- | 1,500 3,329 |
Nizhny Novgorod | April | - | 4,900 |
Oriol | May | - | 5,000 |
Smolensk (Belsk region) |
June | - | 2,600 |
Vladimir | September | - | 1,529 |
The massive desertion as a phenomenon that affected the entire Red Army indicates that the peasantry were hesitant to serve in it.[87] With many still having rural farms or villages to return to, many deserted during periods of Harvest, with spikes in desertion being indicated by season.[88] During 1918 more than a million soldiers deserted,[19] the following year the figure increased to 2 million,[88] and in 1921 there were almost 4 million.[19] Between 1919 and 1920 3 million men deserted.[75] In 1919, these fugitive "green deserters" numbered more than one million in the territory under Bolshevik control alone,[89] and although trace amounts went on to serve with the Whites, most fought in heavily wooded areas near their own homes against authorities from both sides.[90] Detachments were sent to villages near the battlefront and families suspected of harboring deserters were punished with fines, confiscation of livestock and land, the seizure of hostages, executing community leaders and even burning whole villages to the ground.[19] The special commissions ordered by the Cheka with pursuing them captured 500,000 deserters in 1919 and 600,000 to 800,000 in 1920. Thousands were shot and their families deported, but 1.5 to 2 million avoided capture.[91]
The mass desertions started much earlier. From the
It's possible that the Reds never gathered more than half a million "equipped soldiers" at any one time.
Year | Numbers | Institution |
---|---|---|
1914 | 1,423,000 | Russian Imperial Army
|
1918 | 106,000 | Red Army |
1919 | 435,000 | Red Army |
1920 | 3,538,000 | Red Army |
1921 | 4,110,000 | Red Army |
1922 | 1,590,000 | Red Army |
1923 | 703,000 | Red Army |
1924–1927 | 562,000 | Red Army |
The Bolshevik forces were militarily fragile, as proven after the
Within this Red Army, the special units of the Cheka and the "internal defense troops of the Republic" stood out, with 200,000 members in 1921. In the wake of the Revolution, they were the main repressive organs of the fledgling Soviet State.[80] Due to the small number of regular soldiers at the disposal of all sides, the armies that were in the Russian battlefields were very small - tens of thousands in the largest battles - compared to those used in the World War I.[111] Volunteers were scarce and undisciplined, forcing Soviet commanders to recruit peasants, a social group that Soviet military leadership considered unreliable.[85] This was coupled with increased pressure towards requisitions,[88] which only contributed to the formation of new peasant guerrillas.[83]
Leadership
Besides Soviet records of their oppositional activity, there is very little personal information about the Green leaders, described as "men who acted and wrote not" due to the widespread
Constituents, leadership and goals
Despite
Peasant Wars
The revolts varied greatly from one another, however, the Soviets tended to classify them into two main categories: bunt, a specific, brief revolt with few participants; and vostante, an insurrection of thousands of peasants, capable of conquering cities and giving themselves a coherent political program,[67] usually of a social-revolutionary type, as in Tambov,[74] or anarchist, like the peasant armies of Makhno.[116]
First revolts
Among the initial movements would be the
It should be mentioned that the Kuban and Don Cossacks and the tribes of Caucasus rose up in 1920, forming their own peasant guerrillas.[15] The latter reached more than 30,000 rebels in arms.[15] They remained very active until the summer of the following year, when they will be definitively defeated, although small green parties in Kuban, Don and Western Siberia remained active until 1923.[117] Later, in 1924, there would be a last revolt in Georgia. It was quickly and harshly repressed.[118]
Ukrainian Atamans
Another green movement was the brief rebellion of Nykyfor Hryhoriv, ataman of Kherson, and Yuriy Tyutyunnyk. Hryhoriv was an opportunistic leader who knew how to switch sides when it suited him.[120]
Siberian rebellions
Admiral Kolchak made the fatal mistake of winning the animosity of peasants eager for agricultural reform by restoring the rights of landowners.[121] The problem worsened in early 1919.[122] Kolchak resorted to terror to appease them.[123] With his rear weakened by the wear and tear of the guerrillas,[122] the White regime could not stop the Bolshevik advance, which on the other hand, knew how to add local partisans to its forces wherever it advanced.[124]
At the beginning of 1920 the "
Between the beginning of 1921 and the end of 1922, the West Siberian rebellion took place, the largest green uprising, and perhaps the least studied,[15] both in number of rebels and in size geographic.[127]
Makhnovist Revolution
One of the best known and most organized of these movements was the
Tambov Rebellion
Probably the best known green movement is the rebellion that broke out on August 19, 1920 in the small town of Khitrovo, as a rejection of food requisitions in the Tambov Oblast and quickly spread to Penza, Saratov and Voronezh.[126] This was defeated in June 1922 with the death of its leader, Aleksandr Antonov.[131]
Tactics
While it can be difficult to distinguish Green armies from other forms of peasant unrest, they were marked by concentrated leadership and distinct units, displaying a higher level of organization than most peasant uprisings. For instance,
No more than 6,000 men, evenly distributed, fought in the first battles between the Whites of Lavr Kornilov and the Reds of Rudolf Sivers. Because of the small number of men involved and the tiny territory affected, it is difficult to call this even a civil war.[139] During the entire first year of the war there were only skirmishes and artillery duels with small armies or partisan forces, more concerned with obtaining supplies. Territory continually changed hands, there were no front lines or fixed positions.[140] In the decisive battles of 1919, they mobilized the peasantry by force, to fight in large armies with hundreds of thousands of men facing each other on fronts of hundreds of kilometers and supported with heavy weapons.[141]
Their favored activities included blowing up bridges, cutting telegraph lines and raising railways in an attempt to paralyze communications and movements of the Reds.[142] They preferred to prowl during the day, keeping watch over their enemies and attacking at night. They permanently refused to fight in the open, hiding in hills and forests to ambush and retreat quickly. Their greater mobility made up for their total absence of artillery.[33] In Western Siberia and Central Russia, their guerilla tactics were aided by the wooded terrain of the taiga.[143] When they were defeated they mixed with the civil population or fled on horses provided by the locals.[33]
The Greens formed multitudes of peasants with
The first small units sent by the Bolsheviks to subdue them were easily defeated and practically did nothing more than give them more weapons.
Bolshevik response
The Bolshevik government tried to build an
These massive uprisings, which shook Soviet power in
The civil war in Russia has generally been analyzed as a conflict between the
white army, the most important thing was what happened in the rear of the most important front lines.[121]
The Bolsheviks initially believed that they could easily defeat the Greens, treating them as a hopeless cause both in their
In the opinion of the anarchists: "The basic psychological trait of Bolshevism is the realization of its will by means of the violent elimination of all other wills, the absolute destruction of all individuality, to the point where it becomes an inanimate object."[157] Many local communist officials saw that the requisition orders starved their own people to death, but "The good comrade did the what was said to him; he was pleased to leave all critical thinking to the Central Committee." That was the discipline the Party advocated.[158] Ironically, many Bolshevik officers were the children of peasants educated in Tsarist military schools. With their minds open when leaving the narrow rural world, they rejected the mentality of their parents and grandparents and did not hesitate to repress their own people.[159]
The resistance of the Cossacks led to a fierce campaign of
The
Lenin also ordered the
Reasons for failure
Aside from the Bolshevik response, a number of internal aspects of the Green movement led to its failure. Green activity often amounted to violence without an actual goal beyond killing communists and interrupting their economic and political activity. Thus, the armies rarely moved outside of their original geographic region.[174] When Greens conquered towns or villages, they did not install themselves politically, leaving the territory to be retaken later by Bolsheviks.[175] At the same time, many peasant militias were loosely organized and lacked greater military or political coordination among them, which made it difficult to take advantage of the widespread discontent, preventing "most or all of peasant Russia bustling with rebellion" to overthrow the new regime.[101] Furthermore, there was a great deal of tension within the bands, which often included agrarian peasants, kulaks, workers and Whites, many with preexisting resentment towards each other. The Green armies were underfunded, low on supplies, and outmatched by the Red Army (which, despite its flaws, had better organization and morale as a result of greater, more frequent victories).[174]
The civil war caused more than ten million deaths from fighting, terror, plagues and mainly famine, which took about half, and another couple of million emigrated, affecting mainly adult men. Another ten million people were not born as a result of the fall in the birth rate according to demographic estimates.
New Economic Policy
Short of food and fuel, Petrograd was abandoned by most of its population. Of its 2 million inhabitants in 1918, barely 500,000 remained in 1920.[182] Millions returned to the countryside to get food, crowding the railway stations.[183] The fuel shortage, the economic crisis and the impossibility of repairing the cars caused these transports to collapse.[184] The first to do so were those peasants who had arrived to the cities a few years ago or those who still had close ties with their native villages. For their part, the villagers received migrants with kinship ties or who knew some trade (carpenters or blacksmiths), but not the rest.[185] Many were workers whose factories had closed,[186] others only migrated to exchange manufactured objects for food and return to the cities, they went in armed brigades on stolen trains, becoming uncontrollable for the Bolshevik authorities.[185] In addition, many railway officials were very corrupt; trains leaving the farms laden with food were looted by hungry crowds until they were emptied before reaching the cities.[184] This only contributed to throwing transport into chaos and paralyzing industry,[187] with the majority of workers spending most of their time making their own products and then going to exchange them for food on long trips.[188]
Thus, in 1920 most of rural Russia was in the power of rebellious peasant smallholders, while the Bolshevik authorities only controlled the cities with
In the end, this was the cause of the abandonment of war communism and the adoption of the New Economic Policy (NEP): "Having defeated the Whites, who were backed by no less than eight Western powers, the Bolsheviks surrendered to the peasantry.”[194] War communism had brought massive desertions and the blocking of supplies by the peasantry,[83] and it was clear that "the national question was also ipso facto the peasant question",[195] after all, 85% of Russians lived in rural areas.[96] This change was nothing more than a "temporary deviation" in everyone's mind, possibly more than a decade in Lenin's mind, and for the sole purpose of rebuilding Russia.[193] The market would always be regulated and would be gradually socialized by the State.[193]
The Bolsheviks searched for a way to end popular support for the Greens. Salt and manufactured goods were offered to villages that passed a resolution declaring the rebels "bandits," knowing that the latter would attack them in retaliation.[117] The guerrillas themselves helped them in their work. Many criminals joined them and dedicated themselves to looting and raping, earning the hatred of the people.[72]
At the end of the war, the large urban populations were disintegrated and the industry had almost disappeared, only the small rural owners remained.
Famine
The year 1921 in the Russian countryside was characterized by droughts, extreme frosts, and strong spring winds that ripped off the topsoil and ruined fledgling crops. To make matters worse, plagues of locusts and mice followed and the harvest of the previous season had been terrible, so much so that they knew that if they delivered everything the prodotriady demanded they knew that they would starve, being forced to rebel.[197] However, war communism had its part in the disaster. Faced with requisitions, the peasants preferred to cultivate less land, just enough to survive.[198] Faced with the almost non-existence of surpluses, the Bolsheviks began to take away their vital reserves, arguing that they had more hidden.[199] They were accustomed to poor harvests and they overcame them by keeping communal reserves, but to avoid requisitions they reduced their production to mere survival, leaving them extremely vulnerable to bad weather conditions.[200] Thus, the regions most affected by the famine of 1921-1922 had suffered the most from the requisitions of 1918–1921.[201] The regions most disputed in the war, with constant changes of the front, were even more ruined.[51]
Hunger made them eat grass, weeds, leaves, moss, tree bark, roof coverings, and flour made from acorns, sawdust, mud, and horse dung. They devoured their livestock, and hunted dogs, cats, and rodents.
Out of shame, the Bolshevik government did not recognize the famine until July 1921.
In the summer of 1922 the ARA fed eleven million people a day and brought medicines, clothes, tools and seeds that were essential to achieve two large harvests of 1922 and 1923, bringing Russia out of the famine.[207] In contrast, the corrupt and inefficient central commission created by Lenin helped less than three million.[208] The gratitude of the Bolshevik government was translated into accusations to the ARA of attempting to discredit, spy on and shoot them down, interfering in their operations, searching their convoys, stopping their trains, stealing supplies and arresting members of assistance teams.[206] However, the US aid was not canceled until it was made public that in full famine the communist government continued to export millions of tons of its own cereals abroad, excusing itself from buying industrial and agricultural equipment. The ARA ended its operations in June 1923.[209] The Bolsheviks alone wrote a short formal note of thanks, Gorki was much more grateful in a long letter to Hoover.[210]
Despite the efforts, some five million people died. The famine marked the end of the revolution.[211]
Collectivization and restart of conflict
Unable to rule the countryside peacefully or to produce manufactured goods to trade with, the Bolsheviks resorted to terrorizing it and forcibly taking the fruits of their labor. This started a "hidden civil war" between the peasantry and the nascent Bolshevik state,
On March 10, 1923, Lenin suffered his third stroke. From then on, and especially after his death on the following January 24, the struggle to succeed him as unquestionable
The first Soviet ethnographers who visited the villages around Moscow felt that they were going to the
At the end of the decade the Bolsheviks tried to centralize power. They resorted to reducing the number of rural Soviets, but this left many villages without any authority in 1929,[214] making it impossible to collect taxes or enforce laws.[222] The small rural owners had been decisively strengthened by the revolution and as a consequence of the civil war, most of the villages were ruled by their own community. The state only reached the cities with volost.[223] Stalin realized that the longer the NPE lasted, the greater the distance grew between the regime's plans and its impotence before the peasantry, until they could do nothing against the "kulak," that is, small and medium-sized owners. It was better to go ahead and restart the civil war with an advantage.[224] Only in 1927, after banishing, displacing or eliminating his main opponents and remaining safe as boss,[225] did Stalin put an end to the "peasant utopia" based on the "eserovschina" or "revolutionary socialist mentality".[226] That year, greater state intervention on agricultural production began with a strong political repression, despite the fear of some leaders of a new war. This brought down production, causing a "harvest crisis", which served as a pretext for Stalin to initiate collectivization.[227]
There was no resistance from the peasantry until the confrontations against Stalinist collectivization, the expropriation of cattle and church closings. This hit particularly hard in 1930, with two and a half million villagers taking part in 14,000 revolts, riots and mass demonstrations that year. These mainly affect Chernozem, the North Caucasus and Western Ukraine (especially border areas with Poland and Romania), regions that came to be outside government control.[228] About five million fled from the Kolkhoz in the aforementioned regions and Kazakhstan.[229] But this new movement could not federate or organize like the previous one, they had no capable leaders or political cadres (decimated during the civil war), had to fight with pitchforks and axes (firearms were progressively requisitioned during the 1920s) and the regime reacted too quickly.[230]
See also
- Basmachi movement
- Black Guards
- Revolutionary Insurgent Army of Ukraine
- Kronstadt rebellion
- Left SR uprising
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- ^ Figes 1996, p. 728; Werth 1999, p. 101.
- ^ Werth 1999, p. 96.
- ^ Figes 1996, p. 702.
- ^ Werth 1999, p. 104.
- ^ Figes 1996, p. 689.
- ^ Figes 1996, p. 694.
- ^ Arshinov 1974, p. 108.
- ^ Figes 1996, p. 755.
- ^ a b Radkey 1976, pp. 49–59.
- ^ Brovkin 2015, pp. 319–321.
- ^ Figes 1996, pp. 841, 843.
- ^ a b Mawdsley 2007, p. 287.
- ^ Figes 1996, p. 656.
- ^ Mawdsley 2007, p. 285.
- ^ Figes 1996, p. 849; Mawdsley 2007, p. 287.
- ^ Figes 1996, p. 851.
- ^ Figes 1996, p. 661.
- ^ Figes 1996, p. 667.
- ^ a b Figes 1996, p. 666.
- ^ a b Figes 1996, p. 669.
- ^ Figes 1996, p. 668.
- ^ Figes 1996, pp. 669–670.
- ^ Figes 1996, p. 670.
- ^ Figes 1996, pp. 819, 861.
- ^ Figes 1996, pp. 819, 824.
- ^ a b Figes 1996, p. 825.
- ^ Figes 1996, p. 829.
- ^ a b c Figes 1996, p. 837.
- ^ Figes 1996, pp. 824–825.
- ^ a b Kotkin 2014, p. 344.
- ^ a b Figes 1996, p. 858.
- ^ Figes 1996, pp. 818, 820, 843–844.
- ^ Werth 1999, p. 167.
- ^ Figes 1996, pp. 818, 844.
- ^ a b c Figes 1996, p. 844.
- ^ Figes 1996, p. 818.
- ^ Figes 1996, pp. 845–846.
- ^ a b Figes 1996, p. 846.
- ^ Figes 1996, p. 845.
- ^ Figes 1996, p. 847.
- ^ a b Figes 1996, p. 848.
- ^ Figes 1996, p. 848; Werth 1999, p. 146.
- ^ Werth 1999, p. 146.
- ^ Figes 1996, pp. 848–849.
- ^ Figes 1996, p. 849.
- ^ Figes 1996, p. 843; Mawdsley 2007, p. 287; Werth 1999, p. 146.
- ^ Figes 1996, pp. 793, 861; Werth 1999, p. 72.
- ^ Werth 1999, p. 84.
- ^ a b Figes 1996, p. 861.
- ^ a b Werth 1999, p. 155.
- ^ Werth 1999, p. 156.
- ^ Werth 1999, p. 162.
- ^ Figes 1996, p. 857.
- ^ Figes 1996, p. 660.
- ^ a b c Figes 1996, p. 859.
- ^ Figes 1996, p. 860.
- ^ Figes 1996, pp. 861–862.
- ^ Figes 1996, pp. 857–858, 861.
- ^ Figes 1996, p. 862.
- ^ Werth 1999, p. 165.
- ^ Figes 1996, p. 837; Werth 1999, p. 155.
- ^ Werth 1999, p. 166.
- ^ Werth 1999, pp. 174–175.
- ^ Werth 1999, p. 174.
- ^ Werth 1999, p. 175.
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External links
- "Socialist-Revolutionary Party appeal to the Bolshevik government, July 1919". University of East Anglia. Archived from the original on 2007-10-26. Retrieved 2008-06-10.
- British Military Operations 1919-1939 by Brian Watson. Retrieved on 10 June 2008.
- Greens (ЗЕЛЁНЫЕ). Great Soviet Encyclopedia.