HMS Lion (1910)
 Lion underway
| |
| History | |
|---|---|
 United Kingdom | |
| Name | Lion |
| Namesake | Lion |
| Ordered | 1909–1910 Building Programme |
| Builder | HM Dockyard, Devonport |
| Laid down | 29 November 1909 |
| Launched | 6 August 1910 |
| Commissioned | 4 June 1912 |
| Decommissioned | 30 May 1922 |
| Fate | Sold for scrap, 31 January 1924 |
| General characteristics (as built) | |
| Class and type | Lion-class battlecruiser |
| Displacement | |
| Length | 700 ft (213.4 m) |
| Beam | 88 ft 7 in (27 m) |
| Draught | 32 ft 5 in (9.9 m) at deep load |
| Installed power |
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| Propulsion | 4 × shafts; 2 × steam turbine sets |
| Speed | 28 knots (52 km/h; 32 mph) |
| Range | 5,610 nmi (10,390 km; 6,460 mi) at 10 knots (19 km/h; 12 mph) |
| Complement | 1,092 |
| Armament |
|
| Armour |
|
HMS Lion was a battlecruiser built for the Royal Navy in the 1910s. She was the lead ship of her class, which were nicknamed the "Splendid Cats".[1] They were significant improvements over their predecessors of the Indefatigable class in terms of speed, armament and armour. This was in response to the first German battlecruisers, the Moltke class, which were very much larger and more powerful than the first British battlecruisers, the Invincible class.
Lion served as the
Design
The Lion-class battlecruisers were designed to be as superior to the new German battlecruisers of the Moltke class as the German ships were to the Invincible class. The increase in speed, armour and gun size forced a 65 per cent increase in size over the Indefatigable class.
Propulsion
Lion had two paired sets of
Armament
Lion mounted eight
She was built without
Armour
The armour protection given to the Lions was heavier than that of the Indefatigables; their waterline belt of
Wartime modifications
Lion received a fire-control director between mid-1915 and May 1916 that centralised the pointing and firing of the guns under the command of the director positioned on the foremast. The turret crewmen merely had to follow pointers controlled by the director to align their guns on the target. This greatly increased accuracy as it was easier to spot the fall of shells and eliminated the problem of the ship's roll dispersing the shells as each turret fired individually.[10]
By early 1918 Lion carried a Sopwith Pup and a Sopwith 1½ Strutter on flying-off platforms fitted on top of 'Q' and 'X' turrets. Each platform had a canvas hangar to protect the aircraft during inclement weather.[11]
Construction and career
Lion was
World War I
Battle of Heligoland Bight
Lion's first action was as flagship of the battlecruiser force under the command of Admiral Beatty during the
Raid on Scarborough
The German Navy had decided on a strategy of bombarding British towns on the North Sea coast to draw out the
Admiral Hipper set sail on 15 December 1914 for another such raid and successfully bombarded several English towns, but British destroyers escorting the 1st BCS had already encountered German destroyers of the High Seas Fleet at 05:15 and fought an inconclusive action with them. Warrender had received a signal at 05:40 that the destroyer Lynx was engaging enemy destroyers although Beatty had not. The destroyer Shark spotted the German armoured cruiser Roon and her escorts at about 07:00, but could not transmit the message until 07:25. Admiral Warrender received the signal, as did the battlecruiser New Zealand, but Beatty did not, despite the fact that New Zealand had been specifically tasked to relay messages between the destroyers and Beatty. Warrender attempted to pass on Shark's message to Beatty at 07:36, but did not manage to make contact until 07:55. Beatty reversed course when he got the message and dispatched New Zealand to search for Roon. She was being overhauled by New Zealand when Beatty received messages that Scarborough was being shelled at 09:00. Beatty ordered New Zealand to rejoin the squadron and turned west for Scarborough.[17]
The British forces split going around the shallow Southwest Patch of the Dogger Bank; Beatty's ships passed to the north while Warrender passed to the south as they headed west to block the main route through the minefields defending the English coast. This left a 15-nautical-mile (28 km) gap between them through which the German light forces began to move. At 12:25, the light cruisers of the II Scouting Group began to pass the British forces searching for Hipper. The light cruiser Southampton spotted the light cruiser Stralsund and signalled a report to Beatty. At 12:30 Beatty turned his battlecruisers towards the German ships. Beatty presumed that the German cruisers were the advance screen for Hipper's ships, however, those were some 50 km (31 mi) behind. The 2nd Light Cruiser Squadron, which had been screening for Beatty's ships, detached to pursue the German cruisers, but a misinterpreted signal from the British battlecruisers sent them back to their screening positions.[Note 2] This confusion allowed the German light cruisers to escape, and alerted Hipper to the location of the British battlecruisers. The German battlecruisers wheeled to the northeast of the British forces and made good their escape.[18]
Battle of Dogger Bank
On 23 January 1915, a force of German battlecruisers under the command of Admiral Franz von Hipper sortied to clear the Dogger Bank of any British fishing boats or small craft that might be there to collect intelligence on German movements. However, the British were reading their coded messages and sailed to intercept them with a larger force of British battlecruisers under the command of Admiral Beatty. Contact was initiated at 07:20 on the 24th when the British light cruiser Arethusa spotted the German light cruiser SMS Kolberg. By 07:35 the Germans had spotted Beatty's force and Hipper ordered a turn to the south at 20 knots (37 km/h; 23 mph), believing that this would suffice if the ships that he saw to his north-west were British battleships and that he could always increase speed to Blücher's maximum speed of 23 knots (43 km/h; 26 mph) if they were British battlecruisers.[19]
Beatty ordered his battlecruisers to make all practicable speed to catch the Germans before they could escape. The leading ships, Lion, her sister
In the meantime Blücher had been heavily damaged by fire from all the other battlecruisers; her speed had dropped to 17 knots (31 km/h; 20 mph) and her steering gear had been jammed. Beatty ordered Indomitable to attack her at 10:48. Six minutes later Beatty spotted what he thought was a submarine periscope on the starboard bow and ordered an immediate 90° turn to port to avoid the submarine, although he failed to hoist the 'Submarine Warning' flag because most of Lion's signal halyards had been shot away. Almost immediately afterwards Lion lost her remaining dynamo to the rising water which knocked out all remaining light and power. He ordered 'Course Northeast' at 11:02 to bring his ships back to their pursuit of Hipper. He also hoisted 'Attack the rear of the enemy' on the other halyard although there was no connection between the two signals. This caused Rear-Admiral Sir Gordon Moore, temporarily commanding in New Zealand, to think that the signals meant to attack Blücher, which was about 8,000 yards (7,300 m) to the northeast, so they turned away from the pursuit of Hipper's main body and engaged Blücher. Beatty tried to correct the mistake, but he was so far behind the leading battlecruisers that his signals could not be read amidst the smoke and haze.[25]
Lion's starboard engine was temporarily shut down due to contaminated feed water, but it was restarted and Lion headed home at 10 knots (19 km/h; 12 mph) when the rest of the battlecruisers caught up with her around 12:45. At 14:30 the starboard engine began to fail and her speed was reduced to 8 knots (15 km/h; 9.2 mph). Indomitable was ordered to tow Lion back to port at 15:00, but it took two hours and two tries before she could start to tow Lion, and a further day-and-a-half to reach port at speeds of 7–10 knots (13–19 km/h; 8.1–11.5 mph), even after Lion's starboard engine was temporarily repaired.[26]
Lion was temporarily repaired at Rosyth with timber and concrete before sailing to Newcastle upon Tyne to be repaired by Palmers; the Admiralty did not wish it known that she was damaged badly enough to require repair at either Portsmouth or Devonport Dockyards lest that be seen as a sign of defeat. She was heeled 8° to starboard with four cofferdams in place between 9 February and 28 March to repair about 1,500 square feet (140 m2) of bottom plating and replace five armour plates and their supporting structure.[24] She rejoined the Battlecruiser Fleet, again as Beatty's flagship, on 7 April.[27] She had fired 243 rounds from her main guns, but had only made four hits: one each on Blücher and Derfflinger, and two on Seydlitz. In return she had been hit by the Germans sixteen times, but only suffered one man killed and twenty wounded.[22]
Battle of Jutland
On 31 May 1916 Lion was the flagship of Admiral Beatty's Battlecruiser Fleet which had put to sea to intercept a sortie by the High Seas Fleet into the North Sea. The British were able to decode the German radio messages and left their bases before the Germans put to sea. Hipper's battlecruisers spotted the Battlecruiser Fleet to their west at 15:20, but Beatty's ships did not spot the Germans to their east until ten minutes later. Almost immediately afterwards, at 15:32, he ordered a course change to east-south-east to position himself astride the Germans' line of retreat and called his ships' crews to action stations. Hipper ordered his ships to turn to starboard, away from the British, to assume a south-easterly course, and reduced speed to 18 knots (33 km/h; 21 mph) to allow three light cruisers of the 2nd Scouting Group to catch up. With this turn Hipper was falling back on the High Seas Fleet, then about 60 miles (97 km) behind him. Around this time Beatty altered course to the east as it was quickly apparent that he was still too far north to cut off Hipper.[28]
This began what was to be called the 'Run to the South' as Beatty changed course to steer east-south-east at 15:45, paralleling Hipper's course, now that the range closed to under 18,000 yards (16,000 m). The Germans opened fire first at 15:48, followed almost immediately afterwards by the British. The British ships were still in the process of making their turn as only the two leading ships, Lion and
At 16:11 Lion observed the track of a
Lion was hit twice more, during what came to be called the 'Run to the North', after the German battlecruisers made their own turn north.[36] Beatty's ships maintained full speed to try to put some separation between them and the High Seas Fleet and gradually moved out of range. They turned north and then northeast to try to rendezvous with the main body of the Grand Fleet. At 17:40 they opened fire again on the German battlecruisers. The setting sun blinded the German gunners, and they could not make out the British ships and turned away to the northeast at 17:47.[37] Beatty gradually turned more towards the east to allow him to cover the deployment of the Grand Fleet into its battle formation and to move ahead of it, but he mistimed his manoeuvre and forced the leading division to fall off towards the east, further away from the Germans. By 18:35 Beatty was following the 3rd BCS as they were steering east-south-east, leading the Grand Fleet, and continuing to engage Hipper's battlecruisers to their southwest. A few minutes earlier Scheer had ordered a simultaneous 180° starboard turn, and Beatty lost sight of them in the haze.[38] At 18:44 Beatty turned his ships southeast and to the south-south-east four minutes later searching for Hipper's ships. Beatty took this opportunity to recall the two surviving ships of the 3rd BCS to take position astern of New Zealand and then slowed down to eighteen knots and altered course to the south to prevent himself from getting separated from the Grand Fleet. At this moment Lion's gyrocompass failed, and she made a complete circle before her steering was brought under control again.[39] At 18:55 Scheer ordered another 180° turn, which put them on a converging course again with the Grand Fleet, which had altered course itself to the south. This allowed the Grand Fleet to cross Scheer's T, and they badly damaged his leading ships. Scheer ordered yet another 180° turn at 19:13 in an attempt to extricate the High Seas Fleet from the trap into which he had sent them.[40]
This manoeuvre was successful, and the British lost sight of the Germans until 20:05, when the light cruiser Castor spotted smoke bearing west-north-west. Ten minutes later she had closed the range enough to identify German torpedo boats and had engaged them. Beatty turned west upon hearing the sounds of gunfire and spotted the German battlecruisers only 8,500 yards (7,800 m) away. Inflexible opened fire at 20:20, followed almost immediately by the rest of Beatty's battlecruisers.[41] Shortly after 20:30 the pre-dreadnought battleships of Rear Admiral Mauve's II Battle Squadron were spotted and fire switched to them. The Germans were able to fire only a few rounds at them because of the poor visibility and turned away to the west. The British battlecruisers hit the German ships several times before they blended into the haze around 20:40.[42] After this Beatty changed course to south-southeast and maintained that course, ahead of both the Grand Fleet and the High Seas Fleet, until 02:55 the next morning when the order was given to reverse course.[43]
Lion and the rest of the battlecruisers reached Rosyth on the morning of 2 June 1916[44] where she began repairs that lasted until 19 July. The remains of 'Q' turret were removed during this period and not replaced until later. She had been hit a total of fourteen times and suffered 99 dead and 51 wounded during the battle. She fired 326 rounds from her main guns, but can only be credited with four hits on Lützow and one on Derfflinger. She also fired seven torpedoes, four at the German battleships, two at Derfflinger and one at the light cruiser Wiesbaden without success.[45]
Post-Jutland career
She rejoined the Battlecruiser Fleet, again as Beatty's flagship, on 19 July 1916 without 'Q' turret, but then had the turret replaced during a visit to
Lion became the flagship of Vice-Admiral
Notes
- ^ The times used in this article are in UT, which is one hour behind the time zone now known as CET, which is often used in German works.
- ^ Beatty had intended on retaining only the two rearmost light cruisers from Goodenough's squadron; however, Nottingham's signalman misinterpreted the signal, thinking that it was intended for the whole squadron, and thus transmitted it to Goodenough, who ordered his ships back into their screening positions ahead of Beatty's battlecruisers.
- ^ While no sources explicitly state that Lion was part of the fleet at this time, of the seven Royal Navy battlecruisers then in commission, Indomitable was under refit through August and the only one unavailable for action. See Roberts, p. 122.
References
- ^ a b c d Preston, p. 29
- ^ a b Campbell, p. 29
- ^ Burt, pp. 172, 176
- ^ Roberts, pp. 43–44
- ^ Roberts, pp. 70–76, 80
- ^ a b c Roberts, p. 83
- ^ Burt, p. 179
- ^ Roberts, pp. 109, 112
- ^ Roberts, p. 113
- ^ Roberts, pp. 92–93
- ^ Roberts, p. 92
- ^ Roberts, p. 41
- ^ Burt, p. 180
- ^ "HMS Lion". MaritimeQuest. 22 February 2007. Retrieved 17 February 2010.
- ^ Massie, pp. 109–113
- ^ Massie, pp. 333–334
- ^ Massie, pp. 342–343
- ^ Tarrant, p. 34
- ^ Massie, pp. 376–384
- ^ Tarrant, pp. 35–36
- ^ Massie, p. 396
- ^ a b Campbell, pp. 29–30
- ^ a b Massie, p. 397
- ^ a b Campbell, p. 30
- ^ Massie, pp. 398–402
- ^ Massie, pp. 409–412
- ^ a b Roberts, p. 123
- ^ Tarrant, pp. 69, 71, 75
- ^ Tarrant, pp. 80–83
- ^ Massie, p. 592
- ^ Roberts, p. 116
- ^ "No. 29751". The London Gazette (Supplement). 15 September 1916. p. 9067.
- ^ Tarrant, p. 85
- ^ Tarrant, pp. 89–91
- ^ Massie, pp. 598–600
- ^ Massie, p. 601
- ^ Tarrant, p. 109
- ^ Tarrant, pp. 130–138
- ^ Tarrant, p. 145
- ^ Tarrant, pp. 149, 157
- ^ Tarrant, p. 175
- ^ Tarrant, pp. 177–178
- ^ Tarrant, pp. 178, 224
- ^ Massie, p. 657
- ^ Campbell, pp. 30, 32
- ^ Marder, III, pp. 287–296
- ^ Newbolt, pp. 169, 193
- ^ Massie, p. 748
- ^ Marder, V, p. 273
- ^ Burt, p. 183
Bibliography
- ISBN 1-55750-315-X.
- Burt, R. A. (2012). British Battleships of World War One (Revised ed.). Annapolis, Maryland: Naval Institute Press. ISBN 978-1-59114-053-5.
- Campbell, N. J. M. (1978). Battle Cruisers. Warship Special. Vol. 1. Greenwich: Conway Maritime Press. ISBN 0-85177-130-0.
- Marder, Arthur J. (1978). From the Dreadnought to Scapa Flow, The Royal Navy in the Fisher Era, 1904–1919. Vol. III: Jutland and After, May 1916 – December 1916 (Second ed.). London: Oxford University Press. ISBN 0-19-215841-4.
- Marder, Arthur J. (1970). From Dreadnought to Scapa Flow: The Royal Navy in the Fisher Era, 1904–1919. Vol. V: Victory and Aftermath (January 1918 – June 1919). London: Oxford University Press. ISBN 0-19-215187-8.
- ISBN 0-679-45671-6.
- ISBN 0-89839-255-1.
- ISBN 0-85177-245-5.
- Roberts, John (1997). Battlecruisers. Annapolis, Maryland: Naval Institute Press. ISBN 1-55750-068-1.
- Tarrant, V. E. (1999) [1995]. Jutland: The German Perspective: A New View of the Great Battle, 31 May 1916. London: Brockhampton Press. ISBN 1-86019-917-8.
External links
- Account of the battle of Jutland by Alexander Grant, a gunner aboard Lion
- Maritimequest HMS Lion Photo Gallery
- Battle of Jutland Crew Lists Project – HMS Lion Crew List