Habeas corpus in the United States
In
United States law affords persons the right to petition the
Federal habeas review did not extend to those in state custody until almost a century after the nation's founding.[
The right of habeas corpus is not a right against unlawful arrest, but rather a right to be released from imprisonment after such arrest. If one believes the arrest is without legal merit and subsequently refuses to come willingly, he still may be guilty of resisting arrest, which can sometimes be a crime in and of itself (even if the initial arrest itself was illegal) depending on the state.
Origin
Habeas corpus derives from the English common law where the first recorded usage was in 1305, in the reign of
Only the King had a right to summon a jury. Henry [II] accordingly did not grant it to private courts ... But all this was only a first step. Henry also had to provide means whereby the litigant, eager for royal justice, could remove his case out of the court of his lord into the court of the King. The device which Henry used was the royal writ ... and any man who could by some fiction fit his own case to the wording of one of the royal writs might claim the King's justice.
The writ of habeas corpus was issued by a superior court in the name of the Monarch, and commanded the addressee (a lower court, sheriff, or private subject) to produce the prisoner before the Royal courts of law. Petitions for habeas corpus could be made by the prisoner himself or by a third party on his behalf, and as a result of the Habeas Corpus Acts could be made regardless of whether the court was in session, by presenting the petition to a judge.
The 1679 Act remains important in 21st century cases. This Act and the historical body of British practice that relies upon it has been used to interpret the habeas rights granted by the United States Constitution, while taking into account the understanding of the writ held by the framers of the Constitution.
At the 1787 Constitutional Convention habeas corpus was first introduced with a series of propositions on August 20 by Charles Pinckney, a delegate from South Carolina.[1][2][3] Habeas corpus was discussed and voted on substantively on August 28, 1787,[4] where the first vote of the motion in favor of habeas corpus passed unanimously, and the second part passed by a vote of 7 to 3,[5][6] for making habeas corpus Constitutionally-recognized.
Federal law
The Suspension Clause of Article One does not expressly establish a right to the writ of habeas corpus; rather, it prevents Congress from restricting it. There has been much scholarly debate over whether the Clause positively establishes a right under the federal constitution, merely exists to prevent Congress from prohibiting state courts from granting the writ, or protects a pre-existing common law right enforceable by federal judges.
Regardless of whether the writ is positively guaranteed by the constitution, habeas corpus was first established by statute in the Judiciary Act of 1789. This statutory writ applied only to those who "are in custody, under or by colour of the authority of the United States, or are committed for trial before some court of the same, or are necessary to be brought into court to testify" and not to those held by state governments, which independently afford habeas corpus pursuant to their respective constitutions and laws. From 1789 until 1866, the federal writ of habeas corpus was largely restricted to prisoners in federal custody, at a time when no direct appeals from federal criminal convictions were provided for by law. Habeas corpus remained the only means for judicial review of federal capital convictions until 1889, and the only means for review of federal convictions for other "infamous crimes" until 1891.[10] The writ of habeas corpus remained the only way that decisions of military courts could be reviewed by the Supreme Court until the passage of the Military Justice Act of 1983, which extended it to the writ of certiorari.
The authority of federal courts to review the claims of prisoners in state custody was not clearly established until Congress adopted a statute (28 U.S.C. § 2254)
The U.S. Congress grants federal district courts, the Supreme Court, and all Article III federal judges, acting in their own right, jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 2241[13] to issue writs of habeas corpus to release prisoners held by any government entity within the country from custody, subject to certain limitations, if the prisoner –
- Is in custody under or by color of the authority of the United States or is committed for trial before some court thereof; or
- Is in custody for an act done or omitted in pursuance of an Act of Congress, or an order, process, judgment or decree court or judge of the United States; or
- Is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States; or
- Being a citizen of a foreign state and domiciled therein is in custody for an act done or omitted under any alleged right, title, authority, privilege, protection, or exemption claimed under the commission, order or sanction of any foreign state, or under color thereof, the validity and effect of which depend upon the law of nations; or
- It is necessary to bring said persons into court to testify or for trial.
In the 1950s and 1960s, decisions by the
The Civil Rights Act of 1968 at 25 U.S.C. § 1303 makes habeas corpus available in federal court to test the legality of detention by Native American tribes.
The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA) further limited the use of the federal writ by imposing a one-year statute of limitations and dramatically increasing the federal judiciary's deference to decisions previously made in state court proceedings either on appeal or in a state court habeas corpus action. One of AEDPA's most controversial changes is the requirement that any constitutional right invoked to vacate a state court conviction rooted in a mistake of law by the state court must have "resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States" (emphasis added). Thus, a U.S. Court of Appeals must ignore its own precedents and affirm a state court decision contrary to its precedents, if the U.S. Supreme Court has never squarely addressed a particular issue of federal law.[14]
Suspension during the Civil War
Presidential suspension of habeas corpus
On April 27, 1861, the right of habeas corpus was unilaterally suspended by
Lincoln's action was rapidly challenged in court and overturned by the U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals in Maryland (led by the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court,
When Congress convened in July 1861 it failed to support Lincoln's unilateral suspension of habeas corpus. A joint resolution was introduced into the Senate to approve of the president's suspension of the writ of habeas corpus, but filibustering by Senate Democrats, who did not support it, and opposition to its imprecise wording by Senator Lyman Trumbull prevented a vote on the resolution before the end of the first session, and the resolution was not taken up again.[23] Trumbull himself introduced a bill to suspend habeas corpus, but failed on getting a vote before the end of the first session.[24]
Shortly thereafter, on September 17, 1861, the day the Maryland legislature was to reconvene, Lincoln imprisoned pro-Confederate members of the Maryland General Assembly without charges or hearings in further defiance of the Chief Justice's ruling.[25] Thus, the legislative session had to be cancelled.[15]
On February 14, 1862, the war was firmly in progress and Lincoln ordered most prisoners released,[26] putting an end to court challenges for the time being. He again suspended habeas corpus on his own authority in September that same year, however, in response to resistance to his calling up of the militia.[27]
Congressional suspension of habeas corpus
When Congress met again in December 1862, the
General
In 1864,
In the Confederacy
In the Confederacy,
In various proclamations and orders beginning in 1862, Davis suspended the writ and declared martial law in parts of
Davis also suspended the writ in North Carolina (June 1862) and in Atlanta (in September 1862).[38] The Confederate Congress passed re-authorizing legislation twice more, in October 1862 and February 1864.[38] Davis suspended habeas corpus in Arkansas and the Indian Territory in January 1863.[40][42] Although Davis had initially been resistant to the idea, he suspended the writ after receiving a telegram from General Theophilus Holmes complaining that his region was filled with disloyal persons and deserters, and that he could not enforce conscription.[42]
At least 2,672 civilians were subject to military arrest in the Confederacy over the course of its history, although this is likely an undercount given the incompleteness of records.[41] Civil War historian Mark E. Neely Jr. suggests that "there seems to be no difference in the arrest rate in those periods when the Confederate Congress refuse to authorization suspension of the writ of habeas corpus and those periods was authorized. ... civilian prisoners trickled into Confederate military prisons whether the writ of habeas corpus was suspended or not."[41]
A final suspension act was proposed in February 1864, when Jefferson Davis requested the Congress to gain give him the authority to suspend the writ. On February 4, the House Judiciary Committee reported out a suspension bill which was passed the next day by a 58 to 20 majority. The Senate took it up on February 6, and passed it by 14 to 10 on February 11. Davis signed it on February 15. The more conservative Senate had made the bill much more limited than the previous acts. The act authorized the suspension of the writ for thirteen specific offenses, including treason, conspiracies to overthrow the government, assisting the enemy, encouraging servile insurrection, encouraging desertion, espionage, holding concourse with the enemy, trading with the enemy, conspiracy to liberate prisoners of war, conspiracy to aid the enemy, resisting or abandoning the Confederate States, burning bridges or destroying any lines of communication, and destroying any military property. Most significant was the language “Such suspension shall apply only to the cases of persons arrested or detained by Order of the President, Secretary of War, or the General Commanding the Trans-Mississippi Department.” The President was required to appoint officers to investigate the cases of all persons arrested in order for them to be released if improperly detained, unless they could be speedily tried “in the due course of law.” The act did not prevent a court from issuing a writ, but the officer holding the prisoner was not required to answer or deliver the prisoners to any court if he certified under oath that the prisoner was held under the authority of the suspension act. This language would become critical to its interpretation in the courts. The act took effect on its signing and expired automatically on August 1, 1864.
The last suspension lapsed on August 1, 1864, amid deep domestic opposition to the suspension, including from the
Suspension during Reconstruction
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Following the end of the Civil War, numerous groups arose in the South to oppose
Suspension in the Philippines
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In response to continuing unrest, the
(1906).Habeas corpus during World War II
Immediately following the
In 1942, eight German
The period of martial law in Hawaii ended in October 1944. It was held in Duncan v. Kahanamoku (1946)[48] that, although the initial imposition of martial law in December 1941 may have been lawful, due to the Pearl Harbor attack and threat of imminent invasion, by 1944 the imminent threat had receded and civilian courts could again function in Hawaii. The Organic Act therefore did not authorize the military to continue to keep civilian courts closed.
After the end of the war, several German prisoners held in American-occupied Germany petitioned the District Court for the District of Columbia for a writ of habeas corpus. In Johnson v. Eisentrager (1950),[49] the U.S. Supreme Court decided that the American court system had no jurisdiction over German war criminals who had been captured in Germany, and had never entered U.S. soil.
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act
In 1996, following the Oklahoma City bombing, Congress passed (91–8 in the Senate, 293–133 in the House) and President Clinton signed into law the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA). The AEDPA was intended to "deter terrorism, provide justice for victims, provide for an effective death penalty, and for other purposes." The AEDPA introduced one of the few limitations on habeas corpus. For the first time, its Section 101 set a statute of limitations of one year following conviction for prisoners to seek the writ. The Act limits the power of federal judges to grant relief unless the state court's adjudication of the claim has resulted in a decision that
- Is contrary to, or has involved an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or
- Has resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the state court proceeding.
It barred second or successive petitions generally but with several exceptions. Petitioners who had already filed a federal habeas petition were required first to secure authorization from the appropriate United States Court of Appeals, to ensure that such an exception was at least facially made out.
Habeas corpus in the 21st century
The November 23, 2001
In
(1) Except as provided in section 1005 of the
Detainee Treatment Act of 2005, no court, justice, or judge shall have jurisdiction to hear or consider an application for a writ of habeas corpus filed by or on behalf of an alien detained by the Department of Defense at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. (2)The jurisdiction of the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit on any claims with respect to an alien under this paragraph shall be limited to the consideration of whether the status determination ... was consistent with the standards and procedures specified by the Secretary of Defense for Combatant Status Review Tribunals (including the requirement that the conclusion of the Tribunal be supported by a preponderance of the evidence and allowing a rebuttable presumption in favor of the Government's evidence), and to the extent the Constitution and laws of the United States are applicable, whether the use of such standards and procedures to make the determination is consistent with the Constitution and laws of the United States.
On September 29, the
Except as provided in section 1005 of the Detainee Treatment Act of 2005, no court, justice, or judge shall have jurisdiction to hear or consider an application for a writ of habeas corpus filed by or on behalf of an alien detained by the United States who has been determined by the United States to have been properly detained as an enemy combatant or is awaiting such determination." §1005(e)(1), 119 Stat. 2742.
The Supreme Court ruled in Boumediene v. Bush that the MCA amounts to an unconstitutional encroachment on habeas corpus rights, and established jurisdiction for federal courts to hear petitions for habeas corpus from Guantanamo detainees tried under the Act.[55] Under the MCA, the law restricted habeas appeals for only those aliens detained as enemy combatants, or awaiting such determination. Left unchanged was the provision that, after such determination is made, it is subject to appeal in federal courts, including a review of whether the evidence warrants the determination. If the status was upheld, then their imprisonment was deemed lawful; if not, then the government could change the prisoner's status to something else, at which point the habeas restrictions no longer applied.
There is, however, no legal time limit which would force the government to provide a Combatant Status Review Tribunal hearing. Prisoners were, but are no longer, legally prohibited from petitioning any court for any reason before a CSRT hearing takes place.
In January 2007,
Applying Gonzales's reasoning, one could argue that the First Amendment doesn't explicitly say Americans have the right to worship as they choose, speak as they wish or assemble peacefully. Ironically, Gonzales may be wrong in another way about the lack of specificity in the Constitution's granting of habeas corpus rights. Many of the legal features attributed to habeas corpus are delineated in a positive way in the Sixth Amendment ...[57]
The Department of Justice in the George W. Bush administration took the position in litigation that the Military Commissions Act of 2006 does not amount to a suspension of the writ of habeas corpus. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit agreed in a 2-1 decision,[58] on February 20, 2007,[59] which the U.S. Supreme Court initially declined to review. The U.S. Supreme Court then reversed its decision to deny review and took up the case in June 2007. In June 2008, the court ruled 5-4 that the act did suspend habeas and found it unconstitutional.[60]
On June 11, 2007, a federal appeals court ruled that
The Habeas Corpus Restoration Act of 2007 failed to overcome a Republican filibuster in the United States Senate in September, 2007.
On October 7, 2008, U.S. District Judge
region, must be brought to appear in his court in Washington, DC, three days later: "Because the Constitution prohibits indefinite detentions without cause, the continued detention is unlawful."[62]On January 21, 2009, President Barack Obama issued an executive order regarding the Guantanamo Bay Naval Base and the individuals held there. This order stated that the detainees "have the constitutional privilege of the writ of habeas corpus."[63]
"When [U.S. citizens accused of supporting terrorism] say, 'I want my lawyer,' you tell them: 'Shut up. You don't get a lawyer. You are an enemy combatant, and we are going to talk to you about why you joined Al Qaeda.'"
– U.S. Senator Lindsey Graham, 2011, to the United States Senate[64]
Following the December 1, 2011, vote by the
On March 20, 2015, a
2020s
According to the
Differences in post-trial actions
Habeas corpus is an action often taken after sentencing by a defendant who seeks relief for some perceived error in his criminal trial. There are a number of such post-trial actions and proceedings, their differences being potentially confusing, thus bearing some explanation. Some of the most common are an appeal to which the defendant has as a right, a
An appeal to which the defendant has a right cannot be abridged by the court which is, by designation of its jurisdiction, obligated to hear the appeal. In such an appeal, the appellant feels that some error has been made in his trial, necessitating an appeal. A matter of importance is the basis on which such an appeal might be filed: generally appeals as a matter of right may only address issues which were originally raised in trial (as evidenced by documentation in the official record). Any issue not raised in the original trial may not be considered on appeal and will be considered waived via estoppel. A convenient test for whether a petition is likely to succeed on the grounds of error is confirming that
- a mistake was indeed made
- an objection to that mistake was presented by counsel and
- that mistake negatively affected the defendant's trial.
A writ of certiorari, otherwise known simply as cert, is an order by a higher court directing a lower court to send record of a case for review, and is the next logical step in post-trial procedure. While states may have similar processes, a writ of cert is usually only issued, in the United States, by the Supreme Court, although some states retain this procedure. Unlike the aforementioned appeal, a writ of cert is not a matter of right. A writ of cert will have to be petitioned for, the higher court issuing such writs on limited bases according to constraints such as time. In another sense, a writ of cert is like an appeal in its constraints; it too may only seek relief on grounds raised in the original trial.
A petition for a writ of error coram nobis or error coram vobis challenges a final judgment in a criminal proceeding. Use of this type of petition varies from jurisdiction to jurisdiction, but is usually limited to situations where it was not possible to raise this issue earlier on direct appeal. These petitions focus on issues outside the original premises of the trial, i.e., issues that require new evidence or those that could not otherwise be raised by direct appeal or writs of cert.[70] These often fall in two logical categories: (1) that the trial lawyer was ineffectual or incompetent or (2) that some constitutional right has been violated.
Federal habeas corpus statistics
Number of cases
In 2004, there were about 19,000 non-capital federal habeas corpus petitions filed and there were about 210 capital federal habeas corpus petitions filed in U.S. District Court. The vast majority of these were from state prisoners, not from those held in federal prisons. There are about 60 habeas corpus cases filed in the U.S. Supreme Court's original jurisdiction each year. The U.S. Courts of Appeal do not have original jurisdiction over habeas corpus petitions.
Types of cases in which petitions are filed
In 1992, less than 1% of federal habeas corpus petitions involved
Exhaustion of state-court remedies often takes five to ten years after a conviction, so only state prisoners facing longer prison sentences are able to avail themselves of federal habeas corpus rights without facing a summary dismissal for failure to exhaust state remedies. The lack of state remedies to exhaust also means that the timeline for federal death penalty habeas review is much shorter than the timeline for state death penalty habeas review (which can take decades).[citation needed]
In 2004, the percentage of federal habeas corpus petitions involving state death sentences was still about 1% of the total.
Success rates
About 63% of issues raised in habeas corpus petitions by state court prisoners are dismissed on procedural grounds at the U.S. District Court level, and about 35% of those issues are dismissed based on the allegations in the petition on the merits (on the merits has a different meaning than what it's used for here). About 2% are either "remanded" to a state court for further proceedings (which poses an interesting problem of federalism – the federal court usually issues a writ to the state prison to release the prisoner, but only if the state court does not hold a certain proceeding within a certain time), or, far less frequently, resolved favorably to the prisoner on the merits outright. About 57% of habeas corpus issues dismissed on procedural grounds in 1992 were dismissed for a failure to exhaust state remedies.
Success rates are not uniform, however. James Liebman, Professor of Law at Columbia Law School, stated in 1996 that his study found that when habeas corpus petitions in death penalty cases were traced from conviction to completion of the case that there was "a 40 percent success rate in all capital cases from 1978 to 1995."[71] Similarly, a study by Ronald Tabek in a law review article puts the success rate in habeas corpus cases involving death row inmates even higher, finding that between "1976 and 1991, approximately 47% of the habeas petitions filed by death row inmates were granted."[72] Most habeas corpus petitioners in death penalty cases are represented by attorneys, but most habeas corpus petitioners in non-death penalty cases represent themselves. This is because federal funds are not available to non-capital state habeas petitioners to pay for attorneys unless there is good cause, there being no federal right to counsel in such matters. However, in state capital cases, the federal government provides funding for the representation of all capital habeas petitioners.
Thus, about 20% of successful habeas corpus petitions involve death penalty cases.
These success rates predate major revisions in habeas corpus law that restricted the availability of federal habeas corpus relief when AEDPA was adopted in 1996, over a decade ago. Post-AEDPA, the great disparity in success rates remains, however, with the federal courts' overturning of state capital cases a major reason that many states have been unable to carry out a majority of capital sentences imposed and have long backlog lists.
Disposition time
The time required to adjudicate habeas corpus petitions varies greatly based upon factors including the number of issues raised, whether the adjudication is on procedural grounds or on the merits, and the nature of the claims raised.
In 1992, U.S. District Courts took an average of two and a half years to adjudicate habeas corpus petitions in death penalty cases raising multiple issues that were resolved on the merits, about half of that time-length for other multiple issue homicide cases, and about nine months in cases resolved on procedural grounds.
AEDPA was designed to reduce the disposition times of federal habeas corpus petitions. But AEDPA has little impact in non-capital cases, where a majority of cases are dismissed on procedural grounds, very few prisoners prevail and most prisoners are not represented by attorneys. The disposition time in capital cases has actually increased 250% from the time of AEDPA's passage to 2004.
Filing rates
In 1991, the average number of federal habeas corpus petitions filed in the United States was 14 per 1,000 people in state prison, but this ranged greatly from state to state from a low of 4 per 1,000 in Rhode Island to a high of 37 per 1,000 in Missouri.
The Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA) produced a brief surge in the number of habeas corpus filings by state prisoners, as deadlines imposed by the act encouraged prisoners to file sooner than they might have otherwise done so, but this had run its course by 2000, and by 2004, habeas corpus petition filing rates per 1,000 prisoners was similar to pre-AEDPA filing rates.
There was a temporary surge in habeas corpus petitions filed by federal prisoners in 2005 as a result of the Booker decision by the U.S. Supreme Court.[73]
References
- ^ Suspension of the Habeas Corpus., The New York Times, June 2, 1861
- ^ Madison Debates, August 20
- ^ Charles Pinckney National Historic Site, Historic Resource Study, p. 7
- ^ BACK TO BASICS:HABEAS CORPUS PROCEDURES AND LONG-TERM EXECUTIVE DETENTION, p. 21
- ^ "Avalon Project - Madison Debates - August 28".
- ^ The Constitutional History of the United States, Volume 1, by Francis Newton Thorpe
- ^ See Erwin Chemerinsky, Federal Jurisdiction, Section 15.2 (5th ed. 2007)
- ^ 533 U.S. 289 (2001)
- ^ 553 U.S. 723 (2008)
- ^ "FindLaw - Cases and Codes". findlaw.com.
- ^ 28 U.S.C. § 2254
- ^ 316 U.S. 101 (1942)
- ^ 28 U.S.C. § 2241
- ^ "Duhaime v. Ducharme". FindLaw.
- ^ a b "Teaching American History in Maryland – Documents for the Classroom: Arrest of the Maryland Legislature, 1861". Maryland State Archives. 2005. Archived from the original on January 11, 2008. Retrieved February 6, 2008.
- ISBN 0-684-82490-6p.354-355
- ^ Neely, p.7
- ^ George Clarke Sellery, Lincoln's suspension of habeas corpus as viewed by Congress (Ph.D. Dissertation, University of Wisconsin—Madison, 1907), 11–26.
- ^ a b "A time liberties weren't priority". tribunedigital-baltimoresun.
- ^ 17 F. Cas. 144 (C.C.D. Md. 1861)
- ^ Goodwin, p. 355
- ^ a b Howard, F. K. (Frank Key) (1863). Fourteen Months in American Bastiles. London: H.F. Mackintosh. Retrieved August 18, 2014.
- Congressional Globe, Thirty-Seventh Congress, First Session (1861), pp. 40–50, 64–71, 127, 137–144, 177, 180, 208, 217, 220, 234–235, 288–297, 332–336, 391–395, 451–454.
- Congressional Globe, Thirty-Seventh Congress, First Session (1861), pp. 336–343, 364, 372–382.
- ^ William C. Harris, Lincoln and the Border States: Preserving the Union (University Press of Kansas, 2011) p. 71
- ^ Amnesty to Political or State Prisoners
- ^ Proclamation 94.
- Congressional Globe, Thirty-Seventh Congress, Third Session (1862–63), pp. 14, 20–22.
- Congressional Globe, Thirty-Seventh Congress, Third Session (1862–63), pp. 529–554.
- Congressional Globe, Thirty-Seventh Congress, Third Session (1862–63), pp. 1354–1358, 1435–1438, 1459–1479, 1489–1494, 1532.
- ^ Pub. L. 37-81, 12 Stat. 755.
- ^ Proclamation 104.
- ^ Proclamation 148.
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- ^ 71 U.S. 2 (1866).
- ISBN 0-393-04758-Xp.441
- ^ a b Frank J. Williams, "The Great Writ, North and South", New York Times (November 14, 2013).
- ^ a b c d e f g h Amanda L. Tyler, Habeas Corpus in Wartime: From the Tower of London to Guantanamo Bay, p. 187–193.
- ^ Mark E. Neely Jr., Southern Rights: Political Prisoners and the Myth of Confederate Constitutionalism (University Press of Virginia, 1999), p. 151.
- ^ a b Ralph Young, Dissent: The History of an American Idea (New York University Press, 2018), p. 198.
- ^ a b c Barton A. Myers, Rebels Against the Confederacy (Cambridge University Press, 2014), p. 63.
- ^ a b Mark E. Neely Jr., Southern Rights: Political Prisoners and the Myth of Confederate Constitutionalism (University Press of Virginia, 1999), pp. 191–162.
- ^ Robinson, William M. Jr. (1941). Justice in Grey: A History of the Judicial System of the Confederate States of America. New York: Russell and Russell.
- ^ Proclamation 201
- ^ Fisher v. Baker, 203 U.S. 174, 179–81 (U.S. Supreme Court 1906)..
- ^ "Habeas Corpus Suspension". onecl., n1784.
- ^ 317 U.S. 1 (1942)
- ^ 327 U.S. 304 (1946)
- ^ 339 U.S. 763 (1950)
- ^ 542 U.S. 507 (2004)
- ^ 548 U.S. 557 (2006)
- ^ "Bill Text - 109th Congress (2005-2006) - THOMAS (Library of Congress)". loc.gov. October 17, 2006. Archived from the original on November 7, 2010. Retrieved January 4, 2007.
- ^ Klein, Rick (September 29, 2006). "Senate's passage of detainee bill gives Bush a win: Democrats say GOP capitulate". Boston Globe.
- ^ "Bill Summary & Status - 109th Congress (2005 - 2006) - S.AMDT.5087 - THOMAS (Library of Congress)". loc.gov. Archived from the original on December 9, 2010. Retrieved January 4, 2007.
- ^ "Supreme Court of the United States" (PDF). Archived from the original (PDF) on May 18, 2017. Retrieved June 27, 2017.
- ^ San Francisco Chronicle, Gonzales says the Constitution doesn't guarantee habeas corpus, January 24, 2007
- ^ "Gonzales Questions Habeas Corpus". baltimorechronicle.com.
- ^ "Object not found!" (PDF). uscourts.gov.
- ^ Al Odah v. United States, 476 F.3d 981 (D.C. Cir. 2007)
- ^ Greenhouse, Linda (June 13, 2008). "Justices, 5-4, Back Detainee Appeals for Guantánamo". The New York Times. Retrieved June 19, 2008.
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{{cite web}}
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- ACLUBlog of Rights.
- ^ Savage, Charlie (December 1, 2011). "Senate Declines to Clarify Rights of American Qaeda Suspects Arrested in U.S." The New York Times.
- ^ Grimm, David (April 20, 2015). "Updated: Judge's ruling grants legal right to research chimps". Retrieved April 22, 2015.
- ^ "Chemerinsky: Supreme Court imposes further restrictions on habeas corpus". ABA Journal.
- ^ "A Troubling Supreme Court Habeas Decision". Reason.
- ^ Smith, Kyle (December 29, 2015). "Habeas Corpus Petitions in California State Court". Archived from the original on March 20, 2016. Retrieved March 13, 2016.
- ^ "Habeas Corpus Studies". April 1, 1996 – via NYTimes.com.
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{{cite web}}
: Cite uses generic title (help)
Further reading
- Wert Justin J. Habeas Corpus in America: The Politics of Individual Rights (University Press of Kansas; 2011) 296 pages; how presidents, Congress, interest groups, legal scholars, and others have shaped it.
External links
Media related to Habeas corpus in the United States at Wikimedia Commons