Hafez al-Assad
Hafez al-Assad | |
---|---|
حافظ الأسد | |
18th President of Syria | |
In office 12 March 1971 – 10 June 2000 | |
Prime Minister | |
Regional Command of the Syrian Regional Branch | |
In office 27 March 1966 – 10 June 2000 | |
In office 5 September 1963 – 4 April 1965 | |
Personal details | |
Born | Arab Ba'ath Party (1946–1947)Ba'ath Party (1947–1966) | 6 October 1930
Spouse |
Black SeptemberYom Kippur War |
Hafez al-Assad
The new leadership appointed Hafez as the commander of the
When he came to power Hafez organised the state along sectarian lines. (Sunnis and non-Alawites became figure-heads of political institutions whilst the Alawites took control of the military, intelligence, bureaucracy and security apparatuses.) Ba'athist decision-making authority that had previously been collegial was reduced and given to the Syrian president. The Syrian government ceased to be a one-party system in the normal sense of the word and was turned into a one-party dictatorship with a strong presidency. To maintain this system, a cult of personality centred on Hafez and his family was created by the president and the Ba'ath party. The Assad family’s personality cult was integrated with the Ba’athist doctrine to shape the state's official ideology. Hafez ordered an intervention in Lebanon in 1976, which resulted in the Syrian occupation of Lebanon. During his rule Hafez crushed an Islamist uprising led by the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood rebels through a series of crackdowns culminating in the Hama massacre.
After consolidating his personal authority over the Syrian government Hafez began looking for a successor. His first choice was his brother
| ||
---|---|---|
Media gallery |
||
Early life
Family
Hafez was born on 6 October 1930 in
Education and early political career
Alawites initially opposed a united Syrian state (since they thought their status as a religious minority would endanger them),
Hafez proved an asset to the party, organizing Ba'ath student cells and carrying the party's message to the poor sections of Latakia and to Alawite villages.[9] He was opposed by the Muslim Brotherhood, which allied itself with wealthy and conservative Muslim families.[9] Hafez's high school accommodated students from rich and poor families,[9] and Hafez was joined by poor, anti-establishment Sunni Muslim youth from the Ba'ath Party in confrontations with students from wealthy Brotherhood families.[9] He made many Sunni friends, some of whom later became his political allies.[9] While still a teenager, Hafez became increasingly prominent in the party[14] as an organizer and recruiter, head of his school's student-affairs committee from 1949 to 1951 and president of the Union of Syrian Students.[9] During his political activism in school, he met many men who would later serve him when he became president.[14]
Air Force career: 1950–1958
After graduating from high school, Hafez aspired to be a medical doctor, but his father could not pay for his study at the Jesuit
In 1955, the military split in a revolt against President Adib Shishakli.[20] Hashim al-Atassi, head of the National Bloc and briefly president after Sami al-Hinnawi's coup, returned as president and Syria was again under civilian rule.[20] After 1955, Atassi's hold on the country was increasingly shaky.[20] As a result of the 1955 election, Atassi was replaced by Shukri al-Quwatli, who was president before Syria's independence from France.[20] The Ba'ath Party grew closer to the Communist Party not because of shared ideology, but a shared opposition to the West.[20] At the academy, Hafez met Mustafa Tlass, his future minister of Defence.[21] In 1955, Hafez was sent to Egypt for a further six months of training.[22] When Gamal Abdel Nasser nationalised the Suez Canal in 1956, Syria feared retaliation from the United Kingdom, and Assad flew in an air-defense mission.[23] He was among the Syrian pilots who flew to Cairo to show Syria's commitment to Egypt.[22] After finishing a course in Egypt the following year, Assad returned to a small airbase near Damascus.[22] During the Suez Crisis, he also flew a reconnaissance mission over northern and eastern Syria.[22] In 1957, as squadron commander, Assad was sent to the Soviet Union for training in flying MiG-17s.[15] He spent ten months in the Soviet Union, during which he fathered a daughter (who died as an infant while he was abroad) with his wife.[19]
In 1958, Syria and Egypt formed the United Arab Republic (UAR), separating themselves from Iraq, Iran, Pakistan, and Turkey (who were aligned with the United Kingdom).[24] This pact led to the rejection of Communist influence in favour of Egyptian control over Syria.[24] All Syrian political parties (including the Ba'ath Party) were dissolved, and senior officers—especially those who supported the Communists—were dismissed from the Syrian armed forces.[24] Assad, however, remained in the army and rose quickly through the ranks.[24] After reaching the rank of captain, he was transferred to Egypt, continuing his military education with the future president of Egypt, Hosni Mubarak.[15]
Runup to 1963 coup: 1958–1963
Hafez was not content with a professional military career, regarding it as a gateway to politics.[25] After the creation of the UAR, Ba'ath Party leader Michel Aflaq was forced by Nasser to dissolve the party.[25] During the UAR's existence, the Ba'ath Party experienced a crisis[26] for which several of its members—mostly young—blamed Aflaq.[27] To resurrect the Syrian Regional Branch of the party, Muhammad Umran, Salah Jadid, Hafez and others established the Military Committee.[27] In 1957–58 Hafez rose to a dominant position in the Military Committee, which mitigated his transfer to Egypt.[15] After Syria left the UAR in September 1961, Assad and other Ba'athist officers were removed from the military by the new government in Damascus, and he was given a minor clerical position at the Ministry of Transport.[15]
Assad played a minor role in the
Early Ba'ath Party rule: 1963–1970
Aflaqite leadership: 1963–1966
Military work
Not long after Hafiz's election to the Regional Command, the Military Committee ordered him to strengthen the committee's position in the military establishment.[34] Hafiz may have received the most important job of all, since his primary goal was to end factionalism in the Syrian military and make it a Ba'ath monopoly;[34] as he said, he had to create an "ideological army".[34] To help with this task, Hafiz recruited Zaki al-Arsuzi, who indirectly (through Wahib al-Ghanim) inspired him to join the Ba'ath Party when he was young.[34] Arsuzi accompanied Hafiz on tours of military camps, where Arsuzi lectured the soldiers on Ba'athist thought.[34] In gratitude for his work, Hafiz gave Arsuzi a government pension.[34] Hafiz continued his Ba'athification of the military by appointing loyal officers to key positions and ensuring that the "political education of the troops was not neglected".[35] He demonstrated his skill as a patient planner during this period.[35] As Patrick Seale wrote, Hafiz's mastery of detail "suggested the mind of an intelligence officer".[35]
Hafiz was in charge of the Syrian Air Force.[31] By the end of 1964 he was named commander of the Air Force, with the rank of major general.[31] Hafiz gave privileges to Air Force officers, appointed his confidants to senior and sensitive positions and established an efficient intelligence network.[36] Air Force Intelligence, under the command of Muhammad al-Khuli, became independent of Syria's other intelligence organizations and received assignments beyond Air Force jurisdiction.[36] Assad prepared himself for an active role in the power struggles that lay ahead.[36]
Power struggle and 1966 coup
In the aftermath of the 1963 coup, at the First Regional Congress (held 5 September 1963) Hafiz was elected to the
During the 1964 Hama riot, Hafiz voted to suppress the uprising violently if needed.[39] The decision to suppress the Hama riot led to a schism in the Military Committee between Umran and Jadid.[40] Umran opposed force, instead wanting the Ba'ath Party to create a coalition with other pan-Arab forces.[40] Jadid desired a strong one-party state, similar to those in the communist countries of Europe.[40] Hafiz, as a junior partner, kept quiet at first but eventually allied himself with Jadid.[40] Why Hafiz chose to side with him has been widely discussed; he probably shared Jadid's radical ideological outlook.[41] Having lost his footing on the Military Committee, Umran aligned himself with Aflaq and the National Command; he told them that the Military Committee was planning to seize power in the party by ousting them.[41] Because of Umran's defection, Rifaat al-Assad (Hafiz's brother) succeeded Umran as commander of a secret military force tasked with protecting Military Committee loyalists.[41]
In its bid to seize power the Military Committee allied themselves with the regionalists, a group of cells in the Syrian Regional Branch that refused to disband in 1958 when ordered to do so.
In the
Jadid as strongman: 1966–1970
Beginning
After the coup, Hafiz was appointed Minister of Defense.
During the failed coup d'état of late 1966, Salim Hatum tried to overthrow Jadid's government.[51] Hatum (who felt snubbed when he was not appointed to the Regional Command after the February 1966 coup d'état) sought revenge and the return to power of Hammud al-Shufi, the first Regional Secretary of the Regional Command after the Syrian Regional Branch's re-establishment in 1963.[51] When Jadid, Atassi and Regional Command member Jamil Shayya visited Suwayda, forces loyal to Hatum surrounded the city and captured them.[52] In a twist of fate, the city's Druze elders forbade the murder of their guests and demanded that Hatum wait.[52] Jadid and the others were placed under house arrest, with Hatum planning to kill them at his first opportunity.[52] When word of the mutiny spread to the Ministry of Defense, Hafiz ordered the 70th Armored Brigade to the city.[52] By this time Hatum, a Druze, knew that Hafiz would order the bombardment of Suwayda (a Druze-dominated city) if Hatum did not accede to his demands.[52] Hatum and his supporters fled to Jordan, where they were given asylum.[53] How Hafiz learned about the conspiracy is unknown, but Mustafa al-Hajj Ali (head of military intelligence) may have telephoned the Ministry of Defense.[53] Due to his prompt action, Hafiz earned Jadid's gratitude.[53]
In the aftermath of the attempted coup Hafiz and Jadid purged the party's military organization, removing 89 officers; Hafiz removed an estimated 400 officers, Syria's largest military purge to date.[53] The purges, which began when the Ba'ath Party took power in 1963, had left the military weak.[53] As a result, when the Six-Day War broke out, Syria had no chance of victory.[53]
Seizing power
The Arab defeat in the
The war was a turning point for Hafiz (and Ba'athist Syria in general),[55] and his attempted ouster began a power struggle with Jadid for control of the country.[55] Until then Hafiz had not shown ambition for high office, arousing little suspicion in others.[55] From the 1963 Syrian coup d'état to the Six-Day War in 1967, Hafiz did not play a leading role in politics and was usually overshadowed by his contemporaries.[56] As Patrick Seale wrote, he was "apparently content to be a solid member of the team without the aspiration to become number one".[56] Although Jadid was slow to see Hafiz's threat, shortly after the war Hafiz began developing a network in the military and promoted friends and close relatives to high positions.[56]
Differences with Jadid
Hafiz believed that Syria's defeat in the Six-Day War was Jadid's fault, and the accusations against himself were unjust.
While Jadid and his supporters prioritised socialism and the "internal revolution", Hafiz wanted the leadership to focus on foreign policy and the containment of Israel.[57] The Ba'ath Party was divided over several issues, such as how the government could best use Syria's limited resources, the ideal relationship between the party and the people, the organization of the party and whether the class struggle should end.[57] These subjects were discussed heatedly in Ba'ath Party conclaves, and when they reached the Fourth Regional Congress the two sides were irreconcilable.[57]
Hafiz wanted to "democratize" the party by making it easier for people to join.[58] Jadid was wary of too large a membership, believing that the majority of those who joined were opportunists.[57] Hafiz, in an interview with Patrick Seale in the 1980s, stated that such a policy would make Party members believe they were a privileged class.[58] Another problem, Hafiz believed, was the lack of local-government institutions.[58] Under Jadid, there was no governmental level below the Council of Ministers (the Syrian government).[58] When the Ba'athist Iraqi Regional Branch (which continued to support the Aflaqite leadership) took control of Iraq in the 17 July Revolution, Hafiz was one of the few high-level politicians wishing to reconcile with them;[58] he called for the establishment of an "Eastern Front" with Iraq against Israel in 1968.[59] Jadid's foreign policy towards the Soviet Union was also criticised by Hafiz, who believed it had failed.[59] In many ways the relationship between the countries was poor, with the Soviets refusing to acknowledge Jadid's scientific socialism and Soviet newspapers calling him a "hothead".[60] Hafiz, on the contrary, called for greater pragmatism in decision-making.[60]
"Duality of power"
At a meeting someone raised the case of X. Should he not be brought back? Asad gave the questioner a hard look but said nothing. A little later the subject came up again and this time Asad said: I've heard something disagreeable about this officer. When he was on a course in England in 1954, his brother wrote asking for help for their sick mother. X took a £5 note out of his pocket, held it up and said he wouldn't part with it to save her life. Anyone who can't be loyal to his mother is not going to be loyal to the air force.
—General Fu'ad Kallas on the importance in which Assad laid on personal loyalty[61]
The conflict between Hafiz and Jadid became the talk of the army and the party, with a "duality of power" noted between them.
By the Fourth Regional Congress and Tenth National Congress in September and October 1968, Hafiz had extended his grip on the army, and Jadid still controlled the party.
While Hafiz had taken control of the armed forces through his position as Minister of Defense, Jadid still controlled the security and intelligence sectors through
From 25 to 28 February 1969, the Assad brothers initiated "something just short of a coup".[63] Under Assad's authority, tanks were moved into Damascus and the staffs of al-Ba'ath and al-Thawra (two-party newspapers) and radio stations in Damascus and Aleppo were replaced with Hafiz loyalists.[63] Latakia and Tartus, two Alawite-dominated cities, saw "fierce scuffles" ending with the overthrow of Jadid's supporters from local posts.[63] Shortly afterwards, a wave of arrests of Jundi loyalists began.[63] On 2 March, after a telephone argument with head of military intelligence Ali Duba, Jundi committed suicide.[63] When Zu'ayyin heard the news he wept, saying "we are all orphaned now" (referring to his and Jadid's loss of their protector).[64] Despite his rivalry with Jundi, Hafiz is said to have also wept when he heard the news.[63]
Hafiz was now in control, but he hesitated to push his advantage. Hafiz began planning to seize power shortly after the failed Syrian military intervention in the Black September, a power struggle between the PLO and the Hashemite monarchy.[66] While Hafiz had been in de facto command of Syrian politics since 1969, Jadid and his supporters still held the trappings of power.[66] After attending Nasser's funeral, Hafiz returned to Syria for the Emergency National Congress (held on 30 October).[66] At the congress Hafiz was condemned by Jadid and his supporters, the majority of the party's delegates.[66] However, before attending the congress Hafiz ordered his loyal troops to surround the building housing the meeting.[66] Criticism of Hafiz's political position continued in a defeatist tone, with the majority of delegates believing that they had lost the battle.[66] Hafiz and Tlass were stripped of their government posts at the congress; these acts had little practical significance.[66]
When the National Congress ended on 12 November 1970, Hafiz ordered loyalists to arrest leading members of Jadid's government. According to Patrick Seale, Hafiz's rule "began with an immediate and considerable advantage: the government he displaced was so detested that any alternative came as a relief".[68] He first tried to establish national unity, which he felt had been lost under the leadership of Aflaq and Jadid.[69] Hafiz differed from his predecessor at the outset, visiting local villages and hearing citizen complaints.[69] The Syrian people felt that Hafiz's rise to power would lead to change;[70] one of his first acts as ruler was to visit Sultan al-Atrash, father of the Aflaqite Ba'athist Mansur al-Atrash, to honor his efforts during the Great Arab Revolution.[69] He made overtures to the Writers' Union, rehabilitating those who had been forced underground, jailed or sent into exile for representing what radical Ba'athists called the reactionary classes:[69] "I am determined that you shall no longer feel strangers in your own country."[69] Although Hafiz did not democratize the country, he eased the government's repressive policies.[71]
He cut prices for basic foodstuffs 15 percent, which won him support from ordinary citizens.[71] Jadid's security services were purged, some military criminal investigative powers were transferred to the police, and the confiscation of goods under Jadid was reversed.[71] Restrictions on travel to and trade with Lebanon were eased, and Hafiz encouraged growth in the private sector.[71] While Hafiz supported most of Jadid's policies, he proved more pragmatic after he came to power.[71]
Most of Jadid's supporters faced a choice: continue working for the Ba'ath government under Hafiz, or face repression.[71] Hafiz made it clear from the beginning "that there would be no second chances".[71] However, later in 1970, he recruited support from the Ba'athist old guard who had supported Aflaq's leadership during the 1963–1966 power struggle.[71] An estimated 2,000 former Ba'athists rejoined the party after hearing Hafiz's appeal, among them party ideologist Georges Saddiqni and Shakir al-Fahham, a secretary of the founding, 1st National Congress of the Ba'ath Party in 1947.[71] Hafiz ensured that they would not defect to the pro-Aflaqite Ba'ath Party in Iraq with the Treason Trials in 1971, in which he prosecuted Aflaq, Amin al-Hafiz and nearly 100 followers (most in absentia).[72] The few who were convicted were not imprisoned long, and the trials were primarily symbolic.[72]
At the 11th National Congress Hafiz assured party members that his leadership was a radical change from that of Jadid, and he would implement a "corrective movement" to return Syria to the true "nationalist socialist line".[73] Unlike Jadid, Hafiz emphasised "the advancement of which all resources and manpower [would be] mobilised [was to be] the liberation of the occupied territories".[73] This would mark a major break with his predecessors and would, according to Raymond Hinnebusch, dictate "major alterations in the course of the Ba'thist state".[73]
Hafiz turned the presidency, which had been known simply as "head of state" under Jadid, into a position of power during his rule.[74] In many ways, the presidential authority replaced the Ba'ath Party's failed experiment with organised, military Leninism;[74] Syria became a hybrid of Leninism and Gaullist constitutionalism.[74] According to Raymond Hinnebusch, "as the president became the main source of initiative in the government, his personality, values, strengths, and weaknesses became decisive for its direction and stability. Arguably Hafiz's leadership gave the government an enhanced combination of consistency and flexibility which it hitherto lacked."[74]
Hafiz institutionalised a system where he had the final say, which weakened the powers of the collegial institutions of the state and party.[75] As fidelity to the leader replaced ideological conviction later in his presidency, corruption became widespread.[75] The state-sponsored cult of personality became pervasive; as Assad's authority strengthened at his colleagues' expense, he became the sole symbol of the government.[76][75]
While Assad did not rule alone, he increasingly had the last word; When Hafiz came to power, he increased Alawite dominance of the security and intelligence sectors to a near-monopoly. During the early years of his rule, some of Hafiz's elite had appeared non-sectarian;[83] prominent Sunni figures at the beginning of his rule were Abdul Halim Khaddam, Shihabi, Naji Jamil, Abdullah al-Ahmar and Mustafa Tlass.[83] However, none of these people had a power base distinct from that of Hafiz.[85] Although Sunnis held the positions of Air Force Commander from 1971 to 1994 (Jamil, Subhi Haddad and Ali Malahafji), General Intelligence head from 1970 to 2000 (Adnan Dabbagh, Ali al-Madani, Nazih Zuhayr, Fuad al-Absi and Bashir an-Najjar), Chief of Staff of the Syrian Army from 1974 to 1998 (Shihabi) and defense minister from 1972 until after Hafiz's death (Tlass), none had power separate from Hafiz or the Alawite-dominated security system.[85] When Jamil headed the Air Force, he could not issue orders without the knowledge of Khuli (the Alawite head of Air Force Intelligence).[85] After the failed Islamst uprising, Hafiz's reliance on his relatives intensified;[85] before that, his Sunni colleagues had some autonomy.[85] A defector from Assad's government said, "Tlass is in the army but at the same time seems as if he is not of the army; he neither binds nor loosens and has no role other than that of the tail in the beast."[86] Another example was Shihabi, who occasionally represented Assad.[86] However, he had no control in the Syrian military; Ali Aslan, First Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations during most of his tenure, was responsible for troop maneuvers.[86] Although the Sunnis were in the forefront, the Alawites had the power.[86]
Hafiz's pragmatic policies indirectly led to the establishment of a "new class", The Brotherhood had historically been a vehicle for moderate Islam during its introduction to the Syrian political scene during the 1960s under the leadership of 1970 coup d'état
Prime ministership and presidency: 1970–2000
Domestic events and policies
Consolidating power
Institutionalization
Sectarianism
Islamist uprising
Background
Events
The Islamist uprising began in the mid-to-late 1970s, with attacks on prominent members of the Ba'ath Alawite elite.[92] As the conflict worsened, a debate in the party between hard-liners (represented by Rifaat al-Assad) and Ba'ath liberals (represented by Mahmoud al-Ayyubi) began.[92] The Seventh Regional Congress, in 1980, was held in an atmosphere of crisis.[93] The party leadership—with the exception of Hafiz and his proteges—were criticised severely by party delegates, who called for an anti-corruption campaign, a new, clean government, curtailing the powers of the military-security apparatus and political liberalization.[93] With Hafiz's consent, a new government (headed by the presumably clean Abdul Rauf al-Kasm) was established with new, young technocrats.[93] The new government failed to assuage critics, and the Sunni middle class and the radical left (believing that Ba'athist rule could be overthrown with an uprising) began collaborating with the Islamists.[93]
Believing they had the upper hand in the conflict, beginning in 1980 the Islamists began a series of campaigns against government installations in Aleppo;[93] the attacks became urban guerrilla warfare.[93] The government began to lose control in the city and, inspired by events, similar disturbances spread to Hama, Homs, Idlib, Latakia, Deir ez-Zor, Maaret-en-Namen and Jisr esh-Shagour.[93] Those affected by Ba'athist repression began to rally behind the insurgents; Ba'ath Party co-founder Bitar supported the uprising, rallying the old, anti-military Ba'athists.[93] The increasing threat to the government's survival strengthened the hard-liners, who favored repression over concessions.[93] Security forces began to purge all state, party and social institutions in Syria, and were sent to the northern provinces to quell the uprising.[94] When this failed, the hard-liners began accusing the United States of fomenting the uprising and called for the reinstatement of "revolutionary vigilance".[94] The hard-liners won the debate after a failed attempt on Hafiz's life in June 1980,[94] and began responding to the uprising with state terrorism later that year.[94] Under Rifaat al-Assad Islamic prisoners at the Tadmur prison were massacred, membership in the Muslim Brotherhood became a capital offence and the government sent a death squad to kill Bitar and Attar's former wife.[94] The military court began condemning captured prisoners, which "sometimes degenerated into indiscriminate killings".[94] Little care was taken to distinguish Muslim Brotherhood hard-liners from their passive supporters,[94] and violence was met with violence.[94]
The final showdown, the Hama massacre. took place in February 1982[94] when the government crushed the uprising.[95] Helicopter gunships, bulldozers, and artillery bombardment razed the city, killing thousands of people.[95] The Ba'ath government withstood the uprising, not because of popular support, but because the opposition was disorganised and had little urban support.[95] Throughout the uprising, the Sunni middle class continued to support the Ba'ath Party because of its dislike of political Islam.[95] After the uprising the government resumed its version of militaristic Leninism, reverting the liberalization introduced when Hafiz came to power.[96] The Ba'ath Party was weakened by the uprising; democratic elections for delegates to the Regional and National Congresses were halted, and open discussion within the party ended.[96] The uprising made Syria more totalitarian than ever, and strengthened Hafiz's position as undisputed leader of Syria.[96]
1983–1984 succession crisis
In November 1983 Hafiz, a diabetic,[97] had a heart attack complicated by phlebitis; this triggered a succession crisis.[98] On 13 November, after visiting his brother in the hospital,[99] Rifaat al-Assad reportedly announced his candidacy for president; he did not believe Hafiz would be able to continue ruling the country.[98] When he did not receive support from Hafiz's inner circle, he made, in the words of historian Hanna Batatu, "abominably lavish" promises to win them over.[98]
Until his 1985 ouster, Rifaat al-Assad was considered the face of corruption by the Syrian people.[99] Although highly paid as Commander of Defense Companies, he accumulated unexplained wealth.[99] According to Batatu, "there is no way that he could have permissibly accumulated the vast sums needed for the investments he made in real estate in Syria, Europe and the United States".[99]
Although it is unclear if any top officials supported Rifaat al-Assad, most did not.[100] He lacked his brother's stature and charisma, and was vulnerable to charges of corruption.[100] His 50,000-strong Defense Companies were viewed with suspicion by the upper leadership and throughout society;[100] they were considered corrupt, poorly disciplined and indifferent to human suffering.[100] Rifaat al-Assad also lacked military support;[100] officers and soldiers resented the Defense Companies' monopoly of Damascus' security, their separate intelligence services and prisons and their higher pay.[101] He did not abandon the hope of succeeding his brother, opting to take control of the country through his post as Commander of Defense Companies.[102] In what became known as the "poster war", personnel from the Defense Companies replaced posters of Hafiz in Damascus with those of Rifaat al-Assad.[102] The security service, still loyal to Hafiz, responded by replacing Rifaat al-Assad's posters with Hafiz's.[102] The poster war lasted for a week until Hafiz's health improved.[102]
Shortly after the poster war, all Rifaat al-Assad's proteges were removed from positions of power.
Economy
Hafiz called his domestic reforms a corrective movement, and it achieved some results. He tried to modernize Syria's agricultural and industrial sectors; one of his main achievements was the completion of the Tabqa Dam on the Euphrates River in 1974. One of the world's largest dams, its reservoir was called Lake al-Assad. The reservoir increased the irrigation of arable land, provided electricity, and encouraged industrial and technical development in Syria. Many peasants and workers received increased income, social security, and better health and educational services. The urban middle class, which had been hurt by the Jadid government's policy, had new economic opportunities.[105]
By 1977 it was apparent that despite some success, Hafiz's political reforms had largely failed. This was partly due to Hafiz's foreign policy, failed policies, natural phenomena, and corruption. Chronic socioeconomic difficulties remained, and new ones appeared. Inefficiency, mismanagement, and corruption in the government, public, and private sectors, illiteracy, poor education (particularly in rural areas), increasing emigration by professionals, inflation, a growing trade deficit, a high cost of living and shortages of consumer goods were among problems faced by the country. The financial burden of Syria's involvement in Lebanon since 1976 contributed to worsening economic problems, encouraging corruption and a black market. The emerging class of entrepreneurs and brokers became involved with senior military officers—including Assad's brother Rifaat—in smuggling from Lebanon, which affected government revenue and encouraged corruption among senior government officials.[106]
During the early 1980s, Syria's economy worsened; by mid-1984, the food crisis was severe, and the press was full of complaints. Hafiz's government sought a solution, arguing that food shortages could be avoided with careful economic planning. The food crisis continued through August, despite government measures. Syria lacked sugar, bread, flour, wood, iron, and construction equipment; this resulted in soaring prices, long queues and rampant black marketeering. Smuggling goods from Lebanon became common. Hafiz's government tried to combat the smuggling, encountering difficulties due to the involvement of his brother Rifaat in the corruption. In July 1984, the government formed an effective anti-smuggling squad to control the Lebanon–Syria borders. The Defense Detachment commanded by Rifaat al-Assad played a leading role in the smuggling, importing $400,000 worth of goods a day. The anti-smuggling squad seized $3.8 million in goods during its first week.[107]
The Syrian economy grew five to seven percent during the early 1990s; exports increased, the balance of trade improved, inflation remained moderate (15–18 percent) and oil exports increased. In May 1991 Hafiz's government liberalised the Syrian economy, which stimulated domestic and foreign private investment. Most foreign investors were Arab states around the Persian Gulf since Western countries still had political and economic issues with the country. The Gulf states invested in infrastructure and development projects; because of the Ba'ath Party's socialist ideology, Hafiz's government did not privatize state-owned companies.[108]
Syria fell into recession during the mid-1990s. Several years later, its economic growth was about 1.5 percent. This was insufficient since population growth was between 3 and 3.5 percent. Another symptom of the crisis was statism in foreign trade. Syria's economic crisis coincided with a recession in world markets. A 1998 drop in oil prices dealt a major blow to Syria's economy; when oil prices rose the following year, the Syrian economy partially recovered. In 1999, one of the worst droughts in a century caused a drop of 25–30 percent in crop yields compared with 1997 and 1998. Hafiz's government implemented emergency measures, including loans and compensation to farmers and the distribution of free fodder to save sheep and cattle. However, those steps were limited and had no measurable effect on the economy.[109]
Hafiz's government tried to decrease population growth, but this was only marginally successful. One sign of economic stagnation was Syria's lack of progress in talks with the EU on an agreement. The main cause of this failure was the country's difficulty in meeting EU demands to open the economy and introduce reforms. Marc Pierini, head of the EU delegation in Damascus, said that if the Syrian economy was not modernised it would not benefit from closer ties to the EU. Hafiz's government gave civil servants a 20-percent pay raise on the anniversary of the corrective movement that brought him to power. Although the foreign press criticised Syria's reluctance to liberalize its economy, Hafiz's government refused to modernize the bank system, permit private banks and open a stock exchange.[110]
Foreign policy
Yom Kippur War
Planning
Since the Arab defeat in the Six-Day War, Hafiz was convinced that the Israelis had won the war by subterfuge;
When Hafiz took power, Syria was isolated;[111] planning an attack on Israel, he sought allies and war material.[112] Ten weeks after gaining power, Hafiz visited the Soviet Union.[112] The Soviet leadership was wary of supplying the Syrian government, viewing Hafiz's rise to power with a reserve and believing him to lean further West than Jadid did.[113] While he soon understood that the Soviet relationship with the Arabs would never be as deep as the United States' relationship with Israel, he needed its weapons.[113] Unlike his predecessors (who tried to win Soviet support with socialist policies), Hafiz was willing to give the Soviets a stable presence in the Middle East through Syria, access to Syrian naval bases (giving them a role in the peace process) and help in curtailing American influence in the region.[113] The Soviets responded by sending arms to Syria.[113] The new relationship bore fruit, and between February 1971 and October 1973 Hafiz met several times with Soviet leader Leonid Brezhnev.[114]
Hafiz believed that Syria would have no chance in a war against Israel without Egyptian participation.[115] He believed that if the United Arab Republic had not collapsed, the Arabs would already have liberated Palestine.[115] For a war against Israel, Syria needed to establish another front.[115] However, by this time Syria's relations with Egypt and Jordan were shaky at best.[115] Planning for war began in 1971 with an agreement between Hafiz and Anwar Sadat.[115] In the beginning, the renewed Egyptian–Syrian alliance was based upon the proposed Federation of Arab Republics (FAR), a federation initially encompassing Egypt, Libya, Sudan (which left soon after FAR's first summit) and Syria.[70] Hafiz and Sadat used the FAR summits to plan war strategy, and by 1971 they had appointed Egyptian General Muhammad Sadiq supreme commander of both armies.[116] From 1972 to 1973, the countries filled their arsenals and trained their armies.[116] In a secret meeting of the Egyptian–Syrian Military Council from 21 to 23 August 1973, the two chiefs of staff (Syrian Youssef Chakkour and Egyptian Saad el-Shazly) signed a document declaring their intention to go to war against Israel.[117] During a meeting of Hafiz, Sadat and their respective defense ministers (Tlass and Hosni Mubarak) on 26–27 August, the two leaders decided to go to war together.[118]
Egypt went to war for a reason different from Syria’s.[119] While Hafiz wanted to regain lost Arab territory, Sadat wished to strengthen Egypt's position in its peace policy toward Israel.[119] The Syrians were deceived by Sadat and the Egyptians, which would play a major role in the Arab defeat.[120] Egyptian Chief of Staff Shazly was convinced from the beginning that Egypt could not mount a successful full-scale offensive against Israel; therefore, he campaigned for a limited war.[120] Sadat knew that Hafiz would not participate in the war if he knew his real intentions.[120] Since the collapse of the UAR, the Egyptians were critical of the Ba'athist government; they saw it as an untrustworthy ally.[120]
The war
At 14:05 on 6 October 1973, Egyptian forces (attacking through the Sinai Peninsula) and Syrian forces (attacking the Golan Heights) crossed the border into Israel and penetrated the Israeli defense lines.[121] The Syrian forces on the Golan Heights met with more intense fighting than their Egyptian counterparts, but by 8 October had broken through the Israeli defenses.[122] The early successes of the Syrian army were due to its officer corps (where officers were promoted because of merit and not politics) and its ability to handle advanced Soviet weaponry: tanks, artillery batteries, aircraft, man-portable missiles, the Sagger anti-tank weapon and the 2K12 Kub anti-aircraft system on mobile launchers.[122] With the help of these weapons, Egypt and Syria defeated Israel's armor and air supremacy.[122] Egypt and Syria announced the war to the world first, accusing Israel of starting it, mindful of the importance of avoiding appearing as the aggressor (Israel accused the Arab powers of starting the Six-Day War when they launched Operation Focus).[122] In any case, early Syrian successes helped rectify the loss of face they had suffered following the Six-Day War.
The main reason for the reversal of fortune was Egypt's operational pause from 7 to 14 October.[122] After capturing parts of the Sinai, the Egyptian campaign halted and the Syrians were left fighting the Israelis alone.[123] The Egyptian leaders, believing their war aims accomplished, dug in.[124] While their early successes in the war had surprised them, War Minister General Ahmad Ismail Ali advised caution.[124] In Syria, Hafiz and his generals waited for the Egyptians to move.[124] When the Israeli government learned of Egypt's modest war strategy, it ordered an "immediate continuous action" against the Syrian military.[124] According to Patrick Seale, "For three days, 7, 8, and 9 October, Syrian troops on the Golan faced the full fury of the Israeli air force as, from first light to nightfall, wave after wave of aircraft swooped down to bomb, strafe and napalm their tank concentration and their fuel and ammunition carriers right back to the Purple Line."[125] By 9 October, the Syrians were retreating behind the Purple Line (the Israeli–Syrian border since the Six-Day War).[126] By 13 October the war was lost, but (in contrast to the Six-Day War) the Syrians were not crushed; this earned Hafiz respect in Syria and abroad.[127]
On 14 October, Egypt began a limited offensive against Israel for political reasons.[128] Sadat needed Hafiz on his side for his peace policy with Israel to succeed,[128] and military action as a means to an end.[128] The renewed Egyptian military offensive was ill-conceived. A week later, due to Egyptian inactivity, the Israelis had organised and the Arabs had lost their most important advantage.[129] While the military offensive gave Hafiz hope, this was an illusion; the Arabs had already lost the war militarily.[130] Egypt's behavior during the war caused friction between Hafiz and Sadat.[130] Hafiz, still inexperienced in foreign policy, believed that the Egyptian–Syrian alliance was based on trust and failed to understand Egypt's duplicity.[130] Although it was not until after the war that Hafiz would learn that Sadat was in contact with American National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger almost daily during the war, the seeds of distrust had been sown.[131] Around this time, Sadat called for an American-led ceasefire agreement between Egypt, Syria, and Israel; however, he was unaware that under Kissinger's tenure the United States had become a staunch supporter of Israel.[132]
On 16 October, Sadat—without telling Hafiz—called for a ceasefire in a speech to the
Lebanese Civil War
We did not go into Lebanon to achieve any regional ambitions, nor for any selfish or opportunistic motives. On the contrary, it was at the expense of our economy and our daily bread.
—Assad, reviewing Syria's intervention in Lebanon[137]
Syria intervened in Lebanon in 1976 during the
In early 1976 Hafiz was approached by Lebanese politicians for help in forcing the resignation of Suleiman Frangieh, the Christian President of Lebanon.[143] Although Hafiz was open to change, he resisted attempts by some Lebanese politicians to enlist him in Frangieh's ouster;[143] when General Abdul Aziz al-Ahdāb attempted to seize power, Syrian troops stopped him.[144] In the meantime, radical Lebanese leftists were gaining the upper hand in the military conflict.[144] Kamal Jumblatt, leader of the Lebanese National Movement (LNM), believed that his strong military position would compel Frangieh's resignation.[144] Hafiz did not wish a leftist victory in Lebanon which would strengthen the position of the Palestinians.[144] He did not want a rightist victory either, instead of seeking a middle-ground solution which would safeguard Lebanon and the region.[144] When Jumblatt met with Hafiz on 27 March 1976, he tried to persuade him to let him "win" the war;[144] Hafiz replied that a ceasefire should be in effect to ensure the 1976 presidential elections.[144] Meanwhile, on Hafiz's orders Syria sent troops into Lebanon without international approval.[144]
While
On 31 May 1976, Syria began a full-scale intervention in Lebanon to (according to the official Syrian account) end bombardment of the Maronite cities of Qubayat and Aandqat.[146] Before the intervention, Hafiz and the Syrian government were one of several interests in Lebanon; afterward, they were the controlling factors in Lebanese politics.[146] On Hafiz's orders, the Syrian troop presence slowly increased to 30,000.[146] Syria received approval for the intervention from the United States and Israel to help them defeat Palestinian forces in Lebanon.[146] The Ba'athist group As-Sa'iqa and the PLA's Hittīn brigade fought Palestinians who sided with the LNM.[146]
Within a week of the Syrian intervention, Christian leaders issued a statement of support.[147]
Muslim leaders established a joint command of all Palestinian groups except As-Sa'iqa,[147] which was driven by the PLO to its stronghold near the main airport.[147] Shortly afterward, As-Sa'iqa and other leftist Damascus forces were absorbed by the Syrian military.[147] On 8 June 1976 Syrian forces were pushed back from Sidon, encountering stiff resistance in Beirut from the LNM.[147] Hafiz's actions angered much of the Arab world however and the sight of Syria trying to eliminate the PLO brought criticism upon him.[147] There was considerable hostility to Hafiz's alliance with the Maronites in Syria.[148] As a result, the Syrian government asked the Arab League to assist in the conflict.[147] The Arab League began to meditate, establishing the Arab Deterrent Force (ADF) for peacekeeping.[147] Syrian strategy at this point was to gradually weaken the LNM and its Palestinian collaborators, continuing to support the Christian militia.[147] However, the Syrians were unable to capture the LNM's stronghold of Aley before the Arab League called for a ceasefire on 17 October.[149] The Arab League strengthened the ADF to 30,000 troops, most Syrian.[149] While some heavy fighting continued, by December 1976 and January 1977 most Palestinian and Lebanese groups had disposed of their heavy weaponry.[149] According to Charles Winslow, the "main phase" of the Lebanese Civil War had ended by 1977; until the early 1990s most violence was attributed to the turf, proxy, inter-communal and state wars.[150] Hafiz used terrorism and intimidation to extend his control over Lebanon.[151] Jumblatt died in a 1977 assassination allegedly ordered by Syria; in 1982, Syrian agents assassinated Lebanese President Bachir Gemayel (who was helped to power by the Israelis during the 1982 Lebanon War).[151] Jumblatt and Gemayel had resisted Hafiz's attempts to dominate Lebanon.[151] Hafiz caused the failure of the 1983 Lebanon–Israel agreement, and by proxy guerrilla warfare forced the Israeli Defense Forces to withdraw to southern Lebanon in 1985.[151] Terrorism against Palestinians and Jordanian targets during the mid-1980s thwarted the rapprochement between King Hussein of Jordan and the PLO, slowing Jordanian–Israeli cooperation in the West Bank.[151]
Autocracy, succession, and death
Hafiz's first choice of successor was his brother
Abdul Halim Khaddam, Syria's foreign minister from 1970 to 1984, opposed dynastic succession on the grounds that it was not socialist.[152] Khaddam has said that Hafiz never discussed his intentions about succession with members of the Regional Command.[152] By the 1990s, the Sunni faction of the leadership was aging; the Alawites, with Hafiz's help, had received new blood.[156] The Sunnis were at a disadvantage since many were opposed to any kind of dynastic succession.[157]
After [Assad's] illness [in 1983] this matter was too sensitive to be discussed. His love for the family was even stronger than his duty as president. The decision was very wrong. This decision was in total contradiction to all laws and regulations in Syria. In the late 1990s, when he was becoming sicker, this sentiment grew stronger and stronger.
—Abdul Halim Khaddam, on Assad's succession plans[152]
When he returned to Syria, Bashar al-Assad enrolled in the Homs Military Academy.[158] He was quickly promoted to Brigadier Commander, and served for a time in the Republican Guard.[159] He studied most military subjects, "including a tank battalion commander, command and staff"[159] (the latter two of which were required for a senior command in the Syrian army).[159] Bashar al-Assad was promoted to lieutenant colonel in July 1997, and to colonel in January 1999.[160] Official sources ascribe Bashar's rapid promotion to his "overall excellence in the staff officers' course, and in the outstanding final project he submitted as part of the course for command and staff".[160] With Bashar's training, Hafiz appointed a new generation of Alawite security officers to secure his succession plans.[159] Shihabi's replacement by Aslan as Chief of Staff on 1 July 1998—Shihabi was considered a potential successor by the outside world—marked the end of the long security-apparatus overhaul.[159]
Skepticism of Hafiz's dynastic-succession plan was widespread within and outside the government, with critics noting that Syria was not a
By the late 1990s, Hafiz's health had deteriorated.
Foreign honours
- Austria
- Czechoslovakia
- Collar of the Order of the White Lion[173]
- Lebanon
- Poland
- Grand Cross of the Order of Polonia Restituta[174]
- Socialist Republic of Romania
- Yugoslavia
- Order of the Yugoslav Great Star[175]
Notes
- Arabic: حَافِظُ ٱلْأَسَدِ, romanized: Ḥāfiẓ al-ʾAsad, Levantine Arabic: [ˈħaːfezˤ elˈʔasad], Modern Standard Arabic: [ħaːfɪðˤ alˈʔasad].
References
Citations
- ^ Bengio 1998, p. 135.
- ^ Jessup 1998, p. 41.
- ^ a b Reich 1990, p. 52.
- ^ Seale 1990, p. 3.
- ^ a b Alianak 2007, pp. 127–128.
- ^ Seale 1990, p. 5.
- ^ a b Zahler 2009, p. 25.
- ^ a b Seale 1990, p. 20.
- ^ a b c d e f g h i j Alianak 2007, p. 128.
- ^ a b c d e Zahler 2009, p. 28.
- ^ Amos 2010, p. 70.
- ^ a b c d Zahler 2009, pp. 29–31.
- ^ Zahler 2009, pp. 28–29.
- ^ a b c Zahler 2009, p. 31.
- ^ a b c d e f Reich 1990, p. 53.
- ^ a b Alianak 2007, p. 129.
- ^ Tucker & Roberts 2008, p. 168.
- ^ Seale 1990, p. 49.
- ^ a b Zahler 2009, p. 34.
- ^ a b c d e Zahler 2009, p. 32.
- ^ Leverett 2005, p. 231.
- ^ a b c d Seale 1990, pp. 50–51.
- ^ Zahler 2009, p. 33.
- ^ a b c d Zahler 2009, pp. 32–34.
- ^ a b c Seale 1990, p. 98.
- ^ Seale 1990, p. 65.
- ^ a b Seale 1990, pp. 60–61.
- ^ a b Zahler 2009, p. 38.
- ^ a b c Seale 1990, p. 75.
- ^ Seale 1990, pp. 76–78.
- ^ a b c Reich 1990, pp. 53–54.
- ^ Seale 1990, p. 76.
- ^ a b c d e f Seale 1990, p. 77.
- ^ a b c d e f Seale 1990, p. 89.
- ^ a b c Seale 1990, p. 90.
- ^ a b c d Reich 1990, p. 54.
- ^ a b c Seale 1990, p. 87.
- ^ Seale 1990, p. 88.
- ^ Seale 1990, p. 94.
- ^ a b c d Seale 1990, p. 95.
- ^ a b c Seale 1990, p. 96.
- ^ a b Seale 1990, p. 97.
- ^ Devlin 1975, p. 330.
- ^ Rabinovich 1972, p. 187.
- ^ Rabinovich 1972, p. 192.
- ^ Seale 1990, p. 100.
- ^ Seale 1990, p. 101.
- ^ Seale 1990, p. 102.
- ^ a b c d e Seale 1990, p. 104.
- ^ a b c d Seale 1990, p. 105.
- ^ a b Seale 1990, p. 110.
- ^ a b c d e Seale 1990, p. 112.
- ^ a b c d e f Seale 1990, p. 113.
- ^ a b c d e f Seale 1990, p. 142.
- ^ a b c Seale 1990, p. 143.
- ^ a b c d e f g h i j Seale 1990, p. 144.
- ^ a b c d Seale 1990, p. 145.
- ^ a b c d e Seale 1990, p. 146.
- ^ a b Seale 1990, p. 147.
- ^ a b c d e f Seale 1990, p. 148.
- ^ a b c d e f Seale 1990, p. 149.
- ^ a b c d e Seale 1990, p. 150.
- ^ a b c d e f g h i j k Seale 1990, p. 151.
- ^ a b c Seale 1990, p. 152.
- ^ a b c Seale 1990, p. 153.
- ^ a b c d e f g Seale 1990, p. 162.
- ^ a b c d e Seale 1990, p. 164.
- ^ Seale 1990, p. 169.
- ^ a b c d e Seale 1990, p. 170.
- ^ a b Seale 1990, p. 190.
- ^ a b c d e f g h i Seale 1990, p. 171.
- ^ a b Seale 1990, p. 175.
- ^ a b c Hinnebusch 2001, p. 61.
- ^ a b c d Hinnebusch 2001, p. 63.
- ^ a b c d e f Hinnebusch 2001, p. 65.
- ^ Reich 1990, p. 57.
- ^ a b c d Hinnebusch 2001, p. 69.
- ^ a b c d Hinnebusch 2001, p. 72.
- ^ a b Hinnebusch 2001, p. 74.
- ^ Hinnebusch 2001, pp. 72–73.
- ^ a b c Hinnebusch 2001, p. 73.
- ^ Hinnebusch 2001, pp. 65–66.
- ^ a b c d e f Hinnebusch 2001, p. 66.
- ISBN 978-1-108-41833-1.
- ^ a b c d e Batatu 1999, p. 226.
- ^ a b c d Batatu 1999, p. 227.
- ^ a b c Hinnebusch 2001, p. 85.
- ^ a b c Hinnebusch 2001, p. 86.
- ^ a b Hinnebusch 2001, pp. 86–89.
- ^ Hinnebusch 2001, p. 89.
- ^ a b c d e f g Hinnebusch 2001, p. 90.
- ^ a b Hinnebusch 2001, p. 94.
- ^ a b c d e f g h i Hinnebusch 2001, p. 95.
- ^ a b c d e f g h i Hinnebusch 2001, p. 96.
- ^ a b c d Hinnebusch 2001, p. 97.
- ^ a b c Hinnebusch 2001, p. 98.
- ^ Collelo 1987.
- ^ a b c Batatu 1999, p. 232.
- ^ a b c d Batatu 1999, p. 230.
- ^ a b c d e Batatu 1999, p. 233.
- ^ Batatu 1999, pp. 233–234.
- ^ a b c d e f g h i Batatu 1999, p. 234.
- ^ a b c Batatu 1999, p. 235.
- ^ a b c Batatu 1999, p. 236.
- ^ Reich 1990, p. 56.
- ^ Reich 1990, pp. 59–60.
- ^ Olmert 1986, pp. 683–684.
- ^ Zisser 1995, pp. 728–729.
- ^ Zisser 2002, pp. 598–599.
- ^ Zisser 2002, p. 599.
- ^ a b c d e Seale 1990, p. 185.
- ^ a b Seale 1990, p. 186.
- ^ a b c d Seale 1990, p. 187.
- ^ Seale 1990, p. 188.
- ^ a b c d e Seale 1990, p. 189.
- ^ a b Seale 1990, p. 192.
- ^ Seale 1990, pp. 193–194.
- ^ Seale 1990, p. 194.
- ^ a b Seale 1990, p. 195.
- ^ a b c d Seale 1990, p. 197.
- ^ Seale 1990, pp. 197–199.
- ^ a b c d e Seale 1990, p. 205.
- ^ Seale 1990, p. 207.
- ^ a b c d Seale 1990, p. 208.
- ^ Seale 1990, p. 209.
- ^ Seale 1990, p. 210.
- ^ Seale 1990, p. 211.
- ^ a b c Seale 1990, p. 212.
- ^ Seale 1990, pp. 212–213.
- ^ a b c Seale 1990, p. 213.
- ^ Seale 1990, pp. 214–215.
- ^ Seale 1990, pp. 215–218.
- ^ a b Seale 1990, p. 219.
- ^ a b c Seale 1990, p. 220.
- ^ a b c d Seale 1990, p. 221.
- ^ Seale 1990, p. 224.
- ^ Dawisha 2005, p. 273.
- ^ Winslow 2012, p. 194.
- ^ Seale 1990, p. 267.
- ^ a b Winslow 2012, pp. 194–195.
- ^ Gilmour 1983, p. 131.
- ^ a b c Winslow 2012, p. 195.
- ^ a b Winslow 2012, p. 197.
- ^ a b c d e f g h i j k Winslow 2012, p. 198.
- ^ a b Winslow 2012, p. 199.
- ^ a b c d e Winslow 2012, p. 201.
- ^ a b c d e f g h i Winslow 2012, p. 202.
- ^ Gilmour 1983, p. 139.
- ^ a b c Winslow 2012, p. 204.
- ^ Winslow 2012, p. 205.
- ^ a b c d e Reich 1990, p. 61.
- ^ a b c d Blandford 2006, p. 55.
- ^ a b c d e Batatu 1999, p. 237.
- ^ Batatu 1999, pp. 237–238.
- ^ a b Batatu 1999, p. 238.
- ^ Blandford 2006, p. 56.
- ^ Blandford 2006, pp. 55–56.
- ^ Blandford 2006, p. 53.
- ^ a b c d e f Ziser 2001, p. 154.
- ^ a b Ziser 2001, p. 160.
- ^ Blandford 2006, p. 69.
- ^ Ziser 2001, p. 161.
- ^ a b c d Ziser 2001, p. 166.
- ^ Seddon 2004, p. 76.
- ^ a b c d e Zisser 2002, pp. 552–553.
- ^ a b Dagher 2019, p. 241.
- ISSN 0362-4331. Retrieved 2 April 2022.
- ^ Ball 2010, p. 110.
- ^ "Bashar Al_Assad - THE FUNERAL OF PRESIDENT HAFEZ ASSAD". Archived from the original on 6 October 2014.
- ^ Freedman 2002, p. 105.
- ^ Ahmad 2010, p. 313.
- ^ Solomon 2022, p. 7.
- ^ "Československý řád Bílého lva" (PDF) (in Czech).
- ISBN 9788390662824.
- ^ "Свечана вечера у част Тита". Borba. 53 (36): 2. 7 February 1974.
Sources
- Amos, Deborah (2010). Eclipse of the Sunnis: Power, Exile, and Upheaval in the Middle East. ISBN 978-1-58648-649-5.
- ISBN 978-1-4490-1797-2.
- Bengio, Offra, ed. (1998). Minorities and the State in the Arab World. Lynne Rienner Publishers. ISBN 978-1-55587-647-0.
- Alianak, Sonia (2007). Middle Eastern Leaders and Islam: A Precarious Equilibrium. Peter Lang. ISBN 978-0-8204-6924-9.
- Ball, Howard (2010). Genocide: A Reference Handbook. ABC-CLIO. ISBN 978-1-59884-488-7.
- ISBN 0-691-00254-1.
- Blandford, Nicholas (2006). Killing Mr. Lebanon: The Assassination of Rafik Hariri and Its Impact on the Middle East. I.B. Tauris. ISBN 978-1-84511-202-8.
- Carter, Terry; Dunston, Lara; Thomas, Amelia (2008). Syria and Lebanon. Lonely Planet. ISBN 978-1-74104-609-0.
- Collelo, Thomas (1987). "1982 – 1987 Political Developments". Syria: A Country Study. Washington: GPO for the Library of Congress. Retrieved 8 October 2012.
- Dagher, Sam (2019). Assad or we Burn the Country (First U.S. ed.). New York: Little, Brown & Company. ISBN 978-0316556705.
- Dawisha, Adeed (2005). Arab Nationalism in the Twentieth Century: From Triumph to Despair (2nd ed.). ISBN 9780691122724.
- Devlin, John (1975). The Baath Party: a History from its Origins to 1966 (2nd ed.). ISBN 0817965610.
- ISBN 978-0-8130-3110-1.
- ISBN 0312477384.
- Hinnebusch, Raymond (2001). Syria: Revolution from Above (1st ed.). ISBN 978-0-415-26779-3.
- ISBN 978-0-8157-5204-2.
- Jessup, John E. (1998). An Encyclopedic Dictionary of Conflict and Conflict Resolution, 1945–1996. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press. Archived from the original on 10 October 2017. Retrieved 29 August 2017.[ISBN missing]
- Olmert, Yosef (1986). Shaked, Haim; Dishon, Daniel (eds.). Middle East Contemporary Survey. Vol. 8. The Moshe Dayan Center. ISBN 978-965-224-006-4.
- Olmert, Yosef (1988). Rabinovich, Itmar; Shaked, Haim (eds.). Middle East Contemporary Survey. Vol. 10. The Moshe Dayan Center. ISBN 978-0-8133-0764-0.
- Phillips, David L. (2009). From Bullets to Ballots: Violent Muslim Movements in Transition. Transaction Publishers. ISBN 978-1-4128-0795-1.
- ISBN 0-7065-1266-9.
- Reich, Bernard (1990). Political Leaders of the Contemporary Middle East and North Africa: A Biographical Dictionary. Greenwood Publishing Group. ISBN 978-0-313-26213-5.
- ISBN 978-0-520-06976-3.
- Seddon, David (2004). A Political and Economic Dictionary of the Middle East. Taylor & Francis. ISBN 978-1-85743-212-1.
- Solomon, Christopher (2022). "1:Introduction". In Search of Greater Syria: The History and Politics of the Syrian Social Nationalist Party. New York, NY 10018, USA: I.B. Tauris. ISBN 978-1-8386-0640-4.)
{{cite book}}
: CS1 maint: location (link - ISBN 978-1-85109-842-2.
- Winslow, Charles (2012). Lebanon: War and Politics in a Fragmented Society. Routledge. ISBN 978-1-134-76240-8.
- Zahler, Kathy A. (2009). The Assads' Syria. Twenty-First Century Books. ISBN 978-0-8225-9095-8.
- Ziser, Eyal (2001). Asad's Legacy: Syria in Transition. C. Hurst & Co. Publishers. ISBN 978-1-85065-450-6.
- Zisser, Eyal (1993). Ayalon, Ami (ed.). Middle East Contemporary Survey. Vol. 15. The Moshe Dayan Center. ISBN 978-0-8133-1869-1.
- Zisser, Eyal (1995). Ayalon, Ami (ed.). Middle East Contemporary Survey. Vol. 16. The Moshe Dayan Center. ISBN 978-0-8133-2133-2.
- Zisser, Eyal (2002). Maddy-Weitzman, Bruce (ed.). Middle East Contemporary Survey. Vol. 23. The Moshe Dayan Center. ISBN 978-965-224-049-1.
- Zisser, Eyal (2006). Commanding Syria: Bashar al-Asad and the First Years in Power. I. B. Tauris. ISBN 978-1-84511-153-3.