Hafizullah Amin

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Hafizullah Amin
حفيظ الله امين
Mohammed Daoud Khan
Succeeded byShah Wali
Personal details
Born(1929-08-01)1 August 1929
Storm-333

Hafizullah Amin (

communist head of state, who served from September 1979 until his assassination. He organized the Saur Revolution of 1978 and co-founded the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan (DRA), ruling Afghanistan as General Secretary of the People's Democratic Party.[4]

Born in the town of

socialist ideologies to students,[6] and he later joined the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA), a new far-left organization co-founded by Nur Muhammad Taraki and Babrak Karmal. He ran as a candidate in the 1965 parliamentary election but failed to secure a seat, but in 1969 became the only Khalqist
elected to parliament, increasing his standing within the party.

Amin was the main organizer of the April 1978

PDPA Central Committee (supreme leader).[9]

Amin's short-lived leadership featured controversies from beginning to end. His government failed to solve the problem of the population revolting against the regime

Operation Storm-333
, kickstarting the 10-year Soviet–Afghan War; he had ruled for a little more than three months.

Early life and career

Hafizullah Amin was born to a Kharōṭī Ghilzai Pashtun family in the Qazi Khel village in Paghman[18] on 1 August 1929.[19][20] His father, a civil servant, died in 1937 when he was 8. Thanks to his brother Abdullah, a primary school teacher, Amin was able to attend both primary and secondary school, which in turn allowed him to attend Kabul University (KU). After studying mathematics there, he also graduated from the Darul Mualimeen Teachers College in Kabul, and became a teacher. Amin later became vice-principal of the Darul Mualimeen College, and then principal of the prestigious Avesina High School, and in 1957 left Afghanistan for Columbia University in New York City, where he earned MA in education.[18] It was at Columbia that Amin became attracted to Marxism, and in 1958 he became a member of the university's Socialist Progressive Club.[21] When he returned to Afghanistan, Amin became a teacher at Kabul University, and later, for the second time, the principal of Avesina High School.[22] During this period Amin became acquainted with Nur Muhammad Taraki, a communist. Around this time, Amin quit his position as principal of Avesina High School to become principal of the Darul Mualimeen College.[23]

It is alleged that Amin became radicalised during his second stay in the United States in 1962, when he enrolled in a work-study group at the

Columbia University Teachers College, but started to neglect his studies in favour of politics; in 1963 he became head of the Afghan students' association at the college. The association was funded by the Asia Foundation, known to be a CIA pass-through group, or front.[24] When he returned to Afghanistan in the mid-1960s, the route flew to Afghanistan by way of Moscow. There, Amin met the Afghan ambassador to the Soviet Union, his old friend Ali Ahmad Popel, a previous Afghan Minister of Education. During his short stay, Amin became even more radicalised.[23] Some people, Nabi Misdaq for instance, do not believe he travelled through Moscow, but rather West Germany and Lebanon.[21] By the time he had returned to Afghanistan, the Communist People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA) had already held its founding congress, which was in 1965. Amin ran as a candidate for the PDPA in the 1965 parliamentary election, and lost by a margin of less than fifty votes.[23]
In 1966, when the
Dastagir Panjsheri and Saleh Mohammad Zeary in 1969, Amin became one of the party's leading members,[28] and was still a pre-eminent party member by the time of their release in 1973.[29]

The Daoud era

From 1973 until the PDPA unification in 1977, Amin was second only to Taraki in the Khalqist PDPA. When the PDPA ruled Afghanistan, their relationship was referred to as a disciple (Amin) following his mentor (Taraki). This official portrayal of the situation was misleading; their relationship was more work-oriented. Taraki needed Amin's "tactical and strategic talents"; Amin's motivations are more uncertain, but it is commonly believed that he associated with Taraki to protect his own position. Amin had attracted many enemies during his career, the most notable being Karmal. According to the official version of events, Taraki protected Amin from party members or others who wanted to hurt the PDPA and the country.

Republic of Afghanistan, the Khalqist PDPA offered its support for the new regime if it established a National Front which presumably included the Khalqist PDPA itself. The Parchamite PDPA had already established an alliance with Daoud at the beginning of his regime, and Karmal called for the dissolution of the Khalqist PDPA. Karmal's call for dissolution only worsened relations between the Khalqist and Parchamite PDPA.[31] However, Taraki and Amin were lucky; Karmal's alliance actually hurt the Parchamites' standing in Afghan politics. Some communists in the armed forces became disillusioned with the government of Daoud, and turned to the Khalqist PDPA because of its apparent independence. Parchamite association with the Daoud government indirectly led to the Khalqist-led PDPA coup of 1978, popularly referred to as the Saur Revolution. From 1973 until the 1978 coup, Amin was responsible for organising party work in the Afghan armed forces.[32] According to the official version, Amin "met patriotic liaison officers day or night, in the desert or the mountains, in the fields or the forests, enlightening them on the basis of the principles of the working class ideology." Amin's success in recruiting military officers lay in the fact that Daoud "betrayed the left" soon after taking power.[33] When Amin began recruiting military officers for the PDPA, it was not difficult for him to find disgruntled military officers. In the meantime, relations between the Parchamite and Khalqist PDPA deteriorated; in 1973 it was rumoured that Major Zia Mohammadzai, a Parchamite and head of the Republican Guard, planned to assassinate the entire Khalqist leadership. The plan, if true, failed because the Khalqists found out about it.[34]
The assassination attempt proved to be a further blow to relations between the Parchamites and Khalqists. The Parchamites deny that they ever planned to assassinate the Khalqist leadership, but historian Beverley Male argues that Karmal's subsequent activities give credence to the Khalqist view of events. Because of the Parchamite assassination attempt, Amin pressed the Khalqist PDPA to seize power in 1976 by ousting Daoud.[34] The majority of the PDPA leadership voted against such a move.[35] The following year, in 1977, the Parchamites and Khalqists officially reconciled, and the PDPA was unified. The Parchamite and Khalqist PDPAs, which had separate general secretaries, politburos, central committees and other organisational structures, were officially unified in the summer of 1977.[36] One reason for unification was that the international communist movement, represented by the Communist Party of India, Iraqi Communist Party and the Communist Party of Australia, called for party unification.[37]

Saur Revolution

Further information: Saur Revolution

On 18 April 1978

Aslam Watanjar the commander of the ground forces, and the Chief of Staff of the Afghan Air Force, Abdul Qadir.[39]

PDPA rule

Khalq–Parcham break

After the Saur revolution, Taraki was appointed Chairman of the Presidium of the

Minister of National Defence and Minister of Public Works respectively.[43] According to Angel Rasanayagam, the appointment of Amin, Karmal and Watanjar as Deputy Prime Ministers led to the establishment of three cabinets; the Khalqists were answerable to Amin, the Parchamites were answerable to Karmal, and the military officers (who were Parchamites) were answerable to Watanjar.[44] The first conflict between the Khalqists and Parchamites arose when the Khalqists wanted to give PDPA Central Committee membership to the military officers who participated in the Saur Revolution. Amin, who had previously opposed the appointment of military officers to the PDPA leadership, switched sides; he now supported their elevation. The PDPA Politburo voted in favour of giving membership to the military officers; the victors (the Khalqists) portrayed the Parchamites as opportunists, implying that the Parchamites had ridden the revolutionary wave, but not actually participated in the revolution. To make matters worse for the Parchamites, the term Parcham was, according to Taraki, a word synonymous with factionalism.[45]

There is only one leading force in the country - Hafizullah Amin. In the Politburo, everybody fears Amin.

— PDPA Politburo member
Nur Ahmad Nur telling Soviet Ambassador Alexander Puzanov, June 1978[46]

On 27 June 1978, three months after the revolution, Amin managed to outmaneuver the Parchamites at a Central Committee meeting.[47] The meeting decided that the Khalqists had exclusive rights to formulate and decide policy, a policy which left the Parchamites impotent. Karmal was exiled, but was able to establish a network with the remaining Parchamites in government. A coup to overthrow Amin was planned for September. Its leading members in Afghanistan were Qadir, the defence minister, and Army Chief of Staff General Shahpur Ahmedzai. The coup was planned for 4 September, on the Festival of Eid, because soldiers and officers would be off duty. The conspiracy failed when the Afghan ambassador to India told the Afghan leadership about the plan. A purge was initiated, and Parchamite ambassadors were recalled; few returned, for example Karmal and Mohammad Najibullah both stayed in their assigned countries.[48]

Amin–Taraki break

The Afghan people revolted against the PDPA government when the government introduced several

executive (the Chairman of the Revolutionary Council). While the official version of events said that all issues were voted on democratically at the meeting, the Revolutionary Council held another meeting the following day to ratify the new Five-Year Plan and to discuss the reorganisation of the cabinet.[50]

As one of our slogans is 'to everyone according to his capacity and work', therefore as a result of past performances and services he has won our greater trust and assurances. I have full confidence in him and in the light of this confidence I entrust him with this job...

— Taraki telling his colleagues why Amin should be appointed Prime Minister.[51]

Interior Minister Mazdoryar, the President of the Political Affairs of the Armed Forces Mohammad Iqbal, Mohammad Yaqub, the Chief of the General Staff, the Commander of the Afghan Air Force Nazar Mohammad and Assadullah Sarwari the head of ASGA, the Afghan secret police.[52]

The order of precedence had been institutionalised, whereby Taraki was responsible for defence and Amin responsible for assisting Taraki in defence related matters. Amin's position was given a further blow by the democratisation of the decision-making process, which allowed its members to contribute; most of them were against Amin. Another problem for Amin was that the office of HHDC Deputy chairman had no specific functions or powers, and the appointment of a new defence minister who opposed him drastically weakened his control over the Ministry of National Defence. The reorganisation of ministers was a further blow to Amin's position; he had lost control of the defence ministry, the interior ministry and the ASGA. Amin still had allies at the top, many of them in strategically important positions, for instance, Yaqub was his brother-in-law and the Security Chief in the Ministry of Interior was Sayed Daoud Taroon, who was also later appointed to the HHDC as an ordinary member in April. Amin succeeded in appointing two more of his allies to important positions; Mohammad Sediq Alemyar as Minister of Planning and Khayal Mohammad Katawazi as Minister of Information and Culture; and Faqir Mohammad Faqir was appointed Deputy Prime Minister in April 1978.[54] Amin's political position was not secure when Alexei Yepishev, the Head of the Main Political Directorate of the Soviet Army and Navy, visited Kabul.[55] Yepishev met personally with Taraki on 7 April, but never met with Amin. The Soviets were becoming increasingly worried about Amin's control over the Afghan military.[56] Even so, during Yepishev's visit Amin's position was actually strengthened; Taroon was appointed Taraki's aide-de-camp.[57]

Our homeland's enemies, the enemies of the working class movement all over the world are trying to penetrate into the PDPA leadership and above all woo the working class party leader but the people of Afghanistan and the PDPA both take great pride in the fact that the PDPA and its General-Secretary enjoys a great personality which render him impossible to woo.

— Amin in a speech in which he warns of inter-party sectarianism.[58]

Soon after, at two cabinet meetings, the strengthening of the executive powers of the Chairman of the Revolutionary Council was proven. Even though Amin was Prime Minister, Taraki chaired the meetings instead of him. Amin's presence at these two meetings was not mentioned at all, and it was made clear that Taraki, through his office as Chairman of the Revolutionary Council, also chaired the Council of Ministers. Another problem facing Amin was Taraki's policy of autocracy; he tried to deprive the PDPA Politburo of its powers as a party and state decision-making organ. The situation deteriorated when Amin personally warned Taraki that "the prestige and popularity of leaders among the people has no common aspect with a personality cult."[58]

Factionalism within the PDPA made it ill-prepared to handle the intensified

Shia communities by meeting with their leaders; despite this, a section of the Shia leadership called for the continuation of the resistance. Subsequently, a revolt broke out in a Shia populated district in Kabul; this was the first sign of unrest in Kabul since the Saur Revolution.[62] To add to the government's problems, Taraki's ability to lead the country was questioned – he was a heavy drinker and was not in good health. Amin on the other hand was characterised in this period by portrayals of strong self-discipline. In the summer of 1979 Amin began to disassociate himself from Taraki.[63] On 27 June Amin became a member of the PDPA Politburo, the leading decision-making body in Afghanistan.[64]

Rise to power

In-mid July the Soviets made their view official when Pravda wrote an article about the situation in Afghanistan; the Soviets did not wish to see Amin become leader of Afghanistan. This triggered a political crisis in Afghanistan, as Amin initiated a policy of extreme repression, which became one of the main reasons for the Soviet intervention later that year.[65] On 28 July, a vote in the PDPA Politburo approved Amin's proposal of creating a collective leadership with collective decision-making;[66] this was a blow to Taraki, and many of his supporters were replaced by pro-Amin PDPA members.[67] Ivan Pavlovsky, the Commander of the Soviet Ground Forces, visited Kabul in mid-August to study the situation in Afghanistan. Amin, in a speech just a few days after Pavlovsky's arrival, said that he wanted closer relations between Afghanistan and the People's Republic of China; in the same speech he hinted that he had reservations about Soviet meddling in Afghanistan. He likened Soviet assistance to Afghanistan with Vladimir Lenin's assistance to the Hungarian Soviet Republic in 1919. Taraki, a delegate to the conference held by the Non-Aligned Movement in Havana, met personally with Andrei Gromyko, the Soviet Minister of Foreign Affairs, to discuss the Afghanistan situation on 9 September. Shah Wali, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, who was a supporter of Amin, did not participate in the meeting. This, according to Beverley Male, "suggested that some plot against Amin was in preparation".[68]

Taraki was instructed to stop-over in Moscow, where the Soviet leaders urged him to remove Amin from power as per the KGB's decision, because Amin posed danger. Amin's trusted aid, Daoud Taroon, informed Amin of the meeting and the KGB's plan. In Kabul, Taraki's aides, the Gang of Four (consisting of Watanjar, Mazdoryar, Gulabzoi and Sarwari), planned to assassinate Amin but failed as Amin was informed of their plot. Within hours of Taraki's return to Kabul on 11 September, Taraki convened the cabinet "ostensibly to report on the Havana Summit". Instead of reporting on the summit, Taraki tried to dismiss Amin as Prime Minister. Amin, aware of the murder plot, demanded the Gang of Four to be removed from their posts, but Taraki laughed it off.[69][70] Taraki sought to neutralise Amin's power and influence by requesting that he serve overseas as an ambassador. Amin turned down the proposal, shouting "You are the one who should quit! Because of drink and old age you have taken leave of your senses."

On 13 September, Taraki invited Amin to the presidential palace for lunch with him and the Gang of Four. Amin turned down the offer, stating he would prefer their resignation rather than lunching with them. Soviet ambassador Puzanov persuaded Amin to make the visit to the Presidential Palace along with Taroon, the Chief of Police, and Nawab Ali, an intelligence officer. Inside the palace on 14 September, bodyguards within the building opened fire on the visitors. Taroon was killed but Amin only sustained an injury and escaped. Amin drove to the Ministry of Defence building, put the Army on high alert and ordered Taraki's arrest. At 6:30 pm tanks from the 4th Armoured Corps entered the city and stood at government buildings. Shortly afterwards, Amin returned to the palace with a contingent of Army officers, and placed Taraki under arrest. The Gang of Four, however, had "disappeared" and sought refuge in the Soviet Embassy.

After Taraki's arrest, the Soviets tried to rescue Taraki (or, according to other sources, kidnap Amin) via the embassy or

Bagram Air Base but the strength of Amin's officers repelled their decision to make a move. Amin was told by the Soviets not to punish Taraki and strip him and his comrades of their positions, but Amin ignored them. Amin reportedly discussed the incident with Leonid Brezhnev, and indirectly asked for the permission to kill Taraki, to which Brezhnev replied that it was his choice. Amin, who now believed he had the full support of the Soviets, ordered the death of Taraki. It is believed Taraki was suffocated with pillows on 8 October 1979. The Afghan media would report that the ailing Taraki had died, omitting any mention of his murder.[71] Taraki's murder shocked and upset Brezhnev.[72]

Leadership

Domestic policies

Following Taraki's fall from power, Amin was elected Chairman of the Presidum of the

atheist. Amin also tried to increase his popularity with tribal groups, a feat Taraki had been unable or unwilling to achieve. In a speech to tribal elders Amin was defensive about the Western way he dressed; an official biography was published which depicted Amin in traditional Pashtun clothes. During his short stay in power, Amin became committed to establishing a collective leadership; when Taraki was ousted, Amin promised "from now on there will be no one-man government..."[75]

We will not leave a backward country for future generations

— Amin, as quoted in the

New Kabul Times, September 30, 1979[76]

Attempting to pacify the population, Amin released a list of 18,000 people who had been executed, and blamed the executions on Taraki. The total number of arrested during Taraki's and Amin's combined reign number between 17,000 and 45,000.

Afghan military deteriorated; due to desertions the number of military personnel in the Afghan army decreased from 100,000 in the immediate aftermath of the Saur Revolution, to somewhere between 50,000 and 70,000. Another problem Amin faced was the KGB's penetration of the PDPA, the military and the government bureaucracy.[12] While Amin's position in Afghanistan was becoming more perilous by the day, his enemies who were exiled in the Soviet Union and the Eastern Bloc were agitating for his removal. Babrak Karmal, the Parchamite leader, met several leading Eastern Bloc figures during this period, and Mohammad Aslam Watanjar, Sayed Mohammad Gulabzoy and Assadullah Sarwari wanted to exact revenge upon Amin.[78]

Foreign policy

In July of 1979, Hafizullah Amin announced that the

American Ambassador to Afghanistan, strained his relations with the United States. He tried to improve relations by reestablishing contact, met with three different American chargé d'affaires, and was interviewed by an American correspondent. But this did not improve Afghanistan's standing in the eyes of the United States Government. After the third meeting with Amin, J. Bruce Amstutz, the American Ambassador to Afghanistan from 1979 to 1980, believed the wisest thing to do was to maintain "a low profile, trying to avoid issues, and waiting to see what happens".[12] In early December 1979, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs proposed a joint summit meeting between Amin and Muhammad Zia-ul-Haq, the President of Pakistan. The Pakistani Government, accepting a modified version of the offer, agreed to send Agha Shahi, the Pakistani foreign minister, to Kabul for talks. In the meanwhile, the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), Pakistani's secret police, continued to train Mujahideen fighters who opposed Amin's regime.[12]

Afghan-Soviet relations

Any person and any element who harms the friendship between Afghanistan and the Soviet Union will be considered the enemy of the country, enemy of our people and enemy of our revolution. We will not allow anybody in Afghanistan to act against the friendship of Afghanistan and the Soviet Union.

— Amin reassuring the Soviets about his intentions.[81]

Contrary to popular belief, the Soviet leadership headed by

Soviet ambassador to Afghanistan, because of the Soviet leadership's satisfaction with his party and state-building policy. Not everything went as planned, and Andropov talked about "the undesirable turn of events" taking place in Afghanistan under Amin's rule.[83] Andropov also brought up the ongoing political shift in Afghanistan under Amin; the Soviets were afraid that Amin would move Afghanistan's foreign policy from a pro-Soviet position to a pro-United States position.[84] By early-to-mid December 1979, the Soviet leadership had established an alliance with Babrak Karmal and Assadullah Sarwari.[85]

Those who boast of friendship with us, they can really be our friend when they respect our independence, our soil and our prideful traditions.

— Amin stressing the importance of Afghan independence.[81]

Amin kept a portrait of Joseph Stalin on his desk. When Soviet officials criticized him of his brutality, Amin replied "Comrade Stalin showed us how to build socialism in a backward country."[86]

As it turned out, the relationship between Puzanov and Amin broke down. Amin started a smear campaign to discredit Puzanov. This in turn led to an assassination attempt against Amin, in which Puzanov participated. The situation was worsened by the KGB accusing Amin of misrepresenting the Soviet position on Afghanistan in the PDPA Central Committee and the Revolutionary Council. The KGB also noted an increase in anti-Soviet agitation by the government during Amin's rule, and harassment against Soviet citizens increased under Amin.[87] A group of senior politicians reported to the Soviet Central Committee that it was necessary to do "everything possible" to prevent a change in political orientation in Afghanistan. However, the Soviet leadership did not advocate intervention at this time, and instead called for increasing its influence in the Amin leadership to expose his "true intentions".[88] A Soviet Politburo assessment referred to Amin as "a power-hungry leader who is distinguished by brutality and treachery".[89] Amongst the many sins they alleged were his "insincerity and duplicity" when dealing with the Soviet Union, creating fictitious accusations against PDPA-members who opposed him, indulging in a policy of nepotism, and his tendency to conduct a more "balanced policy" towards First World countries.[90] According to the former senior Soviet diplomat, Oleg Grinevsky, the KGB was becoming increasingly convinced that Amin couldn't be counted on to effectively deal with the insurgency and preserve the survival of the Afghan Marxist state.[91]

By the end of October the Special Commission on Afghanistan, which consisted of Andropov, Gromyko, Ustinov and Ponomarev, wanted to end the impression that the Soviet government supported Amin's leadership and policy. The KGB's

Operation Storm-333 (the first phase of the intervention) on 27 December 1979.[94]

Attempted poisoning by Amin's chef

The leadership of the USSR had no need for Amin to remain alive.[95] Andropov's special representative in Afghanistan, General Boris Ivanov, recommended for Amin to attend a conciliatory dinner with his political mentor, who had become an enemy of Amin, so that Amin's chef could poison Amin.[95] However, Amin survived the poisoning after being treated by doctors at the Soviet embassy, who did not know that "special reconnaissance officers" were trying to kill Amin.[95] Since Amin, who was very loyal to the USSR, had survived two attempted assassinations that had been approved by the USSR, the decision was made to eliminate him through a bloody coup at Amin's residence, the Taj Beck Palace.[95]

Death

Further information:
Operation Storm-333
The Tajbeg Palace on 27 December 1979, where Amin was killed

Amin trusted the Soviet Union until the very end, despite the deterioration of official relations, and was unaware that the tide in Moscow had turned against him since he ordered Taraki's death. When the Afghan intelligence service handed Amin a report that the Soviet Union would invade the country and topple him, Amin claimed that the report was a product of imperialism. His view can be explained by the fact that the Soviet Union, after several months, finally gave in to Amin's demands and sent troops into Afghanistan to secure the PDPA government.[96] Contrary to common Western belief, Amin was informed of the Soviet decision to send troops into Afghanistan.[97] General Tukharinov, commander of the 40th Army, met with Afghan Major General Babadzhan to talk about Soviet troop movements before the Soviet army's intervention.[98] On 25 December, Dmitry Ustinov issued a formal order, stating that "[t]he state frontier of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan is to be crossed on the ground and in the air by forces of the 40th Army and the Air Force at 1500 hrs on 25 December". This was the formal beginning of the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan.[99]

Concerned for his safety, on 20 December Amin moved from the Presidential Palace, located in the centre of Kabul, to the

T-54 tanks.[100] Several Soviet commanders involved in the assassination of Amin thought the plan to attack the palace was "crazy".[101] Although the military had been informed by the Soviet leadership through their commanders, Yuri Drozdov and Vasily Kolesnik, that the leader was a "CIA agent"[102] who had betrayed the Saur Revolution, many Soviet soldiers hesitated; despite what their commanders had told them, it seemed implausible that Amin, the leader of the PDPA government, was an American double agent. Despite several objections, the plan to assassinate Amin went ahead.[101]

Before resorting to killing Amin by brute force, the Soviets had tried to poison him as early as 13 December (but nearly killed his nephew instead) and to kill him with a sniper shot on his way to work (this proved impossible as the Afghans had improved their security measures).[101] They even tried to poison Amin just hours before the assault on the Presidential Palace on 27 December. Amin had organised a lunch for party members to show guests his palace and to celebrate Ghulam Dastagir Panjsheri's return from Moscow. Panjsheri's return improved the mood even further; he boasted that he and Gromyko always kept in contact with each other. During the meal, Amin and several of his guests lost consciousness as they had been poisoned. Amin survived his encounter with death, because the carbonation of the Coca-Cola he was drinking diluted the toxic agent.[103] Mikhail Talybov, a KGB agent, was given responsibility for the poisonings.[104]

The assault on the palace began shortly afterward.

Radio Kabul broadcast Babrak Karmal's pre-recorded speech to the Afghan people, saying: "Today the torture machine of Amin has been smashed". Karmal was installed by the Soviets as the new leader[111] while the Soviet Army began its intervention in Afghanistan that would last for nine years
.

Post-death

On 2 January 1980 on the PDPA's 15th anniversary, Karmal who was now the new General Secretary called Amin a "conspirator, professional criminal and recognised spy of the U.S.", as reported in the

Kabul New Times. Anahita Ratebzad
, the education minister, said about Amin:

...this wrathy, cruel and criminal murderer who had made terror and suppression and crushing of every opposition force part and parcel of his way of rule, and started every day with new acts of destruction, putting opponents of his bloody regime, group by group, to places of torture, jails, and slaughterhouses.[112]

Quotes

"Did Stalin make the revolution in white gloves?"

— Hafizullah Amin when questioned on his extreme ways of building a new country.[113]

"Comrade Stalin showed us how to build socialism in a backward country; it's painful to begin with, but afterwards everything turns out just fine"

— Hafizullah Amin's response to Soviet criticism[86]

See also

References

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  2. ^ Misdaq 2006, p. 136.
  3. ^ Afgantsy: The Russians in Afghanistan 1979–89, by Rodric Braithwaite, p104
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Bibliography

External links

Wikiquote has quotations related to Hafizullah Amin.
Party political offices
Preceded by General Secretary of the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan
14 September – 27 December 1979 		Succeeded by
Political offices
Preceded by Chairman of the Revolutionary Council
14 September – 27 December 1979 		Succeeded by
Chairman of the Council of Ministers
27 March – 27 December 1979
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