Hellenistic philosophy
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Hellenistic philosophy is
Background
The preceding classical period in
Early Platonism, known as the "Old Academy" begins with Plato, followed by Speusippus (Plato's nephew), who succeeded him as the head of the school (until 339 BC), and Xenocrates (until 313 BC). Both of them sought to fuse Pythagorean speculations on number with Plato's theory of forms. The Peripatetic school was composed of philosophers who maintained and developed the philosophy of Aristotle after his death, beginning with Theophrastus (371–287 BC) and Strato of Lampsacus (335–269 BC). They advocated examination of the world to understand the ultimate foundation of things. The goal of life was the eudaimonia which originated from virtuous actions, which consisted in keeping the mean between the two extremes of the too much and the too little.
The Hellenistic period began with the death of Alexander and Diogenes in 323 BC, followed by the death of Aristotle the next year in 322 BC. While the classical thinkers were mostly based in Athens, at end of the Hellenistic period philosophers relocated at Rome or Alexandria. The shift followed Rome's military victories from the middle of the second century. Sulla's capture of Athens in 87 led to destructions and the shipping of Aristotle's manuscripts to Rome. The end of the Hellenistic period does not correspond with anything philosophical but gradually during the Roman imperial period the predominance of Ancient Roman philosophy becomes perceptible. According to A. C. Grayling, the greater insecurity and loss of autonomy of the era drove some to use philosophy as a means to seek inner security from the external world.[4] This interest in using philosophy to improve life was captured in Epicurus' claim that "empty are the words of that philosopher who offers therapy for no human suffering".[5]
Socratic schools
Many of the Socratic schools founded prior to the Hellenistic period continued to exert influence well into it, including the Cynic, Cyrenaic and Megarian school.[6]
Cynics
Cynicism, as begun with Antisthenes, followed by Diogenes and Crates of Thebes, advocated purposefully living an ascetic life with only bare necessities in accordance with nature, rejecting all "unnatural pleasures" that were associated with society or its material benefits.[7] Pleasures provided by nature (which would be immediately accessible) were acceptable, however.[7] Crates hence claimed that "Philosophy is a quart of beans and to care for nothing".[7] Stoicism would be based on the ethical ideas of the Cynics.[4]
Cyrenaics
The Cyrenaics, beginning with Aristippus the Younger, the grandson of the founder, argued that the reason pleasure was good was that it was evident in human behavior from the youngest age, because this made it natural and therefore good (the so-called cradle argument).[8] The Cyrenaics also believed that present pleasure freed one from anxiety of the future and regrets of the past, leaving one at peace of mind.[8] These ideas were taken further by Anniceris (fl. 300 BC), who expanded pleasure to include things like friendship and honour.[8] Theodorus (c. 340–250) disagreed with this, and instead argued that social ties should be cut and self-sufficiency be espoused instead.[8] Hegesias of Cyrene (fl. 290) on the other hand claimed that life could ultimately not be overall pleasurable.[8]
Dialectical school
The dialectical school was known for their study of
Stoicism
Stoic logic
The Stoics propounded that knowledge can be attained through the use of reason. Truth can be distinguished from fallacy—even if, in practice, only an approximation can be made. According to the Stoics, the senses constantly receive sensations: pulsations that pass from objects through the senses to the mind, where they leave an impression in the imagination (phantasiai) (an impression arising from the mind was called a phantasma).[16] The mind has the ability to judge (συγκατάθεσις, synkatathesis)—approve or reject—an impression, enabling it to distinguish a true representation of reality from one that is false. Some impressions can be assented to immediately, but others can achieve only varying degrees of hesitant approval, which can be labeled belief or opinion (doxa). It is only through reason that we gain clear comprehension and conviction (katalepsis). Certain and true knowledge (episteme), achievable by the Stoic sage, can be attained only by verifying the conviction with the expertise of one's peers and the collective judgment of humankind.
Stoic physics
According to the Stoics, the
Stoic passions
The foundation of Stoic ethics is that good lies in the state of the soul itself; in wisdom and self-control. One must therefore strive to be free of the passions. For the Stoics, reason meant using logic and understanding the processes of nature—the logos or universal reason, inherent in all things.[21]
Present | Future | |
---|---|---|
Good | Delight | Lust |
Evil | Distress | Fear |
For the Stoics, passions are evaluative judgements;[22] A person experiencing such an emotion has incorrectly valued an indifferent thing.[23] a fault of judgement, some false notion of good or evil, lies at the root of each passion.[24] Incorrect judgement as to a present good gives rise to delight (hēdonē), while lust (epithumia) is a wrong estimate about the future.[24] Unreal imaginings of evil cause distress (lupē) about the present, or fear(phobos) for the future.[24] The ideal Stoic would instead measure things at their real value,[24] and see that the passions are not natural.[25] To be free of the passions is to have a happiness which is self-contained.[25] There would be nothing to fear—for unreason is the only evil; no cause for anger—for others cannot harm you.[25]
The wise person (sophos) is someone who is free from the passions (apatheia). Instead the sage experiences good-feelings (eupatheia) which are clear-headed.[26] These emotional impulses are not excessive, but nor are they diminished emotions.[27][28] Instead they are the correct rational emotions.[28] The Stoics listed the good-feelings under the headings of joy (chara), wish (boulesis), and caution (eulabeia).[23] Thus if something is present which is a genuine good, then the wise person experiences an uplift in the soul—joy (chara).[29]
Epicureanism
Epicureanism was founded by Epicurus in the 3rd century BC.
Atoms and void
Epicurean physics held that the entire universe consisted of two things: matter and void.[30] Matter is made up of atoms, which are tiny bodies that have only the unchanging qualities of shape, size, and weight.[31][32] The Epicureans believed that atoms were unchanging because the world was ordered and that changes had to have specific and consistent sources, e.g. a plant species only grows from a seed of the same species,[33][34] but that in order for the universe to persist, what it is ultimately made up of must not be able to be changed or else the universe would be essentially destroyed.[35][33]
Epicurus holds that there must be an infinite supply of atoms, although only a finite number of types of atoms, as well as an infinite amount of void.
Epicureans believed that senses also relied on atoms. Every object was continually emitting particles from itself that would then interact with the observer.[39] All sensations, such as sight, smell, or sound, relied on these particles.[39] While the atoms that were emitted did not have the qualities that the senses were perceiving, the manner in which they were emitted caused the observer to experience those sensations, e.g. red particles were not themselves red but were emitted in a manner that caused the viewer to experience the color red.[39] The atoms are not perceived individually, but rather as a continuous sensation because of how quickly they move.[39]
Truth of sense-perception
The epistemology of the Epicureans was empiricist, with knowledge being ultimately sourced from the senses.[5] Epicurus argued that sensory information is never false, though it may be misleading sometimes, and that "If you fight against all sensations, you will not have a standard against to which judge even those of them you say are mistaken".[40] He responded to an objection to empiricism made by Plato in Meno, according to which one cannot search for information without having some pre-existing idea of what to search for, hence meaning that knowledge must precede experience. The Epicurean response is that prolepsis (preconceptions) are general concepts which allow particular things to be recognised, and that these emerge from repeated experiences of similar things.[5] When we form judgments about things (hupolepsis), they can be verified and corrected through further sensory information.[41][42][43] For example, if someone sees a tower from far away that appears to be round, and upon approaching the tower they see that it is actually square, they would come to realize that their original judgement was wrong and correct their wrong opinion.[43]
Pleasure
Epicureanism bases its ethics on a hedonistic set of values, seeing pleasure as the chief good in life.[44][45] Hence, Epicurus advocated living in such a way as to derive the greatest amount of pleasure possible during one's lifetime, yet doing so moderately in order to avoid the suffering incurred by overindulgence in such pleasure.[44] Epicurus actively recommended against passionate love, and believed it best to avoid marriage altogether. He viewed recreational sex as a natural, but not necessary, desire that should be generally avoided.[46] Since the political life could give rise to desires that could disturb virtue and one's peace of mind, such as a lust for power or a desire for fame, participation in politics was discouraged.[47][48] Further, Epicurus sought to eliminate the fear of the gods and of death, seeing those two fears as chief causes of strife in life.[49]
Skepticism
Greek
Academic skepticism
Following the death of
Middle Academy
While the objective of the Pyrrhonists was the attainment of
The Academics did not doubt the existence of
The doctrines of Arcesilaus, which must be gathered from the writings of others,
New Academy
The next stage in Academic skepticism was the moderate skepticism of
Knowledge being impossible, a wise man should practice
By the time of Philo of Larissa, we find a tendency not only to reconcile the internal divergences of the Academy itself, but also to connect it with parallel systems of thought.[57] In general, his philosophy was a reaction against the skeptic or agnostic position of the middle and new Academy in favor of the dogmatism of Plato.[62] Philo of Larissa endeavored to show that Carneades was not opposed to Plato, and further that the apparent antagonism between Platonism and Stoicism was because they were arguing from different points of view. From this syncretism emerged the eclectic middle Platonism of Antiochus of Ascalon.[57]
Pyrrhonist revival
Pyrrhonism was revived by Aenesidemus in the 1st century BC. Its objective is ataraxia (being mentally unperturbed), which is achieved through epoché (i.e. suspension of judgment) about non-evident matters (i.e., matters of belief). It is unclear from the surviving evidence how much of its doctrines comprise a revival of older doctrines rather than a development of new ones.[63] Pyrrhonists dispute that the dogmatists – which includes all of Pyrrhonism's rival philosophies – have found truth regarding non-evident matters. For any non-evident matter, a Pyrrhonist makes arguments for and against such that the matter cannot be concluded, thus suspending belief and thereby inducing ataraxia.
Although Pyrrhonism's objective is ataraxia, it is best known for its
Later schools
Middle Platonism
Around 90 BC,
Hellenistic Judaism
Neopythagoreanism
Pythagorean views were revived by Nigidius Figulus during the Hellenistic period, when pseudo-pythagorean writings began circulating.[66] Eventually in the 1st and 2nd centuries AD Neopythagoreanism came to be recognized.
See also
Notes
- ^ Long 1996, p. 1.
- ^ Long 1996, p. vii.
- ^ Adamson 2015, pp. 8–9.
- ^ a b Grayling 2019, p. 99.
- ^ a b c Sellars 2018, pp. 32–36.
- ^ Bobzien 2004, §1.
- ^ a b c Adamson 2015, pp. 10–15.
- ^ a b c d e Adamson 2015, pp. 20–23.
- ^ Bobzien, Susanne (2004). "Dialectical school". In Zalta, Edward N. (ed.). Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
- ^ Bobzien 2004, Introduction.
- ^ * Kneale, William; Kneale, Martha (1984), The Development of Logic, Oxford University Press
- ISBN 978-0415968256.
- ^ Jacques Brunschwig, Stoic Metaphysics in The Cambridge Companion to Stoics, ed. B. Inwood, Cambridge, 2006, pp. 206–32
- ^ Sextus Empiricus, Adversus Mathematicos 10.218. (chronos, topos, kenon, lekton)
- ^ Marcelo D. Boeri, The Stoics on Bodies and Incorporeals, The Review of Metaphysics, Vol. 54, No. 4 (Jun., 2001), pp. 723–52
- Diogenes Laërtius (2000). Lives of eminent philosophers. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. VII.49
- ISBN 978-1844655670.
- ^ Seneca, Epistles, lxv. 2.
- ^ Marcus Aurelius, Meditations, iv. 21.
- ^ Michael Lapidge, Stoic Cosmology, in: John M. Rist, The Stoics, Cambridge University Press, 1978, pp. 182–83.
- OCLC 430497127.
- ^ a b Annas 1994, p. 114
- ^ a b c d Capes 1880, p. 47
- ^ a b c Capes 1880, p. 48
- ^ Inwood 1999, p. 705
- ^ Annas 1994, p. 115
- ^ a b Graver 2007, p. 52
- ^ Inwood 1999, p. 701
- ^ O'Keefe 2010, pp. 11–13
- ^ a b Wilson 2015, p. page=9
- ^ O'Keefe 2010, p. 21
- ^ a b O'Keefe 2010, pp. 18–20
- ^ Sharples, R. W. (1998). Stoics, Epicureans, and Sceptics: An Introduction to Hellenistic Philosophy. New York, NY: Routledge. pp. 34–35.
- ^ Sharples, R. W. (1996). Stoics, Epicureans, and Sceptics: An introduction to Hellenistic Philosophy. New York, NY: Routledge. pp. 35–37.
- ^ a b Wilson 2015, p. =11
- ^ a b c O'Keefe 2010, pp. 25–28
- ^ a b c Sharples, R. W. (1996). Stoics, Epicurus, and Sceptics: An Introduction to Hellenistic Philosophy. New York, NY: Routledge. pp. 64–66.
- ^ a b c d Wilson 2015, pp. 54–55
- ^ Adamson 2015, pp. 26–28.
- ^ O'Keefe 2010, pp. 97–98
- ISBN 9780521194785.
- ^ a b O'Keefe 2010, pp. 103–104
- ^ a b O'Keefe 2010, pp. 107–115
- ^ Sharples, R. W. (1996). Stoics, Epicureans, and Sceptics: An Introduction to Hellenistic Philosophy. New York, NY: Routledge. p. 84.
- ^ Wilson 2015, pp. 95–96
- ^ Wilson 2015, pp. 84–85
- ^ O'Keefe 2010, p. 145
- ^ O'Keefe 2010, pp. 155–171
- ^ Thorsrud 2014, pp. 120–121.
- ^ Thorsrud 2014, p. 45.
- ^ Thorsrud 2014, pp. 102–103.
- ^ public domain: Chisholm, Hugh, ed. (1911). "Scepticism". Encyclopædia Britannica. Vol. 24 (11th ed.). Cambridge University Press. pp. 306–309. One or more of the preceding sentences incorporates text from a publication now in the
- ^ a b c This article incorporates text from a publication now in the public domain: Smith, William, ed. (1870). "Arcesilaus". Dictionary of Greek and Roman Biography and Mythology.
- Phaedo, 64–67
- ^ Veres, Máté (2009). "Carlos Lévy, Les Scepticismes; Markus Gabriel, Antike und moderne Skepsis zur Einführung". Rhizai. A Journal for Ancient Philosophy and Science. 6 (1): 107.: 111
- ^ a b c d e f g public domain: Chisholm, Hugh, ed. (1911). "Academy, Greek". Encyclopædia Britannica. Vol. 1 (11th ed.). Cambridge University Press. pp. 105–106. One or more of the preceding sentences incorporates text from a publication now in the
- ^ Cicero, Acad. i. 12, iv. 24; De Orat. iii. 18; Diogenes Laertius iv. 28; Sextus Empiricus, Adv. Math. vii. 150, Pyrrh. Hyp. i. 233
- ^ a b public domain: Chisholm, Hugh, ed. (1911). "Arcesilaus". Encyclopædia Britannica. Vol. 2 (11th ed.). Cambridge University Press. p. 342. One or more of the preceding sentences incorporates text from a publication now in the
- ^ a b c public domain: Chisholm, Hugh, ed. (1911). "Carneades". Encyclopædia Britannica. Vol. 5 (11th ed.). Cambridge University Press. pp. 363–364. One or more of the preceding sentences incorporates text from a publication now in the
- ^ public domain: Chisholm, Hugh, ed. (1911). "Clitomachus". Encyclopædia Britannica. Vol. 6 (11th ed.). Cambridge University Press. p. 531. One or more of the preceding sentences incorporates text from a publication now in the
- ^ public domain: Chisholm, Hugh, ed. (1911). "Philo of Larissa". Encyclopædia Britannica. Vol. 21 (11th ed.). Cambridge University Press. p. 413. One or more of the preceding sentences incorporates text from a publication now in the
- ^ Long & Sedley 1987.
- ^ Pulleyn, William (1830). The Etymological Compendium, Or, Portfolio of Origins and Inventions. T. Tegg. pp. 353.
- ^ "Platonism - Medieval Platonism".
- ^ The Pythagorean Texts of the Hellenistic Period, Collected and Edited by Holger Thesleff, Acta Acedemias Aboensis, Ser. A. Humaniora. Humanistiska Vetenskaper. Socialvetenskaper. Teologi. Vol. 30 nr I. Paperback – January 1, 1965
References
- Adamson, Peter (2015). Philosophy in the Hellenistic and Roman Worlds. Oxford University Press. ISBN 978-0-19-872802-3. Retrieved 15 January 2023.
- Annas, Julia (1994), Hellenistic Philosophy of Mind, University of California Press, ISBN 978-0-520-07659-4
- Capes, William Wolfe (1880), Stoicism, Pott, Young, & Co.
- Graver, Margaret (2007), Stoicism and Emotion, University of Chicago Press, ISBN 978-0-226-30557-8
- Grayling, A. C. (2019). The History of Philosophy. Penguin UK. ISBN 978-0-241-98086-6.
- Inwood, Brad (1999), "Stoic Ethics", in Algra, Keimpe; Barnes, Johnathan; Mansfield, Jaap; Schofield, Malcolm (eds.), The Cambridge History of Hellenistic Philosophy, Cambridge University Press, ISBN 978-0-521-25028-3
- O'Keefe, Tim (2010). Epicureanism. University of California Press.
- Long, A. A.; Sedley, D. N., eds. (1987). The Hellenistic Philosophers. Cambridge University Press. (2 vols.)
- Long, A. A. (12 September 1996). Hellenistic Philosophy: Stoics, Epicureans, Sceptics. Bloomsbury Academic. ISBN 978-0-7156-1238-5. Retrieved 15 January 2023.
- Sellars, John (2018). Hellenistic Philosophy. Oxford University Press. p. 36. ISBN 978-0-19-967412-1.
- Sorabji, Richard (2000), Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation, Oxford University Press, ISBN 978-0-198-25005-0
- Thorsrud, Harald (5 December 2014). Ancient Scepticism. Routledge. ISBN 978-1-317-49283-2.
- Wilson, Catherine (2015). Epicureanism: a very short introduction (First ed.). Oxford, United Kingdom. )
Further reading
- Kelly Arenson (Ed.), The Routledge Handbook of Hellenistic Philosophy, London 2020
- Keimpe Algra et al., The Cambridge History of Hellenistic Philosophy, Cambridge University Press, 1999.
- ISBN 0887060080.
External links
- The London Philosophy Study Guide offers many suggestions on what to read, depending on the student's familiarity with the subject: Post-Aristotelian philosophy Archived 2021-02-28 at the Wayback Machine
- "Readings in Hellenistic Philosophy" on PhilPapers, edited by Dirk Baltzly