History of conservatism in the United States
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Conservatism in the United States |
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There has never been a national political party in the United States called the
No American party has advocated European ideals of
Unlike Canada and the United Kingdom, there has never been a major national political party named the Conservative Party in the United States.
Founding
Colonial era
The conservatism that prevailed in the Thirteen Colonies before 1776 was of a very different character than the conservatism that emerged based on revolutionary principles. This old conservatism centered on a landed elite and on an urban merchant class that was Loyalist during the Revolution. In Virginia, the largest, richest and most influential of the American colonies, conservatives held full control of the colonial and local governments. At the local level, Church of England parishes handled many local affairs, and they in turn were controlled not by the minister, but rather by a closed circle of rich landowners who comprised the parish vestry. Ronald L. Heinemann emphasizes the ideological conservatism of Virginia, while noting there were also religious dissenters who were gaining strength by the 1760s:
The tobacco planters and farmers of Virginia adhered to the concept of a hierarchical society that they or their ancestors had brought with them from England. Most held to the general idea of a Great Chain of Being: at the top were God and his heavenly host; next came kings...who were divinely sanctioned to rule, then a hereditary aristocracy who were followed in descending order by wealthy landed gentry, small, independent farmers, tenant farmers, servants....Aspirations to rise above one's station in life were considered a sin.[7]
In actual practice, colonial Virginia never had a bishop to represent God nor a hereditary
American Revolution
Russell Kirk saw the American Revolution itself as "a conservative reaction, in the English political tradition, against royal innovation".[11] David Lefer has emphasized the central role of conservative Founding Fathers in shaping the key documents such as the United States Constitution.[12]
American conservatives since the 1770s have honored the American Revolution for its successes in maintaining traditional values, such as local self-rule, that seemed under threat from London. Robert Nisbet, a leading conservative intellectual, stressed the conservative nature of the American Revolution in contrast to the extreme passions and much greater violence of other revolutions, especially the French Revolution. He attributed the Patriots' restraint to the localization of power, religiosity, the absence of anticlericalism, and the relatively open class system made possible by the absence of hereditary aristocrats.[13]
After 1776, the new American conservatism, unlike European conservatism, was not based on inherited rank, landed estates or loyalty to the Crown or the established Church. Donald T. Critchlow and Nancy MacLean point out its resemblance to European liberalism.[14]
At the time of the American Revolution, the colonists under British rule lived under the freest government in the European world,[15] but in their fierce determination to protect and preserve their historic rights, the founding fathers sought independence from the British Empire despite their relatively low level of taxation.[16][17][18][19]
However, wealthy merchants involved in international trade, royal officials, and patronage holders typically enjoyed close ties across the
The patriots who fought in the Revolution did so in the name of preserving traditional rights of Englishmen—especially the right of "no taxation without representation"; they increasingly opposed attempts by the Parliament of Great Britain to tax and control the fast-growing colonies. In 1773, when the British imposed heavy sanctions on the Massachusetts Bay Province in the wake of the Boston Tea Party, self described patriots organized colony-by-colony resistance through organizations such as the Sons of Liberty.[23] Fighting broke out in the spring of 1775, and all Thirteen Colonies entered into open rebellion against the crown. In July 1776, the Second Continental Congress declared independence from the United Kingdom and became the de facto national government espousing the principles of Life, Liberty, and the Pursuit of Happiness. The patriots formed a consensus around the ideas of republicanism, whereby popular sovereignty was invested in a national legislature instead of a King.
Historian Leonard Labaree identified the main characteristics of the Loyalists that contributed to their conservative opposition to independence. Loyalists were generally older than Patriots, better established in society, resisted innovation, believed resistance to the Crown—the legitimate government—was morally wrong, and were further alienated from the Patriot cause when it resorted to violent means of opposition, such as burning houses and tarring and feathering royal officials. Loyalists wanted to take a middle-of-the road position and were angry when forced by the Patriots to declare their opposition. They had a long-standing sentimental attachment to Britain (often with business and family ties) and were procrastinators who realized that while independence might be inevitable, they would rather postpone it for as long as possible. Many Loyalists were also highly cautious and afraid of the potential anarchy or tyranny that could arise out of mob rule. Finally, Loyalists were pessimists who lacked the Patriots' confidence in the future of an independent United States.[24][25][26]
The Patriots' victory established their revolutionary principles as core American political values adhered to by all parties in the newly formed United States. Modern American Conservatives often identify with the Patriots of the 1770s, a fact exemplified in 2009 by the Tea Party movement, named after the Tea Party of 1773. Its members often dress in costumes characteristic of the Founding Fathers.
The American Revolution proved highly disruptive to the old networks of conservative elites in the colonies. The departure of so many royal officials, rich merchants, and landed gentry destroyed the hierarchical networks that previously dominated politics and power in many of the colonies. In New York, for example, the departure of key members of the DeLancy, DePester Walton, and Cruger families undercut the interlocking families that largely owned and controlled the Hudson Valley. Likewise in Pennsylvania, the departure of the powerful Penn, Allen, Chew, and Shippen families destroyed the cohesion of the old upper class. New men became rich merchants, but they retained a spirit of republican equality that replaced the old elitism; the revolution prevented the rise of a truly powerful upper class in American society. Most Loyalists remained in the new nation and became loyal citizens, although they seldom held leadership positions of the sort they were entitled to before the Revolution.
Federalists
In the wake of the Revolution, the newly formed
The Federalists were dominated by businessmen and merchants in the major cities and were supportive of the modernizing, urbanizing,
John Adams
Since the 1790s, conservatives have emphasized an identification with the Founding Fathers and the Constitution. Historians of conservative political thought "generally label John Adams as the intellectual father of American conservatism."[31] Russell Kirk points to Adams as the key Founding Father for conservatives, noting that "some writers regard him as America's most important conservative public man."[32] Historian Clinton Rossiter writes:
Here was no lover of government by plutocracy, no dreamer of an America filled with factions and hard-packed cities. Here was a man who loved America as it was and had been, one whose life was a doughty testament to the trials and glories of ordered liberty. Here ... was the model of the American conservative.[33]
Historian A. Owen Aldridge places Adams, "At the head of the conservative ranks in the early years of the Republic and Jefferson as the leader of the contrary liberal current."[34] It was a fundamental doctrine for Adams that all men are subject to equal laws of morality. He held that in society all men have a right to equal laws and equal treatment from the government. However, he added, "no two men are perfectly equal in person, property, understanding, activity, and virtue."[35] Peter Viereck concluded:
Hamilton, Adams, and their Federalist party sought to establish in the new world what they called a "natural aristocracy." [It was to be] based on property, education, family status, and sense of ethical responsibility....Their motive was liberty itself.[36]
Democratic-Republicans
In the 1790s,
Whigs
During the 1800s and 1810s, the "
By the 1830s, the
In the end, the nation synthesized the two positions, Federalist and Whig, adopting representative democracy and a strong nation state. By the end of the 1820s, American politics had generally adapted to a two-party system whereby rival parties stake their claims before the electorate, and the winner takes control of the government. As time went on, the Federalists lost appeal with the average voter and were generally not equal to the tasks of party organization; hence, they grew steadily weaker. After 1816, the Federalists had no national influence apart from the Marshall Court. They retained some local support into the 1820s, but important leaders left their fading cause, including future presidents John Quincy Adams and James Buchanan, and future Chief Justice Roger B. Taney.
John C. Calhoun
John C. Calhoun of South Carolina (1782-1850), at various times a Jeffersonian Republican, a Whig and a Jacksonian Democrat, was always an independent thinker. He moved from a strong nationalist position in the 1810s and 1820s, to a states' rights position emphasizing the rights of minorities (by which he meant white South), and rejecting a powerful central government. Jefferson and Madison in 1798 had developed a theory of nullification that would enable states to reject unconstitutional federal actions. Calhoun picked up the idea and further developed it as a defense against federal attacks on slavery. His ideas were enormously influential among Southern politicians and intellectuals in the decade after his death in 1850; his ideas were often used to promote secession in 1860 as a legal, constitutional escape valve for the South.[44] Brian Farmer says, "Perhaps no figure better exemplifies the attitudes of Southern conservatism in the antebellum period than John C. Calhoun of South Carolina."[45] His ideas were revived by hard-core Southern conservatives in the 20th century.[46] According to Peter Viereck, "this more extreme, very regional Calhoun conservatism still dominates much of the American South in the 1970s."[47]
American Civil War
Abraham Lincoln
Abraham Lincoln was the first president elected by the newly formed Republican Party, and Lincoln has been an iconic figure for American conservatives.
Historian David Hackett Fischer stresses Lincoln's conservative views. In the 1850s, "Lincoln was a prosperous corporate lawyer, and a member of the conservative Whig party for many years."[48] He promoted business interests, especially banks, canals, railroads, and factories.[49] Before the outbreak of the Civil War, Lincoln explicitly appealed to conservatives. In 1859, he explained what he meant by conservatism in terms of fealty to the original intent of the Founding Fathers:
The chief and real purpose of the Republican party is eminently conservative. It proposes nothing save and except to restore this government to its original tone in regard to this element of slavery, and there to maintain it, looking for no further change in reference to it than that which the original framers of the Government themselves expected and looked forward to."[50]
Lincoln elaborated his position in his famous Cooper Union speech before Republican elites in New York on February 27, 1860. He argued that the Founding Fathers expected slavery to die a natural death, not to spread. His point was that the Founding Fathers were anti-slavery and the notion that slavery was good was a radical innovation that violated American ideals. This speech solidified Lincoln's base in the Republican Party and helped assure his nomination.[51]
During the war, Lincoln was the leader of the moderate Republicans who fought the Radical Republicans on the issues of dealing with slavery and re-integrating the South into the nation. He built the stronger coalition, holding together conservative and moderate Republicans, and War Democrats, against the Radicals who wanted to deny him renomination in 1864.[52][53] When the war was ending Lincoln planned to reintegrate the white South into the union as soon as possible by offering generous peace terms, "with malice toward none, with charity toward all". But when Lincoln was assassinated, the Radicals gained the upper hand and imposed much harsher terms than those Lincoln had wished.[54]
James Randall is one of many who see Lincoln as holding 19th century classical liberal positions, while at the same time emphasizing Lincoln's tolerance and conservatism "in his preference for orderly progress, his distrust of dangerous agitation, and his reluctance toward ill digested schemes of reform." Randall concluded that Lincoln was "conservative in his complete avoidance of that type of so-called 'radicalism' that involved abuse of the South, hatred for the slaveholder, thirst for vengeance, partisan plotting, and ungenerous demands that Southern institutions be transformed overnight by outsiders."[55] David Greenstone argues that Lincoln's thought was grounded in reform liberalism but notes that his unionism and Whiggish politics had a deeply conservative side as well.[56]
Some liberal historians hold alternative views. According to Striner, "...it is vain to try to classify Lincoln as a clear-cut conservative or liberal, as some historians have tried. He was both, and his politics engendered a long-term tradition of centrism..." .[57]
Southern conservatism
Historians such as Stephanie Camp have noted the conservatism of the Confederate States of America.
After the Civil War, "conservative" came to mean those who supported the steady racial integration of blacks into American society, but opposed the Radical Republicans who wanted to impose punitive measures against ex-Confederates.[58] Conservative Southerners thought that the radicalism of Northern reformers to empower the freed slaves would cause upheaval if done too quickly. They often accused Northern Carpetbaggers who tried to help freed slaves of corruption. Conservatives opposed the race-based politics in the American South, but given the dominance of the Democratic Party, had to settle on incrementalism. Supremacist Southern Democrats differed from conservatives in their strong support for white supremacy, and insistence on a second-class powerless status for blacks, regardless of the Constitution.[59] Southern conservatives in the 1950s added anti-communism to their agenda, believing that the ideology was poisoning the civil rights movement and the push for integration.[60]
There was also a liberal element in the South—in support of
Fundamentalism, especially on the part of Southern Baptists, was a powerful force in Southern conservative politics beginning in the late 1970s. However, they voted for Reagan in 1980 over a fellow Southern Baptist Jimmy Carter.[63][64]
Gilded Age
There was little nostalgia and backward looking in the dynamic North and West during the Gilded Age, the period in the U.S. history in the late 19th century, from the 1870s to about 1900. Business was expanding rapidly, with manufacturing, mining, railroads, and banking leading the way. There were millions of new farms in the prairie states. Immigration reached record levels. Progress was the watchword of the day. The wealth of the period is highlighted by American upper class opulence, but also by the rise of American philanthropy (referred to by Andrew Carnegie as the "Gospel of Wealth") that used private money to endow thousands of colleges, hospitals, museums, academies, schools, opera houses, public libraries, symphony orchestras, and charities.[65]
Conservatives in the 20th Century, looking back at the Gilded Age, retroactively applied the word "conservative" to those who supported unrestrained Capitalism. For example, Oswald Garrison Villard, writing in 1939, characterized his former mentor Horace White (1834–1916) as "a great economic conservative; had he lived to see the days of the New Deal financing he would probably have cried out loud and promptly demised."[66]
In this sense, the conservative element of the Democratic party was led by the
Religious conservatives of this period sponsored a large and flourishing media network, especially based on magazines, many with close ties to the Protestant churches that were rapidly expanding due to the Third Great Awakening. Catholics had few magazines but opposed agrarianism in politics and established hundreds of schools and colleges to promote their conservative religious and social values.[67]
Modern conservatives often point to
The Gilded Age came to an end with the Panic of 1893 and the severe nationwide depression that lasted from 1893 to 1897.
1896–1932
1896 realignment
The two parties re-aligned in the election of 1896, with the conservative Republicans led by
The term socialist has long been used as an epithet by conservatives that goes far beyond issues of municipal ownership. Editor William Allen White of Emporia, Kansas, in his famous 1896 editorial on "What's the matter with Kansas" furiously attacked the radicalism of Bryanite Democrats and Populists. Supporters of Republican conservative William McKinley distributed over a million copies to rally opposition to William Jennings Bryan, nominee of both the Democratic and Populist parties. White, according to historian David Hinshaw, used "socialistic" as "his big gun to blast radical opposition."[73][full citation needed]
Conservative empire building
As the 19th century drew to a close, the United States became an imperial power, with overseas territories in Hawaii, the Philippines, Guam, Puerto Rico, and control over Cuba. Imperialism won out, as the election of 1900 ratified McKinley's policies and the U.S. possession of territories acquired in the Spanish–American War. Theodore Roosevelt promoted the military and naval advantages of the U.S., and echoed McKinley's theme that America had a duty to civilize and modernize the heathen.[74][75] Bryan made anti-imperialism a centerpiece of his 1900 presidential election campaign, and the Democrats continued the anti-imperialistic tradition, calling for independence for the Philippines until they finally won congressional approval in 1916 that promised eventual independence, which was achieved in 1946. Meanwhile, the imperialistic Republicans lost interest. The supposed business, religious, and military advantages of having an empire proved illusory; by 1908 or so the most ardent conservative imperialists, especially William Howard Taft, and Elihu Root turned their attention to building up an army and navy at home and to building the Panama Canal.[76] They dropped the notion of additional expansion and by 1920, agreed that the Philippines should become independent.[77][78]
Progressive Era
In the early years of the 20th century, Republican spokesmen for big business in Congress included Speaker of the House
The "insurgents" were on the Left of the Republican Party. Led by
World War I
The Great War broke out in 1914, with Wilson proclaiming neutrality. Former President Theodore Roosevelt denounced Wilson's foreign policy, charging, 'Had it not been for Wilson's pusillanimity, the war would have been over by the summer of 1916." Indeed, Roosevelt believed that Wilson's approach to foreign policy was fundamentally and objectively evil.[86] Roosevelt abandoned the Progressive Party and campaigned energetically for Republican candidate Charles Evans Hughes, but Wilson's policy of neutrality managed to provide him with a narrow victory in the 1916 election. The GOP, under conservative leadership, went on to regain Congress in 1918[87] and then the White House in 1920.
1920s
Republicans returned to dominance in 1920 with the election of President Warren G. Harding, who ran a campaign that pledged a return to normalcy. Tucker (2010) argues that the 1924 election marked the "high tide of American conservatism," as both major candidates campaigned for limited government, reduced taxes, and less regulation. The opposition was split between Progressive Party candidate Robert M. La Follette who won 17% of the vote, and Democratic John W. Davis who took 29%, which allowed Calvin Coolidge to easily win reelection.[88] Under Coolidge (1923–29), the economy boomed and society stabilized; new policies focused on Americanizing immigrants already living in the United States and restricting the influx of new immigrants into the country.
During 1920s,
Representative of the 1900–1930 era, was James M. Beck, a lawyer under Presidents Roosevelt, Harding and Coolidge, and a congressman from 1927 to 1933. He espoused conservative principles such as American nationalism, individualism, constitutionalism, laissez-faire economics, property rights, and opposition to reform. Conservatives like Beck saw the need to regulate bad behavior in the corporate world with the intention of protecting corporate capitalism from radical forces, but they were alarmed by the anti-business and pro-union proposals of Roosevelt after 1905. They began to question the notion of a national authority beneficial to big capital, and instead emphasized legalism, concern for the Constitution, and reverence for the American past.[90]
Anti-Communism
In the wake of the
Writers and intellectuals
A tension between mainstream
Numerous literary figures developed a conservative sensibility and warned of threats to Western Civilization. In the 1900–1950 era Henry Adams, T. S. Eliot, Allen Tate, Andrew Lytle, Donald Davidson, and others feared that heedless scientific innovation would unleash forces that would undermine traditional Western values and lead to the collapse of civilization. Instead they searched for a rationale for promoting traditional cultural values in the face of their fear of an onslaught by moral nihilism based on historical and scientific relativism.[95]
Conservatism as an intellectual movement in the South after 1930 was represented by writers such as Flannery O'Connor and the Southern Agrarians. The focus was on traditionalism and hierarchy.[96]
Numerous former Communist or Trotskyite writers repudiated the Left in the 1930s or 1940s and embraced conservatism, becoming contributors to National Review in the 1950s. They included Max Eastman (1883–1969), John Dos Passos (1896–1970), Whittaker Chambers (1901–1961), Will Herberg (1901–1977), and James Burnham (1905–1987).[97]
Dozens of small circulation magazines aimed at intellectuals promoted the conservative cause in the 20th century.[98]
Newspapers
Major newspapers in metropolitan centers with conservative editorial viewpoints have played an important part in the development of American conservatism. In the 1930–1960 era, the Hearst chain,[99] and the McCormick family newspapers (especially the Chicago Tribune[100]), and the Los Angeles Times[101] championed most conservative causes, as did the Henry Luce magazines, Time and Fortune.[102] In recent years, those media have lost their conservative edge.[103]
By 1936, most publishers favored Republican
New Deal Era
During the 1930s, the beginning of modern conservatism was born with opposition towards the New Deal of President Franklin D. Roosevelt. Conservative (mostly Midwestern) Republicans and Southern Democrats united for the first time, and distinct characteristics of modern conservatism began to appear.
The Great Depression, which followed the Wall Street Crash of 1929 led to price deflation, massive unemployment, falling farm incomes, investment losses, bank failures, business bankruptcies and reduced government revenues. Herbert Hoover's economic policies failed as the depression worsened, and in the 1932 presidential election, Democratic Franklin D. Roosevelt won a landslide victory.
Liberty League and the Old Right
Roosevelt's New Deal had considerable conservative support at the start, but by 1934 the conservatives started uniting in opposition to the president. The counterattack first came from conservative Democrats, led by presidential nominees John W. Davis (1924) and Al Smith (1928), who mobilized businessmen into the American Liberty League.[108]
Opposition to the New Deal also came from the Old Right, a group of conservative free-market anti-interventionists, originally associated with Midwestern Republicans led by Hoover and, after 1938, by Senator Robert A. Taft of Ohio. Ex-President Hoover moved sharply to the right after 1932, abandoning his earlier Progressivism. He became a leading opponent of FDR and the New Deal. Hoover became a senior statesman of "conservative republicanism" until his death in 1964. His research center, the Hoover Institution, became a major think tank for the right.[109][110] The Old Right accused Roosevelt of promoting socialism; some noted his upper class status and said he was a "traitor to his class".[111] By 1935, the New Deal strongly supported labor unions, which grew rapidly in membership and power; they became the main target of conservatives.[112]
Conservative backlash against Franklin D. Roosevelt
Buoyed by his landslide win in 1936, which further reduced the GOP in Congress, Roosevelt in early 1937 astonished the nation by his "court-packing scheme". He called on Congress to add six more justices to the nine on the Supreme Court, which had been overturning New Deal legislations as unconstitutional. Vice President John Nance Garner worked with congressional allies to stop Roosevelt. Many who broke with Roosevelt on the Court issue had been old Progressives such as Senator Burton K. Wheeler of Montana.[113][114]
Roosevelt was defeated in the Court initiative and fought back by targeting his enemies in
Conservative coalition forms
Senator
According to James T. Patterson:
By and large the congressional conservatives by 1939 agreed in opposing the spread of federal power and bureaucracy, in denouncing deficit spending, in criticizing industrial labor unions, and in excoriating most welfare programs. They sought to "conserve" an America which they believed to have existed before 1933.[121]
Foreign policy
The conservative coalition was not concerned with foreign policy, as most of the Southern Democrats were internationalists, a position opposed by most Republicans. The key Republican conservative was Senator Robert A. Taft. He unsuccessfully sought the Republican nomination in 1940, 1948, and 1952, and was a staunch isolationist who opposed American membership in
Thomas Jefferson's image
Conservatives typically argued their positions, which were derived from the
1945–1951
The modern conservative political movement, combining elements from both traditional conservatism and libertarianism, emerged following World War II, but had its immediate political roots in reaction to the New Deal. Those two branches of conservatism allied post World War I anti-communism thought. They defended a system in which the government should have a limited role to play in individual affairs.[124] Their conceptions of conservatism, though differing slightly from one another, shared an inclination towards the elevation of a universal moral code within society. In the early 1950s, Dr. Russell Kirk defined the boundaries and resting grounds of conservatism. In his book The Conservative Mind (1953), Dr. Kirk wrote ten "truisms"[125] that became major concepts for conservatism philosophy. Another important name in the domain of U.S. conservatism is James Burnham. Mr. Burnham, a philosopher remembered for his political life, unsettled some foundations of conservatism when he, fervent opponent of liberalism, took position in favor of the Conscription.[126]
In another book called Rebels All, Kevin Mattson seeks to define the main goals of Post-War conservatism in the United States. He wrote: "isn't conservatism supposed to be about maintaining standards, upholding civility, and frowning on rebellion?"[127] In addition, looking back at how it has evolved from post World War II to modern times, it seems undeniable that conservatism holds the capacity to defend diverging beliefs such as free-market libertarianism and religious traditionalism while valuing the aggressively anti-communist mind.[128] Modern Conservatism, a highly complex concept, finds its roots in the works of post-World War II thinkers and philosophers whose differing opinions about how to promote similar goals reflect the subjectivity of this political inclination.
In the 1946 United States elections, conservative Republicans took control of Congress and opened investigations into communist infiltration of the federal government under Roosevelt. Congressman Richard Nixon accused Alger Hiss, a senior State Department official, of being a Soviet spy. Based on the testimony of Whittaker Chambers, an ex-Communist who became a leading anti-Communist and hero to conservatives, Hiss was convicted of perjury.[129]
President
In 1947, the conservative coalition in Congress passed the Taft–Hartley Act, balancing the rights of management and unions, and delegitimizing Communist union leaders. However, the major job of rooting out communists from labor unions and the Democratic party was undertaken by liberals, such as Walter Reuther of the United Auto Workers[131] and Ronald Reagan of the Screen Actors Guild (Reagan was a Democrat at that time).[132]
One typical mid-century conservative Republican in Congress was
In 1950, Lionel Trilling wrote that conservatives had lost the battle of ideas: "In the United States at this time liberalism is not only the dominant but even the sole intellectual tradition. For it is the plain fact that nowadays there are no conservative or reactionary ideas in general circulation." He likewise wrote: "But the conservative impulse and the reactionary impulse do not, with some isolated and some ecclesiastical exceptions, express themselves in ideas but only in action or in irritable mental gestures which seek to resemble ideas."[134]
Anti-Communism
In the wake of the
Korean War
When the communist
McCarthyism: 1950–1954
When anxiety over Communism in Korea and China reached a fever pitch, an otherwise obscure Senator,
Arthur Herman states that "McCarthy was always a more important figure to American liberals than to conservatives", because he targeted liberals, making them look like innocent victims.[146] However, in recent years conservatives have defended McCarthy's rough tactics. Espionage work done under the Venona project showed that communist spies were really present in the government, and some of the Left at the time were indeed covering up those communist networks.[147] The most notable recent conservative defense of McCarthy is M. Stanton Evans' 2007 book Blacklisted by History.
1950s
Examining postwar conservative intellectual history, Kim Phillips-Fein writes:
The most influential synthesis of the subject remains George H. Nash's The Conservative Intellectual Tradition since 1945.... He argued that postwar conservatism brought together three powerful and partially contradictory intellectual currents that previously had largely been independent of each other: libertarianism, traditionalism, and anticommunism. Each particular strain of thought had predecessors earlier in the twentieth (and even nineteenth) centuries, but they were joined in their distinctive postwar formulation through the leadership of William F. Buckley Jr. and National Review. The fusion of these different, competing, and not easily reconciled schools of thought led to the creation, Nash argued, of a coherent modern Right."[148][149]
As shown by General
Russell Kirk
While Republicans in Washington were making small reversals of the New Deal, the most critical opposition to liberalism came from conservative intellectuals.
Kirk adamantly opposed libertarian ideas, which he saw as a threat to true conservatism. In Libertarians: the Chirping Sectaries Kirk wrote that the only thing libertarians and conservatives have in common is a detestation of collectivism. "What else do conservatives and libertarians profess in common? The answer to that question is simple: nothing. Nor will they ever have.".[153]
William F. Buckley Jr. and the National Review
The most effective organizer and proponent of conservative ideas was
Buckley and Rusher assembled an eclectic group of writers: traditionalists, Catholic intellectuals, libertarians and ex-Communists. They included: Russell Kirk, James Burnham, Frank Meyer, Willmoore Kendall, L. Brent Bozell, and Whittaker Chambers. In the magazine's founding statement Buckley wrote:[156]
The launching of a conservative weekly journal of opinion in a country widely assumed to be a bastion of conservatism at first glance looks like a work of supererogation, rather like publishing a royalist weekly within the walls of Buckingham Palace. It is not that of course; if National Review is superfluous, it is so for very different reasons: It stands athwart history, yelling Stop, at a time when no other is inclined to do so, or to have much patience with those who so urge it.
Milton Friedman and libertarian economics
Austrian economist
More influential was the
John Birch Society
Robert W. Welch Jr. (1900–1985) founded the John Birch Society as an authoritarian top-down force to combat Communism. It had tens of thousands of members and distributed books, pamphlets and the magazine American Opinion. It was so tightly controlled by Welch that its effectiveness was strictly limited, as it mostly focused on calls to impeach Chief Justice Earl Warren, as well as supporting local police.[165] It became a major lightning rod for liberal attacks. In 1962, Buckley won the support of Goldwater and other leading conservatives for an attack on Welch. He denounced Welch and the John Birch Society in National Review, as "far removed from common sense" and urged the GOP to purge itself of Welch's influence.[166]
Frank Meyer and Fusionism
The main disagreement between Kirk, described as a
1960s
South and segregation
Despite the popular perception that conservatism is limited to Republicans, during the era of
1964 Barry Goldwater Presidential Campaign
Conservatives united behind the 1964 presidential campaign of Arizona Senator Barry Goldwater (1919–1998), though his campaign was ultimately unsuccessful. Goldwater published The Conscience of a Conservative (1960), a bestselling book that explained modern conservative theory. Goldwater was significantly weakened by his unpopular views regarding Social Security, income tax, and the Vietnam War. In Tennessee, he suggested selling the Tennessee Valley Authority, which was popular with conservatives and liberals in the region.[171] He voted against the Civil Rights Act of 1964, thereby winning the support of Southern segregationists. Support for the campaign came from numerous grassroots activists, such as Phyllis Schlafly and the newly formed Young Americans for Freedom, sponsored by Buckley to mobilize conservatives. Buckley himself tried to win the 1965 New York City mayoral election under the Conservative Party of New York State banner, but failed.
Despite Goldwater's defeat conservatives were rapidly organizing at the local, state, and national levels. They were most successful in suburban California, where they worked hard in the 1966 California gubernatorial election for their new hero Ronald Reagan (1911–2004), who was elected governor for two terms.[172][173][174]
1970s
Conservative shift in politics
Reagan was the leader of a dramatic conservative shift in American politics that undercut many of the domestic and foreign policies that had dominated the national agenda for decades.[175][176]
The common thread was a growing distrust of government to do the right thing on behalf of the people. While distrust of high officials had been an American characteristic for two centuries, this was brought to the forefront by the Watergate scandal of 1973–1974, forcing the resignation of President Richard Nixon- who faced impeachment- and resulting in criminal trials for many of his senior associates. The media was energized in its vigorous search for scandals, which deeply impacted both major parties at the national, state and local levels.[177] At the same time there was a growing distrust of long-powerful institutions such as big business and labor unions. The postwar consensus regarding the value of technology in solving national problems, especially nuclear power, came under heavy attack from the New Left.[178]
Conservatives at state and local levels increasingly emphasized the argument that the soaring crime rates indicated a failure of liberal policy in the American cities.[179]
Meanwhile, liberalism was facing divisive issues as the New Left challenged established liberals on such issues as the Vietnam War, while building a constituency on campuses and among younger voters. A "cultural war" was emerging as a triangular battle among conservatives, liberals, and the New Left, involving such issues as individual freedom, divorce, sexuality, and even topics such as hair length and musical taste.[180]
The triumphant issue for liberalism was the achievement of civil rights legislation in the 1960s, which won over the black population and created a new black electorate in the South. However, it alienated many working-class ethnic whites, and opened the door for conservative white Southerners to move into the Republican Party.[181]
In foreign policy, the war in Vietnam was a highly divisive issue in the 1970s. Nixon had introduced a policy of détente in the Cold War, but it was strongly challenged by Reagan and the conservative movement. Reagan saw the Soviet Union as an implacable enemy that had to be defeated, not compromised with. A new element emerged in Iran, with the overthrow of a pro-American government, and the emergence of the stream the hostile ayatollahs. Radical Iranian students seized the American Embassy, and held American diplomats hostage for over a year, underscoring the weaknesses of the foreign policy of Jimmy Carter.[182]
The economic scene was in doldrums, with soaring inflation undercutting the savings ability of millions of Americans, while unemployment remained high and growth was low. Shortages of gasoline and high prices at the local pump made the energy crisis a local reality.[183]
Reagan increasingly dominated the conservative movement, especially in his failed 1976 quest for the Republican presidential nomination and his successful run in 1980.[184]
Religious Right
An unexpected new factor was the emergence of the religious right as a cohesive political force that gave strong support to conservatism.[185][186]
By the 1950s, many conservatives emphasized the Judeo-Christian roots of their values.[187] Goldwater noted that conservatives "believed the communist projection of man as a producing, consuming animal to be used and discarded was antithetical to all the Judeo-Christian understandings which are the foundations upon which the Republic stands."[188] Ronald Reagan frequently emphasized Judeo-Christian values as necessary ingredients in the fight against communism.[189] Belief in the superiority of Western Judeo-Christian traditions led conservatives to downplay the aspirations of Third World and to denigrate the value of foreign aid.[190] Since the 1990s, the term "Judeo-Christian" has been primarily used by conservatives.[191]
Evangelicals had been politicized in the 1920s, battling to impose prohibition and to stop the teaching of evolution in the schools (as in the
Noting the anger of Catholic bishops at losing state funding because of the Catholic opposition to gay adoptive parents, along with other social issues, The New York Times reported in late 2011:
The idea that religious Americans are now the victims of government-backed persecution is now a frequent theme not just for Catholic bishops, but also for Republican presidential candidates and conservative evangelicals.[195]
Neoconservatives
The 1970s saw the movement of many prominent liberal intellectuals to the right, many of them from New York City Jewish roots and well-established academic reputations,[196] who had become disillusioned with liberalism.
Neoconservatives generally support pro-business policies. Some went on to high policy-making or advisory positions in the Reagan, Bush I and Bush II administrations.
Conservatism in the South
Increased conservatism within the Republican Party attracted conservative white Southern Democrats in presidential elections. A few big names switched to the GOP, including South Carolina Senator Strom Thurmond in 1964 and Texas Governor John Connally in 1973. Starting in 1968 in the South, the GOP dominated most presidential elections (1976 was the exception), but not until the 1990s did the GOP become dominant in state and local politics in the region. Through the Southern strategy, Republicans built their strength among Southern Baptists and other religious Fundamentalists, social conservatives, middle-class suburbanites, migrants from the North, and Hispanic people in Florida. Meanwhile, continuing the trend since the New Deal in the 1930s, African American voters in the South showed increasing support for the Democratic Party at both the presidential and local levels. They elected a number of congressmen and mayors. In 1990, there were still many moderate white Democrats holding office in the South, but when they retired they were typically replaced by more conservative Republicans and black people.[63] In the 21st century, political scientists point to the strong base of social conservatism in the South. The evangelical Protestants, comprising the "Religious Right", have since the 1980s strongly influenced the vote in Republican primaries, for "it is primarily in the South where the evangelical core of the GOP is strongest."[197][198]
Think Tanks and Foundations
In 1971, Lewis F. Powell Jr. urged conservatives to retake command of public discourse through a concerted media outreach campaign. In Powell's view, this would involve monitoring "national television networks…; induc[ing] more 'publishing' by independent scholars who do believe in the [free enterprise] system"; publishing in "magazines and periodicals—ranging from the popular magazines to the more intellectual ones"; issuing "books, paperbacks, and pamphlets"; and dedicating advertising dollars to "a sustained, major effort to inform and enlighten the American people."[199] Conservative think tanks like the American Enterprise Institute and The Heritage Foundation brought in intellectuals for shorter or longer periods, financed research, and disseminated the products through conferences, publications, and systematic media campaigns. They typically focused on projects with immediate policy implications.
Aware that the
In the following decades, conservative policies once considered outside the political mainstream—such as reducing welfare,
Complaining that mainstream academia was hostile to conservatives, several foundations became especially active in funding conservative policy research, notably the Adolph Coors Foundation, the Bradley Foundation, the Koch family foundations, the Scaife Foundations, and (until it closed in 2005), the John M. Olin Foundation. Typically, they have emphasized the need for market-based solutions to national problems.[203] The foundations often invested in conservative student publications and organizations, such as the Intercollegiate Studies Institute and legal foundations such as the Federalist Society.[204]
Policy entrepreneurs such as
Richard Nixon, Gerald Ford and Jimmy Carter
The Republican administrations of President Richard Nixon (1969–74) and Gerald Ford (1974–77) were characterized by their emphasis on détente and on economic intervention through wage and price controls. Ford angered conservatives by retaining Henry Kissinger as Secretary of State and pushing his policy of détente with the Soviet Union. Conservatives finally found a new champion in Ronald Reagan, whose 8 years as governor of California had just ended in 1976, and supported his campaign for the 1976 Republican Party presidential primaries. Ford narrowly won renomination but lost the White House. Following major gains by Democratic liberals in the 1976 presidential election, Jimmy Carter was elected as president. Carter proved too liberal for his fellow Southern Baptists, ( they voted for him in 1976 but not 1980), too conservative for the mainstream of the Democratic Party, and many considered his foreign policy a failure. Carter realized there was a strong national sense of malaise, as inflation skyrocketed, interest rates soared, the economy stagnated, and prolonged humiliation resulted when Islamic militants in Tehran kept American diplomats hostage for 444 days in 1979–81.[206]
1970s recessions
During the recessions of the 1970s, inflation and unemployment rates soared simultaneously and budget deficits began to raise concerns among many Americans. In the early 1970s, America was still a moderately progressive country, as citizens supported
Stopping the Equal Rights Amendment
Conservative women were mobilized in the 1970s by Phyllis Schlafly in an effort to stop ratification of the Equal Rights Amendment (ERA) to the U.S. Constitution. The ERA had seemed a noncontroversial effort to provide legal equality when it easily passed Congress in 1972 and quickly was ratified by 28 of the necessary 38 states. Schlafly denounced it as tilting the playing field against the middle-class housewife in a power grab by anti-family feminists on the left. She warned it would mean women would be drafted in the United States Armed Forces on the same basis as men. Through her Eagle Forum she organized state-by-state to block further ratification, and to have states rescind their ratification. The United States Congress extended the time needed, and a movement among feminists tried to boycott tourist cities in states that had not ratified (such as Chicago and New Orleans). It was to no avail. The ERA never became law and Schlafly became a major spokesperson for feminist traditionalism in the conservative movement.[210]
1980s: Reagan Era
With Ronald Reagan's victory in 1980 the modern American conservative movement took power. Republicans took control of the Senate for the first time since 1954, and conservative principles dominated Reagan's economic and foreign policies, with supply-side economics and strict opposition to Soviet Communism defining the Administration's philosophy. Reagan's ideas were largely espoused and supported by the conservative Heritage Foundation, which grew dramatically in its influence during the Reagan years, extended to a second term by the 1984 presidential election, as Reagan and his senior aides looked to Heritage for policy guidance.
An icon of the American conservative movement, Reagan is credited by his supporters with transforming the politics of the United States, galvanizing the success of the Republican Party. He brought together a coalition of economic conservatives, who supported his
In defining conservatism, Reagan said: "If you analyze it I believe the very heart and soul of conservatism is libertarianism. I think conservatism is really a misnomer just as liberalism is a misnomer for the liberals—if we were back in the days of the Revolution, so-called conservatives today would be the Liberals and the liberals would be the Tories. The basis of conservatism is a desire for less government interference or less centralized authority or more individual freedom and this is a pretty general description also of what libertarianism is."[212] Reagan's views on government were influenced by Thomas Jefferson, especially his hostility to strong central governments.[213] "We're still Jefferson's children," he declared in 1987. He also stated, "Freedom is not created by Government, nor is it a gift from those in political power. It is, in fact, secured, more than anything else, by limitations placed on those in Government".[214][215] Likewise he greatly admired and often quoted Abraham Lincoln.[216]
The 1980s also saw the founding of The Washington Times, a newspaper influential in the conservative movement. Reagan was said to have read the paper every morning, and the paper had close ties to multiple Republican administrations.[221][222] In 1987, after the end of the fairness doctrine, conservative talk radio began to grow in significance, preventing the demise of many AM radio stations.[223]
Since 1990
In 2012, Time stated there has been an identity crisis in U.S. conservatism growing since the end of the Cold War and the Presidency of Ronald Reagan.[224] Supporters of classical liberalism—distinct from modern liberalism—tend to identify as "conservatives," and in the 21st century, classical liberalism remains a major force within the Republican Party and the larger conservative movement.[225] In the 21st Century, only in the United States is classical liberalism a significant political ideology.[226]
1990s
After the end of the Reagan administration significant change occurred within the conservative movement during the
Beginning in the early 1990s conservative leaning internet sites began to emerge, such as Drudge Report, Free Republic, and Townhall.[235] These websites were created due to an alleged liberal bias within mainstream media.[236] Since then, conservative leaning internet sites have gained a significant following, and have received more readership than liberal leaning internet sites.[237]
George W. Bush
The election of George W. Bush in 2000 brought a new generation of conservatives to power in Washington. Bush ran under the banner of
Bush won solid support from Republicans in Congress and from conservative voters in his 2004 reelection campaign. Exit polls in 2004 showed that 34% of the voters identified themselves as "conservatives" and they voted 84% for Bush. By contrast, 21% identified as "liberals," of whom 13% voted for Bush; 45% were "moderates" and they voted 45% for Bush. Almost the same pattern had appeared in the 2000 exit polls.[240] The exit polls show Bush won 57% of the rural vote, 52% of the suburban vote and 45% of the urban vote.[240]
When the financial system verged on total collapse in 2008, Bush pushed through large scale
2008–present
This section needs to be updated.(November 2021) |
The Republican contest for the nomination in 2008 was a free-for-all, with Senator John McCain the winner, facing Barack Obama. McCain chose Alaska Governor Sarah Palin as his running mate, and while she was greeted by the GOP establishment with initial skepticism, she electrified many conservatives and became a major political force on the right.[244] In 2008, a period that began in 1980, termed the "conservative era" ended.[245]
After the election of Obama for president, Republicans in Congress were unified in almost total opposition to the programs and policies of Obama and the Democratic majority. They unsuccessfully attempted to stop an
On foreign policy, some conservatives, especially neoconservatives and those in the
In the
During the COVID-19 pandemic, Republicans have continued to support limited government regulations in response to government initiated restrictions due to the virus. Some conservatives have warmed to the idea of using government power to stop business-initiated restrictions, such as vaccine passports. In April 2021, Governor Ron DeSantis of Florida banned businesses from requiring employees and patrons to present proof of vaccination,[258] and in November, limited their ability to implement vaccine mandates for workers, requiring establishments to allow various exemptions.[259] These actions were widely seen as contrary to the conservative principals of the past, with those in favor arguing that the actions were necessary to protect people from being forced to get a vaccine.
Tea Party
A relatively new element of conservatism is the
The Tea Party is a conglomerate of conservatives with diverse viewpoints including libertarians and social conservatives.[266] Most Tea Party supporters self-identify as "angry at the government".[267][268][269] One survey found that Tea Party supporters in particular distinguish themselves from general Republican attitudes on social issues such as same-sex marriage, abortion and illegal immigration, as well as global warming.[270] However, discussion of abortion and gay rights has also been downplayed by Tea Party leadership.[271] In the lead-up to the 2010 election, most Tea Party candidates have focused on federal spending and deficits, with little focus on foreign policy.[272]
Noting the lack of central organization or an explicit spokesmen, Matthew Continetti of The Weekly Standard has said: "There is no single Tea Party. The name is an umbrella that encompasses many different groups. Under this umbrella, you'll find everyone from the woolly fringe to Ron Paul supporters, from Americans for Prosperity to religious conservatives, independents, and citizens who never have been active in politics before. The umbrella is gigantic."[273]
See also
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- ^ "On most of these topics, supporters of the Tea Party movement are angrier than any of the other groups," according to the BBC World News America/Harris Poll of Oct. 2010. "What Are We Most Angry About? The Economy, Unemployment, the Government, Taxes and Immigration: Tea Party supporters are angrier than Republicans, who are angrier than Democrats", Harris Interactive, Oct. 21, 2010 Archived 2012-03-02 at the Wayback Machine
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- ^ "The widest gulfs between Tea Party supporters and others—Republicans and the public in general—are in their responses to questions about social issues, from gay marriage to abortion to immigration to global warming."Zernike, Kate (April 17, 2010). "Tea Party Supporters Doing Fine, but Angry Nonetheless". New York Times. Archived from the original on May 24, 2010. Retrieved November 2, 2010.
- ^ the New York Times says, "But as the Tea Party infuses conservatism with new energy, its leaders deliberately avoid discussion of issues like gay marriage or abortion." Kate Zernike, "Tea Party Avoids Divisive Social Issues," New York Times March 12, 2010
- ^ According to the New York Times, "a review of the Web sites of many Tea Party candidates suggests that they have not spent much time exploring foreign policy specifics. Many do little more than offer blanket promises to keep America safe." Michael D. Shear, "Tea Party Foreign Policy a Bit Cloudy" New York Times Oct. 21, 2010 Archived 2017-07-10 at the Wayback Machine
- ^ The Two Faces of the Tea Party Archived 2015-10-21 at the Wayback Machine by Matthew Continetti, The Weekly Standard, Vol. 15, No. 39, June 28, 2010
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Further reading
- Allitt, Patrick. The Conservatives: Ideas and Personalities Throughout American History (2010) excerpt and text search.
- Continetti, Matthew. The Right: The Hundred-Year War for American Conservatism (2022) excerpt
- Critchlow, Donald T. The Conservative Ascendancy: How the Republican Right Rose to Power in Modern America (2nd ed. 2011) excerpt
- Critchlow, Donald T. and Nancy MacLean. Debating the American Conservative Movement: 1945 to the Present (2009)
- Farber, David. The Rise and Fall of Modern American Conservatism: A Short History (2012).
- Filler, Louis. Dictionary of American Conservatism (Philosophical Library, 1987) online
- Frohnen, Bruce et al. eds. American Conservatism: An Encyclopedia (2006) ISBN 1-932236-44-9, the most detailed reference.
- Guttman, Allan. The Conservative Tradition in America Oxford University Press, 1967.
- Kirk, Russell. The Conservative Mind. Regnery Publishing; 7th edition (2001): a famous history.
- Lichtman, Allan J. White Protestant Nation: The Rise of the American Conservative Movement (2008) detailed history from a liberal standpoint. ISBN 978-0-87113-984-9
- Lora, Ronald. The Conservative Press in Twentieth-Century America (Greenwood Press, 1999) online edition Archived 2005-04-24 at the Wayback Machine.
- Lora, Ronald, and William Henry Longton eds. The Conservative Press in Eighteenth-and Nineteenth-Century America (1999) online edition.
- Miner, Brad. The Concise Conservative Encyclopedia: 200 of the Most Important Ideas, Individuals, Incitements, and Institutions that Have Shaped the Movement (1996) excerpt.
- Morgan, Iwan. Reagan: American Icon (IB Tauris, 2016).
- Nash, George. The Conservative Intellectual Movement in America Since 1945 (2006; 1st ed. 1978) influential history by a conservative scholar. online
- Nickerson, Michelle M. Mothers of Conservatism: Women and the Postwar Right (Princeton UP, 2012), 248 pp.
- Patterson, James. Congressional Conservatism and the New Deal: The Growth of the Conservative Coalition in Congress, 1933–39 (1967).
- Perlstein, Rick. Before the Storm: Barry Goldwater and the Unmaking of the American Consensus (2004) on 1964 campaign.
- Rossiter, Clinton. Conservatism in America. (1955; 2nd ed. Harvard UP, 1982), a famous history.
- Schneider, Gregory. The Conservative Century: From Reaction to Revolution (2009).
- Thorne, Melvin J. American Conservative Thought since World War II: The Core Ideas (1990) online edition.
- Viereck, Peter. Conservatism: from John Adams to Churchill (2nd ed. 1978).
Historiography
- Brinkley, Alan. "The Problem of American Conservatism," American Historical Review 99 (April 1994): 409–29.
- Burns, Jennifer. "In Retrospect: George Nash's the Conservative Intellectual Movement in America since 1945," Reviews in American History, Sep 2004, Vol. 32 Issue 3, pp. 447–62 online Archived 2016-09-11 at the Wayback Machine.
- Cowie, Jefferson, and Nick Salvatore, "The Long Exception: Rethinking the Place of the New Deal in American History," International Labor & Working-Class History, (2008) 74:3–32; argue the New Deal was a response to depression and did not mark a commitment to a welfare state because America has always been too individualistic.
- Dochuk, Darren. "Revival on the Right: Making Sense of the Conservative Moment in Post-World War II American History," History Compass (Sept 2006) 4#4 pp. 975–99, .
- Kazin, Michael. "The Grass-Roots Right: New Histories of U.S. Conservatism in the Twentieth Century," American Historical Review (February 1992) 97:136–55.
- Lewis, Hyman. "Historians and the Myth of American Conservatism" Journal of The Historical Society (2012), 12#1 pp. 27–45. .
- McGirr, Lisa. "Now That Historians Know So Much about the Right, How Should We Best Approach the Study of Conservatism?" Journal of American History (2011) 98(3): 765–70 .
- Moore, Leonard Joseph. "Good Old-Fashioned New Social History and the Twentieth-Century American Right," Reviews in American History (1996) 24#4 pp. 555–73 in Project MUSE.
- Phillips-Fein, Kim. "Conservatism: A State of the Field," Journal of American History (Dec 2011) 98#3 pp. 723–43, with commentary by Wilfred M. McClay, Alan Brinkley, Donald T. Critchlow, Martin Durham, Matthew D. Lassiter, and Lisa McGirr, and response by Phillips-Fein, pp. 744–73 online.
- Ponce de Leon, Charles L. "The New Historiography of the 1980s," Reviews in American History, (2008) 36#2 pp. 303–31, in Project MUSE.
- Ribuffo, Leo P. "Why is There so Much Conservatism in the United States and Why Do So Few Historians Know Anything about It," American Historical Review Vol. 99, No. 2 (Apr., 1994), pp. 438–49 in JSTOR.
- Ribuffo, Leo P. "The Discovery and Rediscovery of American Conservatism Broadly Conceived," OAH Magazine of History (2003) 17#2 pp. 5–10. .
- Ribuffo, Leo. "Conservatism and American Politics," Journal of the Historical Society, March 2003, Vol. 3 Issue 2, pp. 163–75.
- Zelizer, Julian E. "Reflections: Rethinking the History of American Conservatism," Reviews in American History, 38#2 (June 2010), pp. 367–92 .
Primary sources
- Buckley, William F., Jr., ed. Did You Ever See a Dream Walking? American Conservative Thought in the 20th Century Bobbs-Merrill (1970).
- Gregory L. Schneider, ed. Conservatism in America Since 1930: A Reader (2003).
- Wolfe, Gregory. Right Minds: A Sourcebook of American Conservative Thought. Regnery (1987).