History of the People's Republic of China (2002–present)
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People's Republic of China
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2002–present | |||||||
Anthem: | |||||||
Hu Jintao (until 2012) Xi Jinping (from 2012) | |||||||
Hu Jintao (until 2013) Xi Jinping (from 2013) | |||||||
• Premier | Wen Jiabao (until 2013) Li Keqiang (until 2023) Li Qiang (from 2023) | ||||||
Legislature | Succession by Xi Jinping | 18 November 2012 | |||||
1 December 2019 | |||||||
Area | |||||||
• Total | 9,596,961 km2 (3,705,407 sq mi) (3rd) | ||||||
• Water (%) | 2.8% | ||||||
Population | |||||||
• Estimate | 1.41 Billion | ||||||
• 2002 | 1.28 billion | ||||||
Currency | .中國 | ||||||
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History of the People's Republic of China |
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History of |
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The
In this process, there was an unprecedented shift in stance towards favouring rural development and farmers, as well as other generally populist policies. The Hu-Wen government, on the same token, attempted to restrict some personal freedoms, especially those associated with political content on the
China's increased prominence on the global stage has also brought with it general skepticism and intense scrutiny, especially in the lead up to the 2008 Summer Olympics and after the March 2008 protests in Tibet. The government continues to be criticized on human rights abuses and the various product quality scandals that have increasingly damaged the country's integrity and continues to raise suspicions about the country's safety standards. This has led to an intense wave of nationalism (or Socialist patriotism) surfacing in Chinese populations around the world.
As of mid-2012, government statistics show that for the first time ever over 50% of the Chinese population now live in urban areas, marking a milestone in the urbanization of China. The majority of modern city dwellers are migrants and their children who moved to cities during the economic boom of the last 30 years started by Deng Xiaoping's policy of economic liberalization.
"Fourth Generation": The Hu-Wen administration
Power transition
Ever since the 1980s, Deng Xiaoping had promoted mandatory retirement ages for senior CCP officials, which was made official in 1998. In November 2002, at the
Also elevated during the Congress was
In November 2012, Hu Jintao retired as General Secretary and was succeeded by Xi Jinping, the nation's first paramount leader to be born after the foundation of the PRC. Xi initiated a series of large-scale anti-corruption drives, which however are believed to be secondary to removing his political opponents in the party, especially allies of Jiang Zemin's two sons. Jiang himself, despite being retired since 2004, is believed to still be manipulating politics behind the scenes.
Policy transition
Due to the large number of social, political, and economic imbalances left over from the Jiang era, Hu and Wen inherited a government nearly run-down from severe corruption and the immense rise in materialism. Because Jiang continued to wield influence, the direction of the Hu-Wen administration did not deviate from that of the Jiang-era for a few years after taking over power. Jiang, however, faced both popular pressure and significant inner party and military opposition, and stepped down as the Central Military Commission Chairman in September 2004. Although superficially, Hu and Wen continued to support Jiang era policies and hail his Three Represents theory, gradual changes were put in place to revert some of the worst excesses of the Jiang era. The changes had a much more egalitarian focus, concentrated on sectors of the Chinese population which have been left behind by the economic reform and closing the great wealth gap. Hu and Wen have both taken a number of high-profile trips to the poorer areas of China with the stated goal of understanding these areas better.
The degree of difference between the Hu and Jiang administrations is subject to debate. Within the top leadership of the PRC, there still a general consensus that
Media control
Chinese leaders understand that news media could be a very effective means to fight against corruption. Media controls were initially reduced, as market forces have encouraged tabloid reporting. Yet, the government occasionally fires reporters or shuts down newspapers that stray outside the party-line. The media reforms of Hu Jintao have been considered conservative by Western watchdogs. At the same time, Hu issued a directive for official CCP newspapers and state media outlets such as Xinwen Lianbo to concentrate on more populist issues instead of constantly following the daily affairs of each of China's top leaders.
The introduction of the
Protection of individual rights
The term "Weiquan movement" first appeared in the 1990s. The word wéiquán (Chinese characters: 維權) literally means "rights protection". As it implies, weiquan movement is not necessarily meant to protect specifically the political rights of the civilians. In fact, it was rather like a movement of consumers' rights protection at its early stage. It became more developed after 2003. The citizens began to protect their violated rights by means of organizing demonstrations, seeking help through the legal system and media reports, writing open or appeal letters, etc. However, because the legal system is not independent and mature, and the fact that the central government is sometimes suspicious and local governments even hostile toward it, weiquan movement has been encountering difficulties in the course of its development.
There are cases in which lawyers were harassed,journalists beaten, and civilians imprisoned in weiquan movement. What makes weiquan movement more difficult is that in China there exists a system called "Re-education through labor" (Pinyin: láodòng jiàoyăng or láojiào in short) (Chinese characters: 劳动教养 or 劳教 in short). It is a system in which a person can be detained for up to 4 years without being convicted by a court. This system is also used to deal with some weiquan movement activists.
In spite of the difficulties, the weiquan movement still made some progress, such as the abolition of "custody and repatriation" in 2003. However, the pace of the progress is still very slow.[citation needed]
Hong Kong
Hong Kong's sovereignty was transferred to the People's Republic of China in 1997. Since then, the economy of the former
Taiwan
With Hong Kong and Macau reunited with the mainland the main outstanding issue is
Tibet
The Chinese government and the
Issues
SARS, Neo-SARS and other disasters
In November 2002, the
Just as the nation was emerging out of the SARS crisis, A new dangerous epidemic suddenly appeared the
In December 2019, a new strain of
Anti-corruption efforts
Chinese society depended heavily on personal relationships, which, combined with the new lust for wealth, produced escalating corruption. Historian Keith Schoppa says that bribery was only one of the tools of corruption, which also included, "embezzlement, nepotism, smuggling, extortion, cronyism, kickbacks, deception, fraud, squandering public monies, illegal business transactions,
Top leaders such as General Secretary Jiang Zemin warned that corruption could threaten the party's ongoing existence.[6] Corruption has been a major area of focus in the Hu-Wen Administration, although the effectiveness of anti-corruption measures has been disputed. Although it has been argued that corruption is the inevitable result of China's social customs and the complicated nature of social relationships (see guanxi) in the country, it is reasonable to believe that one-party rule and the current political system is, at least in part, exacerbating the problem. In 2008 the head of the university center on corruption estimated that 10,000 corrupt officials fled China with up to $100 billion in public funds in the last decade.[7]
Xu Caihou provided a classic case of high-level corruption.[8] He served as a high military official in once sat on the Politburo. He died of cancer in 2015 as investigations into his embezzlements and bribes began. His home contained enormous amounts of gold, jewelry, cash, and other luxury items requiring several trucks to haul away. He kept a long list of clients who had received undeserved military promotions through bribery and payoffs.[9]
Opinion polls continually show that corruption (in all sectors of society) is the main complaint of the people. Currently, hospitals, schools, police, and social and legal institutions are constantly affected by bribery, cronyism, and nepotism. However, the Chinese Communist Party still asserts a monopoly on exposing corrupt officials and businessmen, and critics accuse the party of selective punishment. Analysts say the authorities are reluctant to pursue senior figures and their allies and punishment comes in the form of political purges rather than genuine law enforcement.[10]
After 2012, Chinese Communist Party general secretary Xi Jinping made corruption a high priority target, including the removal of many high officials. In the process he greatly and increased his own powers and ability to undermine political opponents.[11]
Removal of Xi's term limits
In March 2018, the party-controlled
According to the Financial Times, Xi expressed his views of constitutional amendment at meetings with Chinese officials and foreign dignitaries. Xi explained the decision in terms of needing to align two more powerful posts—General Secretary of the Chinese Communist Party and Chairman of the Central Military Commission (CMC)—which have no term limits. However, Xi did not say whether he intended to serve as party general secretary, CMC chairman and state president, for three or more terms.[16]
In October 2022, Xi Jinping was re-elected as General Secretary of the Chinese Communist Party for a precedent-breaking third term of paramount leader after Mao Zedong's death.[17]
Foreign policy
Hu Jintao's serious public image led China to a more staunch stance on global affairs compared to the Jiang era[citation needed]. Partly attributed to the United States' attention being focused towards problem regions such as Iraq, China has made advances in foreign affairs without much restriction from the U.S. in the 21st century.
Military modernization and increased defense spending, as well as industrial and military espionage and accusations of cyber-hacking, have caused increased concern over Chinese intentions since 2000. However, the PLA's modernization efforts have continued to be hamstrung by corruption, outdated military equipment, and continued emphasis on political indoctrination over practical military skills.[18]
Since taking power in 2012, General Secretary Xi Jinping has conducted a series of purges of corrupt PLA generals, including Gu Junshan and Xu Caihou, who were accused of embezzling enormous sums of money. However, China observers have noted that many of these purges were motivated by politics as much as a desire to eliminate corruption, as most of the victims were army officers who supported Xi Jinping's political rivals. Gu Junshan, who had served as Deputy Logistics Chief for the PLA, was charged with embezzlement, bribery, misuse of state funds and abuse of power, and expelled from all his posts and the party. He received a suspended death sentence. Enormous quantities of gold, jewelry, and fine furniture were confiscated from his home in Henan, and it was reported that 20 large trucks had to be used to haul all of it.[19]
North Korea
Recognized as the world's next
African nations
China has also taken an increasingly prominent role in Africa. Hu Jintao went on a 7-nation African visit in January 2007, solidifying deals and promising financial aid with African leaders with no conditions attached, winning the support, albeit with some caution, of many African leaders.
Shanghai Cooperation Organisation
In 1996 the Shanghai Five grouping was created, comprising China, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, and Tajikistan. When Uzbekistan joined the group in 2001 it was renamed to the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO). The SCO states its goals are "the strengthening mutual confidence and good-neighbourly relations among the member countries; promoting their effective cooperation in politics, trade and economy, science and technology, culture as well as education, energy, transportation, tourism, environmental protection and other fields; making joint efforts to maintain and ensure peace, security and stability in the region, to move towards the establishment of a new, democratic, just and rational political and economic international order."[20]
Western analysts note that the SCO may serve as a balance against US and NATO advancement in the region. Some have even called it a new Warsaw Pact.[21][22] SCO leaders, however, insist that the organization is not an alliance directed against any other states.[23]
Taiwan issue
As usual, the PRC and world governments still adhere to the one-China policy. Some countries also maintained the status of Taiwan remains undetermined. Since the 1990s, the number of countries which have formal diplomatic relations with the Chinese Republic on Taiwan remains in the twenties, and Taiwan has been trying to buy diplomatic recognition from more countries by so-called "money diplomacy".
Having become economically stronger, the PRC is emulating ROC's "money diplomacy", and persuading those countries to cut diplomatic relations with the ROC and to sway to PRC's side.
Promising financial help, buying over high government officials, and even getting involved in election campaigns in those countries have become part of their "money diplomacy".
After the 2016 Taiwanese presidential election that brought Tsai Ing-wen to power, some countries in Latin America, Africa and the Pacific switched recognition to the People's Republic instead of Taiwan.
Culture
There appeared some changes in various cultural aspects in China. New movements and trends (influenced by western society such as high brand clothing, street dancing, etc.) have appeared in the society, and the newly forged and ever expanding middle class has the opportunity to have a different life style which few of the former generations had access to. This includes studying abroad, finding new jobs in large cities and purchasing luxury goods. However these opportunities are still only limited to the urban city dwellers in China.
Nationalism
Although Marxist–Leninist Mao Zedong Thought has remained the guiding principle of the Chinese state, communist ideology became increasingly sidelined after the 1980s and the PRC's main justification for its continued existence is the notion that multiparty democracy is inefficient and cannot rapidly modernize the nation. Nonetheless, small, but vocal groups of diehard communists have remained, including Chongqing Party Secretary Bo Xilai.
Bo Xilai, the son of Bo Yibo, one of the legendary "Eight Elders" of the CCP, rose from mayor of Dalian to party secretary of Chongqing by 2007. A one-time Red Guard and advocate of Maoist nostalgia, Bo actively promoted a revival of old-fashioned socialist ideals and campaigns, as well as merciless "Strike Hard" offensives against organized crime. He gained considerable support among the poorer and less advantaged in the inland city, but Maoist revivalism was not well received by many, nor was his use of ruthless, ham-fisted tactics.
The mainstream CCP leadership, wary of anything reminiscent of a return to Cultural Revolution-era chaos, decided to act against Bo, and in 2012, he and his wife were tried on corruption and embezzlement charges. Ultimately, he was stripped of all his positions and expelled from the party. The episode exposed an ugly power struggle within the CCP, and was thought to be connected with the upcoming leadership transition from Hu Jintao to Xi Jinping.
Remaining challenges
Population
The leaders of the PRC now face a daunting task of pushing ahead with major economic reforms while managing its vast population of 1.3 billion people. The recent economic reforms have undermined the socialist state's safety net and forced people to look to the private sector for work and services. As the economy faces structural changes, 25 to 30 million state workers have been laid off since 1998 while only 8 million jobs are created annually at the current growth rate. With millions of laid off workers roaming the cities, keeping social order will prove a difficult task. Workers' protests have not been too infrequent, with the government usually heeding to the protestors' demands, while arresting their leaders.
Another potential crisis is the advent of
While there have been major economic reforms, the government has been slow on political reform, citing that social stability is vital for a developing economy. Few analysts believe the PRC will democratize quickly, but many see democratization as an inevitable end of the economic reforms. Many in mainland China see one-party rule as effective and any talk of political reform is meant to change the way the party governs, rather than remove it from power. In recent years, local elections with more candidates than positions available have become regular, yet talking about major changes at higher levels remains taboo.
Pollution
China's reliance on coal continue to damage its already compromised air quality. Some of its major cities are among the most polluted in the world.
Notes
- ^ In the Mongolian script is used in Inner Mongolia and the Tibetan script is used in the Tibetan Autonomous Region, alongside traditional Chinese.
- ^ Motor vehicles and metros drive on the right in mainland China. Hong Kong and Macau use left-hand traffic except several parts of metro lines. The majority of the country's trains drive on the left.
References
- ^ General Information of the People's Republic of China (PRC): Languages, chinatoday.com, retrieved April 17, 2008
- ^ Goldstein, Melvyn (January–February 1998). "The Tibet Question". Foreign Affairs. 77 (1). Archived from the original on July 2, 2007. Retrieved August 28, 2010.
- ^ Sara E. Davies, "Duty in the time of epidemics: What China and Zimbabwe teach us." Australian Journal of International Affairs 66.4 (2012): 413-430.
- ^ Lei Zhang, and Lijin Zhong, "Integrating and prioritizing environmental risks in China's risk management discourse." Journal of contemporary China 19.63 (2010): 119-136.
- ^ R. Keith Schoppa, Revolution and Its Past: Identities and Change in Modern Chinese History (3rd ed. 2020) p . 383.
- ISBN 9781863959179.
- ^ The Americana Annual 2009: An encyclopedia of the events of 2008 (2009) p 121
- ISBN 9781317507888.
- ^ "Here's Why It Was So Shocking That Chinese General Xu Caihou Was Busted for Corruption". Business Insider.
- ^ Jiangnan Zhu, Jie Lu, and Tianjian Shi, "When grapevine news meets mass media: Different information sources and popular perceptions of government corruption in mainland China." Comparative Political Studies 46.8 (2013): 920-946.
- ^ Ling Li, "Politics of Anticorruption in China: Paradigm change of the party's disciplinary regime 2012–2017." Journal of Contemporary China 28.115 (2019): 47-63. Online
- ^ Shi, Jiangtao; Huang, Kristin (February 26, 2018). "End to term limits at top 'may be start of global backlash for China'". South China Morning Post. Archived from the original on February 27, 2018. Retrieved February 28, 2018.
- ^ Phillips, Tom (March 4, 2018). "Xi Jinping's power play: from president to China's new dictator?". The Guardian. Archived from the original on March 4, 2018. Retrieved March 4, 2018.
- ^ Wen, Philip (March 17, 2018). "China's parliament re-elects Xi Jinping as president". Reuters. Archived from the original on March 17, 2018. Retrieved March 17, 2018.
- ^ Bodeen, Christopher (March 17, 2018). "Xi reappointed as China's president with no term limits". Associated Press. Archived from the original on March 17, 2018. Retrieved March 17, 2018.
- ^ Mitchell, Tom (September 7, 2019). "China's Xi Jinping says he is opposed to life-long rule". Financial Times. Archived from the original on April 17, 2018. Retrieved April 17, 2018.
President insists term extension is necessary to align government and party posts
- ^ "China's leader Xi Jinping secures third term and stacks inner circle with loyalists". The Guardian. October 23, 2022. Retrieved October 23, 2022.
- ^ "Chinese Generals Wonder if Military is Too Corrupt to Fight and Win a War". Business Insider.
- ^ "China's disgraced PLA general Gu Junshan given suspended death sentence for corruption". August 10, 2015.
- ^ Brief introduction to the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation SCO Website
- ^ SCO: means new Warsaw Pact? Archived January 29, 2008, at the Wayback Machine Russia: Beyond the Headlines
- ^ Putin praises strength of 'Warsaw Pact 2' Telegraph Online
- ^ Moscow Moves To Raise Profile in Central Asia The Jamestown Foundation
Further reading
- Cheng, Linsun (2009). Berkshire Encyclopedia of China. Berkshire Pub. Group. ISBN 9781933782683.
- Duckett, Jane. "International Influences on Policymaking in China: Network Authoritarianism from Jiang Zemin to Hu Jintao." China Quarterly 237 (2018): 15–37. online
- Economy, Elizabeth C. The Third Revolution: Xi Jinping and the New Chinese State (2019) excerpt
- Economy, Elizabeth C. "China's New Revolution: The Reign of Xi Jinping." Foreign Affairs 97 (2018): 60+. online
- Fenby, Jonathan The Penguin History of Modern China: The Fall and Rise of a Great Power 1850 to the Present (3rd ed. 2019) popular history.
- Ferdinand, Peter. "Westward ho—the China dream and ‘one belt, one road’: Chinese foreign policy under Xi Jinping." International Affairs 92.4 (2016): 941-957.
- Garver, John W. China's Quest: The History of the Foreign Relations of the People's Republic (2nd ed. 2018).
- Godement, François. Contemporary China: between Mao and market (2012, translated 2015) online; focus on 2009-2012 online review
- Kissinger, Henry. On China (2011)
- Lam, Willy Wo-Lap. Chinese politics in the era of Xi Jinping: Renaissance, reform, or retrogression? (Routledge, 2015).
- Pew Research Center. "The 2008 Pew Global Attitudes Survey in China: The Chinese Celebrate Their Roaring Economy, As They Struggle with its Costs" (2008) online free, primary source
- Zeng, Jinghan. The Chinese Communist Party's capacity to rule: ideology, legitimacy and party cohesion. (Springer, 2015).