Hokushin-ron

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Map of Japanese Hokushin-ron plans for a potential attack on the Soviet Union. Dates indicate the year that Japan gained control of the territory.

Hokushin-ron (北進論, "Northern Expansion Doctrine" or "Northern Road") was a

sphere of interest and that the potential value to Japan for economic and territorial expansion
in those areas was greater than elsewhere. Its supporters were sometimes called the Strike North Group.

It enjoyed wide support within the Imperial Japanese Army during the interwar period but was abandoned in 1939 after military defeat on the Mongolian front at the Battles of Khalkhin Gol (known in Japan as the Nomonhan incident) and the signing of Soviet–Japanese Neutrality Pact in 1941.

It was superseded by the diametrically-opposite rival policy,

Pacific Islands as Japan's political and economic sphere of influence and aimed to acquire the resources of European colonies
and to neutralize the threat of Western military forces in the Pacific.

Origins

From the 1890s

Siberian Intervention during the Allied intervention in the Russian Civil War, with the hope that Japan could be freed from any future Russian threat by detaching Siberia and forming an independent buffer state.[3] The Japanese troops remained until 1922, which encouraged discussion by Japanese strategic planners of the idea of permanent Japanese occupation of Siberia east of Lake Baikal.[1]

Invasion of Manchuria

Main article: Japanese invasion of Manchuria

An essential step in the Hokushin-ron proposal was for Japan to seize control of Manchuria to obtain an extensive de facto land border with the

Reijirō Wakatsuki could do was weakly protest and resign with his cabinet. When the new cabinet was formed, Araki, as War Minister, was the real power in Japan. A puppet state was formed in Northeast China and Inner Mongolia, named Manchukuo, and was governed under a form of constitutional monarchy
.

Factionalism within the military

Hokushin-ron was largely supported by the Imperial Japanese Army. General Kenkichi Ueda was a strong believer in the Hokushin-ron policy since he believed that Japan's main enemy was communism and that Japan's destiny lay in conquest of the natural resources of the sparely-populated Northern Asian mainland. General Yukio Kasahara was also a major proponent of the Hokushin-ron philosophy and felt strongly that the Soviet Union posed both a major threat and a major opportunity for Japan.

However, rival cliques of officers in the Army claimed to represent the "true will" of the Emperor. The radical

preemptive strike against the Soviet Union. They were opposed by the more moderate conservative Control Faction (Tōseiha), which favored a more cautious defence expansion and sought to impose greater discipline over the Army and war with China as a strategic imperative.[4]

Meiji period. From the early 1930s the Army saw the Soviet Union as Japan's greatest threat and for the most part supported the Hokushin-ron concept that Japan's strategic interests were on the Asian continent. The Navy looked across the Pacific Ocean and saw the United States as the greatest threat and, for the most part, supported the Nanshin-ron concept that Japan's strategic interests were in Southeast Asia and the Pacific islands.[5] By the mid-1930s there was the serious possibility of a clash between the Army and the Navy because of their incompatible expansionist ideas.[6]

Events of 1936

The Kōdōha faction, which favoured Hokushin-ron, was dominant in the Army during Araki's tenure as Minister of War from 1931 to 1934 and occupied most significant staff positions. However, many of its members were replaced by Tōseiha officers following Araki's resignation from ill health in 1934.

February 26 Incident
. As a result, Kōdōha generals were purged from the Army, including Araki, who was forced to retire in March 1936.

The Imperial Defence Plan, formulated in June 1936, incorporated a balance of both Hokushin-ron and Nanshin-ron by requiring both the Army and the Navy to take a peaceful and unprovocative approach to their "enemies".[6] The plan's goal was to acquire territories that possessed the raw materials, particularly petroleum, which Japan needed to sustain its growth and economy but it did not possess itself. Northward expansion (Hokushin-ron) would gain the natural resources of Siberia by attacking the Soviet Union via Manchuria. Southward expansion (Nanshin-ron) would involve seizing the Dutch East Indies (now Indonesia) and other colonies from the French and/or the British.[5][9] Japan's supply of resources would eventually be assured by creating a "Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere". However, European powers had been dominant in Southeast Asia for more than a century, and Japanese foreign policy had little experience there. In pursuing Nanshin-ron Japan would risk and, in some quarters even welcome, a large-scale war with the great powers from across the globe.[1]

In November 1936, the Anti-Comintern Pact was concluded between Japan and Nazi Germany. It agreed that in case of an attack by the Soviet Union against Germany or Japan, both countries agreed to consult on what measures to take "to safeguard their common interests." They also agreed that neither would make any political treaties with the Soviet Union, and Germany also agreed to recognize Manchukuo.

Soviet–Japanese border conflicts

A series of Soviet–Japanese border conflicts, without any formal declaration of war, began in 1932. Aggressive actions initiated by Japanese staff and field officers on the Soviet border with Manchukuo and Mongolia led to the disastrous Battles of Khalkhin Gol (1939), which resulted in heavy casualties for Kwantung Army and severely challenged its much-vaunted reputation. Any farther expansion northwards into Siberia was shown to be impossible because of the Soviets' superiority in numbers and armour.[9] However, General Ueda continued to support the actions of his officers, refused to discourage them from taking similar actions, and remained adamant in his support of the Hokushin-ron policy. He was recalled back to Japan in late 1939 and forced into retirement. The Kwantung Army was purged of both its more insubordinate elements and its proponents of Hokushin-ron.[10][11]

Abandonment

Main article: Kantokuen

The Army lost prestige because of its failures in the

Soviets declared war on Japan in August 1945.[13]

See also

References

  1. ^
    ISBN 978-1782009320
    .
  2. ISBN 978-9041119520
    .
  3. ISBN 978-0804723756
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  4. ISBN 978-0801474903
    .
  5. ^ a b Brian Dollery; Zane Spindler; Craig Parsons (2003). "Nanshin: Budget- Maximising Behavior, The Imperial Japanese Navy And The Origins Of The Pacific War" (PDF). Working Paper Series in Economics. University of New England School of Economics: 4 & 12. Retrieved 27 July 2015.
  6. ^
    ISBN 978-0275947910
    .
  7. S2CID 154319122
    .
  8. ISBN 9780837166438
    .
  9. ^ a b c Flank, Lenny (25 Nov 2014). "Khalkhin Gol: The Forgotten War Between Japan and the USSR". Daily Kos. Retrieved 28 July 2015.
  10. ^ Neeno, Timothy (16 January 2005). "Nomonhan: The Second Russo-Japanese War". Military History Online. Retrieved 28 July 2015.
  11. ISBN 978-0804718356
    .
  12. ISBN 978-0415723862
    .
  13. ^ Hauer, Neil (18 February 2014). "The Undeclared War: Mongolia, 1939". Republic of the East. Archived from the original on 4 March 2016. Retrieved 28 July 2015.
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