Mind
The mind (adjective form: mental) is that which
The exact nature of the mind is disputed. Traditionally, minds were understood as substances, but contemporary philosophers tend to see them as collections of properties or capacities. There is a lengthy tradition in philosophy, religion, psychology, and cognitive science exploring what constitutes a mind, what its distinguishing properties are, and whether humans are the only beings that have minds.
Mind, or mentality, is usually contrasted with body, matter, or physicality. The issue of the nature of this contrast and specifically the relation between mind and brain is called the
Different cultural and religious traditions often use different concepts of mind, resulting in different answers to these questions. Some see mind as a property exclusive to humans, whereas others ascribe properties of mind to non-living entities (e.g.,
Psychologists such as Freud and James and computer scientists such as Turing developed influential theories about the nature of the mind. The possibility of nonbiological minds is explored in the field of artificial intelligence, which works closely with cybernetics and information theory to understand the ways in which information processing by nonbiological machines is comparable to or different from mental phenomena in the human mind.[8] The mind is also sometimes portrayed as a stream of consciousness, where sense impressions and mental phenomena are constantly changing.[9][10]
Etymology
The original meaning of Old English gemynd was the faculty of memory, not of thought in general.[11] Hence call to mind, come to mind, keep in mind, to have mind of, etc. The word retains this sense in Scotland.[12] Old English had other words to express "mind", such as hyge "mind, spirit".[13]
The meaning of "memory" is shared with
The generalization of mind to include all mental faculties, thought, volition, feeling and memory, gradually develops over the 14th and 15th centuries.[14]
Definitions
The mind is often understood as a faculty that manifests itself in
Despite this agreement, there is still a lot of difference of opinion concerning what the exact nature of mind is and various competing characterizations have been proposed, sometimes referred to as theories of mind.[2][18][a] Philosophical definitions of mind usually proceed not just by listing various types of phenomena belonging to the mind but by searching the "mark of the mental": a feature that is shared by all mental states and only by mental states.[16][15] Epistemic approaches define mental states in terms of the privileged epistemic access the subject has to these states. This is often combined with a consciousness-based approach, which emphasizes the primacy of consciousness in relation to mind. Intentionality-based approaches, on the other hand, see the power of minds to refer to objects and represent the world as being a certain way as the mark of the mental. According to behaviorism, whether an entity has a mind only depends on how it behaves in response to external stimuli while functionalism defines mental states in terms of the causal roles they play. The differences between these diverse approaches are substantial since they result in very different answers to questions like whether animals or computers have minds.[2][16][15]
There is a great variety of mental states. They fall into categories like sensory and non-sensory or conscious and unconscious.[19][15] Various of the definitions listed above excel for states from one category but struggle to account for why states from another category are also part of the mind. This has led some theorists to doubt that there is a mark of the mental. So maybe the term "mind" just refers to a cluster of loosely related ideas that do not share one unifying feature.[15][16][17] Some theorists have responded to this by narrowing their definitions of mind to "higher" intellectual faculties, like thinking, reasoning and memory. Others try to be as inclusive as possible regarding "lower" intellectual faculties, like sensing and emotion.[20]
In popular usage, mind is frequently synonymous with thought: the private conversation with ourselves that we carry on "inside our heads".[21] Thus we "make up our minds", "change our minds" or are "of two minds" about something. One of the key attributes of the mind in this sense is that it is a private sphere to which no one but the owner has access. No one else can "know our mind". They can only interpret what we consciously or unconsciously communicate.[22]
Epistemic and consciousness-based approaches
One way to respond to this worry is to ascribe a privileged status to conscious mental states. On such a consciousness-based approach, conscious mental states are non-derivative constituents of the mind while unconscious states somehow depend on their conscious counterparts for their existence.[16][23][24] An influential example of this position is due to John Searle, who holds that unconscious mental states have to be accessible to consciousness to count as "mental" at all.[25] They can be understood as dispositions to bring about conscious states.[26] This position denies that the so-called "deep unconscious", i.e. mental contents inaccessible to consciousness, exists.[27] Another problem for consciousness-based approaches, besides the issue of accounting for the unconscious mind, is to elucidate the nature of consciousness itself. Consciousness-based approaches are usually interested in phenomenal consciousness, i.e. in qualitative experience, rather than access consciousness, which refers to information being available for reasoning and guiding behavior.[16][28][29] Conscious mental states are normally characterized as qualitative and subjective, i.e. that there is something it is like for a subject to be in these states. Opponents of consciousness-based approaches often point out that despite these attempts, it is still very unclear what the term "phenomenal consciousness" is supposed to mean.[16] This is important because not much would be gained theoretically by defining one ill-understood term in terms of another. Another objection to this type of approach is to deny that the conscious mind has a privileged status in relation to the unconscious mind, for example, by insisting that the deep unconscious exists.[24][27]
Intentionality-based approaches
Intentionality-based approaches see
Behaviorism and functionalism
Behaviorist definitions characterize mental states as dispositions to engage in certain publicly observable behavior as a reaction to particular external stimuli.[38][39] On this view, to ascribe a belief to someone is to describe the tendency of this person to behave in certain ways. Such an ascription does not involve any claims about the internal states of this person, it only talks about behavioral tendencies.[39] A strong motivation for such a position comes from empiricist considerations stressing the importance of observation and the lack thereof in the case of private internal mental states. This is sometimes combined with the thesis that we could not even learn how to use mental terms without reference to the behavior associated with them.[39] One problem for behaviorism is that the same entity often behaves differently despite being in the same situation as before. This suggests that explanation needs to make reference to the internal states of the entity that mediate the link between stimulus and response.[40][41] This problem is avoided by functionalist approaches, which define mental states through their causal roles but allow both external and internal events in their causal network.[42][43][17] On this view, the definition of pain-state may include aspects such as being in a state that "tends to be caused by bodily injury, to produce the belief that something is wrong with the body and ... to cause wincing or moaning".[44][19]
One important aspect of both behaviorist and functionalist approaches is that, according to them, the mind is
One problem for all of these views is that they seem to be unable to account for the phenomenal consciousness of the mind emphasized by consciousness-based approaches.[19] It may be true that pains are caused by bodily injuries and themselves produce certain beliefs and moaning behavior. But the causal profile of pain remains silent on the intrinsic unpleasantness of the painful experience itself. Some states that are not painful to the subject at all may even fit these characterizations.[19][44]
Externalism
Theories under the umbrella of externalism emphasize the mind's dependency on the environment. According to this view, mental states and their contents are at least partially by external circumstances.[47][48] For example, some forms of content externalism hold that it can depend on external circumstances whether a belief refers to one object or another.[49][50] The extended mind thesis states that external circumstances not only affect the mind but are part of it.[51][52] The closely related view of enactivism holds that mental processes involve an interaction between organism and environment.[53][54]
Forms
Functions and processes
The mind encompasses many functions and processes, including
Memory is the mechanism of storing and retrieving information.[57] Episodic memory handles information about specific past events in one's life and makes this information available in the present. When a person remembers what they had for dinner yesterday, they employ episodic memory. Semantic memory handles general knowledge about the world that is not tied to any specific episodes. When a person recalls that the capital of Japan is Tokyo, they usually access this general information without recalling the specific instance when they learned it. Procedural memory is memory of how to do things, such as riding a bicycle or playing a musical instrument.[58] Another distinction is between short-term memory, which holds information for brief periods, usually with the purpose of completing specific cognitive tasks, and long-term memory, which can store information indefinitely.[59]
Thinking involves the processing of information and the manipulation of
Imagination is a creative process of internally generating mental images. Unlike perception, it does not directly depend on the stimulation of sensory organs. Similar to
Motivation is an internal state that propels individuals to initiate, continue, or terminate goal-directed behavior. It is responsible for the formation of
Attention is an aspect of other mental processes in which mental resources like awareness are directed towards certain features of experience and away from others. This happens when a driver focuses on the traffic while ignoring billboards on the side of the road. Attention can be controlled voluntarily in the pursuit of specific goals but can also occur involuntarily when a strong stimulus captures a person's attention.[68] Attention is relevant to learning, which is the ability of the mind to acquire new information and permanently modify its understanding and behavioral patterns. Individuals learn by undergoing experiences, which helps them adapt to the environment.[69]
Faculties and modules
Traditionally, the mind was subdivided into mental faculties understood as capacities to perform certain functions or bring about certain processes.[70] An influential subdivision in the history of philosophy was between the faculties of intellect and will.[71] The intellect encompasses mental phenomena aimed at understanding the world and determining what to believe or what is true; the will has a practical orientation focused on desire, decision-making, action, and what is good.[72] The exact number and nature of the mental faculties are disputed and more fine-grained subdivisions have been proposed, such as dividing the intellect into the faculties of understanding and judgment or adding sensibility as an additional faculty responsible for sensory impressions.[73][b]
In contrast to the traditional view, more recent approaches analyze the mind in terms of
Conscious and unconscious
An influential distinction is between conscious and unconscious mental processes. Consciousness is the awareness of external and internal circumstances. It encompasses a wide variety of states, such as perception, thinking, fantasizing, dreaming, and
Unconscious or nonconscious mental processes operate without the individual's awareness but can still influence mental phenomena on the level of thought, feeling, and action. Some theorists distinguish between preconscious, subconscious, and unconscious states depending on their accessibility to conscious awareness.
Other categories of mental phenomena
A mental state or process is rational if it is based on good reasons. For example, a belief is rational if it relies on strong supporting evidence and a decision is rational if it follows careful deliberation of all the relevant factors and outcomes. Mental states are irrational if they are not based on good reasons, such as beliefs caused by faulty reasoning, superstition, or cognitive biases, and decisions that give into temptations instead of following one's best judgment.[87] Mental states that fall outside the domain of rational evaluation are arational rather than irrational. There is controversy regarding which mental phenomena lie outside this domain; suggested examples include sensory impressions, feelings, desires, and involuntary responses.[88]
Another contrast is between dispositional and occurrent mental states. A dispositional state is a power that is not exercised. If a person believes that cats have whiskers but does not think about this fact, it is a dispositional belief. By activating the belief to consciously think about it or use it in other cognitive processes, it becomes occurrent until it is no longer actively considered or used. The great majority of a person's beliefs are dispositional most of the time.[89]
Relation to matter
Mind–body problem
The mind–body problem is the difficulty of providing a general explanation of the relationship between mind and body, for example, of the link between thoughts and brain processes. Despite their different characteristics, mind and body interact with each other, like when a bodily change causes mental discomfort or when a limb moves because of an
The monist view most influential in contemporary philosophy is
The hard problem of consciousness is a central aspect of the mind-body problem: it is the challenge of explaining how physical states can give rise to conscious experience. Its main difficulty lies in the subjective and qualitative nature of consciousness, which is unlike typical physical processes. The hard problem of consciousness contrasts with the "easy problems" of explaining how certain aspects of consciousness function, such as perception, memory, or learning.[105]
Brain areas and processes
Another approach to the relation between mind and matter uses empirical observation to study how the brain works and which brain areas and processes are associated with specific mental phenomena.
The primary operation of many of the main mental phenomena is located in specific areas of the forebrain. The
The close interrelation of brain processes and the mind is seen by the effect that physical changes of the brain have on the mind. For instance, the consumption of
Evolution
The evolution of human intelligence refers to several theories that aim to describe how human intelligence has evolved in relation to the evolution of the human brain and the origin of language.[118]
The timeline of
Many traits of human intelligence, such as
There is a debate between supporters of the idea of a sudden emergence of intelligence, or "Great leap forward" and those of a gradual or "continuum hypothesis".
Theories of the evolution of intelligence include:
- Robin Dunbar's social brain hypothesis[119]
- sexual selection in human evolution[120]
- The ecological dominance-social competition (EDSC)[121] explained by Mark V. Flinn, David C. Geary and Carol V. Ward based mainly on work by Richard D. Alexander.
- The idea of intelligence as a signal of good health and resistance to disease.
- The group selection theory contends that organism characteristics that provide benefits to a group (clan, tribe, or larger population) can evolve despite individual disadvantages such as those cited above.
- The idea that intelligence is connected with nutrition, and thereby with status.[122] A higher IQ could be a signal that an individual comes from and lives in a physical and social environment where nutrition levels are high, and vice versa.
Philosophy
Philosophy of mind is the branch of
The 20th century philosopher Martin Heidegger suggested that subjective experience and activity (i.e. the "mind") cannot be made sense of in terms of
The philosopher of
Philosopher David Chalmers has argued that the third person approach to uncovering mind and consciousness is not effective, such as looking into other's brains or observing human conduct, but that a first person approach is necessary. Such a first person perspective indicates that the mind must be conceptualized as something distinct from the brain.
The mind has also been described as manifesting from moment to moment, one thought moment at a time as a fast flowing stream, where sense impressions and mental phenomena are constantly changing.[10][9]
Scientific study
This section needs additional citations for verification. (December 2021) |
Neuroscience
According to the
Contemporary neuroscience research reports a large-scale neuronal integration associated with the mental functions in the brain.[139] This neuronal orchestra cannot be explained only by linear integration due to synaptic interactions. Therefore, a mechanism of temporal coordination for neuronal interaction due to oscillatory synchronization is the mainstream in neuroscience research,[139] i.e., the idea of brain wave interactions for network oscillatory synchronization.[140][141][142][143]
According to Professor of Radboud University Martin Vinck and colleagues,[139] a mechanism of temporal coordination for neuronal interaction can be explained by four hypotheses:
- oscillatory synchronization (communication-through-coherence);[144][145]
- communication-through-resonance;[146]
- nonlinear integration;[147][148] and
- linear signal transmission (coherence-through-communication).[149][150]
Most brain activities display oscillations in four frequency orders, from the infra-low (<0.01 Hz) to ultra-fast (200 Hz) oscillations: delta (0.5-4 Hz), theta (4-8 Hz), alpha activity (8-13 Hz), beta (13- 30 Hz), and gamma (30-200 Hz) frequency bands.[140]
Cognitive science
At the birth of cognitive science in the 1960s and 1970s, the paradigm of the computational theory of mind was widely adopted. This paradigm holds that the mind is essentially a computational system, and its explanation needs to be provided in terms of a computational description. More recently, rival paradigms gained ground within cognitive science, namely the neurophysical description and the intentional description.[152]
Though the interface between neuroscience and an exact model of cognition is not yet made, progress in biological neuron models help to mathematically quantify cognitive neuroscience; and elaborate a theory of mind that can be provable. However a theoretically fundamental synthesis in psychology, cognitive science, neuroscience, and biophysics must be made; for the problem of mind and its faculties to gain tractable scientific ground.[153]
Over the past years, research in cognitive sciences has highlighted the importance of the body for cognition. Proponents of the embodied cognition theory of mind hold that cognition (and mental phenomena) is the product of active interactions between individuals and their surrounding environment.[154]
Psychology
Psychology differs from the other
Psychiatry, neurology and neurosurgery
Mental health
This section needs additional citations for verification. (December 2021) |
By analogy with the health of the body, one can speak metaphorically of a state of health of the mind, or mental health. Merriam-Webster defines mental health as "a state of emotional and psychological well-being in which an individual is able to use his or her cognitive and emotional capabilities, function in society, and meet the ordinary demands of everyday life". According to the World Health Organization (WHO), there is no one "official" definition of mental health. Cultural differences, subjective assessments, and competing professional theories all affect how "mental health" is defined. In general, most experts agree that "mental health" and "mental disorder" are not opposites. In other words, the absence of a recognized mental disorder is not necessarily an indicator of mental health.
One way to think about mental health is by looking at how effectively and successfully a person functions. Feeling capable and competent; being able to handle normal levels of stress, maintaining satisfying relationships, and leading an independent life; and being able to "bounce back" or recover from difficult situations, are all signs of mental health.
Non-human
This section needs additional citations for verification. (December 2021) |
Animal cognition
Artificial intelligence
Research in AI is concerned with producing machines to automate tasks requiring intelligent behavior. Examples include
The debate about the nature of the mind is relevant to the development of artificial intelligence. If the mind is indeed a thing separate from or higher than the functioning of the brain, then hypothetically it would be much more difficult to recreate within a machine, if it were possible at all. If, on the other hand, the mind is no more than the aggregated functions of the brain, then it will be possible to create a machine with a recognisable mind (though possibly only with computers much different from today's), by simple virtue of the fact that such a machine already exists in the form of the human brain.
Religion
This section needs additional citations for verification. (December 2021) |
Many religions associate spiritual qualities to the human mind. These are often tightly connected to their
The
Buddhism
Buddhist teachings explain the moment-to-moment manifestation of the mind-stream.[9][10] The components that make up the mind are known as the five aggregates (i.e., material form, feelings, perception, volition, and sensory consciousness), which arise and pass away continuously. The arising and passing of these aggregates in the present moment is described as being influenced by five causal laws: biological laws, psychological laws, physical laws, volitional laws, and universal laws.[10][9] The Buddhist practice of mindfulness involves attending to this constantly changing mind-stream.
According to Buddhist philosopher Dharmakirti, the mind has two fundamental qualities: "clarity and cognizes". If something is not those two qualities, it cannot validly be called mind. "Clarity" refers to the fact that mind has no color, shape, size, location, weight, or any other physical characteristic, and "cognizes" that it functions to know or perceive objects.[162] "Knowing" refers to the fact that mind is aware of the contents of experience, and that, in order to exist, mind must be cognizing an object. You cannot have a mind – whose function is to cognize an object – existing without cognizing an object.
Mind, in Buddhism, is also described as being "space-like" and "illusion-like". Mind is space-like in the sense that it is not physically obstructive. It has no qualities which would prevent it from existing. In Mahayana Buddhism, mind is illusion-like in the sense that it is empty of inherent existence. This does not mean it does not exist, it means that it exists in a manner that is counter to our ordinary way of misperceiving how phenomena exist, according to Buddhism. When the mind is itself cognized properly, without misperceiving its mode of existence, it appears to exist like an illusion. There is a big difference however between being "space and illusion" and being "space-like" and "illusion-like". Mind is not composed of space, it just shares some descriptive similarities to space. Mind is not an illusion, it just shares some descriptive qualities with illusions.
Buddhism posits that there is no inherent, unchanging identity (Inherent I, Inherent Me) or phenomena (Ultimate self, inherent self, Atman, Soul, Self-essence, Jiva, Ishvara, humanness essence, etc.) which is the experiencer of our experiences and the agent of our actions. In other words, human beings consist of merely a body and a mind, and nothing extra. Within the body there is no part or set of parts which is – by itself or themselves – the person. Similarly, within the mind there is no part or set of parts which are themselves "the person". A human being merely consists of five aggregates, or skandhas and nothing else.
In the same way, "mind" is what can be validly conceptually labelled onto our mere experience of clarity and knowing. There is something separate and apart from clarity and knowing which is "Awareness", in Buddhism. "Mind" is that part of experience of the sixth sense door, which can be validly referred to as mind by the concept-term "mind". There is also not "objects out there, mind in here, and experience somewhere in-between". There is a third thing called "awareness" which exists being aware of the contents of mind and what mind cognizes. There are five senses (arising of mere experience: shapes, colors, the components of smell, components of taste, components of sound, components of touch) and mind as the sixth institution; this means, expressly, that there can be a third thing called "awareness" and a third thing called "experiencer who is aware of the experience". This awareness is deeply related to "no-self" because it does not judge the experience with craving or aversion.
Clearly, the experience arises and is known by mind, but there is a third thing called Sati which is the "real experiencer of the experience" that sits apart from the experience and which can be aware of the experience in 4 levels. (Maha Sathipatthana Sutta)
- Body,
- Sensations (changes of the body mind),
- Mind,
- Contents of the mind (changes of the body mind).
To be aware of these four levels one needs to cultivate equanimity toward Craving and Aversion. This is Called Vipassana which is different from the way of reacting with Craving and Aversion. This is the state of being aware and equanimous to the complete experience of here and now. This is the way of Buddhism, with regards to mind and the ultimate nature of minds (and persons).
Mortality
Due to the
Parapsychology
The term is based on the Greek
See also
- Outline of human intelligence – topic tree presenting the traits, capacities, models, and research fields of human intelligence, and more.
- Outline of thought – topic tree that identifies many types of thoughts, types of thinking, aspects of thought, related fields, and more.
- Embodied cognition
Notes
- ^ not to be confused with the related term theory of mind
- ^ Mental faculties also play a central role in the Indian tradition, such as the contrast between the sense mind (manas) and intellect (buddhi).[74]
- ^ A different perspective is proposed by the massive modularity hypothesis, which states that the mind is entirely composed of modules with high-level modules establishing the connection between low-level modules.[78]
- ^ The two terms are usually treated as synonyms but some theorists distinguish them by holding that materialism is restricted to matter while physicalism is a wider term that includes additional physical phenomena, like forces.[96]
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Further reading
- Max Bertolero and Danielle S. Bassett, "How Matter Becomes Mind: The new discipline of network neuroscience yields a picture of how mental activity arises from carefully orchestrated interactions among different brain areas", Scientific American, vol. 321, no. 1 (July 2019), pp. 26–33.
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