INTERFET logistics
The logistical support of the multinational International Force East Timor (INTERFET) peacekeeping mission in 1999 and 2000 involved, at its peak, 11,693 personnel from 23 countries. Of these 5,697 were from Australia, making it the largest deployment of Australian forces overseas since the Vietnam War. INTERFET was unusual in that it was led by Australia, casting the country in a wholly unfamiliar role. The logistics and support areas of the Australian Defence Force (ADF) had been subject to deep cuts in the 1990s. The ADF had not anticipated being committed to such a large peacekeeping mission, and was unprepared to support an Australian force projection of this size, much less act as lead nation of an international coalition.
INTERFET deployed to East Timor in September 1999. Over 90 per cent of the cargo and most of the passengers travelled by sea, transported by a naval task force. Eleven nations contributed transport aircraft to the INTERFET Coalition Airlift Wing (ICAW), which flew 3,400 sorties in support of INTERFET, carried 9,500 tonnes (10,500 short tons) of cargo and transported more than 30,000 passengers. A base was established in Darwin, with supplies, equipment, stores and in many cases personnel stockpiled or staged there before being dispatched to East Timor by sea or air.
East Timor posed significant challenges for logistical support. There was only one deepwater port, the Port of Dili, and it had a maximum quayside depth of just 7 metres (23 ft). There were few beaches suitable for Logistics Over-the-Shore (LOTS) and just three airfields. To give effect to an operational concept that involved flooding East Timor with as many combat troops as possible, troops were initially landed with a minimum of vehicles and supplies. The logistical support units spent October and November catching up and eliminating backlogs. Effective logistical support enabled INTERFET to carry out its mission without severe limitations resulting from inadequate logistics, although there were shortages of spare parts, medical supplies and amenities.
Background
The island of
After its April 1974
The United States declined to intervene in East Timor. There were concerns about the economic and political consequences of a conflict with Indonesia.
East Timor posed significant challenges. There was only one deepwater port, the
A decade of defence cuts in the 1990s had fallen disproportionately on the logistics and support areas of the Australian Defence Force (ADF),[26] as the leadership attempted to preserve combat capability.[27] This was compounded by a defence policy of the Howard government that sought to maximise the tooth-to-tail ratio.[28] On 11 March 1999, the Minister for Defence, John Moore, announced that administrative cuts had permitted an increase in readiness, so that the Australian Army's Darwin-based 1st Brigade could be brought to 28 days' notice to deploy, the same as the Townsville-based 3rd Brigade. This, he claimed, would allow for a two-brigade deployment to a trouble spot in the Asia-Pacific region at short notice, East Timor being specifically mentioned as a possibility,[29] but the very same cuts rendered this impossible. While they provided short-term financial benefits,[27] far from increasing operational capability, in the words of Lieutenant Colonel David Beaumont "the preferential allocation of resources to combat capabilities and the acceptance of risk in logistics functions brought the Army to the precipice of operational failure."[30]
Planning
Australia
During July and August 1999, the head of the Australian Army's Strategic Command,
The Logistic Support Force was not designed to manage the logistic support of forces deployed away from Australia; its mission was to command the Army's field force logistic units, and it was in the midst of a reorganisation in 1999.[33] Wilkinson anticipated being designated the Logistic Component Commander for Operation Spitfire, responsible for coordinating the logistics of all three services, but this did not occur until 26 August, the day before the first troops began deploying to northern Australia for the operation.[34] To support Operation Spitfire, Kehoe detached a small group of specialists under Captain Phil MacMaster to work with Lieutenant Colonel Steve Kinloch's 3rd Brigade Administrative Support Battalion (3 BASB). He later admitted that this was a mistake, costing him the services of key personnel for several weeks.[35]
On 6 September, the day after Operation Spitfire began, Wilkinson received official notice of
New Zealand
In New Zealand, the
It was soon determined that the ADF could provide little assistance with logistics, and in fact was looking to New Zealand for assistance with airlift and sealift, and medical services. A mutual logistics support agreement between the ADF and NZDF was signed in late September. The joint planning group resolved to make the New Zealand force as self-sufficient as possible, and that it would take 60 days' supplies with it. As East Timor had no facilities for handling containers, special container handling cranes were designed and manufactured in New Zealand. The joint planning group calculated that moving a battalion group to Darwin or Dili would require chartering two merchant ships, each of about 7,500 tonnes (7,400 long tons) capacity. Merchant shipping available for charter in New Zealand was scarce but two suitable ships were eventually found. A Boeing 747 freighter was leased to transport high priority cargo to Darwin.[40] In one flight it carried 108.7 tonnes (107.0 long tons) of cargo, including seven four-wheel-drive vehicles.[41] MV Edamgracht, the first of the chartered vessels, departed Wellington on 30 September. It was followed by the MV Edisongracht, which departed on 18 October. The two carried 120 vehicles or pieces of plant, and 1,000 tonnes (980 long tons) of cargo in 100 containers. They arrived at Darwin on 12 and 19 October, where they were unloaded by the same terminal operations platoon that had loaded them.[42]
Organisation
Wilkinson and Cousins agreed that a base at Darwin, 720 kilometres (450 mi) south east of Timor, was required to support Operation Spitfire and subsequent operations.
The
This operation will be Operation Stabilise and is to be commanded by Major General Cosgrove, under my command... Operation Stabilise and Warden together represent the most significant military commitment of the Australian Government, on behalf of the Australian people since World War II. Our logistic support must also be a world-class performance.[16]
The 10th Force Support Battalion had been formed on 1 March 1998 from the amalgamation of the 10th Terminal Regiment, 2nd Field Logistics Battalion, 1st Division Postal Unit and the Defence National Storage and Distribution Centre (DNSDC) Watercraft Base Repair Detachment. It was based in the Townsville area, except for the 36th Water Transport Troop in Darwin. Its sub-units included the 30th/35th Water Transport and Terminal Squadron, 26th Combat Supply Company and 2nd Equipment Company.[49] Along with its main role of providing general (third line) support to operations, the 10th Force Support Battalion had also been charged with providing fourth-line logistic support in northern Queensland. It, therefore, consisted of a mix of deployable and non-deployable components. The 2nd Equipment Company was a non-deployable unit with significant numbers of civilians, and the 26th Combat Supplies Company, which was responsible for classes of supply I (food and potable water), III (petrol, oil and lubricants (POL)) and V (ammunition), also contained many.[35][50]
No plans had been drawn up to cover a contingency in which the battalion had to deploy overseas.[50] In November 1999, the Chief of Army, Lieutenant General Frank Hickling, announced that the 10th Force Support Battalion would be relieved of its responsibility for northern Queensland from November 2000. In the meantime, it was split in two, the 10th Force Support Battalion (INTERFET) deploying to East Timor and the 10th Force Support Battalion (Rear) remaining in northern Queensland under the command of Major Max Walker, the commander of the 2nd Equipment Company.[35]
The ADF had not anticipated commitment to such a large peacekeeping mission, and borrowed 4,000
Deployment
Airlift
McLennan had at his disposal 13
The first INTERFET troops to arrive in East Timor were the INTERFET Response Force, consisting of members of the
The Dili heliport was found abandoned, but not burnt or seriously damaged.
An air traffic control team headed by Squadron Leader George Christianson arrived from Townsville on the seventh aircraft to arrive at Dili with the 3rd Brigade staff, but without communications equipment. Christianson went to the control tower and explained, through an interpreter since he did not speak
The
Sealift
Nonetheless, 91.7 per cent of the cargo by weight and 93.2 per cent by volume, and most of the passengers arrived in East Timor by sea.[73] A naval task force consisting of the Royal Australian Navy (RAN) landing ship HMAS Tobruk, landing craft HMAS Balikpapan, Brunei and Labuan, and the replenishment oiler HMAS Success, escorted by the frigates HMAS Adelaide, HMAS Anzac, HMNZS Te Kaha and HMS Glasgow, weighed anchor in Darwin on 18 September, and set out for East Timor, its arrival on 20 September coinciding with the airlift.[60] The cruiser USS Mobile Bay, tanker HMNZS Endeavour, French frigate Vendémiaire and Australian frigate HMAS Darwin, were already in waters around East Timor.[38] Endeavour carried aviation fuel, and was a particularly valuable asset as the RAN's other oiler, HMAS Westralia, was still out of action as a result of a fire in 1998.[58]
The RAN's
The ADF Movements staff not only had to find commercial airlift and sealift for the deployment to East Timor in a matter of days rather than the months that it would usually require, it also had to contend with the difficulty of moving troops, equipment and stores over the vast distances of Australia. Moving the 10th Force Support Battalion was a particular problem. The initial concept was that it should move overland from Townsville to Darwin, and embark for East Timor from there. But staff with the appropriate licences were not experienced in long-haul operations,[76] and there was a high risk of loss of equipment in transit or in Darwin while awaiting shipment.[77]
The movements officer in Sydney found two vessels whose owners were willing to charter on short notice, the Calatagan, a grain ship, and the Danish Svendborg Guardian, a
During Operation Stabilise, the ADF chartered seventeen commercial vessels to supplement its strategic lift capability. All were foreign, as the Department of Defence did not feel that Australian vessels offered the best value for money. The operation put the port of Darwin under great strain, and the facilities were upgraded, lifting the wharf capacity to 70 tonnes (77 short tons). To reduce the strain on Darwin's facilities, casualties were evacuated to other cities, and where practical purchasing was conducted in Sydney to avoid overburdening local suppliers. The Darwin Port Authority, which managed the port with the assistance of a lone ADF liaison officer, were able to increase the port's turnover fourfold, and no shipping delays occurred.[33][78]
Operations
Distribution
To effect Cosgrove's operational concept of flooding East Timor with as many combat troops as possible, Mark Evans deployed his brigade with a minimum of vehicles and logistical support.[63] Unlike exercises conducted in northern Australia in the 1980s and 1990s, the logistical support would follow the combat troops, and not be pre-positioned to receive them.[79] Since the operational situation was uncertain, demand for items like ammunition and medical supplies could not be forecast. The plan therefore was to build up stockpiles in Darwin from DNSDC in Sydney, and then forward them on demand to 10 FSB by air to Comoro airport via the ICAW or by sea to the port of Dili by HMAS Jervis Bay and Tobruk. 10 FSB would then distribute them to 3 BASB or directly to the troops.[80] To send supplies directly to Dili would have resulted in their arrival without troops to receive them, facilities to store them, or transport to distribute them, as had occurred to Australian forces in the Vietnam War in 1966.[81] Cousins set priorities on the advice of Colonel Ash Power, Cosgrove's operations officer. Contingency stocks were held offshore on HMAS Success.[80]
ADF cargo was tracked using three computer systems, the Standard Defence Supply System (SDSS),
McManus's FLSG had responsibility for the purchase, receipt, storage and forwarding of supplies from Darwin. He did not have sufficient operators trained in the use of SDSS and LNIDS to track their movements and order items such as spare parts, nor did he have sufficient personnel to prepare pallets or load aircraft, and there were only four trained staff who were available to deal with what soon became a flood of mail. He established an ad hoc unit called the Top End Distribution Squadron (TEDS), and leased some former military warehouses in the Darwin suburb of Berrimah from their new owners, where stocks could be held until called forward. A terminal operations unit was created at RAAF Base Darwin to handle air dispatch. He coordinated air delivery with No. 395 Expeditionary Combat Support Wing and No. 321 Expeditionary Combat Support Squadron RAAF at RAAF Base Darwin, and sea delivery with the HMAS Coonawarra naval base. Eventually some 120 personnel were assigned to the FLSG, drawn from 9th and 10th Force Support Battalions and the 7th Combat Service Support Battalion.[83] Kinloch was appointed commander, Land Component Support Group, and would be responsible for the support of the advance elements in Dili until the 10th Force Support Battalion arrived.[84]
Sustainment
The first priority was water. Until engineer units with boring equipment arrived, there was no potable water in Dili. Every soldier had to carry a day's supply, which meant 8 to 10 litres (1.8 to 2.2 imp gal; 2.1 to 2.6 US gal) on their backs. Another day's supply went with the troops on their aircraft and ships as packaged water. Two water tankers, each holding 22,000 litres (4,800 imp gal; 5,800 US gal), arrived on 21 September on landing craft. These were used to refill
Fuel presented a problem because the ADF had no ship-to-shore refuelling capability. Naval units were the sole source of the diesel and aviation fuel for units in East Timor for the first three months of Operation Stabilise, during which INTERFET consumed 3,000 litres (660 imp gal; 790 US gal) of fuel per day. Initially, packaged fuel was flown from HMAS Success to the heliport by RAN
Each soldier carried an initial supply of ammunition. More stocks arrived on HMAS Tobruk and Jervis Bay, and contingency reserves were held on ships in Dili harbour. Due to its weight, ammunition resupply was by sea rather than by air. For other items such as spare parts and medical supplies, each unit was directed to bring 15 to 30 days' supply.[83] While the 1,500 soldiers of the 3rd Brigade had limited stocks of ammunition on hand, there were some 15,000 TNI troops in the area, who presumably had plenty of ammunition.[88] Nor were the air and sea bridges secure from interception: the TNI had naval assets in the area that included surface combatants and two Type 209 submarines,[38] and intelligence sources reported that TNI aircraft based in West Timor included three BAE Systems Hawks, North American Rockwell OV-10 Broncos, an Aérospatiale SA 330 Puma and a CASA C-212 Aviocar. RAAF Lockheed P-3 Orions kept a lookout for the submarines, and two McDonnell Douglas F/A-18 Hornets were kept on standby in case air defence or close air support missions were required.[89]
The supply plan was simple, but finely tuned, with little room for error. It fell apart in the first 48 hours. Medical personnel and supplies were unexpectedly delayed. This was critical, as it was not known whether there would be casualties. There were unforeseen requirements like RAAF personnel and equipment to run the airport,[90] and, unlike Operation Spitfire, the ADF was not ICAW's only customer. There was political pressure to deploy media representatives and UNAMET personnel with their equipment and stores, and the remaining elements of 2 RAR and 3 BASB with their vehicles and stores, and bottled water, were pushed back in the queue.[63] Members of the 3rd Brigade who wanted to join their comrades in East Timor were frustrated at seeing others boarding flights instead of themselves, and subjected the movements staff to abuse.[91] An abandoned fleet of Land Rover Discovery vehicles was made available to INTERFET at the UNAMET compound, which partially offset 2 RAR's vehicle shortage.[90] The emergency stocks of water on HMAS Success had to be brought ashore immediately, and 2 RAR commandeered water that had been flown in as part of 3 BASB's stocks. When 3 RAR arrived on Jervis Bay with 500 cartons of bottled water, they handed over part of this stockpile to 2 RAR.[90]
Dili, Baucau and
It was imperative to get 10 FSB to Dili before unit-level supplies and the reserves held by the Land Component Support Group had been consumed.
Colonel Grant Cavanaugh was appointed the commander of the Logistic Support HQ. He had arrived in Dili on 24 September, but had no staff, and no authority over Kinloch, who was answerable to Mark Evans, or McManus, who was answerable to Cosgrove.
Movements staff gave priority to food, water, fuel and ammunition. Foreign contingents complained about confusion over priority and authority. The Canadian contingent reported that in Darwin:
Priority of shipments/movement of personnel set by JMCC [Joint Movements Coordination Centre] was sometimes questionable. This remained a major problem for the most part of the tour as priorities were changed on a daily basis, we saw pallets of beer being loaded on hercs [Hercules aircraft] while our NCE [National Command Element] vehicles were still waiting in the holding area at the airport. Darwin was a real bottleneck and it was felt on many occasions that the lines of Comm[unications] between INTERFET and AS [Australia] in Darwin were non existent and that pers[onnel] in Darwin had no authority to take decisions.[100]
Construction
The first
At an early stage it was appreciated that what little infrastructure there was in East Timor was being destroyed by the pro-Indonesia militia,[105] but there was no engineering staff at DJFHQ.[76] The ADF's engineering capability had been reduced by defence cuts, but the Army still maintained two construction squadrons, largely thanks to its involvement in the Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Commission's Army Community Assistance Program (AACAP), which provided facilities for indigenous communities in remote areas. In August 1999, the 17th Construction Squadron was in Sydney on 180 days' notice to move, having just completed an AACAP tour in Jumbun, Queensland,[106] while the 21st Construction Squadron was in Rockhampton, supporting Crocodile 99.[34] The 17th Construction Squadron was placed on 28 days' notice to move on 13 September, but was not given more personnel to bring it up to full strength, nor authorisation to requisition or purchase engineering stocks and equipment.[107] On 20 September it was given seven days' notice to move. Only then was it topped up with 22 sappers from other units.[107] It was hoped that engineering requirements would be met by other nations, but this did not occur.[108] Appeals to contribute engineering units produced a construction troop from Kenya, which was due to arrive in late December.[101]
The advance party of the 17th Construction Squadron assumed responsibility for the main water point in Dili from the 3rd Combat Engineer Regiment on 14 October, and began looking for other water sources. The main body arrived in East Timor with its 160 personnel and 130 vehicles on 26 October. Abandoned bores were restored, and
The 17th Construction Squadron's next priority was upgrading the Dili heliport to facilitate all-weather operations. The heliport was located on low ground that was susceptible to flooding in the wet season. The 198th Works Section produced a design that called for the excavation of the subbase, the construction of hard stands, and laying pierced aluminium plank for eleven helipads. The work was carried out by the 17th Construction Squadron, and took four weeks to complete. At Suai, the airstrip was upgraded to support all-weather C-130 operations. The runway was extended by 150 metres (490 ft), and a turning node added. Hard stands were provided, along with accommodation, workshops and five helipads.[110]
Mostafa was determined to have 21st Construction Squadron sent to East Timor as well, but senior Department of Defence officials were concerned that the INTERFET was going beyond its mandate, and developing East Timor's infrastructure – the reason for not deploying engineer construction assets in the first place. Finally, on 8 November, the 21st Construction Squadron was ordered to send a plant troop group to East Timor to assist in road maintenance, its numbers capped at 80 personnel.[109] The main body arrived in Dili on 3 December, but the ship carrying its heavy plant and equipment did not reach Brisbane until 27 November, and broke down several times en route. Work on the roads finally commenced on 17 December. The 21st Construction Squadron repaired the main route from Dili to Aileu. The Kenyan troop arrived on 26 December and worked on repairing the roads to the south. After an initial downpour, the rainy season was not as severe as feared, but the departure of the 3rd Combat Engineer Regiment in mid-January left no resources to maintain the roads in the border areas.[111]
To resolve the waste disposal problem, the 17th Construction Squadron erected
Amenities
By late October 1999, expectations that units in East Timor could live more comfortably began to build.[81] In Sydney, Lieutenant Colonel Dianne Gallasch negotiated contracts for deliveries of fresh produce to be shipped from Darwin, and established a flexible resupply system for rations. Refrigerated containers, generators and kitchen trailers were shipped to East Timor, allowing hot meals to be provided by 22 field kitchens six weeks after the first troops arrived in Dili. Yet many soldiers were still sleeping on the ground. There were still no laundry facilities, so soldiers washed their clothes in old ration tins. Funds were provided to hire East Timorese civilians to provide laundry facilities, but some units were more successful than others in using them wisely.[81][112]
Cousins pressed for tents and camping stores to be sent, which Support Command in Melbourne struggled to provide among competing priorities. Cosgrove assigned top priority to maintaining the tempo of operations, and second to building up stocks of food, fuel, water and ammunition in time for the rainy season. As a veteran of the Vietnam War, where the Army had lived rough for longer periods, he believed that the troops could go without amenities for a bit longer. The
Throughout November, logistical personnel in Australia and East Timor worked to reduce the backlogs, build up stockpiles for the rainy season, and improve the living conditions of the troops in the field. FLSG forwarded an average of 176 tonnes (194 short tons) of cargo per day, and 60 refrigerated containers of fresh produce each week. The backlog of spare parts was overcome in early November, and canteens and showers were available in Balibo. On 12 November, 2 RAR finally received a full complement of camp stores, including tents, chairs, tables, stretchers and duckboards. On 15 December, Support HQ assumed responsibility for the support of the forces in East Timor.[111]
Helicopters
Unloading was difficult in the primitive conditions of the damaged ports in East Timor, especially at Suai, where there was no equipment to unload the containers that the Canadians and New Zealanders had brought their stores in. The containers had to be unloaded from HMAS Tobruk with one of its cranes onto a heavy landing craft, to be picked up by a side-loading truck when it reached the shore. This was neither quick nor safe. A better solution would have been to unload with heavy lift helicopters, but the RAN had none, and the
PACOM turned to the US Army's
Medical
The vaccination regime for Japanese encephalitis proved effective, and there were no recorded INTERFET cases. The main diseases affecting the troops were dengue fever and malaria, with 306 and 334 cases respectively. Both were endemic in East Timor. Australian troops recorded 224 cases of dengue fever In East Timor.[115] There was no dengue vaccine, although there was some evidence that the Japanese encephalitis vaccine was partially effective against dengue. Nor was there any treatment other than rest until the patient recovered.[116] Preventative measures for mosquito-borne diseases like dengue and malaria included the use of insect repellents, permethrin-treated mosquito nets, and mosquito control measures such as spraying suspected breeding areas with insecticides.[117] A particular concern with dengue was that troops returning from East Timor to bases in Northern Queensland might cause an outbreak in Australia, as the area was receptive to dengue due to the presence of its principal vector, the Aedes aegypti mosquito. Nine confirmed cases were reported among soldiers in Townsville, who were closely monitored, but none among the civilian population.[118]
As in previous wars, malaria was a major concern, and one Malaysian UN observer died from malaria.[115] A prophylactic regime was instituted whereby ADF personnel were given a daily dose of 100 milligrams (1.5 gr) of doxycycline commencing two days before departure from Australia and continuing for two weeks after returning to Australia. For those who suffered adverse side effects, a weekly dose of 250 milligrams (3.9 gr) of mefloquine was substituted. A terminal prophylaxis of 7.5 milligrams (0.116 gr) of primaquine three times a day was administered for three weeks after return from Australia.[117] In addition, a small team from the Australian Army Malaria Institute headed by Major Scott J. Kitchener went to Dili as advisors.[119] Subsequent trials of mefloquine in East Timor in 2001 and 2002 found that about 6.5 per cent of soldiers suffered side effects from it, mainly of a neuropsychiatric nature.[120] There are ongoing concerns about the use of the drug.[121]
The results showed that the memory of previous campaigns had faded since the Vietnam War ended in 1975 at every level of command. Officers failed to supervise the chemoprophylaxis regimen, and while most soldiers dutifully took their tablets, some did not. Both Plasmodium falciparum and Plasmodium vivax are endemic in East Timor, and the prevalence of malaria among the civilian population was much greater than usual in September 2000, due to many people fleeing from the violence into the jungle where there was greater exposure to mosquitoes. There were 64 cases of malaria among ADF personnel in East Timor. Since there was no evidence of resistance against doxycycline, the cause was either failure to take the tablets or their deterioration under tropical conditions. About two-thirds of cases were falciparum, the remainder being vivax. The falciparum cases were treated with a combination of quinine, mefloquine and doxycycline, while the vivax cases were treated with a combination of chloroquine and primaquine.[117][119]
Another 212 cases were reported from ADF personnel after they returned to Australia. All were falciparum cases except for two who developed vivax within two weeks of return. Primaquine resistance has been documented in Papua New Guinea but not in East Timor, but the terminal regimen was not as effective as hoped. In any case, it was the only drug capable of eliminating the malaria parasites from the liver, so cases were administered another course of chloroquine and primaquine. It was noted that compliance with the treatment was excellent among those who had already suffered an attack of malaria. Some 44 cases had a relapse, eleven had a second relapse, and two had a third.[117][119]
INTERFET's medical resources were stretched by the East Timorese civilian population, many of them children, who had broken bones or infected wounds from edged weapons. Some had fractures that had been improperly set. The available medical supplies were insufficient to cope with the demand, and the soldiers scrounged for medical supplies from abandoned clinics, the Dili General Hospital, and TNI stores.
Civil affairs
Over 72,000 civilians had returned to Dili by early October, mainly from the surrounding area, but increasingly from further afield. The Dili stadium became the focal point for the delivery of humanitarian aid. Techniques honed in
Postal
Some members of the 10th Force Support Battalion had prior active service in Rwanda and Bougainville, but the volume of mail received in East Timor came as a surprise. Delivered to Australian Field Post Office (AFPO) 5 in Dili by forklift on large metal RAAF L pallets, the volume of mail increased from 250 kilograms (550 lb) a day on October to 12 tonnes (13 short tons) per day in early November. As Christmas approached, families and friends of ADF personnel took advantage of the Australian government's offer of free mail delivery, and from mid-November the volume of mail increased to 37 tonnes (41 short tons) per day. Jervis Bay was employed to fetch the incoming mail from Darwin three times a week. Outgoing mail was dispatched to Australia seven days a week. As a result, the postal unit found themselves working from 14 to 16 hours a day.[125][126]
Coalition logistics
At its peak, INTERFET had 11,693 personnel from 23 countries. Of these 5,697 were from Australia,[127] making it the largest deployment of Australian forces overseas since the Vietnam War.[128] But, as Major Bronwyn Worswick, the legal officer at FLSG, noted, "our logistics system is set up to supply us. It's not set up to supply and sell basically to other countries".[129] When operations commenced, formal arrangements regarding logistical support were in place only with the United Kingdom and New Zealand. Contingents therefore arrived without a clear idea of what they would be called upon to pay for, creating the potential for fractures in the coalition over supplies and their cost recovery.[130]
While there was a requirement for INTERFET to account for all stores issued for later cost recovery, FLSG adopted a policy that rigid accounting was not required from New Zealand, as they were such close allies. The two nations shared a similar operational culture, in that immediate operational needs were considered paramount, and worrying about the details could be left for later. This culture was not shared by ASEAN nations, who wanted their logistical support provided on a commercial basis. Some contingents attempted to run a cash-based economy, paying for minor items at the point of acquisition. The South Korean force went so far as to seek financial compensation for the late delivery of rations. Australian fuel pumps did not have meters on them, so it was difficult to measure how much fuel was provided to contingents. Nor were there procedures in place for capturing the labour and materials required in servicing vehicles; these had to be developed in-theatre.[130]
In the Guidelines for Force Contributing Nations, contingents were asked to arrive in Australia self-sufficient for forty-two days. This proved to be little more than a vain hope. Some contingents, taking advantage of the speed at which the Australians had assembled the coalition, arrived with little or no logistical support, which they expected Australia to provide in its role as the lead nation.
End of mission
Indonesia recognised East Timor as an independent nation on 19 October 1999, and TNI forces withdrew on 31 October, leaving INTERFET in charge. Between 1 and 23 February 2000 it transferred responsibility for the administration of East Timor to the United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET).[133] On 20 February 2000, the 10th Force Support Battalion handed over responsibility for support of the forces in East Timor, along with its few remaining personnel there, to the 9th Force Support Battalion.[35] Australian logistical support was still required until UNTAET could stand on its own feet, and logistical handover to UNTAET was not completed until 1 July 2000.[134]
Retrospect
For Australia, the East Timor intervention revealed serious deficiencies in its logistical capabilities. There was no joint logistics doctrine, and the Army, RAN and RAAF had not practised joint logistical operations in support of joint task forces. Important equipment such as ship-to-shore refuelling capability was lacking, and there were insufficient forklifts and trailers to move shipping containers. There were skills shortages in critical areas such as air and water terminal operations, petroleum distribution, supply clerks, medical specialists and cooks. The notion that the ADF could shop for supplies like any other consumer was disproved, warehouses being unable to cope with sudden demands for personal items, stores, equipment and spare parts. US military aircraft had to fly in helmets and flak jackets from US sources. The logistical computer systems were designed to track cargo movements from one base to another in Australia, not to deployed forces. Personnel systems were not automated, and there were four cases of underage personnel being sent to East Timor. It took 54 days before Support Command was ready to assume responsibility for East Timor.[135][136]
Wilkinson described the support of operations in East Timor as a logistics environment that was about "as easy as it gets".[137] The theatre of operations was close to Australia; the area involved and the forces deployed were relatively small; there was no high-level combat; and logistical units could perform their duties unhampered by enemy action.[137] The situation stabilised once INTERFET boots were on the ground, and the overburdened logistical system was not overwhelmed by urgent requests for high volumes of ammunition and other combat supplies.[25] Whether by good luck or good management, Cosgrove had the resources he needed to carry out his mission without severe limitations resulting from inadequate logistics. While the troops had good reason to be critical of a lack of spare parts, medical supplies and amenities, "on balance," historian Bob Breen concluded, "Australians are harder on their logistical system than most nationalities and receive support that many other nationalities could only dream about."[138]
Notes
- ^ "Population Settlements in East Timor and Indonesia". University of Canberra. Retrieved 2 February 2020.
- ^ Fowler 2016, pp. 4–6.
- ^ Frei 1996, pp. 282–287.
- ^ Frei 1996, pp. 298–299.
- ^ Pietsch 2009, pp. 79–81.
- ^ Farram 2004, pp. 186–188.
- ^ Farram 2004, pp. 216–218.
- ^ Pietsch 2009, pp. 64–70.
- ^ Pietsch 2009, pp. 80–81.
- ^ Pietsch 2009, pp. 81–84.
- ^ Stevens 2007, p. 17.
- ^ Fowler 2016, pp. 12–14.
- ^ Fowler 2016, pp. 15–18.
- ^ a b Glynn 2001, p. 11.
- ^ Connery 2010, p. 47.
- ^ a b Breen 2008, p. 138.
- ^ "Texas Tragedy and East Timor". clintonwhitehouse4.archives.gov. 16 September 1999. Retrieved 25 October 2019.
- ^ a b Glynn 2001, p. 13.
- ^ Smith 2001, pp. 11–12.
- ^ Glynn 2001, pp. 2–3.
- ^ Barrie 2015, p. 84.
- ^ a b c Müller & Hickman 2002, p. 57.
- ^ "Average Draft by Containership Capacity". The Geography of Transport Systems. 11 November 2017. Retrieved 9 November 2019.
- ^ a b Stevens 2007, p. 28.
- ^ a b Smith 2001, p. 7.
- ^ Palazzo 2001, p. 349.
- ^ a b Beaumont 2016, p. 140.
- ^ Howard 2016, p. 19.
- ^ Horner 2010, p. 209.
- ^ Beaumont 2016, pp. 138–139.
- ^ a b c d Breen 2000, p. 123.
- ^ "Companion to East Timor – The meaning of Operation Spitfire". UNSW Canberra. Archived from the original on 15 October 2019. Retrieved 15 October 2019.
- ^ a b c Horner 2010, p. 223.
- ^ a b c d e f g Breen 2000, p. 124.
- ^ a b c d Downey & Grant 2000, p. 3.
- ^ "ADF: past operations in Timor-Leste (East Timor)". Nautilus Institute for Security and Sustainability. 19 December 2011. Retrieved 18 October 2019.
- ^ Evans 2015, p. 118.
- ^ a b c Stevens 2007, p. 20.
- ^ Crawford & Harper 2001, pp. 42–44.
- ^ Crawford & Harper 2001, pp. 44–46.
- ^ a b Crawford & Harper 2001, p. 54.
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