Imagery intelligence
Imagery intelligence (IMINT), pronounced as either as Im-Int or I-Mint, is an
As an intelligence gathering discipline, IMINT production depends heavily upon a robust
History
Origins
Although
In 1939,
The systematic collection and interpretation of the huge amounts of aerial reconnaissance intelligence data soon became imperative. Beginning in 1941,
During 1942 and 1943, the CIU gradually expanded and was involved in the planning stages of practically every operation of the war, and in every aspect of intelligence. In 1945, daily intake of material averaged 25,000 negatives and 60,000 prints. Thirty-six million prints were made during the war. By
American personnel had for some time formed an increasing part of the CIU and on 1 May 1944 this was finally recognized by changing the title of the unit to the Allied Central Interpretation Unit (ACIU).
Sidney Cotton's aerial photographs were far ahead of their time. Together with other members of his reconnaissance squadron, he pioneered the technique of high-altitude, high-speed photography that was instrumental in revealing the locations of many crucial military and intelligence targets. Cotton also worked on ideas such as a prototype specialist reconnaissance aircraft and further refinements of photographic equipment. At its peak, British reconnaissance flights yielded 50,000 images per day to interpret.
Of particular significance in the success of the work of Medmenham was the use of
It is claimed that Medmanham's greatest operational success was "
Post war spyplanes
Immediately after World War II, long range aerial reconnaissance was taken up by adapted jet bombers – such as the
Highly specialized and secretive strategic reconnaissance aircraft, or spy planes, such as the
There are claims that the US constructed a
Early use of satellites
Early photographic reconnaissance satellites used photographic film, which was exposed on-orbit and returned to earth for developing. These satellites remained in orbit for days, weeks, or months before ejecting their film-return vehicles, called "buckets." Between 1959 and 1984 the U.S. launched around 200 such satellites under the codenames
Between 1961 and 1994 the USSR launched perhaps 500
The U.S.
Aircraft
Low- and high-flying planes have been used all through the last century to gather intelligence about the enemy. U.S. high-flying reconnaissance planes include the
Satellite
Though the resolution of satellite photographs, which must be taken from distances of hundreds of kilometers, is usually poorer than photographs taken by air, satellites offer the possibility of coverage for much of the earth, including hostile territory, without exposing human pilots to the risk of being shot down.
There have been hundreds of
Using
we can get
where θ is the angular resolution, λ is the wavelength of light, and D is the diameter of the lens or mirror. Were the Hubble Space Telescope, with a 2.4 m telescope, designed for photographing Earth, it would be diffraction-limited to resolutions greater than 16 cm (6 inches) for green light ( nm) at its orbital altitude of 590 km. This means that it would be impossible to take photographs showing objects smaller than 16 cm with such a telescope at such an altitude. Modern U.S. IMINT satellites are believed to have around 10 cm resolution; contrary to references in popular culture, this is sufficient to detect any type of vehicle, but not to read the headlines of a newspaper.[13]
The primary purpose of most spy satellites is to monitor visible ground activity. While resolution and clarity of images has improved greatly over the years, this role has remained essentially the same. Some other uses of satellite imaging have been to produce detailed 3D maps for use in operations and missile guidance systems, and to monitor normally invisible information such as the growth levels of a country's crops or the heat given off by certain facilities. Some of the multi-spectral sensors, such as thermal measurement, are more electro-optical MASINT than true IMINT platforms.
To counter the threat posed by these "eyes in the sky," the United States, USSR/Russia, China and India have developed systems for destroying enemy spy satellites (either with the use of another 'killer satellite', or with some sort of Earth- or air-launched missile).
Since 1985, commercial vendors of
Analytical Methodology
The value of IMINT reports are determined on a balance between the timeliness and robustness of the intelligence product. As such, the fidelity of intelligence that may be gleaned from imagery analysis is a traditionally perceived by intelligence professionals as a function of the amount of time an imagery analyst (IA) has to exploit a given image or set of imagery. As such, the United States Army field manual breaks IMINT analysis into three distinct phases, based upon the amount of time expended in exploiting any given image.[14]
First phase
First phase imagery analysis is deemed "time-dominant." This means that given imagery must be rapidly exploited in order to satisfy an immediate requirement for imagery-sourced intelligence from which a leader may make an educated political and/or military decision. Due to the need to produce near-real time intelligence assessments based upon collected imagery, first phase imagery analysis is rarely compared to collateral intelligence.
Second phase
Second phase imagery analysis is centered on the further exploitation of recently collected imagery to support short- to mid-term decision-making. Like first phase imagery analysis, second phase imagery analysis is generally catalyzed by a local commander's Priority Intelligence Requirements, at least in the context of a military operational setting. Whereas first phase imagery analysis may depend on the exploitation of a relatively small repository of imagery, or even a single image, second phase imagery analysis generally mandates a review of a chronological set of imagery over time, so as to establish a temporal understanding of objects and/or activities of interest.
Third phase
Third phase imagery analysis is generally conducted in order to satisfy strategic intelligence questions or to otherwise explore existing data in the search of "discovery intelligence." Third phase imagery analysis hinges on the use of a large repository of historical imagery as well as access to a variety of sources of information. Third phase imagery analysis incorporates supporting information and intelligence from other
See also
- Arthur C. Lundahl
- Canadian Forces Joint Imagery Centre (Canadian GEOINT organization)
- Defence Imagery and Geospatial Organisation(DIGO) (Australian GEOINT organization)
- Defence Intelligence Fusion Centre (British GEOINT organization)
- Dino A. Brugioni
- First images of Earth from space
- GIS in GEOINT
- Geospatial intelligence (GEOINT)
- National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (American GEOINT organization)
- RAF Intelligence: Royal Air Force Intelligence Branch
- Remote Sensing
Notes
- ^ Headquarters, Department of the Army. (2004). Intelligence (FM 2-0)|(https://www.globalsecurity.org/intell/library/policy/army/fm/2-0/chap7.htm).
- S2CID 110420739.
- ^ "Photography Before Edgerton".
- ISBN 9781408702802.
- ISBN 0-7011-1334-0.
- ISBN 9781408702802.
- ^ "Unlocking Buckinghamshire's Past". Archived from the original on 2012-08-16. Retrieved 2014-01-11.
- ^ a b c Allied Central Interpretation Unit (ACIU) Archived March 12, 2013, at the Wayback Machine
- YouTube
- ^ a b "Operation Crossbow", BBC2, broadcast 15 May 2011
- ^ "The GAMBIT Story, Appendix A, page 154, initial Sept. 2011 release". National Reconnaissance Office. June 1991. Archived from the original on 2012-09-15. Retrieved 2013-07-26.
- ^ "Discoverer 14 - NSSDC ID: 1960-010A". NASA.
- ^ "Imint resolution comparison". Federation of American Scientists.
- ^ https://fas.org/irp/doddir/army/fm2-0.pdf[bare URL PDF]
Further reading
- Beitler, Stephen S. "Imagery Intelligence." in The Military Intelligence Community (Routledge, 2019) pp. 71–86.
- Caddell Jr, Joseph W. "Corona over Cuba: The Missile Crisis and the Early Limitations of Satellite Imagery Intelligence." Intelligence and National Security 31.3 (2016): 416-438. online
- Davies, Philip H. J. "Imagery in the UK: Britain's troubled imagery intelligence architecture." Review of International Studies 35.4 (2009): 957-969. online
- Diamond, John M. "Re-examining problems and prospects in US imagery intelligence." International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence 14.1 (2001): 1-24.
- Dupré, Robert E. "Guide to imagery intelligence." Intelligencer: Journal Of US Intelligence Studies 18.2 (2011): 61-64. online
- Firschein, Oscar, and Thomas M. Strat, eds. RADIUS: Image understanding for imagery intelligence (Morgan Kaufmann, 1997).
- Jenkins, Peter. Covert Imagery, ISBN 978 09535378 53, Intel Publishing UK.
- McAuley, Cheryl D. Strategic implications of imagery intelligence (Army War College, 2005) online.
- Quiñones, Maya. William Gould, and Carlos D. Rodríguez-Pedraza. United States Department of Agriculture Geospatial Data Availability for Haiti (February 2007) (Study on availability of commercial imagery in 2007 which summarizes collection systems and data products.)
- Ułanowicz, Leszek, and Ryszard Sabak. "Unmanned aerial vehicles supporting imagery intelligence using the structured light technology." Archives of Transport 58 (2021). online