Informal fallacy
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Informal fallacies are a type of incorrect
Traditionally, a great number of informal fallacies have been identified, including the
The traditional approach to fallacies has received a lot of criticism in contemporary philosophy. This criticism is often based on the argument that the alleged fallacies are not fallacious at all, or at least not in all cases. To overcome this problem, alternative approaches for conceiving arguments and fallacies have been proposed. These include the dialogical approach, which conceives arguments as moves in a dialogue-game aimed at rationally persuading the other person. This game is governed by various rules. Fallacies are defined as violations of the dialogue rules impeding the progress of the dialogue. The epistemic approach constitutes another framework. Its core idea is that arguments play an epistemic role: they aim to expand our knowledge by providing a bridge from already justified beliefs to not yet justified beliefs. Fallacies are arguments that fall short of this goal by breaking a rule of epistemic justification. In the Bayesian approach, the epistemic norms are given by the laws of probability, which our degrees of belief should track.
The study of fallacies aims at providing an account for evaluating and criticizing arguments. This involves both a descriptive account of what constitutes an argument and a normative account of which arguments are good or bad.[1][2] In philosophy, fallacies are usually seen as a form of bad argument and are discussed as such in this article. Another conception, more common in non-scholarly discourse, sees fallacies not as arguments but rather as false yet popular beliefs.[3]
Traditional account
Informal fallacies are a form of incorrect
The traditional approach tries to account for these fallacies using the concepts and theses discussed in this section.Arguments and fallacies
Only arguments can constitute a fallacy. Various erroneous expressions do not count as fallacies because no argument is made, e.g. because no reasons are cited or no assertion is made.[5] The core idea of arguments is that the premises support the conclusion or that the conclusion follows from the premises.[5][3][1] Deductively valid arguments offer the strongest form of support: for them, it is impossible for the conclusion to be false if all the premises are true. The premises in non-deductive arguments offer a certain degree of support for their conclusion but they are defeasible:[5][12] it is possible for all the premises to be true and the conclusion to be false. Defeasible arguments may still be rationally compelling despite being fallible, so they do not automatically constitute fallacies.[13] The premises of an argument may be seen as the foundation on which the conclusion is built. According to this analogy, two things can go wrong and turn an argument into a fallacy. It could be that the foundation is shaky. But even a solid foundation is not helpful if it does not provide support for the conclusion in question.[5]
Traditionally, fallacies have been defined by three necessary conditions: "a fallacy (i) is an argument, (ii) that is invalid, and (iii) appears to be valid."[3] This definition covers only formal fallacy since it has deductive invalidity as a necessary condition. But it can easily be modified to include informal fallacy by replacing this condition with a more general term, like logical weakness or incorrect reasoning.[3] The last clause includes a psychological element in referring to how the argument appears to the arguer. This clause is used to distinguish genuine fallacies from mere mistakes in reasoning, for example, due to carelessness.[3] The idea is that fallacies have an alluring element that goes beyond mere carelessness by seducing us into committing the mistake, thereby explaining why they are committed in the first place. Some philosophers reject this appeal to appearances because the reference to psychology would complicate the investigation in various ways.[1][3] One issue is that appearances are different for different people. This problem also involves social sciences in order to determine which reference group of people to consult for defining fallacies.[1][3] It has been suggested that, at its core, the study of fallacies is about normative aspects of arguments and not about their persuasive force, which is studied by empirical psychology instead.[14][3]
Form, content, and context
The source of the error in incorrect arguments can lie in the argument's form, content, or context.[7] The form or structure of an argument is also called "rule of inference". The most well-known rule of inference is modus ponens, which states that given a premise of the form "If p then q" and another in the form "p", then the conclusion is "q". Rules of inferences are formal because it depends only on the structure or the syntax of the premises and not on their content. So an argument based on modus ponens is valid no matter what propositional contents are used for "p" and "q".[15]
The content of an argument is found on the level of its propositions: it is what is expressed in them. The source of many informal fallacies is found in a false premise. For example, a false dilemma is a fallacy based on a false disjunctive claim that oversimplifies reality by excluding viable alternatives.[12][4][16]
The context of an argument refers to the situation in which it is used.
Natural language and contrast to formal fallacies
Formal fallacies are
The distinction between formal and informal fallacies is opposed by deductivists, who hold that deductive invalidity is the reason for all fallacies.[18] One way to explain that some fallacies do not seem to be deductively invalid is to hold that they contain various hidden assumptions, as is common for natural language arguments. The idea is that apparent informal fallacies can be turned into formal fallacies by making all these assumptions explicit and thereby revealing the deductive invalidity. The claim that this is possible for all fallacies is not generally accepted.[18][3] One requirement for a formal treatment is translating the arguments in question into the language of formal logic, a process known as "formalization".[19] Often many of the subtleties of natural language have to be ignored in this process. Some bodies of knowledge can be formalized without much residue but others resist formalization. This is also true for many informal fallacies.[19]
Other approaches
The traditional approach to fallacies has received a lot of criticism in contemporary philosophy.[3][9] This criticism is often based on the argument that some of the alleged fallacies are not fallacious at all, or at least not in all cases.[20][1] Various alternative approaches to how arguments and fallacies are to be conceived have been proposed. These alternatives often aim to show that, given their perspective, it is possible to evaluate if an alleged fallacy is actually fallacious in a given case.[3][1] The dialogical approach uses a game-theoretic framework to define arguments and sees fallacies as violations of the rules of the game. According to the epistemic approach, it is the goal of arguments to expand our knowledge by providing a bridge from already justified beliefs to not yet justified beliefs. Fallacies are arguments that fall short of this goal by breaking a rule of epistemic justification. It has been suggested that there may not be one single framework for evaluating all fallacies but only a manifold of ideals according to which a given argument may be good or bad.[3]
Dialogical
The dialogical approach sees arguments not simply as a series of premises together with a conclusion but as a speech act within a dialogue that aims to rationally persuade the other person of one's own position.
From this perspective, fallacies are defined as violations of the dialogue rules.
Epistemic
The core idea behind the epistemic approach is that arguments play an epistemic role: they aim to expand our knowledge by providing a bridge from already justified beliefs to not yet justified beliefs.[9][2] Fallacies are arguments that fall short of this goal by breaking a rule of epistemic justification.[3] This explains, for example, why arguments that are accidentally valid are still somehow flawed: because the arguer himself lacks a good reason to believe the conclusion.[9]
The fallacy of begging the question, on this perspective, is a fallacy because it fails to expand our knowledge by providing independent justification for its conclusion. Instead, the conclusion is already assumed in one of its premises.[2][12] A purely logical approach, on the other hand, fails to explain the fallacious nature of begging the question since the argument is deductively valid.[3]
The
This perspective is well suited for explaining why some slippery slope arguments constitute fallacies but others not. Slippery slope arguments argue against a certain proposal based on the fact that this proposal would bring with it a causal chain of events eventually leading to a bad outcome.[4][9] But even if every step in this chain is relatively probable, probabilistic calculus may still reveal that the likelihood of all steps occurring together is quite small.[22][9] In this case, the argument would constitute a fallacy. But slippery slope arguments are rationally justified if the associated probabilities are sufficiently high.[22]
Types
A
Fallacies of ambiguity
The source of the error for fallacies of ambiguity lies in the usage of language. This is due to the fact that many terms in natural language have ambiguous or vague meanings.[23][12][8][1] Ambiguous terms have several meanings while vague terms have an unclear meaning. Fallacies of ambiguity often result in merely verbal disputes: the arguing parties have different topics in mind and thereby talk past each other without being aware of this.[23][12] One way to avoid or solve these fallacies is to clarify language, e.g. by committing to definitions and by introducing new distinctions.[24] Such reformulations may include a condensation of the original argument in order to make it easier to spot the erroneous step.[12]
Fallacies of ambiguity are perhaps best exemplified by the
- Feathers are light. ("light" as "not heavy")
- What is light cannot be dark. ("light" as "pale in color")[25]
- Therefore, feathers cannot be dark.
Equivocations are especially difficult to detect in cases where the two meanings are very closely related to each other.[12]
The
- "The police were told to stop drinking on campus after midnight.
- So, now they are able to respond to emergencies much better than before"[3]
On one interpretation, the police are not allowed to drink alcohol. On another, it is now the job of the police to stop other people from drinking. The argument seems plausible on the former reading but fallacious on the latter reading.[3]
The fallacies of division and composition are due to ambiguity of the term "all" and similar expressions.[12][8][3] This term has both a collective and a distributive meaning. For example, the sentence "all the citizens are strong enough to resist a tyrant" may mean either that all together are strong enough (collective) or that each one individually is strong enough (distributive).[12] The fallacy of division is committed if one infers from the sentence in the collective sense that one specific individual is strong enough.[12][24] The fallacy of composition is committed if one infers from the fact that each member of a group has a property that the group as a whole has this property.[24] For example, "[e]very member of the investigative team was an excellent researcher", therefore "[i]t was an excellent investigative team".[3] Any form of fallaciously transferring a property from the whole to its parts or the other way round belongs to the category of fallacies of division and composition, even when linguistic ambiguity is not the cause.
Fallacies of presumption
Fallacies of presumption involve a false or unjustified premise but are often valid otherwise.
A false dilemma is a fallacy of presumption based on a false disjunctive claim that oversimplifies reality by excluding viable alternatives.[16][12] For example, a false dilemma is committed when it is claimed that "Stacey spoke out against capitalism, therefore she must be a communist". One of the options excluded is that Stacey may be neither communist nor capitalist. Our liability to commit false dilemmas may be due to the tendency to simplify reality by ordering it through either-or-statements.[16]
For fallacies of generalization, the false premise is due to an erroneous generalization. In the case of the fallacy of
Begging the question is a form of circular reasoning in which the conclusion is already assumed in the premises.[16][12][8][3][1] Because of this, the premises are unable to provide independent support for the conclusion. For example, the statement "Green is the best color because it is the greenest of all colors", offers no independent reason besides the initial assumption for its conclusion. Detecting this fallacy can be difficult when a complex argument with many sub-arguments is involved, resulting in a large circle.[12]
Fallacies of relevance
Fallacies of relevance involve premises that are not relevant to the conclusion despite appearances otherwise.[12][8] They may succeed in persuading the audience nonetheless due to being emotionally loaded (for example: by playing on prejudice, pity or fear).[26]
Etymological fallacies may confuse older or "original" meanings of words with current semantic usage.
See also
References
- ^ a b c d e f g h i j k l m n o p q r s t u v w x y z aa ab Walton, Douglas N. (1987). "1. A new model of argument". Informal Fallacies: Towards a Theory of Argument Criticisms. John Benjamins.
- ^ S2CID 126269789.
- ^ a b c d e f g h i j k l m n o p q r s t u v w x y z aa ab ac ad ae af ag ah Hansen, Hans (2020). "Fallacies". The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University. Retrieved 18 March 2021.
- ^ a b c d e f g h i Dowden, Bradley. "Fallacies". Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Retrieved 19 March 2021.
- ^ a b c d e f Engel, S. Morris (1982). "1. Nature and scope of logic". With Good Reason an Introduction to Informal Fallacies.
- ^ a b Vleet, Van Jacob E. (2010). "Introduction". Informal Logical Fallacies: A Brief Guide. Upa.
- ^ a b c "The Fallacy Files: Informal Logical Fallacy". www.fallacyfiles.org. Retrieved 20 March 2021.
- ^ a b c d e f g h i j k Stump, David J. "Fallacy, Logical". www.encyclopedia.com. Retrieved 20 March 2021.
- ^ .
- ^ a b Vleet, Van Jacob E. (2010). Informal Logical Fallacies: A Brief Guide. Upa.
- ^ a b Engel, S. Morris (1982). With Good Reason an Introduction to Informal Fallacies.
- ^ a b c d e f g h i j k l m n o p q r s Mackie, J. L. (1967). "Fallacies". www.encyclopedia.com. Retrieved 19 March 2021.
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- ^ a b c Walton, Douglas N. (1987). "3. Logic of propositions". Informal Fallacies: Towards a Theory of Argument Criticisms. John Benjamins.
- ^ Lopez, Shane J. (2009). "modus ponens". The Encyclopedia of Positive Psychology. Wiley-Blackwell.
- ^ a b c d e f g Engel, S. Morris (1982). "4. Fallacies of presumption". With Good Reason an Introduction to Informal Fallacies.
- ^ Honderich, Ted (2005). "logic, informal". The Oxford Companion to Philosophy. Oxford University Press.
- ^ S2CID 124311289.
- ^ ISBN 978-3-11-081608-2.
- ^ a b c d Groarke, Leo (2020). "Informal Logic: 4. Assessing Arguments". The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University. Retrieved 20 March 2021.
- ^ ISSN 1069-7977.
- ^ S2CID 31415386.
- ^ a b Engel, S. Morris (1982). "2. The medium of language". With Good Reason an Introduction to Informal Fallacies.
- ^ a b c d e Engel, S. Morris (1982). "3. Fallacies of ambiguity". With Good Reason an Introduction to Informal Fallacies.
- ^ "light_2 adjective - Definition, pictures, pronunciation and usage notes | Oxford Advanced Learner's Dictionary at". Oxfordlearnersdictionaries.com. Retrieved 2022-05-06.
- ^ a b c Engel, S. Morris (1982). "5. Fallacies of relevance". With Good Reason an Introduction to Informal Fallacies.
- Oxford Living Dictionaries, Oxford University Press, 2017, archived from the originalon 9 March 2017, retrieved 21 July 2017,
Origin - 1990s: from the way in which counter-accusations may take the form of questions introduced by 'What about —?'. ... Also called whataboutery
- ^ Zimmer, Ben (9 June 2017). "The Roots of the 'What About?' Ploy". The Wall Street Journal. Retrieved 22 July 2017.
"Whataboutism" is another name for the logical fallacy of "tu quoque" (Latin for "you also"), in which an accusation is met with a counter-accusation, pivoting away from the original criticism. The strategy has been a hallmark of Soviet and post-Soviet propaganda, and some commentators have accused President Donald Trump of mimicking Mr. Putin's use of the technique.
- Cambridge Dictionary
- ^ Kurtzleben, Danielle (17 March 2017). "Trump Embraces One Of Russia's Favorite Propaganda Tactics — Whataboutism". NPR. Retrieved 20 May 2017.
This particular brand of changing the subject is called 'whataboutism' – a simple rhetorical tactic heavily used by the Soviet Union and, later, Russia.
- ISBN 978-1784530648
- ^ Trudolyubov, Maxim (15 January 2017), "How Putin succeeded in undermining our institutions", Newsweek, retrieved 3 July 2017,
The way the Kremlin has always reacted to reports about corruption or arbitrary police rule, or the state of Russia's penal institutions, is by generating similar reports about the West. Whatever the other party says the answer is always the same: 'Look who's talking.' This age-old technique, dubbed 'whataboutism', is in essence an appeal to hypocrisy; its only purpose is to discredit the opponent, not to refute the original argument.
- ^ a b Bartha, Paul (2019). "Analogy and Analogical Reasoning". The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University. Retrieved 21 January 2021.
- ISBN 978-0-470-99721-5.
- ^ Sandkühler, Hans Jörg (2010). "Analogie". Enzyklopädie Philosophie. Meiner. Archived from the original on 2021-03-11. Retrieved 2021-03-22.
- ISBN 978-1-133-71164-3.