Insects in ethics
Insects and human ethical obligations towards them have been discussed by a number of writers and figures throughout history, many of whom, arguing from a variety of different perspectives, have contended that there exists a moral obligation towards not harming or killing insects. According to generally accepted definitions in animal welfare and agricultural ethics, however, it is argued that individual insects do not have a "right to life".
Religious perspectives
Jainism
Buddhism
According to Buddhist principles, insects, are considered as
Taoism
Judaism
The Sefer Hasidim, a medieval Hebrew work, instructs its followers to never inflict pain on animals, including insects, and to not kill wasps or flies.[6]
Christianity
Soame Jenyns, an English MP and writer, argued that: "We are unable to give life, and therefore ought not wantonly to take it away from the meanest insect, without sufficient reason; they all receive it from the same benevolent hand as ourselves, and have therefore an equal right to enjoy it."[7] William Ellery Channing stated in a letter that he would never kill an insect and asserted that insects have been given the same right to life as humans by God; he also argued that killing them would spoil the work of God's creation.[8]
Insects and their Habitations: A Book for Children, published by the
Historical perspectives
The 11th-century Arab poet and philosopher Al-Maʿarri described the compassion of releasing a flea from his hand as being kinder that giving money to a human in need. He asserted that both the flea and human take precautions against death and have a passion to continue living.[10]
The early
Animal rights and welfare
Peter Singer argues that a lack of knowledge around the capacity for insects to have subjective experiences means that "insect rights" is not yet something that should be campaigned for.[13]
The entomologist Jeffrey A. Lockwood argues that:
Considerable empirical evidence supports the assertion that insects feel pain and are conscious of their sensations. In so far as their pain matters to them, they have an interest in not being pained and their lives are worsened by pain. Furthermore, as conscious beings, insects have future (even if immediate) plans with regard to their own lives, and the death of insects frustrates these plans. In that sentience appears to be an ethically sound, scientifically viable basis for granting moral status and in consideration of previous arguments which establish a reasonable expectation of consciousness and pain in insects, I propose the following, minimum ethic: We ought to refrain from actions which may be reasonably expected to kill or cause nontrivial pain in insects when avoiding these actions has no, or only trivial, costs to our own welfare.[14]
An ethical analysis around the issue of killing harmful animals (other than for meat production or product testing) concluded that it is allowable under the following conditions:
- they pose innocent threats to human life;
- they serve as innocent shields to threats to human life;
- we and the animals are in a "lifeboat" type of situation in which all cannot survive.
In such a situation, a prima facie right to life of an animal is overridden. In general, insects are not postulated to have such rights anyway, and moreover, agricultural ethics concerns itself with the morality of killing harmful mammals (predators, herbivores) or disease vectors (rats). "Insect killing" is strictly an ecological concern due to the use of potentially harmful insecticides, and the event of killing a single insect is quantitatively neglectable.[15]
Cultural depictions
It has been argued that
In the poem "On Cruelty", John Clare refers to rescuing flies from the webs of spiders: "E'en 'plaining flies to thee have spoke, / Poor trifles as they be; / And oft the spider's web thou'st broke, / To set the captive free."[16]
The idiom "wouldn't hurt a fly" is used to refer to someone who is gentle and who would not do anything to cause harm or injury.[17]
See also
References
- ^ ISBN 978-0-19-280457-0.
- ISBN 0-203-39827-0.
- ISSN 1747-9681.
- ISBN 978-1-4008-4805-8.
- ^ ISBN 978-0-900001-22-2.
- ISSN 0748-0814.
- ^ Jenyns, Soame (1793). Cole, Charles Nalson (ed.). The Works of Soam Jenyns. Vol. 3 (2nd ed.). London: T. Cadell. p. 190.
- ^ Unti, Bernard (2002-01-01). "The Quality of Mercy: Organized Animal Protection in the United States 1866-1930". Animal Welfare Collection: 34.
- ^ OCLC 437055953.
- ^ Nicholson, Reynold Alleyne (1921). Studies in Islamic Poetry. Cambridge: University Press. p. 202.
- ^ Renier, Hannah (March 2012). "An Early Vegan: Lewis Gompertz". London Historians. Retrieved 2020-04-22.
- ^ Gompertz, Lewis (1992). Moral Inquiries on the Situation of Man and of Brutes. Fontwell: Centaur Press. p. 110.
- ^ Singer, Peter (2016-05-12). "Are Insects Conscious?". Project Syndicate. Retrieved 2021-03-22.
- .
- ^ Pluhar EB. (1988). "When is it Morally Acceptable to Kill Animals?" Journal of Agricultural Ethics, Volume 1, pp. 211-224. Retrieved 1 August 2021.
- ^ Clare, John (1820). Poems Descriptive of Rural Life and Scenery. London: Taylor & Hessey. p. 112.
- ^ "wouldn't hurt a fly". Cambridge Dictionary. Retrieved 2021-03-23.
Further reading
- Lockwood, Jeffrey A. (1987). "The Moral Standing of Insects and the Ethics of Extinction". The Florida Entomologist. 70 (1): 70–89. ISSN 0015-4040.
- Monsó, Susana; Osuna-Mascaró, Antonio (2020-01-01). "Problems with basing insect ethics on individuals' welfare". Animal Sentience. 5 (29). ISSN 2377-7478.
- Villamor, Alejandro (2021). "The Suffering of Invertebrates: An Approach from Animal Ethics" (PDF). Tópicos: Revista de Filosofía. 61: 403–420.