Iraqi–Kurdish conflict

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Iraqi–Kurdish conflict (1919-present)

Kurdish refugees in camps along the Turkey-Iraq border, 1991
Date1919-present
(104 years, 11 months, 3 weeks and 4 days)
Location
Iraq
Status

Ongoing

Belligerents

Kingdom of Kurdistan (1922–1924)

KDP
PUK
ICP
INC
Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq
Supported by:
 Israel (1961–1970)
 Iran (before 1988)
 Syria (1980–1988)

 Iraqi Kurdistan
Enforcing No-Fly Zone per UNSC Resolution 688:

Kurdistan Regional Government
(2005-present)

Iraq Mandatory Iraq
Supported by:
 United Kingdom (1922–1924)

Iraq Kingdom of Iraq

Iraqi Republic

Iraq Ba'athist Iraq

Republic of Iraq
(2005-present)
Commanders and leaders

Mahmud Barzanji

Ahmed Barzani

Mustafa Barzani
Idris Barzani
Masoud Barzani
Babakir Zebari
Mahmoud Ezidi †
Jalal Talabani

Ibrahim Ahmad

Ali Askari †
Nawshirwan Mustafa
Kosrat Rasul Ali
Mama Risha †
Uthman Abd-Asis
Ahmed Chalabi
Aziz Muhammad
Iran Mohsen Rezaee
Iran Ali Sayad Shirazi
Abdul Aziz al-Hakim

United States John Shalikashvili

Iraq Faisal I of Iraq

Faisal II of Iraq

Abd al-Karim Qasim Executed

Iraq Abdul Salam Arif Executed
Iraq Abdul Rahman Arif
Iraq Tahir Yahya Executed
Iraq Ahmed Hassan al-Bakr †
Iraq Saddam Hussein Executed
Iraq Ali Hassan al-Majid Executed
Iraq Taha Yassin Ramadan Executed
Iraq Izzat Ibrahim al-Douri
Iraq Tariq Aziz
Iraq Saddam Kamel
Iraq Qusay Hussein †

Iraq Uday Hussein †
Strength

KDP:
15,000–20,000 (1962)[1][2]
6,000 (1970)[3]
50,000-60,000 (1974)[4]
KDP & PUK:
5,000 (1980)[5]
100,000 (1991)[6]

 Iraqi Kurdistan 70,000 (2003)[7]

Iraq Iraqi Armed Forces
48,000 (1969)[8]
90,000 (1974)[8]
180,000 (1978)[9]
300,000 (1980)[10]
1,000,000 (1988)[10]
382,500 (1992)[11]

424,000 (2002)[12]
Casualties and losses
163,800–345,100 killed[a]
Millions of Kurds displaced and turned refugees

The Iraqi–Kurdish conflict consists of a series of wars, rebellions and disputes by the

President of the United States expressing concerns about a possible collapse of the Kurdistan Region following the suspension of oil exports, and calling for the United States
to intervene.

The first chapter of the Iraqi–Kurdish dispute followed the end of World War I and the arrival of British forces. Mahmud Barzanji began secession attempts in 1919 and in 1922 proclaimed the short-lived Kingdom of Kurdistan. Though Mahmud's insurrections were defeated, another Kurdish sheikh, Ahmed Barzani, began to actively oppose the central rule of the Mandatory Iraq during the 1920s. The first of the major Barzani revolts took place in 1931, after Barzani, one of the most prominent Kurdish leaders in Northern Iraq, succeeded in defeating a number of other Kurdish tribes.[15] He ultimately failed and took refuge in Turkey. The next serious Kurdish secession attempt was made by Ahmed Barzani's younger brother Mustafa Barzani in 1943, but that revolt failed as well, resulting in the exiling of Mustafa to Iran, where he participated in an attempt to form the Kurdish Republic of Mahabad.

In 1958, Mustafa Barzani and his fighters returned to Iraq from exile, and an attempt was made to negotiate Kurdish autonomy in the north with the new Iraqi administration of Gen. Qasim. The negotiations ultimately failed and the First Iraqi–Kurdish War erupted on 11 September 1961,[14] lasting until 1970 and inflicting 75,000–105,000 casualties. Despite the attempts to resolve the conflict by providing Kurds with a recognized autonomy in north Iraq (Iraqi Kurdistan), the negotiations failed in 1974, resulting in resumed hostilities known as the Second Iraqi–Kurdish War, which resulted in the collapse of the Kurdish militias and the reconquest of northern Iraq by Iraqi government troops. As a result, Mustafa Barzani and most of the KDP leadership fled to Iran, while PUK gained power in the vacuum, leading an insurgency campaign against the central Iraqi government. Since 1976 PUK and KDP relations quickly deteriorated, reaching the climax in April 1978, when PUK troops suffered a major defeat by KDP, which had the support of Iranian and Iraqi air forces. During this period, the Ba'athist authorities took the opportunity to perform large-scale displacement and colonization projects in North Iraq, aiming to shift demographics and thus destabilize Kurdish power bases.

The

war in Iraq (2014-2017) and the failed Kurdish independence referendum in 2017, and the ensuing conflict between the central government of Iraq and the KRG, Iraq has taken steps to weaken the Kurdistan Region and expand its own authority, in order to shift the political dynamics of the country towards a centralised political system
similar to the one it had pre-2003.

Early phase

Mahmud Barzanji (1919–1924)

British Mandate in Iraq. Following his first insurrection in May 1919, Sheykh Mahmud was imprisoned and eventually exiled to India for a one-year period. When he returned he was once again appointed a governor, but shortly afterwards revolted again and declared himself the ruler of the Kingdom of Kurdistan. The Kingdom of Kurdistan lasted from September 1922 – 1924.[16] With British forces greatly exceeding his in ammunition and training, Barzanji was finally subdued and the region reverted to central British Iraqi rule in 1924. Sheykh Mahmud retreated into the mountains, and eventually reached terms with the independent Kingdom of Iraq
in 1932, over his return from the underground. Shaykh Mahmud revolts are considered the first chapter of the modern Iraqi–Kurdish conflict.

1931 Kurdish revolt

Southern Kurdistan, succeeded in unifying a number of other Kurdish tribes.[15] The Barzan
forces were eventually overpowered by the Iraqi Army with British support, forcing the leaders of Barzan to go underground.

Ahmed Barzani was later forced to flee to Turkey, where he was held in detention and then sent to exile in the south of Iraq. Although initially a tribal dispute, the involvement of the Iraqi government inadvertently led to the growth of Shaykh Ahmad and Mulla Mustafa Barzani as prominent Kurdish leaders.[17]

1943 Kurdish revolt

Main article: 1943 Barzani revolt

The 1943–1945 Kurdish revolt in Iraq was a Kurdish nationalistic insurrection in the Kingdom of Iraq, during World War II. The revolt was led by Mustafa Barzani and later joined by his older brother Ahmed Barzani, the leader of the previous Kurdish revolt in the Kingdom of Iraq. The revolt, initiating in 1943, was eventually put down by Iraqi military assault in late 1945, combined with the defection of a number of Kurdish tribes. As a result, the Barzanis retreated with much of their forces into Iranian Kurdistan, joining the local Kurdish elements in establishing the Republic of Mahabad.

Negotiations over Kurdish autonomy (1958–1960)

After the

Abdul Karim Qasim in 1958, Mustafa Barzani was invited by new Iraqi President Qasim to return from exile, and was greeted with a "hero's welcome", as a former dissident to the now abolished Iraqi monarchy. As part of the deal arranged between Qasim and Barzani, Qasim promised to give the Kurds regional autonomy in return for Barzani's support for his policies. Meanwhile, during 1959–60, Barzani became the head of the Kurdistan Democratic Party
(KDP), which was granted legal status in 1960.

First Iraqi–Kurdish War (1961–1970)

Main article: First Iraqi–Kurdish War

First Iraqi–Kurdish War[18] or Barazani Rebellion was a major event of the Iraqi–Kurdish conflict, lasting from 1961 to 1970. The struggle was led by Mustafa Barzani in an attempt to establish an independent Kurdish state in north Iraq. Throughout the 1960s the uprising escalated into a long war, which failed to resolve despite internal power changes in Iraq. The war ended with a stalemate by 1970, resulting in between 75,000[19] to 105,000 casualties.[20] A series of Iraqi–Kurdish negotiations followed the war in an attempt to resolve the conflict.

Cease-fire (1970–1974)

Main article: Iraqi–Kurdish Autonomy Agreement of 1970

A

Autonomous Region, consisting of the three Kurdish governorates and other adjacent districts that have been determined by census to have a Kurdish majority. The plan also gave Kurds representation in government bodies, to be implemented in four years.[21]
For its time it was the most serious attempt to resolve the long-running conflict.

Second Iraqi–Kurdish War (1974–1975)

Main article: Second Iraqi–Kurdish War

Second Iraqi–Kurdish War was an offensive, led by Iraqi forces against rebel

KDP troops of Mustafa Barzani during 1974–75. The war came in the aftermath of the First Iraqi–Kurdish War (1961–70), as the 1970 peace plan
for Kurdish autonomy had failed to be implemented by 1974. Unlike the previous guerilla campaign, waged by Barzani, the 1974 war was an attempt for symmetric warfare against the Iraqi Army, which eventually led to the quick collapse of the Kurds, lacking advanced and heavy weaponry. The war ended with the exile of the Iraqi KDP and between 7,000 and 20,000 deaths on both sides.

Arabization of Iraqi Kurdistan and PUK insurgency (1976–1979)

Main articles:
Ba'athist Arabization campaigns in North Iraq

The PUK insurgency was a low-level militant campaign by the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) against the state of Iraq, after the defeat of the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) in the Second Iraqi–Kurdish War, which forced the KDP organization to declare a ceasefire and move into exile. Due to lack of foreign support, however, the guerrillas were only able to operate in the highest regions of Iraqi Kurdistan's mountains.[22] The PUK also faced the KDP, the KDPI, led by Abdul Rahman Ghassemlou, and Iran supporting the Iraqis at various occasions. The insurgency dimmed with the 1979 Kurdish rebellion in Iran.

Ba'athist Arabization campaigns in North Iraq were forced displacement and cultural Arabization of minorities (Kurds, Yezidis, Assyrians, Shabaks, Armenians, Turkmen, Mandeans), in line with settler colonialist policies, led by the Ba'athist government of Iraq from 1960s to early 2000s, in order to shift the demographics of North Iraq towards Arab domination. The Baath party under Saddam Hussein engaged into active expulsion of minorities from the mid-1970s onwards.[23]
The campaigns took place during the Iraqi–Kurdish conflict, being largely motivated by the Kurdish-Arab ethnic and political conflict.

The policies are sometimes referred as "internal colonialism",[24] described by Francis Kofi Abiew as a "Colonial 'Arabization'" program, including large-scale Kurdish deportations and forced Arab settlement in the region.[25]

Kurdish rebellion during the Iran–Iraq War (1980–1988)

Main article:
1983-1986 Kurdish rebellions in Iraq

Between 1980 and 1988, the conflict intensified as the

Al-Anfal Campaign, directed against Kurds by the government under the command of Ali Hassan al-Majid, head of the Northern Bureau of the Ba'ath Party.[28][29]

1991 Kurdish uprising

Main article:
1991 uprisings in Iraq

On 2 August 1990, Saddam launched a military invasion onto neighboring

Al-Anfal Campaign).[31]

Later phase

The "two-state solution" for the conflict refers to the permanent separation of Iraqi Kurdistan from Iraq, as opposed to retaining Iraqi unity with Iraqi Kurdistan as an autonomous region. It would change the long-term status which has existed in the country following the formation of the Kurdish autonomy in Northern Iraq in 1991.[32][33] Another term that exists is the "three-state solution", the name for a proposal to divide into three states for its three minorities: the Kurds, the Sunni Arabs and the Shias in the south.[34][35]

Kurdish Civil War (1994–1997)

Main article: Iraqi Kurdish Civil War

The

Kurdish factions in Iraqi Kurdistan in the mid-1990s, most notably the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan vs. the Kurdistan Democratic Party. Over the course of the conflict, Kurdish factions from Iran and Turkey, as well as Iranian, Iraqi
and Turkish forces were drawn into the fighting, with additional involvement from the American forces. Between 3,000 and 5,000 fighters and civilians were killed throughout more than 3 years of warfare.

2003 invasion of Iraq

Main article: Operation Viking Hammer

Arriving in July 2002 to Iraqi Kurdistan, the CIA seldom worked with the Peshmerga, despite their claim to be on a counterterrorism mission against Ansar al-Islam. To the disappointment of PUK Peshmerga intent on destroying Ansar al-Islam, the true mission of the CIA was to acquire intelligence about the Iraqi government and military. CIA-Peshmerga operations eventually went beyond the scope of intelligence gathering however, as PUK Peshmerga were used to destroy key rail lines and buildings prior to the U.S. attack in March 2003.[36] Following Turkey's decision to deny any official use of its territory, the Coalition was forced to modify the planned simultaneous attack from north and south.[37] Special Operations forces from the CIA and US Army managed to build and lead the Kurdish Peshmerga into an effective force and assault for the North.

On March 20, 2003, at approximately 02:30

UTC or about 90 minutes after the lapse of the 48-hour deadline, at 05:33 local time, explosions were heard in Baghdad, signaling the beginning of the U.S.-led invasion. Beginning on 21 March 2003, U.S. forces launched Tomahawk missiles at selected Ansar al-Islam positions throughout the Sargat Valley. In preparation for the ground assault, nicknamed Operation Viking Hammer, American Lt. Col. Tovo divided his forces into six mixed peshmerga-Special Forces units. The peshmerga in two of these teams refused to contribute to the assault for various reasons including having lost too many personnel in previous fighting.[36]
The Peshmerga who did fight were once again armed with AK-47s, rocket-propelled grenades, and other assorted weapons.

Despite their well-armed adversaries, during the operation only 24 Peshmerga were killed in the fighting, compared to an enemy body count of over 300.[36]

2011–2012 tensions

Further information:
Disputed territories of Northern Iraq
Kurdish flag in the Kurdistan Region

Tensions between Iraqi Kurdistan and the central Iraqi government mounted through 2011–2012 on the issues of power sharing, oil production and territorial control.[38] In April 2012, the president of Iraq's semi-autonomous northern Kurdish region demanded that officials agree to their demands or face consequences of a secession from Baghdad by September 2012.[39]

In September 2012, the Iraqi government ordered the

Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) claim jurisdiction.[40]

On 16 November 2012, a military clash between the Iraqi forces and the Peshmerga resulted in one person killed.[40] CNN reported that 2 people were killed (one of them an Iraqi soldier) and 10 wounded in clashes at the Tuz Khurmato town.[41]

On the night of November 19, it was reported that clashes between security forces of the central Iraqi government and the KRG forces in Tigrit left 12 Iraqi soldiers and one civilian dead, according to Doğan news agency.[42] The clash erupted when Iraqi soldiers attempted to enter northern Iraq; Peshmergas tried to prevent the Iraqi soldiers from entering the area upon Barzani's instructions.[42] There was no confirmation of the event.

On November 25, it was reported that Iraqi Kurdistan sent reinforcements to a disputed area, where its troops are "involved in a standoff with the Iraqi army", despite calls on both sides for dialogue to calm the situation.[43]

On December 11, Iraqi Kurdistan President Massoud Barzani, dressed in a military uniform, visited Kurdish-controlled areas of Kirkuk, a city long seen as a flashpoint for Arab-Kurdish tensions after the US military withdrawal in December 2011.[44] Following Massoud Barzani's visit of Kurdish troops stationed in the disputed area near Kirkuk, Iraqi Prime Minister Maliki's party – The State of Law – issued a statement that "the visit of the President of Kurdistan Region Massoud Barzani and his son wearing a military helmet to inspect the battlefronts in Kirkuk province is a 'declaration of war' on all Iraqis not only Maliki, and even on President Jalal Talabani".[45]

2014 regional conflict in Iraq

Main articles: Northern Iraq offensive (June 2014) and Northern Iraq offensive (August 2014)

In 2014, Iraqi army units fled large parts of northern Iraq in the face of attacks by the

Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant. Peshmerga forces took control of Kirkuk and other Kurdish-populated areas outside the official territory of the KRG. Officials in Baghdad were angered by the sale of tankers worth of oil transported through the Kirkuk–Ceyhan Oil Pipeline.[46]

In November 2016, Amnesty International reported that Kurdish authorities (namely Peshmerga and Asayish) had taken part in Kurdification (forced displacement of Arabs) in Kirkuk, including by bulldozing homes and banishing the residents.[47]

2017 Failed Iraqi Kurdistan independence referendum and ensuing clashes

Main articles:
2017 Iraqi Kurdistan independence referendum and 2017 Iraqi–Kurdish conflict
Pro-independence rally in Erbil in September 2017

Following the defeat of ISIS in the

2017 Iraqi Kurdistan independence referendum.[48]

Angered by the decision, the

KRG to initiate dialogue "in the framework of the constitution", ordered it to withdraw its forces from the disputed territories seized in 2014, and warned of a possible military retaliation.[48][49]

Following the reluctance of the KRG to heed the warnings, in October 2017, Iraq began to move its forces into areas seized by the KRG in 2014, and all the disputed areas outside the Kurdish Region, including Kirkuk. In a successful military operation that lasted less than two weeks, the Iraqi Armed Forces successfully reclaimed the area seized by the KRG.

Since then, Kurdish news reports have made claims of Arabization and forced demographic displacement of Kurds, most notably in Kirkuk, Tuz Khurmatu and Khanaqin.[50][51][52]

2023 ICC ruling on illegal Kurdistan Region oil exports

On 23 May 2014, Iraq issued an international arbitration case against

Kirkuk-Ceyhan Oil Pipeline. Iraq claimed Turkey had breached provisions of the Iraq-Turkey Pipeline Agreement (1973) by not heeding the instructions of the (Iraqi) Ministry of Oil. In February 2023, the International Court of Arbitration issued a verdict in favour of Iraq and on 25 March 2023, all oil exports from the Kurdistan Region were halted. Since then, the KRG has been effectively rendered unable to resume the export of oil to Turkey without the permission of the Iraqi Ministry of Oil, as outlined in the ITP Agreement.[53][54][55][56]

Concerns about possible Kurdistan Region collapse

In September 2023, Al-Monitor published an article claiming that the Prime Minister of the KRG,

President of the United States urging him to mediate between Erbil and Baghdad on issues threatening the Kurdistan Region, stating: "I write to you now at another critical juncture in our history, one that I fear we may have difficulty overcoming. …[W]e are bleeding economically and hemorrhaging politically. For the first time in my tenure as prime minister, I hold grave concerns that this dishonorable campaign against us may cause the collapse of … the very model of a Federal Iraq that the United States sponsored in 2003 and purported to stand by since."[57]

Yerevan Saeed, director of the 'Global Kurdish Initiative for Peace' at American University in Washington, expressed concerns in February 2024 about the future of the Kurdistan Region if problems persist. He stated that the combined effect of Baghdad's obstructive attitude towards the Kurdistan Region as well as intra-Kurdish problems will “inevitably result in the diminishment of the Kurdistan Region’s political, legal, and economic influence, and could potentially lead to its dissolution."[58]

Growing state centralism

In March 2024, after a series of court rulings by the Supreme Court of Iraq targeting the Kurdistan Region, Abdul Rahman Zibari a Kurdish judge resigned in protest, describing the Court's actions as "a move towards centralization and a blatant violation of the constitutional rights of the Kurdistan Region".[59] In his resignation statement, the judge hinted at concerns about Baghdad's departure from the principles of federalism.[60][61] The Court subsequently announced in a statement that the resignation of Zibari will not deter its work.

The KDP also announced that it will not participate in the upcoming parliamentary elections dated June 10, 2024, citing "unconstitutional rulings against the Kurdistan Region in the past four years" and labeling the actions of the Supreme Court as "a clear and dangerous violation of the constitution” and an attempt to “return Iraq to a centralized system."[62]

Casualties

[a].^ Iraqi–Kurdish conflict (combined casualty figure 163,800–345,100):

Mahmud Barzanji revolts (1919–1924) – unknown
Ahmed Barzani revolt (1931–1932) – hundreds killed
1943 Barzani revolt (1943–1945) – hundreds killed
First Iraqi–Kurdish War (1961–1970) – 12,000–105,000 killed.[63]
Second Iraqi–Kurdish War (1974–1975) – 9,000 killed.[64]
PUK insurgency (1976–1978) – 800 killed.
1980 Persecution of Feyli Kurds under Saddam Hussein - 25,000[65][66][clarification needed]
Iraqi Kurdish uprising (1982–1988)
– 50,000–198,000 killed.
1991 Uprising in As Sulaymaniyah
– 700–2,000 killed.
Iraqi Kurdish Civil War (1994–1997) – 3,000[67]–5,000 killed
2003 invasion of Iraq (Operation Viking Hammer) – 300 Islamists killed, at least 24 Peshmerga killed;[36] unknown number of Iraqi agents "eliminated".

See also

References

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Further reading

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